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HISTORY
OF THE
WAR IN FRANCE AND BELGIUM,
IN 1815.
CONTAINING MINUTE DETAILS
OF THE
BATTLES OF QUATRE-BRAS, LIGNY, WAVRE,
AND
WATERLOO.

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HISTORY

OF THE

WAR IN FRANCE AND BELGIUM

IN 1815.

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18th of
June.

NAPOLÉON, having taken the precaution of posting a cavalry corps of observation upon his right flank, no longer delayed sending the order to Ney for the commencement of the grand attack upon the centre and left wing of the Anglo-allied army. About the same time, Wellington, considering that some of the battalions along the right wing of his front line were too much exposed to the enemy's cannonade, which had from the commencement been principally directed against them, and which was now conducted with increased vigour, withdrew them more under shelter of the crest of the ridge. It might then be about half-past one, or perhaps a quarter before two o'clock. The simultaneous advance of d'Erlon's four divisions of infantry, amounting to nearly 18,000 men, was grand and imposing. As the heads of the columns cleared their own line of batteries ranged along the crest of the intervening ridge, and as the points on which they were directed for attack opened out to their view, loud and reiterated shouts arose from their ranks of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" which, as the masses began to descend the exterior slope of their position, were

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suddenly drowned in the roar produced by the discharge of seventy-four pieces of French cannon over their heads. The effects of the latter upon Picton's division, and upon Bylandt's Dutch-Belgian brigade, which, as before stated, was deployed upon the exterior slope of the Anglo-allied position, were severely felt. Light troops now issued forth from each column, and soon spread out into a line of skirmishers extending the whole length of the valley. As Donzelot's division, which was on the left, approached La Haye Sainte, one of its brigades moved out to attack that farm, while the other continued its advance on the right of the Charleroi road; and it was not long before a sharp fire of musketry along and around the hedges of the orchard of La Haye Sainte announced the first resistance to d'Erlon's formidable advance. Shortly afterwards a dropping fire commenced among the hedges and inclosures of Papelotte, La Haye, and Smohain, which were occupied by the Nassau battalions under Prince Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar. The right brigade of Durutte's division was thrown out against the troops defending these inclosures, while the left brigade continued to advance across the valley, so as to form a support to Marcognet's division on its left, and, at the same time, to connect this attack with the advance of the latter against the main front line of the Allied right wing.

Durutte's skirmishers pressed boldly forward against those of Prince Bernhard's brigade; and it

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was not long before they succeeded in gaining possession of the farm-house of Papelotte, driving out the light company of the 3d battalion of the 2d regiment of Nassau, commanded by Captain von Rettberg; but the latter, on being reinforced with four additional companies, resumed the offensive, and gallantly retook the farm. The contest in this quarter was now limited to a persistent skirmish, which extended itself along La Haye and Smohain, occupied by the regiment of Orange-Nassau. With this tirillade on either flank of d'Erlon's corps, the central columns pursued their onward course, and began to ascend the exterior slope of the Allied position.

✓ Immediately on the departure of d'Erlon's corps from the French position, Bachelu's infantry-division, which constituted the right of Reille's corps, was moved forward to the immediate height between La Belle Alliance and La Haye Sainte, (where it is intersected by the hollow-way formed by the Charleroi road,) in order to maintain that point, to be at hand as a reserve to the attacking force, and to keep up the connection between the right and left wings of the front line of the French army.

The three central columns continued their advance up the exterior slope of the Allied position. The nature of the ground still admitted of the play of the French batteries over their heads, and great was the havoc produced by this fire in Picton's

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devoted ranks. As the heads of the columns neared the deployed line of Bylandt's brigade, the shouts of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" were renewed. The skirmishers in advance were on the point of opening their fire upon the brigade, in order to prepare for, and give increased effect to, the succeeding charge of the columns, when the Dutch-Belgians, who had already evinced a considerable degree of unsteadiness, commenced a hurried retreat, not partially and promiscuously, but collectively and simultaneously—so much so, that the movement carried with it the appearance of its having resulted from a word of command. The disorder of these troops rapidly augmented; but, on their reaching the straggling hedge along the crest of the position, an endeavour was made to rally them upon the 5th battalion of Dutch militia. This attempt, however, notwithstanding the most strenuous exertions on the part of the officers, completely failed. The reserve battalion and the artillerymen of Captain Byleveld's battery, though they seemed to stem the torrent for a moment, were quickly swept away by its accumulating force. As they rushed past the British columns, hissings, hootings, and execrations, were indignantly heaped upon them; and one portion, in its eagerness to get away, nearly ran over the grenadier company of the 28th British regiment, the men of which were so enraged, that it was with difficulty they could be prevented from firing upon

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the fugitives. Some of the men of the 1st, or Royal Scots, were also desirous of shooting them. Nothing seemed to restrain their flight, which ceased only when they found themselves completely across and covered by the main ridge along which the Anglo-allied army was drawn up. Here they continued, comparatively under shelter, during the remainder of the battle, in which they took no further part, and to assist in gaining which their services were, from that moment, neither afforded nor required.

Picton, who had been calmly watching the French movements, and whose quick and practised eye detected the increasing unsteadiness and wavering disposition of the Dutch-Belgians, appeared to expect but a feeble resistance on their part; and upon his aide-de-camp, Captain Tyler,* remarking to him that he was sure they would run, he said, "Never mind; they shall have a taste of it, at all events." He had certainly not anticipated the possibility of their running off in the manner they did, the moment the French came within musket-range of their ranks.

Now, however, that these troops had completely cleared away to the rear, and left him no other means wherewith to brave the coming storm than could be afforded by the shattered remnants of ~~X~~Kempt's and Pack's brigades which had survived

* Lieut. Colonel John Tyler, K.H., died on the 4th June, 1842.

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the sanguinary fight of Quatre-Bras, Picton immediately deployed his force, and assumed an attitude of patient but determined resistance. When the disparity in relative numbers of the assailants and defenders is considered, the attempt to make head, with such odds, against the advancing masses of an enemy elated by his triumphant progress, was, it must be admitted, a daring and critical undertaking. Each brigade presented a thin two-deep line. Their united strength did not amount to more than about 3,000 men; whilst of the French force, the central attacking columns alone, which were now advancing directly upon these two brigades, consisted of nearly 13,000 men. Picton had, moreover, no infantry-reserve whatever, from which he could obtain support in case of success, or upon which he could fall back in case of disaster. He was not, however, one to be daunted by the approach of heavy columns, formidable as they might appear in point of numbers, when he could meet them with a well-trained British line, though it should be but two deep, and present but a fourth of the numerical force of its opponents. It is true, that nearly all the regiments in Kempt's and Pack's brigades had lost half their numbers in the battle of the 16th; but Picton well knew that they had not lost that indomitable spirit, which, under his guidance, had immortalized them on that memorable field of battle. There, he had triumphantly led them both in line against heavy columns of in-

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fantry, and in squares against charging squadrons of cavalry. What, then, might not be achieved by such innate valour—by such consummate discipline? The entire confidence which he reposed in his men was warmly reciprocated on their part. With such a chief to lead them, they would have bravely confronted the whole French army, had it been moving in mass against them. The flight of the panic-stricken Dutch-Belgians produced no effect upon them beyond that of exciting their derision and contempt.

The 28th, 32d, and 79th regiments of Kempt's brigade, when deployed, occupied a line parallel to, and about fifty yards distant from, the hedge along the Wavre road, its right resting on a high bank lining the Charleroi road, and its left terminating at a point in rear of that part of the Wavre road which begins to incline for a short distance towards the left rear. In their right front, immediately overlooking the intersection of the Charleroi and Wavre roads, stood (as before stated)* the reserve of the 1st battalion 95th rifles; they had two companies, under Major Leach,† posted in the sand-pit adjoining the left of the Charleroi road; and one company, under Captain Johnston,‡ at the hedge on the knoll in rear of the sand-pit. Their commanding officer, Colonel Sir Andrew Barnard, and Lieut.

* See page 334, vol. i.

† Now Lieut. Colonel Jonathan Leach, C.B.

‡ Major William Johnston died in April, 1836.

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Colonel Cameron,* were with these advanced companies, watching the enemy's movements. Pack's line was in left rear of Kempt's brigade, and about 150 yards distant from the Wavre road. Its left rested upon the knoll between the Wavre road and a small coppice on the reverse slope of the position; but the centre and right extended across a considerable hollow which occurs on the right of that coppice. The front of the interval between the two brigades became, after the retreat of the Dutch-Belgians, completely exposed and uncovered.

The French left central attacking column had continued its advance in a direction contiguous to, and parallel with, the high road, until the skirmishers in its front were suddenly checked by the companies of the 95th British rifles posted in the sand-pit, which obstacle had hitherto been in a great measure concealed from their view by the particular formation of the ground, combined with the height of the intervening corn. Influenced by the discovery of this impediment, and by the appearance of the *abatis* upon the high road, the column inclined to the right so as to clear the sand-pit; and, as their skirmishers were pressing on in that direction, the companies of the 95th became turned, and were forced to fall back upon the other company stationed along the little hedge in rear of the pit. So vigorous and effective was

* Now Major General Sir Alexander Cameron, K.C.B.

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the fire maintained from this hedge by the British riflemen, both upon the skirmishers and upon the column itself, that the latter was induced to swerve still further to the right, out of its original direction. The retreat of Bylandt's brigade having removed all impediment to the advance of the central attacking columns, the three companies of the 95th soon found themselves outflanked by the French skirmishers, and gradually retired upon their reserve. The light companies of the other regiments of Kempt's brigade, which had moved out to skirmish, fell back in like manner, accordingly as the French columns advanced. With a view to secure the left flank of the attacking force, and at the same time to connect the movements with those on the opposite side of the high road, the French presented a strong line, or rather a mass, of skirmishers, in the interval between that road and the left central column.

As the columns now rapidly approached the crest of the Anglo-allied position, the greater part of the batteries along the French ridge—that is, all those which had been cannonading that portion of the line embraced by the attack—gradually suspended their fire. The partial cessation of their thunder was immediately succeeded by loud and reiterated shouts from the columns of “*Vive l'Empereur !*” whilst at short intervals were heard the cheering exhortations of “*En avant ! en avant !*” mingled with the continued roll of drums beating

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the "*pas de charge*." The left central column was advancing in a direction which would have brought it in immediate contact with the right of the 28th British regiment and the left of the 79th Highlanders, and had arrived within about forty yards of the hedge lining the Wavre road, when Picton moved forward Kempt's brigade close to the hedge, where it was joined by its light companies, who came running in, followed by some of the most daring of the French skirmishers, who, however, were quickly driven back. Suddenly the column halted, and commenced a deployment to its right, the rear battalions moving out rapidly to disengage their front. Picton, seizing upon the favourable moment, ordered the brigade to fire a volley into the deploying mass, and its brief but full and condensed report had scarcely died away, when his voice was heard loudly calling "Charge! charge! Hurrah!" Answering with a tremendous shout, his devoted followers burst through the nearest of the two hedges that lined the Wavre road. In doing this, their order was in some degree broken; and, when making their way through the further hedge, a fire was poured into them by such of their opponents as had their front uncovered. The enemy's skirmishers that had previously fallen back upon the flanks of the column instantly darted forward, and by their rapid and close-telling fire assisted in the endeavour to augment the apparent disorder of Kempt's line. The 79th Highlanders

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suffered greatly, and experienced some delay in clearing the hedges. The Ensign (Birtwhistle*) carrying the regimental colour of the 32d, was severely wounded. Lieutenant Belcher,† who commanded the left centre subdivision, took the colour from him. In the next moment it was seized by a French officer whose horse had just been shot under him. A struggle ensued between him and Lieutenant Belcher; but, while the former was attempting to draw his sword, the covering colour-serjeant (named Switzer) gave him a thrust in the breast with his halbert, and the right-hand man of the subdivision (named Lacy) shot him, just as Brevet Major Toole,‡ commanding the right centre subdivision, called out, though too late, (for the French officer fell dead at Lieutenant Belcher's feet,) "Save the brave fellow!" The delay in crossing the hedges was but momentary; order was speedily restored; and then, levelling their bayonets, the brigade disclosed to view the glorious sight of a British line of infantry at the charge.

It was during this brief struggle that a severe and irreparable blow was inflicted upon the entire British army, and a whole nation plunged into grief and mourning for the loss of a chief, the brilliancy of whose career had so excited her admiration, and the

* Now Major John Birtwhistle, Unatt.

† Captain Robert Tresillian Belcher retired from the service on the 13th May, 1824.

‡ Major William H. Toole died on the 17th of August, 1831.

fame of whose exploits had so exalted her pride.* The truly brave and noble Picton was struck by a musket-ball on the right temple. His death, which was instantaneous, was first observed by the Earl of Uxbridge's aide-de-camp, Captain Horace Seymour,† whom he was, at the moment, desiring to rally the Highlanders. Captain Seymour, whose horse was just then falling, immediately called the attention of Picton's aide-de-camp, Captain Tyler, to the fact of the general having been wounded, and, in the next moment, the hero's lifeless corpse was, with the assistance of a private soldier of the nearest regiment, borne from off his charger by that officer. Thus fell the gallant soldier, who, as the leader of the 3d or "fighting division" in the Peninsular war, had already acquired an imperishable renown in the history of the British army. As his life was spent in fighting the battles of his country, his death was an end suited to his stirring career. His brave spirit passed away amidst the roar and din of the bloody conflict, and his eyes closed on his last of fields in the very moment of the advance of his troops to victory.‡

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* It is said that one of Napoleon's first inquiries, on the morning of this day, was, "*Où est la division de Picton?*"

† Now Colonel Sir Horace B. Seymour, K.C.H.

‡ What nobler instance of patriotism could be afforded than the fact, that in order to secure his being present at the great battle which he foresaw would take place, he concealed from every one the circumstance of his having been wounded at Quatre-Bras. This was not discovered until his

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The French column, surprised in the midst of its attempted deployment, and appalled by the bold and determined onset of Kempt's line, appeared as if struck by a panic, fell into irremediable confusion, and fled with precipitation from its pursuers. Just as the British brigade bore down the slope, its front was partially crossed from the right by French cuirassiers, followed by the 2d ~~British~~ life guards; the former, dashing in amongst their own thickly-scattered infantry-skirmishers, who threw themselves down to allow both fugitives and pursuers to ride over them, and then, in many instances, rose up and fired after the latter. But although the greater part of the cuirassiers turned about and boldly faced their opponents, whereby several isolated individual contests occurred, the 2d life guards soon obtained the mastery, and compelled them to resume their flight, whilst the 95th rifles speedily closed upon the disordered mass of infantry through which this portion of the cavalry had passed, and amongst which the greatest confusion and consternation prevailed. Many flew wildly

corpse was laid out at Brussels, shortly after the action. It then appeared that the skin, on one side, just above the hip, was raised into a very large bladder, and distended with a mass of coagulated blood, unaccompanied by any abrasion. It had evidently been occasioned by the action of a round shot, causing extensive contusion, and its very dark colour showed that the wound must have occurred previously to the 18th of June. Such was Picton; such his stern sense of duty; such his boundless zeal for the honour of his profession; such his complete devotion to the cause of his sovereign and country!

they scarcely knew whither ; others delivered themselves up ; and several were seized as prisoners.

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On its right, the brigade was supported in the charge by the 1st light battalion of the King's German legion, which crossed over for that purpose from the opposite side of the high road.

Immediately after passing through the hedge, the extreme left of the 28th regiment had unexpectedly found itself almost in contact with a well-formed French column still advancing against the Allied position. The right wing of the regiment was too deeply engaged with the column directly before it to admit of its attention being drawn off to any other quarter ; but the left wing, having a clearer front, boldly brought forward its right shoulders, thus detaching itself from the right wing, and fired into the left flank of the advancing column at the very moment when the head of the latter was charged by the right regiment (the Royals) of Ponsonby's brigade of heavy cavalry. Kempt, becoming aware of the prolongation of the French attack along the line to his left, and of the consequently exposed state of this flank, and possessing no infantry-support or reserve of any kind, felt himself under the necessity of restraining his men from further pursuit, and ordered the brigade to halt and re-form. The left wing of the 28th, however, having its whole attention fixed upon the column charged by the Royals, followed these dragoons some distance down the slope, and assisted

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them in securing a great number of prisoners, after which it fell back, and rejoined the right wing of the regiment. The 95th rifles continued advancing, and driving the French skirmishers before them, beyond the knoll by the sand-pit.

✓ From this extremely gallant and most decisive attack by Kempt's brigade, we must proceed to describe the no less brilliant charges performed by both Somerset's and Ponsonby's cavalry-brigades; but to afford a more ready comprehension of this period of the action, it will be necessary, in the first instance, to revert to the attack and defence of La Haye Sainte.

The French skirmishers thrown out by the left brigade of Donzelot's division advanced boldly and resolutely against the orchard of La Haye Sainte. The first shot tore away the bridle of Major Baring's horse close to his hand, and the second killed Major Bösewiel, the next in command. The three companies of the 2d light battalion of the King's German legion, which, as before stated, were posted in the orchard, together with two companies of the 1st light battalion of the King's German legion under Captains Wynecken* and von Goeben,† and a company of Hanoverian riflemen under Major von Spörken, which were extended on the right of the farm, presented a gallant resistance

* Now Lieut. Colonel Christian Wynecken, K.H. in the Hanoverian service.

† Captain Augustus Alexander von Goeben was killed in this battle.

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to the enemy ; but the latter continued to press forward with superior force, and the main body of the French brigade having formed two columns of attack, which were rapidly advancing, one into the orchard, and the other towards the buildings, Major Baring fell back with his men upon the barn. At this moment, Colonel von Klencke reached the farm with the Lüneburgfield-battalion, which Wellington, on observing the French advance, had detached from the left of Kielmansegge's brigade as a reinforcement to the troops at La Haye Sainte. Baring immediately endeavoured to recover the orchard, and had already made the enemy give way, when he perceived a strong line of cuirassiers forming in right front of the inclosure. At the same time, Lieutenant Meyer* came to report to him that the enemy had surrounded the garden in which his company was posted, and that it had become no longer tenable. Baring ordered him to fall back into the buildings, and to assist in their defence. The skirmishers upon the right, on the sudden appearance of the cavalry, ran in upon the orchard to collect together, but coming in contact with the newly-arrived Hanoverians, the latter got into disorder ; and the effect produced by the sight of the advancing line of cuirassiers in their front, as also by the shouts of the French infantry gaining possession of the garden in their rear, was such, that

* Now Captain Charles Meyer, in the Hanoverian service.

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notwithstanding all Baring's exertions to halt and collect his men, the whole of these troops betook themselves to an indiscriminate flight towards the main position of the Allied army, a course which they seemed to imagine constituted their only chance of safety. They were speedily undeceived. The cavalry overtook them in the midst of their confused retreat, rode over, sabred, and still further dispersed them; whilst, to add to the severity of their loss, they became exposed, after the cavalry had passed on, to a flank fire from the enemy's infantry lining the hedge of the garden. A portion of them succeeded in gaining the main position, whilst the remainder, securing themselves in the buildings, augmented the little garrison under Lieutenants Carey* and Græme,† and Ensign Frank,‡ who bravely and successfully maintained possession in defiance of the vigorous attacks on the part of the French light troops. The Lüneburg Hanoverian battalion, however, suffered most severely: many were killed and wounded; among the latter was the commanding officer, Lieut. Colonel von Klencke, and among the prisoners taken was Major von Dachenhausen. Some on the left saved themselves by a precipitate retreat into the

* Now Captain Thomas Carey, K.H., on the retired list of the Hanoverian service.

† Now Major George Drummond Græme, K.H., in the Hanoverian service.

‡ Now Captain George Frank, K.H., on the retired list of the Hanoverian service.

high road. The few that were collected together again during the remainder of the day constituted but a very insignificant portion of the original strength of the battalion.

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The Earl of Uxbridge, on perceiving the advance of the French cavalry by La Haye Sainte, on the British right of the Charleroi road, (the same alluded to as having dispersed the Hanoverian Lüneburg battalion and Baring's skirmishers of the legion,) as also the approach of the infantry-columns which constituted the attack upon the Allied left wing on the opposite side of that road, decided upon a simultaneous charge by the heavy cavalry-brigades of Lord Edward Somerset and Sir William Ponsonby; the former against the enemy's cavalry, the latter against his masses of infantry. The resolution was scarcely formed when he proceeded to carry it into instant execution. Riding up to Lord Edward Somerset, he ordered him to prepare to form line, keeping the Blues in support; and galloping on to Ponsonby's brigade on the opposite side of the high road, he ordered that officer to wheel into line as soon as he saw the other brigade do so, and to hold the Scots Greys in support. He then returned to the household-brigade, and immediately put the whole in motion.

As this was the first grand attack made by the French on that day in fair open field, Lord Uxbridge felt very desirous, in meeting it, to establish, if possible, the superior prowess of the British

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cavalry, and thus to inspire it with confidence, and cause it to be held in respect by its opponents. He, therefore, with a view to excite the courage and heighten the enthusiasm of his followers, led the advance in person, placing himself in front of the left of Somerset's brigade, so as to be at about the centre of the line when the brigades should unite, on the continuation of the advance, in front of the Allied position. Nobly and faithfully did these brave dragoons fulfil his anxious expectations.

For the purpose of ensuring efficient support to his cavalry attacks, Lord Uxbridge had, before the commencement of the battle, intimated to the generals of brigade that as he could not be present everywhere to give orders, he expected they would always take upon themselves to conform to, and support, offensive movements in their front; and having on this occasion light cavalry-brigades on either flank of the charging force, he felt in a great degree justified in placing himself in front line, particularly as he had assigned to each of the advancing brigades its own immediate support. Though greatly palliated by the adoption of these precautionary measures, this was perhaps not altogether a prudent act on the part of the commander of the entire cavalry of an army; since, in the charge of an extended line of cavalry against an enemy close at hand, the *carrière* once begun, the leader becomes so completely identified and mixed

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up with that line itself, that his virtual command is rapidly limited to that of a squadron-officer; whereas, when accompanying a *second* line, he is enabled to draw off, or reinforce, as circumstances may render expedient. His eager desire, however, to render this first charge a brilliant affair, combined with his own chivalric nature, led him to assume the post of honour and of danger, in order to animate by his example as a bold and determined soldier. At the same time, he trusted to the dispositions he had already made, and to the alertness of his brigadiers, for due support to his attack, but which, from fortuitous circumstances, as will be seen by the sequel, was not forthcoming at the moment it was most urgently required.

The French line of cavalry, as it advanced, presented an imposing appearance. These veteran warriors bore with them an air of confident superiority and anticipated triumph, joined with a sort of *gaieté de cœur*, inspired no doubt by the reflection that they were about to encounter and overthrow their most implacable enemies, the British. Their advance, like that of the infantry on their right, had been to a certain extent triumphant; and as the flight of the Dutch-Belgians had led that infantry to imagine that victory was already within its grasp, so the dispersion of the Hanoverians was hailed by these dragoons as a happy prelude to their grand attack. They had now ascended the brow of the ridge on which the Anglo-

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allied infantry was posted, prepared for their reception: a vigorous fire was opened upon them by the four guns of Ross's British horse-battery on the right of the high road, as also by Lloyd's British foot-battery still further to the right; but a few seconds sufficed to restore the order of their advance: in the next moment their trumpets sounded the charge; when, amidst shouts of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" this gallant line, glittering in all the splendour reflected from burnished helmet and cuirass, rushed on to the attack. On the other hand, the British household-brigade, presenting a beautiful line, and animated by an equal degree of enthusiasm, had already been put into charging speed; and just as the cuirassiers came close upon the squares, and received a fire from their front faces, the two lines dashed into each other with indescribable impetuosity. The shock was terrific. The British, in order to close as much as possible upon the cuirassiers, whose swords were much longer, and whose bodies were encased in steel, whilst their own were without such defence, seemed for a moment striving to wedge themselves in between the horses of their infuriated antagonists. Swords gleamed high in air with the suddenness and rapidity of the lightning-flash, now clashing violently together, and now clanging heavily upon resisting armour; whilst with the din of the battle-shock were mingled the shouts and yells of the combatants. Riders vainly struggling for mastery

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quickly fell under the deadly thrust or the well-delivered cut. Horses, plunging and rearing, staggered to the earth, or broke wildly from their ranks. But desperate and bloody as was the struggle, it was of brief duration. The physical superiority of the British, aided by transcendant valour, was speedily made manifest; and the cuirassiers, notwithstanding their most gallant and resolute resistance, were driven down from off the ridge, which they had ascended only a few minutes before with all the pride and confidence of men accustomed and determined to overcome every obstacle. This first collision at the charge did not occur, however, throughout the entire extent of the opposing lines. Somerset's line was not parallel to that of the cuirassiers, and as its right was thrown somewhat forward, this came first in contact with the enemy, and the collision, in consequence of the rapidity of the charge on both sides, followed in instantaneous succession in the direction of the Allied left until intercepted in its further progress by a natural obstruction consisting of the hollow-way through which the cross-road leads into the Charleroi road. The cuirassiers on the right of the French line were suddenly thrown out of their speed by coming unexpectedly on this hollow-way, into which they consequently descended abruptly and confusedly; and as they began to urge their horses up the opposite bank, they beheld the 2d British life guards, which formed the left

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of Somerset's brigade, in full speed towards them. All idea of resistance, in such a situation, was abandoned as hopeless. They immediately filed away down this hollow-way to their right, and struck across the Charleroi road into the field in front of the 95th British rifles, followed by the 2d life guards, who were in equal disorder from having to pick their way as they best could down the steep banks adjoining the intersection of the two roads. These cuirassiers, after having rushed in upon the French infantry-skirmishers, thickly and confusedly congregated in that quarter, reined in their steeds, and fronting their pursuers, engaged them individually in hand to hand combat.* They were soon, however, made sensible of their inferiority in this species of contest, and either submitted to the victors, or fled with precipitation; whilst at the same time, Kempt's brigade was charging gloriously down the exterior slope of the Allied position, and closing upon the infantry with which these horse-

* Among the combatants on this part of the field was one whose prowess acquired for him considerable reputation. This was Corporal Shaw, of the 2d life guards, a noted pugilist, possessing great physical strength, combined with the most resolute courage. When in the midst of the cuirassiers, he rendered himself conspicuous by the bold and dexterous manner in which he encountered all who came in his way. Rapid and deadly were the blows which he dealt around him, and it is said that no less than nine of his opponents were laid prostrate within an incredibly short space of time. His career, however, was suddenly cut short. A cuirassier, who had proceeded some little distance, so as to clear the left of the 2d life guards, turned round, and taking a very deliberate aim with his carbine, deprived Shaw of that life which his powerful arm and gallant daring had made proof against the swords of all who ventured to approach him.

men had become intermingled, in the manner previously described.*

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No sooner did Ponsonby perceive the household-cavalry in motion, than, in pursuance of the orders he had received, he led on his own brigade; but not being sufficiently aware of the state of affairs on the opposite side of the Wavre road, and not wishing to launch his line against the enemy's masses until the favourable moment had arrived, he commanded a temporary halt, and rode up to the hedge, in order that he might, by personal observation, ensure the correct timing of the charge. He was accompanied by Colonel Muter, commanding the Inniskilling dragoons, whom he desired to return, and place himself in front of the centre squadron, and to order and conduct the movement, the moment he should observe him hold up his cocked-hat as a signal. It is necessary to remark that the Scots Greys, who stood in support some short time previously to this advance, just where the enemy's round shot, after passing over the ridge in front, descended in quick succession and occasioned some losses in their ranks, were ordered to some lower ground in left rear of the other two regiments, which new position they had scarcely reached when the latter were advanced, as above, and the Greys immediately conformed to this movement.

* See page 14.

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During the advance of Alix's French division, (the 1st,) its rear brigade, which consisted of the 54th and 55th regiments, inclined to its right, moved out of the mass, and formed two columns of two battalions each, in support, *en échelon* to the leading brigade, consisting of the 28th and 105th regiments. In like manner, the rear brigade of Marcognet's division, (the 3d,) consisting of the 21st and 46th regiments, broke into two columns of two battalions each, in support, *en échelon* to, but more immediately in rear of, the leading brigade, consisting of the 25th and 45th regiments.

✓ While Kempt's brigade was bravely charging down the slope on the right, the heads of the leading brigades of Alix's and Marcognet's divisions, with conspicuous gallantry, and amidst shouts of triumph, crowned the crest of the Allied position on the left, crossing the Wavre road and the straggling hedge, by which their order had been in some degree disturbed. Alix's leading brigade, having passed clear of Kempt's left, found itself unopposed by infantry in its front, but the head of Marcognet's column, after passing close
✕ by the right of Captain von Rettberg's Hanoverian foot-battery, from which it had received a very destructive fire during its advance, beheld Pack's brigade approaching to meet it. The three Scotch regiments, the 1st Royals, the 42d and 92d Highlanders, under the animating sounds of their

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native pibroch, moved steadily on with the noble mien and gallant bearing of men bent upon upholding, at any sacrifice, the honour and glory of their country. The 44th regiment, which formed the left of the brigade, having its front covered by Best's Hanoverians, remained in support upon the summit or knoll immediately above, and on the left of, the hollow in which the rest of the brigade had been posted. That portion of the French column which had by this time crossed the hedge was in perfect order, and presented a bold and determined front. It was opposed to the 42d and 92d Highlanders, but principally to the latter regiment. As the brigade approached the column, it received from it a fire, which, however, it did not return, but continued to advance steadily until it had arrived within twenty or thirty yards distance, when the 92d and 42d Highlanders, who were more directly in front of the column, threw into the mass a concentrated fire, most destructive in his effects. The French were staggered by the shock, but speedily recovering themselves, began to reply with great spirit to the fire of their opponents, when the latter received the order to charge; but at this very moment Ponsonby's brigade came up. Colonel Muter had just before perceived the raised cocked-hat,* when he instantly ordered and conducted the

* This signal was not made by Sir William Ponsonby himself, but by his aide-de-camp Captain Evans, (now Colonel Sir De Lacy Evans, K.C.B.;

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advance of the brigade. It will be recollected that the Scots Greys had been ordered to support the Royals and Inniskillings; but having, as was before explained, moved down into lower ground on the left, to get more under cover from the enemy's cannonade, and subsequently advanced in left rear of those two regiments, they beheld in their direct front the head of Marcognet's division establishing itself on the height. Their course from that moment was obvious. They soon got up into line, or nearly so with the remainder of the brigade, and joined in the general charge. Upon Ponsonby's brigade coming up with the infantry, it passed through the latter as well and as quickly as it could: in some instances intervals were made for the dragoons by the wheeling of companies; in others, by that of subdivisions or of sections; but generally the passage was effected in rather an irregular manner; and, under the circumstances, this was unavoidable.

As the Scots Greys passed through, and mingled with the Highlanders, the enthusiasm of both corps was extraordinary. They mutually cheered. "Scotland for ever!" was their war-shout. The smoke in which the head of the French column was

Lieut. General in the Spanish service.) The former was mounted on a secondary untrained horse, which became restive, and startled by the fire and noise that prevailed at the very moment the general had decided upon advancing the brigade. His cloak being loose, flew off; and he dismounted for an instant for the purpose of restoring it to its place, and it was while he was thus engaged that he directed Captain Evans to make the signal in question.

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enshrouded had not cleared away, when the Greys dashed into the mass. So eager was the desire, so strong the determination, of the Highlanders to aid their compatriots in completing the work so gloriously begun, that many were seen holding on by the stirrups of the horsemen, while all rushed forward, leaving none but the disabled in their rear. The leading portion of the column soon yielded to this infuriated onset; the remainder, which was yet in the act of ascending the exterior slope, appalled by the sudden appearance of cavalry at a moment when, judging by the sound of musketry-fire in front, they had naturally concluded that it was with infantry alone they had to contend, were hurled back in confusion by the impetus of the shock. The dragoons, having the advantage of the descent, appeared to mow down the mass, which, bending under the pressure, quickly spread itself outwards in all directions. Yet, in that mass were many gallant spirits, who could not be brought to yield without a struggle; and these fought bravely to the death; not that they served to impede, but only to mark more strongly the course of the impetuous torrent as it swept wildly past them, presenting to the eye of the artistic observer those streaks which, arising incidentally from such partial and individual contests, invariably characterize the track of a charge of cavalry. Within that mass too, was borne the imperial eagle of the 45th regiment, proudly displaying on its banner the names

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of Jena, Austerlitz, Wagram, Eylau, and Friedland—fields in which this regiment had covered itself with glory, and acquired the distinguished title of “The Invincibles.”* A devoted band encircled the sacred standard, which attracted the observation, and excited the ambition, of a daring and adventurous soldier, named Ewart, a serjeant of the Greys. After a desperate struggle, evincing on his part great physical strength combined with extraordinary dexterity, he succeeded in capturing the cherished trophy. The gallant fellow was directed to proceed with it to Brussels, where he was received with acclamations by thousands who came forward to welcome and congratulate him.†

Without pausing for a moment to re-form, those of the Greys who had forced their way through, or on either flank of, the mass, rushed boldly onward against the leading supporting column of Marcognet’s right brigade. This body of men, lost in amazement at the suddenness, the wildness, of the charge, and its terrific effect upon their countrymen on the higher ground in front, had either not taken advantage of the very few moments that intervened, by preparing an effectual resistance to cavalry, or, if they attempted the necessary formation, did so when there was no longer time for its completion. Their outer files certainly opened a

* This eagle now adorns the chapel of Chelsea Hospital.

† Early in the following year, Serjeant Ewart was appointed to an Ensigncy in the 3rd Royal Veteran battalion.

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fire which proved very destructive to their assailants ; but to such a degree had the impetus of the charge been augmented by the rapidly increasing descent of the slope, that these brave dragoons possessed as little of the power as of the will to check their speed, and they plunged down into the mass with a force that was truly irresistible. Its foremost ranks driven back with irrepressible violence, the entire column tottered for a moment, and then sank under the overpowering wave. Hundreds were crushed to rise no more ; and hundreds rose again but to surrender to the victors ; who speedily swept their prisoners to the rear, while the Highlanders secured those taken from the leading column.

Along the remainder of the line, the charge of the "Union brigade" was equally brilliant and successful. On the right, the Royal dragoons, by inclining somewhat to their left, during the advance, brought their centre squadron to bear upon the head of the leading column of Alix's division, which had crossed the hedges lining the Wavre road, and being unchecked, was rapidly advancing across the crest of the ridge. Suddenly its loud shouts of triumph ceased as it perceived the close approach of cavalry up the interior slope of the Anglo-allied position. Whether it was actuated by a consciousness of danger from the disorder necessarily occasioned in its rear by the passage through the banked-up hedges, by a dread of being caught in

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the midst of any attempt to assume a formation better adapted for effective resistance, or of being entirely cut off from all support, it is difficult to decide, but the head of this column certainly appeared to be seized with a panic. Having thrown out an irregular and scattering fire, which served only to bring down about twenty of the dragoons, it instantly faced about, and endeavoured to regain the opposite side of the hedges. The Royals, however, were slashing in amongst them before this object could be effected. The rear ranks of the column, still pressing forward, and unconscious of the obstruction in front, now met those that were hurled back upon them, down the exterior slope, by the charge of the Royals, who continued pressing forward against both front and flanks of the mass. The whole was in a moment so jammed together as to have become perfectly helpless. Men tried in vain to use their muskets, which were either jerked out of their hands, or discharged at random, in the attempt. Gradually, a scattering flight from the rear loosened the unmanageable mass, which now rolled back helplessly along its downward course. Many brave spirits, hitherto pent up in the midst of the throng, appeared disposed to hazard a defiance; and amongst these the swords of the Royals dealt fearful havoc: many threw down their arms, and gave themselves up in despair, and these were hurried off by the conquerors to the rear of the British line.

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The 28th French regiment,* which formed a direct support to the 105th regiment,* comprising the column thus attacked, though astounded by the scene before it, and almost driven back by the panic-stricken fugitives, still retained a considerable semblance of order. Amidst the crowd that was now precipitating itself on this supporting column, to seek its shelter and protection, was an officer, the bearer of the eagle of the 105th regiment. This standard, which had been presented to the corps by the Empress Maria Louisa, was accompanied at the moment by a party apparently forming a guard for its defence. Captain Clark,† commanding the centre squadron of the Royals, on discovering the group, instantly gave the order, “Right shoulders forward—attack the colour!” and led directly upon the eagle himself. On reaching it, he ran his sword through the body of the standard-bearer, who immediately fell, and the eagle dropped across the head of Captain Clarke’s horse. He endeavoured to catch it with his left hand, but could only touch the fringe of the colour, and it would probably have fallen to the ground, and have been lost in the confusion of the moment, had it not been saved by Corporal Stiles, who, having been standard-coverer, and therefore posted

* These two regiments, consisting of two battalions each, constituted the left brigade of Alix’s division, commanded by General Quiot.

† Now Colonel Alexander Kennedy Clark Kennedy, C.B., K.H., Unatt.

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immediately in rear of the squadron-leader, came up at the instant, on Captain Clark's left, and caught the colour as it struck, in falling, against his own horse's neck.*

So great were the confusion and dismay created in the second column by the rush towards it of the disorganized remnant of the leading body, mixed up as it was with the dragoons, still pressing eagerly forward, as also by the signal overthrow of the columns on their right by the Inniskillings, that the entire mass speedily yielded to the pressure, and commenced a disorderly flight, pursued by the Royals to the foot of the valley by which the two positions were divided.

✓ The Inniskillings, forming the centre regiment of the brigade, did not come quite so soon into contact with the French infantry as did the flank regiments. The columns in their immediate front were the two formed by the 54th and 55th French regiments, of two battalions each, which, as previously explained, advanced in support, and in right rear, of Alix's leading brigade. Only the left, and

* As a reward for this distinguished service, Lieut. Colonel Clark has since been appointed a companion of the order of the Bath. Upon receiving the eagle from Corporal Stiles, he vainly endeavoured to break it off from the pole, with the intention of placing it in the breast of his coat, in order to secure it, whilst in the midst of the enemy's troops. Seeing this, Corporal Stiles remarked, "Pray, sir, do not break it;" whereupon Colonel Clark said, "Very well, carry it to the rear as fast as you can—it belongs to me." This eagle has also been deposited in Chelsea Hospital.

Corporal Stiles was appointed, in the following year, to an Ensigny in the 6th West India regiment.

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part of the centre, squadron of the Inniskillings had to pass through British infantry as they advanced; the front of the right squadron was clear. The Irish "*hurrah!*" loud, wild, and shrill, rent the air, as the Inniskillings, bursting through the hedge and bounding over the road, dashed boldly down the slope towards the French columns, which were about a hundred yards distant; an interval that imparted an additional impetus to their charge, and assisted in securing for it a result equally brilliant with that obtained by the other two regiments. The right and centre squadrons bore down upon the 55th French regiment; while the left squadron alone charged the 54th regiment. These columns, like those on their right and left, were not allowed time to recover from their astonishment at the unexpected, sudden, and vehement charge of cavalry launched against them. A feeble and irregular fire was the only attempt they made to avert the impending danger. In the next instant, the dragoons were amongst them, plying their swords with fearful swiftness and dexterity, and cleaving their way into the midst of the masses, which, rolling back, and scattering outwards, presented an extraordinary scene of confusion. In addition to the destruction effected by this regiment, the number of prisoners which it secured was immense.*

* Just as the Inniskillings were on the point of advancing across the Wavre road to charge, an individual in plain clothes, on their left, called

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✓ The household-brigade continued its charge down the slope on the right, and partly on the left, of La Haye Sainte, with the most distinguished gallantry and success; and bringing their right shoulders forward, the 1st life-guards pressed severely on the rear of the cuirassiers, as a very considerable portion of them rushed tumultuously towards that part of the high road beyond the orchard of La Haye Sainte which lies between high banks, and which was thus completely choked up with the fugitives. Many of those who found their retreat so seriously impeded, again faced their opponents, and a desperate hand-to-hand contest ensued, which, however, was suddenly terminated by a destructive fire, poured down upon the 1st life-guards from the top of the banks, by the light troops of Bachelin's division, that crowned the heights through which the road has been excavated.

out, "Now's your time!" This was the late Duke of Richmond, who was induced by his intimacy with the Duke of Wellington, and the interest which he naturally felt in the progress of the campaign, to repair to the field of battle; not in a military capacity, for he held no rank in the army, but merely *en amateur*. He was accompanied by his son, the present Lord William Lennox, then a Cornet in the Blues, and extra aide-de-camp to Major General Maitland. The latter had, a few days before the battle, met with a violent accident, by a fall from his horse in the park of Enghien: his right arm was severely fractured, the sight of his right eye destroyed, and his life despaired of; but hearing, when on the sick list at Brussels, that his brother aide-de-camp, Captain Lord James Hay, had been killed at Quatre-Bras, he decided on accompanying his father to the field on the 18th. Here he presented himself to General Maitland, who, however, would not permit his lordship to remain with him, deeming a boy of fifteen, with a maimed arm, bandaged eye, and weak frame of body, but ill calcu-

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The King's dragoon guards, leaving this struggle on their right, and rattling across the *pavé*, boldly ascended the enemy's position. They were joined on their left, by the 2d life-guards, whose course had been by the left of La Haye Sainte. With these were now mingled Royals and Inniskillings, while further to the left were the Greys—the whole line, without even any semblance of regularity, madly pursuing their wild career, as if intoxicated with the excess of triumph. Then it was that Lord Uxbridge, who had so gallantly led the charge in person, and incited all by his example, eagerly sought for the support on which he had confidently calculated, when, to his great surprise and mortification, he discovered that there was none at hand. Ponsonby's own immediate support, which Lord Uxbridge himself had ordered to be formed by the Greys, had necessarily been employed in front line, on the left, in the manner described; a fact of which, from his own position

lated to prove an efficient aide-de-camp. Lord William then accompanied his father, who rode about the field, unmindful of the frequently heavy fire to which he became exposed, conversing with his friends, and passing his remarks as if on actual service. After witnessing the brilliant cavalry-charge on the left, his Grace proceeded towards the right, but finding the fire had become very heavy, and the ground strewn with the slain, he and his son returned leisurely to Brussels. Two other members of the noble house of Lennox were present on the field, and distinguished themselves by their zeal and efficiency as staff-officers—Captain the Earl of March, (the present Duke of Richmond,) who was extra aide-de-camp to his Royal Highness the Prince of Orange, and Lieutenant Lord George Lennox, who was aide-de-camp to the Duke of Wellington (retired from the service, as Lieut. Colonel, in July, 1832).

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as leader of that line, he had been quite unaware.

The direct support of Somerset's brigade, consisting of the Blues, had, during the charge, come up with, and joined, the front line. The regiment was kept well in hand; and, by its comparatively good order, facilitated the drawing off of the remainder of that brigade from further pursuit. But it was on the left of the high road, in rear of Ponsonby's line, that support was most needed. His Lordship could not account for the circumstance of neither of the light cavalry-brigades, posted on the extreme left, having come up in support of Ponsonby's advance, in conformity with the general instructions conveyed to his brigadiers on the subject of affording mutual support. The fact is, that Vandeleur's brigade, which was the nearest, was then in motion for the purpose of affording its aid, but its progress was unfortunately impeded by its having previously to make a retrograde movement in order to pass a hollow-way which separated it from the troops on its right. In vain did Lord Uxbridge sound to halt and rally—neither voice nor trumpet was heeded. In a few seconds more, the advanced line was seen crowning the enemy's position. The King's dragoon guards were suddenly exposed to a severe fire from the batteries and from Bachelu's columns of infantry on their right; and perceiving a strong and well formed body of cuirassiers on the point of advancing from the hollow beyond the ridge they

had so rashly ascended, they, with such of the Royals and Inniskillings as had joined them, at length commenced a hasty retreat. The Greys, along with many of the Royals and Inniskillings, dashed in amongst the batteries, and then, wheeling sharply to their left, rode along the line of cannon in that direction, sabring the gunners and stabbing the horses, until they became sensible of the approach of a body of French lancers moving down obliquely from the left upon the arena of this memorable conflict. They now fell back, but, with their horses blown and exhausted, it was not long before they were overtaken by the lancers. These formed the advance of Jaquinot's light cavalry-brigade, which had been unaccountably remiss in not having afforded a prompt and close support to the attacking columns of infantry. ✓

Both the British heavy cavalry-brigades were now in full retreat. Somerset's regained the position without any serious molestation, but Ponsonby's dragoons, particularly the Greys, who were upon the extreme left, suffered severely from Jaquinot's lancers and chasseurs, the greater part of them being in a state of the utmost confusion and exhaustion, whilst the latter were infinitely superior in numerical force, were in good order, and mounted on horses perfectly fresh. On their right the lancers charged in open column; the remainder, extending in open lancer-order towards their left, rapidly spread over the plain, darting upon the

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stragglers and wounded of the British cavalry who came within their reach; and, at the same time, giving confidence to such of their own scattered infantry as were still retreating in disorder and confusion.

At length, the support so imminently needed by Ponsonby's brigade arrived upon its left flank.

- ✓ Vandeleur, having passed the hollow-way and ravine which intercepted his progress towards the scene of action, had reached that part of the crest of the position occupied by Best's Hanoverian brigade, through which it now advanced to the front in open column of divisions. The 12th light dragoons, being the leading regiment, moved quickly down the slope: the 16th regiment remained higher up the acclivity; while the 11th were drawn up in reserve upon the brow of the hill. The 12th and 16th wheeled into line to their right. Lieut. Colonel the Hon. Frederick Ponsonby, who commanded the 12th, perceiving the confusion that prevailed amidst the French infantry in the valley, as also the extremely critical situation of a great number of scattered red-coated dragoons nearly on the crest of the French position, instantly charged a mass of unsteady infantry which intervened between him and these dragoons. This infantry comprised the rearmost supporting column of Marcognet's division, and was the only one of the attacking columns yet intact. It was now destined to share their fate. Already alarmed by the dis-

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order into which the entire of the infantry on its left had been thrown, and now attacked so suddenly and unexpectedly on its right, it was penetrated by the charge of the 12th. These dragoons having forced their way through the column, whereby their order was naturally much broken, came upon the right flank of the lancers who were in pursuit of Ponsonby's brigade. Quickening their speed, they dashed in amongst the French cavalry, and acting almost perpendicularly upon their flank, they 'rolled up' such as were immediately in their front. The 16th light dragoons, with Vandeleur at their head, very gallantly charged obliquely upon the front of the lancers, whose further advance was completely checked by this double attack. On their extreme right, the 16th rather clashed with some of the retiring dragoons, but the two regiments, carrying every thing before them, succeeded in driving the French light cavalry down again to the foot of the valley, which they had been ordered, previously to their charge, not to pass. Some few of both the 12th and 16th did, nevertheless, madly rush up the opposite height, where, by this time, fresh troops had arrived, who made them suffer for their temerity.

Merle's Dutch-Belgian light cavalry-brigade had, in the mean time, come up to the brow of the main position, on the left of Vandeleur's brigade, but only a small portion of it went down the slope,

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following the 12th light dragoons. It did not appear to take any active part in the attack. Probably it was deterred by the brisk fire kept up by Durutte's skirmishers from behind a bank and hedge, low down the slope, and from which the 12th light dragoons had previously suffered.

Vivian, who had come forward in person from the extreme left, and proceeded some way down the slope for the purpose of making his observations, upon perceiving Ponsonby's brigade charging in disorder up the French heights, immediately sent back word for the 10th and 18th British hussars to move through the hollow-way to their right, leaving the remaining regiment of his brigade, the 1st hussars of the King's German legion, to keep a look-out to the left. Very shortly afterwards, two guns detached in advance from his horse-battery, drew up on the brow of the main ridge, but had scarcely opened a fire when a well-directed shot from one of the French batteries passed through the ammunition-boxes of one of the limbers, causing an explosion, which drew forth a shout of triumph on the part of the French artillerymen. The charge of Vandeleur's brigade having succeeded, without the active aid of even its own immediate support, the 11th light dragoons, the advance of the 10th and 18th hussars was not required, but they continued in their new position, on the right of the lane leading to Verd-cocou, and the two guns rejoined their battery.

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Major Whinyates's rocket-troop, having been brought up to the crest of the main ridge, from its previous position in reserve near Mont St. Jean, its rocket-sections were moved down to the foot of the exterior slope, whence they discharged several rockets at the French troops then formed, or in the act of re-forming, upon the opposite heights. Immediately after the execution of this service, which was gallantly and skilfully conducted, the troop rejoined its guns on the crest of the position.

In the general *mêlée* which resulted from the charge of the British heavy dragoons, and the overthrow of such masses of infantry, augmented as it was by the subsequent charges of, firstly, the French lancers, and, then, the two regiments of British light cavalry, severe losses were sustained on both sides; and the British army was deprived of some of its brightest ornaments. The gallant leader of the "Union brigade," when endeavouring to return to the Allied position, after using the most strenuous but fruitless exertions to restrain his men in their wild pursuit, and to withdraw them from a contest in which they had already gained undying fame, became a sacrifice to his chivalrous and patriotic zeal. Intercepted by a party of the lancers in the soft ground of a newly ploughed field, out of which his exhausted steed had not the power to extricate itself, he fell beneath their deadly thrusts. Sir William Ponsonby had

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highly distinguished himself as a cavalry officer in Spain; and, independently of his merits as a soldier, which were justly appreciated by the whole service, his amiable disposition and private virtues endeared him to all his brother officers. His equally gallant namesake, Colonel the Hon. Frederick Ponsonby, immediately after his brilliant charge with the 12th light dragoons, first through a column of infantry, and then upon the right flank of the lancers, was endeavouring to withdraw his regiment from further pursuit, when he was disabled in both arms, and carried by his horse up to the crest of the French position, where, receiving a sabre cut, he was struck senseless to the ground; and it was very generally supposed at the time that he had been left dead on the field.*

* Upon recovering, some time after his fall, and raising himself up a little to look around him, he was observed by a lancer passing by, who, in a savage and cowardly manner, struck his lance through his back, exclaiming "*Ah! coquin, tu n'es pas mort!*" Not long afterwards he was plundered by a *tirailleur*; but the latter was no sooner gone than he was accosted by a French officer, who had just brought up and halted some troops near the spot. He experienced great kindness from this individual, who, upon his complaining of thirst, held his brandy-bottle to his lips, directing one of his men to lay him straight on his side and place a knapsack under his head. He then passed on into the action, and Sir Frederick Ponsonby never knew to whom he was indebted, as he believed, for his life. Late in the day he was passed over by two squadrons of Prussian cavalry, in full trot, whereby his sufferings were much increased. On the following morning he was discovered by some English, and removed to the village of Waterloo. To the inexpressible delight of his corps, and of all who enjoyed his acquaintance and friendship, he gradually recovered from his dreadfully severe wounds, notwithstanding their great number, as well as their extremely critical and almost hopeless nature.

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Lieut. Colonel Hay, who commanded the 16th light dragoons, was desperately and dangerously wounded. Colonel Hamilton, the commanding officer of the Scots Greys, after gallantly leading his regiment through the enemy's columns, across the valley, and up the opposite heights, was last seen far in advance, where it is presumed, from his never having again appeared, he fell in the midst of the French lines, a sacrifice to his distinguished but indiscreet valour. Colonel Fuller, who commanded the 1st, or King's, dragoon guards, was killed when pursuing the cuirassiers, he boldly led his regiment up the French height immediately upon the Allied left of the Charleroi road. In addition to the above mentioned, the British cavalry engaged in this affair sustained a very heavy loss in both officers and men.

With the exception of the bodies of the slain, of such of the wounded as were too far from their respective lines to be removed, of loose horses, some wildly careering about, others quietly grazing, and many staggering, plunging, or convulsively pawing the ground around them, from the agony of their wounds, the arena of this terrible conflict, which had ceased but a few minutes before, was now perfectly clear. The retiring crowds of French infantry had disappeared behind the foremost ridge of their position, to collect and re-form their scattered remnants. The British cavalry were similarly employed—Somerset's brigade on the right

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X of the Charleroi road, near the orchard of the farm of Mont St. Jean; Ponsonby's on the opposite side of the road, in rear of a coppice bordering the hollow below that farm; and Vandeleur's on the interior slope of the position, more to the right than where it had been posted during the earlier part of the day. Pack's and Best's brigades closed to their right upon Kempt, so as to fill up the interval occasioned by the retreat of Bylandt's Dutch-Belgian brigade; and the knoll in front of Kempt's brigade was again occupied by three companies of the 95th regiment; as was also the farm of La Haye Sainte by the 2d light battalion King's German legion, reinforced by two companies of the 1st light battalion of that corps. Major General X Sir John Lambert's infantry-brigade, which had been kept in reserve near Mont St. Jean, was put in motion at the time Ponsonby's dragoons advanced to the charge, and it was now placed on the left of the Charleroi road, in column, at quarter distance, in rear and in support of the 5th division.

The importance of the result of this signal defeat of the French attack was fully commensurate with the glory by which its achievement was distinguished. The object of that attack, which was to force the centre and left wing of the Anglo-allied army, and to establish a very considerable body of troops in the vicinity of Mont St. Jean, was completely frustrated: 3,000 prisoners were

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taken; 2 eagles were captured; and between 30 and 40 pieces of cannon were put *hors de combat* for the greater part of the remainder of the day.

Thus terminated one of the grandest scenes which distinguished the mighty drama enacted on the ever-memorable plains of Waterloo; a scene presenting in bold relief, genuine British valour crowned with resplendent triumph; a scene, which should be indelibly impressed upon the minds as well of living British warriors, as of their successors in ages yet unborn. Britons! before other scenes are disclosed to your view, take one retrospective glance at this glorious, this instructive spectacle. Let your imagination carry you to the rear of that celebrated position, and a little to the left of the Charleroi road. Behold, in the foreground, on the right, a British line of cavalry advancing to the charge, exulting in the consciousness of its innate courage, indomitable spirit, and strength of arm. Whilst you are admiring the beautiful order and perfect steadiness of their advance, your eyes are suddenly attracted by the glittering splendour of a line of horsemen in burnished coats of mail, rising above the brow, and now crowning the summit of the ridge. They are the far-famed cuirassiers of France, led on by a Kellermann; gallant spirits, that have hitherto overcome the finest troops that could be brought against them, and have grown grey in glory. Trumpets sound the charge; in the next instant

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your ears catch the low thundering noise of their horses' hoofs, and your breathless excitement is wound to the highest pitch as the adverse lines clash together with a shock, which, at the moment, you expect must end in their mutual annihilation. Observe the British, how they seem to doubt, for a second, in what manner to deal with their opponents. Now they urge their powerful steeds into the intervals between the necks of those of the cuirassiers. Swords brandished high in air, gleam fitfully in rapid succession throughout the lines, here clashing together, there clanging against helmet and cuirass, which ring under their redoubled strokes. See! the struggle is but a moment doubtful—the cuirassiers, seemingly encumbered by their coats of mail, are yielding to superior strength, dexterity, and bravery combined—men and horses reel and stagger to the earth—gaps open out in their line—numbers are backing out—others are fairly turning round—their whole line now bends, and breaks asunder into fragments—in the next moment they appear, as if by a miracle, to be swept from off the crest of the position, and being closely and hotly pursued by the victors, the whole rushing down the other side of the ridge, are snatched from your view. Your attention is now irresistibly drawn to that part of the foreground immediately facing you; where you have barely time to catch sight of a line of British infantry just as it forces its way through the hedge

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that runs along the crest of the ridge, to charge a column advancing up the other side. At the moment the shouts that proclaim its triumph reach your ear, you are struck by the majestic advance, close to your left, of another line of British horsemen. These halt just under the brow of the ridge. In their left front your eye now also embraces a line of British infantry moving quickly up the steep; whilst at the same time you see the heads of two hostile columns issuing through the hedge, and crowning the ridge amidst shouts of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" The one nearest to you, finding no immediate opposition to its further advance, is rapidly establishing itself on the height: the other is met by the advancing line of infantry. A struggle ensues; the furthest column is concealed from your view by the smoke in which it is suddenly enshrouded; but at the very moment when doubts arise in your mind as to the result, the cavalry rushes forward, and, passing through intervals opened out for it by the infantry, charges both these heads of columns, cutting them up, as it were, root and branch; and then bounding through the hedge, the whole disappear as if by magic. Now let your imagination, keeping pace with the intensity of feeling excited by such a scene, carry you up to the summit of the ridge. Behold, at once, the glorious spectacle spread out before you! The dragoons are in the midst of the enemy's columns—the furious impetuosity of their on-

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slaught overcomes all resistance—the terror-stricken masses, paralyzed by this sudden apparition of cavalry amongst them, have neither time nor resolution to form squares, and limit their defence to a feeble, hasty, straggling fire from their ill-cemented edges—a flight, commencing from the rearmost ranks, is rapidly augmented by the outward scattering occasioned by the continually increasing pressure upon the front—the entire slope is soon covered with the dispersed elements of the previously attacking force—parties of infantry are hurrying over the brow of the ridge to aid others of the cavalry in securing the prisoners—3,000 of these are swept to the rear, and 2 eagles are gloriously captured. From the momentary contemplation of these trophies, your eyes instinctively revert to the course of the victors, whom you now perceive in the middle distance of the view—a broken line of daring horsemen, rushing up the opposite heights. Their intoxicating triumph admits of no restraint. They heed not the trumpet's call to halt and rally, but plunging wildly amidst the formidable line of batteries ranged along the French position, they commence sabreing the gunners, stabbing the horses, and seem to clear the ground of every living being. But physical efforts, however powerfully developed and sustained, have their limit: exhausted nature yields at length; and their fiery steeds, subdued, not by force but by exhaustion, retire with lagging, faltering pace.

You look in vain for a support—there is none—
but your eye is suddenly caught by the fluttering
lance-flags of a column of the enemy's cavalry,
approaching from the left, and you become ner-
vously alive to the danger that awaits the valiant
band of heroes, who are only now made sensible of
the necessity of retiring to collect and rally their
scattered numbers. Seeing no support ready to
receive them, and becoming aware of the near
approach of hostile cavalry, they make a last and
desperate effort. Those who are best mounted,
and whose horses are least blown, succeed in re-
gaining the Allied position unmolested ; but a very
considerable number are overtaken by the lancers,
with whom they now contend under a fearful dis-
advantage in point of speed and order. But mark !
a rescue is at hand—a gallant line of friendly ca-
valry throws itself against the right flank of the
lancers, the further portion, or left, of that line
first dashing through and scattering an unsteady
mass of infantry, the sole remaining column out of
the entire attacking force that has yet kept toge-
ther. The tide of destruction now sets in strongly
against the lancers. Their pursuit is checked. The
heavy dragoons are relieved from the pressure.
A *mêlée* ensues : but you are not kept long in sus-
pense ; for in another moment this newly-arrived
force, making good its way, succeeds in driving the
lancers in confusion down to the foot of the valley.

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The arena in your front is speedily cleared of both friends and foes—the discharge of rockets, which now attracts your attention, appears like a display of fire-works in celebration of the glorious triumph—the affair has terminated. But stay to witness the concluding part of the scene. Observe the splendidly attired group entering upon the right, just above La Haye Sainte. It is headed by one whom you cannot for a moment mistake—the illustrious Wellington. Lord Uxbridge, returning from his brilliant charge, now joins the Duke, while the whole *corps diplomatique et militaire* express in the strongest terms their admiration of the grand military spectacle of which they have been spectators. Among them are representatives of nearly all the continental nations, so that this glorious triumph of your valiant countrymen may be said to have been achieved in the face of congregated Europe. Honour, imperishable honour, to every British soldier engaged in that never-to-be-forgotten fight! When Britain again puts forth her strength in battle, may her sovereign's guards inherit the same heroic spirit which animated those of George, Prince Regent, and inspire them with the desire to maintain in all their pristine purity and freshness the laurels transmitted to them from the field of Waterloo; and when the soldiers of the three united kingdoms shall again be found fighting side by side against the common enemy,

may they prove to the world that they have not degenerated from the men of the "Union brigade,"* 18th of June.
who by their heroic deeds on that great day, so faithfully represented the military virtues of the British empire !

* Sir William Ponsonby's brigade was thus designated from the circumstance of its having consisted of an English regiment—the Royals,—a Scotch regiment—the Greys,—and an Irish regiment—the Inniskillings.

CHAPTER XII.

Continuation of the contest at Hougomont—Attempted flank attack upon this post completely defeated by Captain Cleeves's foot-battery of the King's German legion—The principal buildings of Hougomont, including the château, set on fire by the French—Napoleon prepares a grand cavalry-attack upon Wellington's right wing—Renewed attack upon La Haye Sainte—Tremendous cannonade along the French heights—French grand cavalry-attack—Its failure—Its renewal—Second failure—Ney, on being reinforced by Kellermann's corps of heavy cavalry, and Guyot's heavy cavalry-division of the guard, renews his attack—This is most successfully resisted—Ney directs another attack upon La Haye Sainte, and advances a heavy column of Bachelu's infantry against the centre of the Anglo-allied right wing—Wellington draws Chassé's Dutch-Belgian division from Braine-la-leud towards the principal scene of action, and moves Clinton's division into the front line—Contest at La Haye Sainte—The 5th and 8th line-battalions of the King's German legion, on advancing to charge French infantry in rear of La Haye Sainte, are suddenly assailed in flank by French cavalry, and the 8th battalion is almost entirely destroyed—Artillery in the Anglo-allied front line reinforced—Attack by a column of French heavy cavalry upon the Anglo-allied right completely defeated by Major Mercer's battery of British horse-artillery—A strong column of French infantry, supported by cavalry, advances against the centre of the Anglo-allied right wing—It is charged by Somerset's heavy cavalry-brigade—Conduct of Trip's Dutch-Belgian carabinier-brigade—Gallant charge by the 3d hussars of the King's German legion—Renewed attack by the column of French heavy cavalry in front of Major Mercer's horse-battery—It is repulsed as before—Wellington reinforces the right of his front line by du Plat's infantry-brigade of the King's German legion, accompanied by Captain Sympher's horse-battery of the same service—It is attacked by French cuirassiers—These are driven off by the battalions of du Plat's brigade—Renewed charge by the cuirassiers equally unsuccessful—Failure of French cavalry attack upon the right centre of the Anglo-allied line—Adam's British light infantry-brigade advances into the front line, on the right of Maitland's brigade; crosses the ridge, and takes up a position on the exterior slope—Here it is repeatedly attacked by French cavalry—Advance of Halkett's Hanoverian brigade—The French assail the post of La Haye Sainte with the utmost vigour—It falls into their possession—Napoleon

directs Ney to follow up this advantage with a vigorous attack upon the centre of the Anglo-allied line, and at the same time to renew the assault upon Hougomont—Ney's views and dispositions—Attack upon Alten's division—The 5th line-battalion of the King's German legion, led by Ompteda, gallantly charges French infantry, but is furiously assailed in flank by a regiment of cuirassiers, and nearly destroyed : Ompteda is killed—Gallant repulse of an attack made upon portions of Maitland's and Adam's brigades—Renewed but unsuccessful attack upon Hougomont—Adam's brigade withdrawn to the reverse slope of the main position—General view of the Anglo-allied line.

MUCH as the attention of both commanders had been absorbed by the contest described in the last chapter, the attack and defence of Hougomont had nevertheless been renewed and maintained with unabated vigour. The assailants, who continued in possession of the wood, having been strengthened by powerful reinforcements from both Jerome's and Foy's divisions, now opened so rapid and indiscriminate a fire upon the garden wall that it might almost be supposed they entertained the hope of battering it down with their shower of bullets. They failed to make any impression upon the little garrison ; though they obtained partial successes on the flanks, which again were counteracted on the part of the defenders by the aid of detachments from the main body of Byng's brigade of guards, as also by the natural advantages of the localities. Thus, upon the right, a retreat of the guards from the hedge which lines the avenue and road leading to the château, if followed up by the French, would draw upon the latter a murderous fire from the banks, brushwood, and other cover, in rear of the

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avenue, together with a flank fire from behind the buildings ; and, upon the left, if the enemy succeeded in forcing back the defenders from the front to the rear hedge of the orchard, his left flank must be exposed to a severe fire from the troops lining the eastern garden-wall, while they suffered at the same time from the new fire directed against their front by the retreating party, formed under cover of the hollow-way by which that rear hedge is bounded.

It was about two o'clock when Byng, perceiving the increased pressure upon the troops in the orchard, and the great diminution which had taken place in their numbers, desired Colonel Hepburn,* who commanded the 2d battalion of the 3d foot guards, to move down the slope with the remainder of his men as a reinforcement. Colonel Hepburn on reaching the hollow-way found it occupied by Lord Saltoun with a very small force, and his Lordship having scarcely a man remaining of his own battalion, gave over to the Colonel the command of that part of Hougomont, and rejoined X Maitland's brigade. After a short time, Hepburn and his battalion made a sudden and vigorous rush into the great orchard from the hollow-way in its rear. The French skirmishers gave way ; and, as they crowded together while retreating through the gap that leads into the wood, they suffered severely

* Major General Hepburn, C.B., died in June, 1835.

from the concentrated fire poured upon them by the guards; who quickly established themselves along the front hedge of the orchard. 18th of June.

This happened nearly at the same time in which the French were repulsed in their grand attack upon the centre and left of the Duke of Wellington's line. It might be about half-past two o'clock. The battle was then limited to a general cannonade, the roar of which was incessant, and its effects, now that the range on both sides had been very accurately obtained, were most galling and destructive to the troops posted along the interior slope of either position. Alten's light troops again spread themselves out to the front as soon as Kellermann's cuirassiers had been swept from off the exterior slope of the Anglo-allied position. They had not been out long before their attention was directed to a heavy column of infantry, apparently advancing from the vicinity of La Belle Alliance towards La Haye Sainte. It was Bachelu's division, which had fallen back a little after the failure of d'Erlon's attack, to which it had acted as a reserve. Lieut. Colonel Vigoureux,* of the 30th British regiment, who commanded these light troops of Alten's division, immediately threw them forward to meet the column. They poured a well concentrated and most galling fire upon the mass, which immediately brought its right

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* Colonel Charles A. Vigoureux, C.B., died on the 25th of February, 1841.

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shoulders forward, and took the direction of Hougomont, either in consequence of that fire, or in accordance with orders previously given. The ground over which it wound its course descended sufficiently to render the movement indistinct to the British batteries on the position; but the circumstance having been communicated to Captain X Cleeves, whose foot-battery of the King's German legion was posted on the most commanding point of the ridge, on the right of the Charleroi road, this officer lost not a moment in making his arrangements. He permitted the column to continue its march unmolested until it reached a point immediately in his front, on which he had directed his guns so as to concentrate upon the mass, at the proper moment, the whole fire of his battery. The column continued its march, and had cleared more than two thirds of the distance between La Belle Alliance and Hougomont, when, having well entered within Captain Cleeves's line of fire, three rounds from each gun were thrown into it with astonishing rapidity, and awful effect. In a moment the greater portion of the column appeared to be dispersed, and flying back in confusion towards the lower ground for shelter; leaving an immense number of dead and dying to attest the fatal accuracy of the fire from the battery. As no hostile force of either cavalry or infantry appeared in its immediate vicinity, Bachelu soon succeeded in rallying his division, and renewing the advance.

A similar result followed; whereupon all further attempt to effect the contemplated movement was abandoned; and thus a most serious flank attack upon Hougomont was completely frustrated by the skilfully managed fire of a single battery. Bachelu now took post again, upon the right of Foy, leaving a considerable interval between his division and the Charleroi road. ✓

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Foiled in his varied and repeated attacks upon Hougomont, Napoleon had now recourse to incendiary projectiles. For this purpose he had ordered a battery of howitzers to be formed, from which shells were thrown so as to descend into the buildings. The great barn, the outhouses on the north side of the château, the farmer's house, and finally the château itself, were speedily set on fire. Dense volumes of smoke, enveloping the whole post and its defenders, were wafted slowly towards the Anglo-allied line; the roofs of the buildings soon fell in; and, shortly before three o'clock, the flames burst forth with great brilliancy. Many of the wounded had been carried, or had crawled, into the buildings; but although their comrades entertained the most distressing apprehensions for their safety, the stern sense of duty and of honour prescribed that of the post itself as paramount to every other consideration. Invested as the place was by an enemy so overwhelmingly superior in numbers, and so unceasingly on the alert to seize upon any advantage that might offer, not a man could be

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spared to assist in extricating the sufferers from their perilous situation. Obedience to the natural dictates of humanity was necessarily sacrificed to that which was due to the severe demands of discipline. Thus several perished in the flames. Others, who had contrived to crawl into the open courts, could scarcely breathe in the scorching and suffocating atmosphere. Many who had sought shelter, or had been laid in the chapel, and whose terrors were excited as they heard the crashing fall of burning timbers, or the frequent explosion of shells around them, at length beheld the flames penetrating the door of the sanctuary. The prayers that had been fervently, though silently, offered up from that holy place, had surely been accepted—the fire, reaching the feet of the wooden image of the Saviour of mankind, that stood above the entrance, seemed to feel the sacred presence; for here its progress terminated; and this, without the aid of human efforts.*

The conflagration did not occasion a moment's relaxation in the heroic exertions of the brave defenders of Hougomont. The courage and devotedness of the men kept pace with the zeal and intelligence of their officers; and no sooner did new difficulties arise than they were met and overcome by the most judicious arrangements, combined with the most consummate gallantry.

* See note at page 344, vol. i.

It was now about half-past three o'clock. The Anglo-allied line continued compact and unshaken in its original position. Its advanced posts of La Haye Sainte and Hougomont had successfully resisted the most formidable assaults. The left wing had sustained considerable loss in meeting and repelling the attack by the French right wing, but the losses endured by the latter in that attack were infinitely more severe: whole columns of infantry had been completely overthrown and dispersed; squadrons of the most splendid and most devoted cavalry, had shared a similar fate; whilst from thirty to forty pieces of cannon had been rendered useless for nearly the remainder of the day. Hence, the French Emperor did not deem it advisable to renew, at least so soon, an attack upon the left of the Anglo-allied army. He decided on forming a grand attack upon its right and centre; and since Reille's infantry had already suffered very considerably in its assaults upon Hougomont, he determined upon employing his cavalry for that purpose; more especially as the ground in front of that part of the Allied line appeared well adapted for the movements of this description of force. To gain possession of La Haye Sainte and Hougomont, as a preliminary step, was undoubtedly the most judicious course; but hitherto his endeavours to obtain that vantage-ground had altogether failed, and he was now compelled to limit his plan, combining with the pro-

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X jected attack, renewed assaults against those posts, which, even if again unsuccessful, would at least serve to divert, in some degree, the enemy's attention. Napoleon also contemplated a more important diversion, by causing a demonstration to be made with Piré's light cavalry against Wellington's right flank.

| In pursuance of this plan, renewed efforts were made by the attacking force against Hougomont; and two columns from Donzelot's division descended upon La Haye Sainte.

X Meanwhile, Major Baring having applied for a reinforcement, two companies were detached to his post from the 1st light battalion of the King's German legion. To these and a part of his own battalion, he intrusted the defence of the garden; and, abandoning altogether the orchard, he placed the remainder of his force in the buildings, distributing their defence among the three officers who had so courageously maintained them during the previous attack. The French columns advanced against this post with the most undaunted resolution and the most conspicuous gallantry. The well-aimed bullets of the German rifles, though they told quickly and fearfully amidst their masses, arrested not their progress for a moment. They rushed close up to the walls, and, seizing the rifles as they protruded through the loop-holes, endeavoured to wrest them from the hands of the defenders. They also made a most furious assault

against the gates and doors, in the defence of which many lives were sacrificed. The greatest struggle was at the western opening to the large barn, the door of which was wanting. The French, determined to make good an entrance, encountered the brave Germans, equally resolute to prevent them. The foremost Frenchmen, dashing boldly on to force their way, were struck down by the deliberate fire from the rifles the instant they reached the threshold, and seventeen of their dead bodies already formed a rampart for those who continued to press forward to carry on the struggle. 18th of June.

It was nearly four o'clock when certain movements made by the lancers on the French extreme left, led the Duke to suspect an attack from that quarter; and which, considering the almost isolated position of his detached forces at Braine-la-leud and Vieux Foriez, might, if successful, be attended with very serious consequences to himself. He drew Lord Uxbridge's attention to that point; and the latter immediately despatched Grant, with the 13th light dragoons and the 15th hussars of his brigade, to attack the ~~lancers~~; detaching, at the same time, the 2d light dragoons of the King's German legion, from Dörnberg's brigade, towards Braine-la-leud, for the purpose both of facilitating the attack, by manœuvring on the left of the lancers, and of watching the enemy's dispositions in that direction. ✓

The fire of artillery along both lines had been

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X maintained with the utmost vigour. At this moment, however, a most furious cannonade was directed against that part of the Anglo-allied line which was situated between the two high roads. While some of the French light batteries took post in advance, others, of the imperial guard, comprising 12-pounders, opened a fire from the heights in rear of, and above, La Belle Alliance; and as the batteries upon the main French line were ranged along the arc of the chord formed by the Allied line, the French artillery was enabled, by its very great numerical superiority in guns, to concentrate an overwhelming fire upon any part of the Duke's position. The Allied infantry posted in columns along the interior slope of the ridge, were entirely screened from the observation of the French, who could not distinguish any portion of their enemies beyond the devoted British and German artillerymen at their guns, which, despite the severity of the fire from their opponents, were worked with the most admirable coolness and intrepidity, and with a precision beyond all praise.

X The thunder of the artillery continued pealing forth in an uninterrupted roll, and the scene became awfully grand. The guns having once obtained the required range, were fired without intermission. Instantaneous flashes met the eye, all along the heights, succeeded by volumes of smoke bounding forth along the ground in front, and enveloping the batteries in clouds. The earth trem-

bled beneath the dread concussion. The oldest soldiers had never witnessed a cannonade conducted with such fury, with such desperation. The Allied columns of infantry were lying down upon the ground to shelter themselves as much as possible from the iron shower that fell fast and heavily—round shot, tearing frightful rents directly through their masses, or ploughing up the earth beside them; shells, bursting in the midst of the serried columns, and scattering destruction in their fall, or previously burying themselves in the soft loose soil to be again forced upwards in eruptions of iron, mud, and stones, that fell amongst them like volcanic fragments.

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During this terrible conflict of artillery, Ney was making his preparatory dispositions with the cavalry which Napoleon had desired him to launch against the Anglo-allied right wing. He first formed for attack, Milhaud's corps of cuirassiers, consisting of 21 squadrons, and directed Lefebvre-Desnouette's light cavalry-division of the guard, comprising 7 squadrons of lancers and 12 squadrons of chasseurs, to follow and support—in all 40 squadrons—constituting a magnificent array of gallant horsemen. As they began to advance, the first line, of cuirassiers, shone in burnished steel, relieved by black horse-hair-crested helmets; next came the red lancers of the guard, in their gaudy uniform, and mounted on richly caparisoned steeds, their fluttering lance-flags heightening the bril-

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liancy of their display ; whilst the third line, comprising the chasseurs of the guard, in their rich costume of green and gold, with fur-trimmed pelisses à la hussard, and black bear-skin shakos, completed the gorgeous, yet harmonious, colouring of this military spectacle. Though formed in successive lines of columns, in the hollow space on the immediate left of La Haye Sainte, where they were sheltered in some degree from the cannonade that raged so furiously above them, the rear lines obliques to their left, on the advance, and became echeloned to the first line, so as to present a general front, extending from the Charleroi road on their right, to the Hougomont inclosures on their left. As they ascended the ridge, the French artillery suspended their fire, and the Allied batteries commenced pouring a destructive shower of grape-shot amidst their devoted ranks. Fiercely and fatally did this iron hail rattle against the helmed and steel-clad cuirassiers, here glancing off, there penetrating the armour, wounding or laying prostrate many a gallant warrior, at the very moment when the brightest visions of glory had opened on his ardent imagination. This iron sleet, however, caused no perceptible check to their progress ; and, with shouts of “ *Vive l’Empereur !* ” they accelerated their pace until, having arrived within about forty yards of the guns, they received the last and well-prepared discharge. Its effects were terrific : but though their order was somewhat

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broken, their courage was not shaken. The charge was sounded ; a cheer followed ; and, in the next instant, they rushed up to the very cannon's mouth. In accordance with previous instructions given by the Duke of Wellington himself, the artillerymen withdrew, upon the close approach of the cavalry, and sought shelter either beside, or in rear of the infantry-squares ; or, where occasion required, they threw themselves under the projecting bayonets of the outer kneeling ranks for protection. The cuirassiers, on crowning the crest of the ridge, and finding themselves so unexpectedly in possession of a line of batteries, shouted loudly forth their triumph ; and then, renewing their onward charge, were, in a moment, lost to the view of the lancers and chasseurs of the guard. These troops, carried away by the enthusiasm of the moment, and the eager desire to share in the fancied victory, advanced with the same fiery impetuosity, and the whole force was now fairly across the ridge. The Allied infantry, distributed in chequered squares along the interior slope, were fully prepared to meet the attack. Some little apprehension had been entertained for the safety of the right of the front line, where the Brunswickers, who, as before remarked, were mostly young, raw troops, had taken up the ground previously occupied by Byng's brigade of guards, which had been entirely absorbed by the defence of Hougomont, with the exception of two com-

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panies which, with the colours, had been withdrawn, as a reserve, to a more sheltered position on the right of the Nivelles road. As the French cavalry advanced, the 23d British regiment of infantry was led up to the front line, and into an interval between the Brunswick squares. This regiment had nearly reached the brow of the ridge when it was suddenly ordered to halt and prepare to receive cavalry; and the chasseurs of the guard appearing the next moment in its front, a fire from this face was opened so hastily that scarcely a shot could have told upon the enemy. It instantly recovered this somewhat nervous precipitation, and presented a bold and determined stand, as did also the Brunswickers, who acted on this occasion in a manner that would have reflected credit on the most experienced veterans.

The cannonade had necessarily ceased along the right wing of the Anglo-allied front line, and along the French batteries to which it was opposed. Hence the vehement cheering on the part of the French cavalry became the more distinctly audible and the more highly exciting. A sullen silence was maintained throughout the Allied squares, which were all at the "prepare,"—front ranks kneeling, and the second at the charge,—thus forming a *chevaux-de-frise*, over which the rear ranks were ready to fire, as occasion might demand. As the cavalry now rushed down upon the squares, the front faces of the latter opened their

fire when the former had approached within about thirty paces of them. The effect of this fire was to create disorder and confusion in the leading squadron or half squadron (as the case might be), which would then open out from the centre, and, obliquing to the right and left respectively, pass on by the flanks of the square attacked, to the fire from which it would consequently become completely exposed. The succeeding, repeated the manœuvre of the leading divisions; and their disorder became greater and greater as the continually augmenting obstacles in their front, the upset riders and horses, increased in multitude. Here, as at Quatre-Bras, the French cavalry did not rush to the shock against a single British square. The horsemen of the leading divisions who escaped the opposing fire, failed to maintain the direction of their speed with unabated vigour, and to dash against the square, heedless of personal danger, and intent only upon securing the sole chance that offered for the success of their immediate followers. That portion of the cavalry which passed through the intervals between the foremost squares, directed their advance upon those that were in rear, and the squares being generally *en échiquier*, the opening out and dividing of the attacking squadrons in the manner described, soon commingled the horsemen of different regiments, and added considerably to the disorder already caused by the dropping fire which assailed them in

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all directions. The Anglo-allied cavalry, having the advantage of perfect order, now advanced to the charge, and, after encountering some little resistance on different points, speedily succeeded in relieving the squares from the presence of the enemy, whom they pursued over the crest of the ridge and down the exterior slope. No sooner was Ney's cavalry driven from the position, than the Allied artillerymen flew from their shelter to their guns, and the French batteries recommenced their fire. The former dealt destruction amidst the retiring masses, as soon as, and wherever, they were uncovered by the Allied cavalry; but some of the British regiments, giving too much rein to their ardour, carried their pursuit rather too far, particularly the 23d British light dragoons, which, crossing the hollow on the right of La Haye Sainte, drove back the cuirassiers and lancers on their own batteries upon the heights beyond, and thus created confusion amongst the French gunners; who, however, made them pay for their temerity as they withdrew again towards their own position.

✓ Towards the Allied right, the lancers, pursued by the 1st light dragoons of the King's German legion, instantly re-formed, and, resuming their charge, became themselves the pursuers; but on advancing over the ridge, they were not only exposed again to the fire from the squares, but were at the same time most unexpectedly assailed by a brisk discharge of round-shot from Captain Bol-

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ton's British foot-battery, which had just been rapidly advanced to its left front, and very judiciously posted on some favourable ground close to, and on the right of, the Nivelles road, and in direct rear of the main ridge. Its fire was directed with great precision at the French cavalry in the intervals between the squares in its front, and by its valuable assistance the enemy was soon compelled to retire again across the ridge. It will be readily conceived that such assistance was most essential, when it is recollected that, at this time, the 7th hussars, the 1st light dragoons of the King's German legion, the Brunswick hussars, and the squadron of Brunswick lancers, were the only cavalry-regiments posted in rear of that portion of the front line extending from the Nivelles road on the right, to the position of Halkett's British infantry brigade on the left, in rear of which latter stood the 23d light dragoons. The manner in which those regiments charged and repelled the French cavalry opposed to them, merits the highest commendation.

The French cavalry evinced the greatest alacrity, nay, impatience, in again getting into order—actuated, no doubt, by a sense of shame and indignation at finding its efforts frustrated, and its valour fruitless, although in possession of the enemy's guns, and at liberty to act at its own discretion against his squares. The advance was speedily renewed, but evidently conducted with more cau-

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tion, though not with less enthusiasm. Again did this brilliant array of horsemen boldly face the iron shower of grape, and gallantly crown the crest of the Anglo-allied right wing. But now, instead of attacking indiscriminately, as before, one portion was allotted to that service, whilst the remainder was kept in more compact order to stem the onset of the Allied cavalry, by which, on the former occasion, they had been so signally repulsed. The charges were repeated against the squares, in the same style, and upon the same system, as before, and with an equally fruitless result. This portion of the attacking force became gradually exhausted and out of order, but the remainder appeared well formed up, and moving forward to charge the second line, comprising Allied cavalry, which, however, did not wait for the attack, but instantly advanced to meet it. The latter consisted of ✓ Somerset's brigade on the left, (greatly diminished by the effects of its former charge, on the occasion of the French attack of the Allied-left and centre,) of the 23d British light dragoons, in rear of Halkett's British infantry-brigade, of Trip's Dutch-Belgian carabinier-brigade, in rear of the 23d, of the Brunswick hussars and lancers, more to the right, of the 1st light dragoons of the King's German legion, close to the Nivelles road, and of the 7th British hussars, on the interior slope of that portion of the ridge which was immediately in left rear of Hougomont—a force scarcely amount-

ing to half the number of squadrons with which the French cavalry had commenced this attack. The charge was executed under great excitement, and with the utmost steadiness and gallantry. The struggle was desperate and sanguinary, but the French cavalry, assailed in front, by the same description of force, and on their flanks, by the fire from the squares, at length went about, and were followed, as before, over the ridge and down the exterior slope. In rear of the right of the Anglo-allied line, where, as previously observed, the cavalry was then so very weak in numbers, the 1st light dragoons of the King's German legion had deployed into line, in order to occupy more ground and show a greater front. As the French lancers were attacking the squares, and advancing through the intervals between them, notwithstanding the renewed fire from Bolton's battery, the regiment hastened forward to charge them. The Germans had not proceeded far when it was discovered that a body of the enemy's cavalry had penetrated to the open space on their left. With great presence of mind and admirable promptitude, Major von Reizenstein,* who perceived the danger to which the regiment was exposed by the already meditated attack upon its left flank, drew off a great part of it, and, with a right-shoulder-forward movement,

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* Colonel Augustus von Reizenstein, C.B., K.C.H., of the Hanoverian service, died on the 6th of November, 1830.

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advanced to meet these new assailants, who were now coming on at full speed. The mutual impetuosity of the charge, and violence of the shock, were terrific. The two lines dashed at and through each other, and those of the horsemen that were yet firm in their saddles, wheeling sharply round, again rushed to the fierce encounter with the most resolute bravery; and the dispersed riders, after rapidly exchanging cuts and thrusts, *en passant*, sought out their respective corps.

As the cavalry retired, the infantry that had attacked La Haye Sainte desisted from their fruitless endeavours to force the gallant little garrison. Not long afterwards, Major Baring, on finding that the ammunition of his men had, by the constant firing, been reduced to less than one-half, became apprehensive of its speedy exhaustion; and despatched an officer to request a supply, which was promised to him. In the mean time, the Germans set about diligently repairing the injuries they had sustained, and making the best preparation in their power to meet the next attack.

✓ Upon the first advance of the French cavalry, by the Allied left of Hougomont, a body of infantry skirmishers crept along the boundary hedge of the great orchard on that side, and by thus turning the flank of the 3rd guards, who were at the same time assailed with renewed vigour in front, compelled them to retire into the hollow-way in rear of the inclosure; but, as the cavalry with-

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drew, so did the light troops on the left of the orchard, and Lieut. Colonel Hepburn, advancing his men from their cover, drove back the French skirmishers in the orchard, and again occupied its front hedge.

The contest at this time, between the Allied left, and the French right, wing, was limited to a continued cannonade, with light troops skirmishing in the valley which separated the two positions. The Nassau troops, under Prince Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, maintained their ground with great spirit along the villages and inclosures upon the extreme left of the Anglo-allied army.

Grant, who, it will be recollected, had been detached with the 13th light dragoons and the 15th hussars, to attack the 5th and 6th French lancers, upon the extreme left of the French line, in consequence of certain menacing dispositions on their part, was first made aware that these had been merely a diversion, to draw off a portion of the Allied cavalry from the real point of attack, by the shouts which suddenly proceeded from their ranks, when, on turning round to ascertain the cause, he perceived the French in possession of the batteries along the crest of the position, and charging the squares posted on the interior slope. Observing a repetition of the attack, and the want of cavalry on that part of the position which he had quitted, he most judiciously took upon himself to return to it with both regiments; and, as will

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appear in the sequel, he arrived there at a most critical moment, when his absence might have produced the most fatal consequences. As a precautionary measure, the right squadron of the 15th hussars, under Captain Wodehouse, was left in its original position, to observe the extreme left of the French line; and the 2d light dragoons of the King's German legion continued to keep a look-out between that point and Braine-la-leud.

Napoleon, perceiving the necessity of affording an immediate support to Ney's attack sent an order to Kellermann to advance for that purpose, with his corps of heavy cavalry, consisting of the two divisions commanded by L'Heritier and Rous-
sel-d'Urbal, and comprising (at the commencement of the battle) 7 squadrons of dragoons, 11 squadrons of cuirassiers, and 6 squadrons of carabiniers. In the mean time, Ney, with a similar object in view, had ordered forward Guyot's heavy cavalry-division of the guard, comprising 6 squadrons of horse grenadiers, and 7 squadrons of dragoons. These 37 squadrons, combined with the force which had already attacked, and which had originally consisted of 40 squadrons,* constituted a stupendous array of cavalry, in comparison with that which was then posted in rear of the right wing of the Anglo-allied army, and which received no accession beyond the 5 squadrons that

* See page 65.

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Grant was in the act of withdrawing, as before explained, from the extreme right. Guyot's division of the guard having been placed by Napoleon at Ney's disposal, when he first desired him to form the grand cavalry-attack, the Marshal was entitled to employ it if he thought proper; but it is doubtful whether Napoleon, after having sent forward Kellermann's corps, was desirous that the combined force should be thus prematurely engaged, and himself deprived of his only cavalry-reserve. Still, when we consider the limited extent of the field of battle, and the consequent facility with which he might have either suspended the employment of the heavy cavalry of the guard, or countermanded Kellermann's advance, it is reasonable to infer that the French Emperor was not altogether displeased with the grand experiment which was about to be made, and which encouraged the most sanguine expectations of a glorious triumph.

The coming attack was, like the former one, preceded by a violent cannonade. As before, the French batteries concentrated their fire upon the Allied artillery and squares. The entire space immediately in rear of the crest of the ridge that marked the front line of the Duke's right wing, was again assailed with a tempest of shot and shell. Again were whole files torn away, and compact sections rent asunder. But the extraordinary skill and the untiring energies of the British and Ger-

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man gunners, combined with the heroic forbearance and the admirable steadiness of the squares, fully impressed upon the mind of Wellington the conviction that, however formidable and disproportionate the force which his powerful adversary could wield against him, it might yet be made to suffer an exhaustion, moral as well as physical, that would render it totally unavailable and helpless at the moment when its extremest tension and fullest application would be so urgently required to extricate the Emperor from that perilous crisis which, by his Grace's masterly arrangements, was gradually approaching its consummation. To act exclusively on the defensive, to maintain his ground in defiance of every assault and every stratagem, and yet to harass and weaken his enemy to the extent of his power, constituted the grand point on which hinged the practical development of those arrangements. A defeat and dispersion of his army before the arrival of the Prussian troops, would lead to new measures, to additional sacrifices—perhaps to irretrievable disasters. But his resolve was fixed and irrevocable; for he knew that he could fearlessly rely upon the devotion, the endurance, and the valour, of his British and German soldiers. And this implicit confidence was nobly reciprocated; for, as the troops remarked the serenity of his countenance and demeanour when rectifying any confusion or disorder, or felt as if spell-bound by the magic influence of a few

simple and homely words from his lips, they entertained no doubt as to the result of their glorious exertions. 18th of June.

When the tremendous cavalry force which Ney had thus assembled, moved forward to the attack, the whole space between La Haye Sainte and Hougomont appeared one moving glittering mass; and, as it approached the Anglo-allied position, undulating with the conformation of the ground, it resembled a sea in agitation. Upon reaching the crest of the ridge, and regaining temporary possession of the batteries, its very shouts sounded on the distant ear like the ominous roar of breakers thundering on the shore. Like waves following in quick succession, the whole mass now appeared to roll over the ridge; and as the light curling smoke arose from the fire which was opened by the squares, and by which the latter sought to stem the current of the advancing host, it resembled the foam and spray thrown up by the mighty waters as they dash on isolated rocks and beetling crags; and, as the mass separated and rushed in every direction, completely covering the interior slope, it bore the appearance of innumerable eddies and counter currents, threatening to overwhelm and engulf the obstructions by which its onward course had been opposed. The storm continued to rage with the greatest violence; and the devoted squares seemed lost in the midst of the tumultuous onset. In vain did the maddening mass chafe and fret away

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its strength against these impregnable barriers, which, based upon the sacred principles of honour, discipline, and duty, and cemented by the ties of patriotism and the impulse of national glory, stood proudly unmoved and inaccessible. Disorder and confusion, produced by the commingling of corps, and by the scattering fire from the faces of the chequered squares, gradually led to the retreat of parties of horsemen across the ridge: these were followed by broken squadrons, and, at length, the retrograde movement became general. Then the Allied dragoons, who had been judiciously kept in readiness to act at the favourable moment, darted forward to complete the disorganization and overthrow of the now receding waves of the French cavalry.

The Allied artillery had barely time to fire a few rounds into the retiring masses, when the enemy's formidable support rapidly advanced to renew the attack; and, as if it had been made aware that the right of the Anglo-allied line was the weakest part, from the want of a sufficient cavalry-support, its efforts appeared particularly directed to that point. A body of heavy dragoons was drawn up in line, and advanced up the ridge leaving the Hougomont inclosures immediately on its left. At this moment, however, Grant had most opportunely returned with the 13th light dragoons and 15th hussars from the extreme right; and instantly forming the 13th, which was the

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leading regiment, in line to the front, moved it up to the crest of the ridge, over which it gallantly charged and routed the French dragoons, driving them about three hundred yards down to the low ground near the north-east angle of the great orchard of Hougomont. The 15th hussars were also formed to the front, on the left of the 13th light dragoons, and charged a mass of cuirassiers, which was driven back a like distance, upon large bodies of cavalry. As these were observed commencing offensive operations, both in front and on the flank, the two regiments, first the 13th, and then the 15th, were compelled to retreat to the main position, and take post in rear of the squares ; but this they did with so much order and regularity that their presence and example imparted new life and confidence to the young Brunswickers, whose steadiness, on the right of the line, had been severely tested in the course of the grand cavalry-attack. Notwithstanding these reverses, and the decided failure of their former attempts, the French horsemen most gallantly and resolutely renewed their advance, and again plunged, in masses, amidst the Allied squares. Failing in their direct attack, they rode through the intervals between the squares in all directions, exhibiting extraordinary coolness and intrepidity. Some of the most daring approached close up to the ranks, to draw forth the fire from a square, and thus secure a better chance of success for the squadron prepared to seize the

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advantage and to charge. Small parties of desperate fellows would endeavour to force an opening at some weak point, by cutting aside the bayonets and firing at the defenders with their pistols. But the squares were proof against every assault and every stratagem. More cavalry crossed over the summit of the ridge; and the greater part of the interior slope occupied by the Allied right wing seemed covered with horsemen of all kinds—cuirassiers, lancers, carabiniers, chasseurs, dragoons, and horse-grenadiers. The French, enraged at their want of success, brandishing their swords, and exciting one another by shouts of “*Vive l'Empereur!*” reiterated their attacks with redoubled but fruitless vigour. Like the majestic oaks of the forest, which are poetically said to strike their roots deeper and more tenaciously into the earth, as the fury of the storm increases, so stood the Anglo-allied squares, grand in the imposing attitude of their strength, and bidding defiance to the tempestuous elements by which they were assailed on every side. At length the attack evinced symptoms of exhaustion: the charges became less frequent and less vigorous; disorder and confusion were rapidly augmenting; the spirit of enthusiasm and the confidence of superiority, were quickly yielding to the feeling of despondency, and the sense of hopelessness. The Anglo-allied cavalry again advanced, and once more swept the mingled host, comprising every description of mounted

troops, from off the ground on which they had so fruitlessly frittered away their strength.

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On this occasion, a body of cuirassiers, having been intercepted in its direct line of retreat by a party of British light dragoons, was induced to surrender; but taking advantage of the weakness of their escort, they suddenly broke away, and galloped down the Nivelles road, by which they hoped to return to the French lines. They were fatally deceived. As they passed the high bank, covered with brush-wood, on the right of the road, where a detachment of the 51st regiment was stationed as one of the supports to the light troops extended in front of the extreme right, they were fired upon, though but partially, in consequence of their close pursuit by the light dragoons. This attracted the attention of Captain Ross* of that regiment, who was posted with his company more in advance, and close to the *abatis* which had been thrown across the road near the head of the avenue leading to Hougomont. Captain Ross, being thus prepared, also fired upon the cuirassiers, whereupon their commanding officer, finding all further retreat effectually cut off by the *abatis*, surrendered to Captain Ross, declaring that he would not give himself up to the dragoons. At this spot eighty of the cuirassiers and twelve of their horses were

• Now Lieut. Colonel John Ross, Unatt.

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killed ; and the remainder, about sixty, were dismounted, taken, or dispersed.

✓ Shortly before this, Ney, perceiving the ill success of his cavalry attacks, determined on combining them with such infantry as he had at his disposal. Between d'Erlon's and Reille's corps there was now a great interval, and the only troops of which he could make use for the above object, consisted of Bachelu's division, on the right of the latter, as Donzelot's division, on the left of the former, was still required for the attack upon La Haye Sainte, and which he now ordered to be vigorously renewed, whilst he advanced a heavy column of Bachelu's infantry towards the centre of the Allied right wing. Wellington, who had, from the first, anticipated that the attacks of cavalry would be followed up by others, in which that arm would be combined with infantry, was fully prepared to meet this contingency, having, as soon as he had ascertained that the enemy was not disposed to attempt any serious movement against his right flank, ✓ despatched an order to Chassé to evacuate Braine-la-leud and its vicinity, and to proceed, with his Dutch-Belgian division, towards the principal scene of action, along the low ground through Merbe-braine. By this means, his Grace, who contemplated reinforcing his first line with troops from his second, would be enabled to supply their place in the latter with others of equal strength.

Chassé's movement, executed with much judgment, was in a great measure, if not entirely, concealed from the enemy's observation, and was very skillfully covered by the 2d light dragoons of the King's German legion, who continued hovering near the left flank of the French army. ✓

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In the mean time, the attack upon La Haye Sainte had been renewed with the same fury as before. Major Baring, on perceiving the advance of the enemy's columns, sent an officer to the position with this intelligence, and repeated his request for ammunition. The light company of the 5th line-battalion of the King's German legion was sent to his assistance, but the supply of ammunition, of which he stood so much in need, was not forthcoming; and he therefore, after waiting half an hour longer, during which the contest was uninterrupted, despatched another officer on the same errand. This application proved equally unsuccessful. He received, however, a reinforcement of two flank companies from the 1st regiment of Nassau. The great struggle was again at the open entrance to the barn, and the French, finding all their efforts to force an entrance so obstinately and successfully frustrated, had recourse to the expedient of setting the place on fire. A thick smoke was soon observed issuing from the barn. The greatest consternation pervaded the little garrison, for although there was a pond in the yard, there were no means at hand for conveying the water to

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the point of danger. Major Baring, whose anxiety was extreme, glancing his eye at the large camp-kettles borne by the recently-arrived Nassauers, instantly pulled one from off a man's back : several officers followed his example, and filling the kettles with water, carried them, in the face of almost certain death, to the fire. The men hesitated not a moment. Every kettle was instantly applied to the same good office, and the fire was fortunately extinguished, though at the sacrifice of many a brave soldier. Several of the men, although covered with wounds, rejected all persuasion to retire. Their constant reply was, "So long as our officers fight, and we can stand, we will not stir from the spot."* At length the enemy, wearied out by this most resolute and gallant defence, once more withdrew.

At the commencement of this attack, while one portion of the enemy's force was principally directed against the western entrance of the great barn, the other, leaving the buildings on its right, advanced higher up the slope, as if intending either

* One of the men, named Frederick Lindau, bleeding from two wounds in his head, and carrying in his pocket a large bag full of gold, which he had taken from a French officer, stood at the small barn-door facing the yard, defending from thence the open western entrance. Major Baring, observing that the cloth bound round his head did not suffice to stop the strong flow of blood, called out to him to withdraw ; but the latter, as heedless of his wounds as of his gold, replied, "None but a scoundrel would desert you so long as his head remains upon his shoulders !" This brave fellow was afterwards taken prisoner, and lost his treasure.

to penetrate the farm by the garden, or to cut off its communication with the main position. The Prince of Orange, conceiving this to be a favourable opportunity for attacking the French column, ordered the 5th and 8th line battalions of Ompteda's brigade of the King's German legion to deploy and advance. The line was quickly formed, and the battalions, bounding across the narrow sunken road, rushed forward at a charging pace, driving the enemy before them. But a body of cuirassiers, that had unsuccessfully charged the left squares of Kielmansegge's Hanoverian brigade, whilst those battalions were advancing, came upon the right flank of the latter, unexpectedly for both parties. The 5th line battalion, which was on the right, having been supported in sufficient time by Somerset's heavy cavalry-brigade, suffered little loss; but the 8th line battalion—being on the left, and more in advance, in the act of charging when the cuirassiers appeared—was completely surprised, and almost entirely destroyed. The commanding officer of the battalion, Colonel von Schröder, was mortally wounded: several other officers fell: Ensign de Moreau,* who carried and defended the King's colour, having been severely wounded, as also the serjeant who afterwards held it, the enemy succeeded in carrying off the prize. Major von

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* Now Captain William de Moreau, K.H., on the retired list of the Hanoverian army.

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Petersdorff,* the next in command, collected the scattered remnant of the battalion, and posted it in rear of the hollow-way.

The moment the Anglo-allied right wing became cleared of the presence of the French cavalry, it was again exposed to a furious cannonade. Several of the guns along the main ridge were by this time disabled. Major Bull, who had been obliged at an earlier period to withdraw his howitzer-battery to the second line, for the purpose of repairing casualties and completing ammunition, advanced again to his former post in the front line, along with Major Ramsay's horse-battery, during the second general charge of the French cavalry. These batteries suffered severely from Piré's guns, stationed on the extreme left of the French line. Bull directed Lieutenant Louis† to turn his two right guns towards them, and it was not long before this officer succeeded in silencing them; a service which, as they enfiladed the Allied right flank, was of considerable advantage, during the remainder of the battle, to all the batteries and troops in this part of the field. A reinforcement of artillery was particularly required in front of Cooke's division and the Brunswick infantry, against which the enemy was evidently preparing fresh attacks:

* Lieut. Colonel Charles von Petersdorff, C.B., K.C.H., in the Hanoverian service, died on the 13th March, 1834.

† Now Lieut. Colonel Matthew Louis, Royal Artillery.

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Lieut. Colonel Dickson's British horse-battery, commanded by Major Mercer, and Major Sympher's horse-battery of the King's German legion, were therefore ordered up into the front line; the former, to the left of Lieut. Colonel Smith's horse-battery, in front of the Brunswickers, and the latter, further to the left. Major Mercer's battery had barely time to get into action, when a heavy column of cavalry, composed of horse-grenadiers and cuirassiers, were seen ascending the ridge, and advancing at a rapid rate directly towards the spot upon which it had taken post. The guns, which were 9-pounders, were each loaded with a round and a case shot; and were run close up to a bank of two or three feet in height, which descended from the narrow cross-road along the ridge, and which thus formed a sort of *genouillère* to the battery. In front, the summit of the ridge consisted of a flat surface, of forty or fifty yards in width, whence the ground descended rapidly towards the plain that divided the two armies. The column continued to advance until it came quite close upon these guns, the muzzles of which were nearly on a level with the cross-road, when it suddenly recoiled from the very destructive fire with which it was received. The horsemen of the leading squadrons faced about, and endeavoured to force their way to the rear; confusion ensued, and the whole mass broke into a disorderly crowd. Several minutes elapsed ere they succeeded in quitting the summit

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of the ridge, during which the fire from the battery was incessant ; and, from the shortness of the distance, the size of the objects, and the elevation of the ground on which they stood, the consequent carnage was truly frightful. Many, instead of seeking safety in retreat, dashed through the intervals between the guns, and surrendered ; but the greater part, rendered desperate at finding themselves held, as it were, in front of the battery, actually fought their way through their own ranks ; and, in the struggle, blows were exchanged on all sides. At length, the wreck of this formidable column gained shelter under the slope of the ridge, leaving the summit encumbered with its killed and wounded.

About the same time, a strong column of French infantry, supported by cavalry, was advancing against the centre of the Anglo-allied right wing. Whilst the opposed batteries were concentrating upon it a vigorous fire, Lord Uxbridge brought forward Somerset's heavy cavalry-brigade from its position on the right of the Charleroi road, for the purpose of attacking this column, and also ordered up, in support, ~~Trip's~~ Dutch-Belgian carabinier-brigade. The attack was made with great gallantry by the household cavalry, which succeeded in checking the advance of the enemy ; but, having been so much reduced in numbers, it was unable to penetrate the column, which received it with a heavy fire. As Somerset retired, the French ca-

valry by which the column had been supported, prepared to advance. Trip's Dutch-Belgian cavalry was now at hand. Uxbridge, pleased with their fine appearance, and desirous of exciting in them a courageous enthusiasm, placed himself conspicuously in their front, and ordering the "charge," led them towards the enemy. He had proceeded but a very short distance, when his aide-de-camp, Captain Horace Seymour, galloped close up to him, and made him aware that not a single man of them was following him. Turning round his horse, he instantly rode up to Trip, and addressed himself to this officer with great warmth. Then, appealing to the brigade in terms the most exhorting and encouraging, and inciting them by gestures the most animated and significant, he repeated the order to charge, and again led the way in person. But this attempt was equally abortive; and Uxbridge, exasperated and indignant, rode away from the brigade, leaving it to adopt any course which its commander might think proper; and as the French cavalry, to which this hesitation was but too manifest, was now advancing rapidly to the attack, the Dutch-Belgians went about, and retired in such haste and disorder that the two right squadrons of the 3d hussars of the King's German legion experienced the greatest difficulty in maintaining their ground, and avoiding being carried along to the rear by these horsemen in the wildness of their flight. The 3d hussars had just moved up into

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the second line, in rear of Kruse's Nassau brigade, when this occurred, and the left squadron, being free from any interruption of the kind, gallantly charged and completely overthrew that portion of the cuirassiers which was in its immediate front. As soon as the other two squadrons had recovered their order, which had been so unexpectedly disturbed by the fugitive Dutch-Belgians, the whole regiment advanced to the crest of the position, where it received from Lord Uxbridge, in person, the order to charge a line of French cavalry, distant about a hundred and fifty yards, and consisting of about three squadrons of cuirassiers and three squadrons of heavy dragoons. Commencing the charge with a steady trot, and then plunging into a gallop, they broke through the enemy's line, which was advancing at a short trot, or almost at a walk, but became so completely turned and hemmed in upon their flanks and rear, that a vast proportion of them was cut off. The remainder, dispersed, and pursued by the French cavalry, rode back to the infantry-squares, in rear of which the regiment re-formed. Here the great loss which it had suffered in these two attacks became manifest. It was reduced to between sixty and seventy files, which were formed into two squadrons, and posted in rear of Kielmansegge's Hanoverian brigade.

About this time, the Earl of Uxbridge, on examining the state of his cavalry, perceived the

Cumberland regiment of Hanoverian hussars at some distance in the rear, on the Brussels road. 18th of June.

He immediately ordered them forward, and on their coming up, he posted them where they were by no means much exposed, but where they would at least *appear* to fill a gap occasioned by the severe losses experienced by Somerset's and Ponsonby's brigades, for the manner of their commanding officer, whilst being thus posted, rendered his Lordship doubtful of their continuing there if attacked. That he had reason to apprehend something of this kind, was subsequently proved, for Colonel Hake, on finding the shot flying about him a little, took himself and his regiment out of the field ; on discovering which, Lord Uxbridge despatched his aide-de-camp, Captain Horace Seymour, with an order for his return. When Captain Seymour delivered this order, the Colonel remarked that he had no confidence in his men, that they were volunteers, and that their horses were their own property. The regiment continued moving to the rear, notwithstanding Captain Seymour's repeating the order to halt, and asking the second in command to save the honour and character of the corps, by placing himself at its head and fronting the men. Finding his remonstrances produced no effect, he laid hold of the bridle of the Colonel's horse, and commented upon his conduct in terms such as no man of honour could have been expected to listen to unmoved. This officer,

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however, appeared perfectly callous to any sense of shame, and far more disposed to submit to these attacks upon his honour than he had been to receive those of the enemy upon his person and his regiment. Upon rejoining the Earl of Uxbridge and relating what had passed, Captain Seymour was again directed to proceed to the commanding officer, and to desire that, if he persevered in refusing to resume his position in the line, he would, at least, form the regiment across the high road, *out of fire*. But even this order was disregarded, and the corps went altogether to the rear, spreading alarm and confusion all the way to Brussels.*

In front of the right of the Anglo-allied line, the French column of horse-grenadiers and cuirassiers which had met with so disastrous a repulse from Major Mercer's horse-battery, was re-formed for another attack, to meet which the British gunners were fully prepared, for the French horsemen had not retired so far down the hill but that the high caps of the horse-grenadiers of the leading squadrons, were visible above the brow of the exterior slope. The second attempt was preluded by a cloud of skirmishers, who, advancing to within a very short distance of the front of the battery, did considerable mischief to the gunners with their

* As might have been expected, Colonel Hake was tried by a General Court Martial for this conduct, and sentenced to be dismissed from the profession of arms, of which he had proved himself so unworthy a member.

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carbines and pistols ; but their intention being evidently to draw forth their fire, no notice was taken of them. Then the column again ascended the ridge, and advanced to attack the battery ; but on this occasion their pace scarcely exceeded a walk, or at most a gentle trot, too many obstacles lying in their way to admit of more rapid movement without confusion. Experience having shown the gunners the destructive effects of a close fire, they allowed the leading squadrons to attain about half the distance between the brow of the slope and the narrow road in their front before they commenced. The result, as may be readily imagined, was precisely similar to that of the former attack, which has already been detailed. Again the French horsemen fell into confusion, and again for several minutes were they exposed to a deliberate and an unerring fire of case-shot, within a distance of not more than twenty yards, so that the pile of killed and wounded, left on the ground immediately in front of the battery, before great, was now enormous.

Other batteries along this part of the position were equally successful in repelling the attacks on the enemy's cuirassiers, who were assembling in considerable numbers at the foot of the exterior slope, close to the Hougomont inclosures, apparently with the object of cutting off the direct communication with that post, and forcing the right of the Allied front line. The moment seemed

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favourable for such a project. Several of the Allied guns had by this time become completely disabled ; the 2d battalion of the 3d British guards, awfully reduced, had been driven into the hollow-way in rear of the orchards of Hougomont ; the young Brunswick infantry had suffered severe losses ; and the supporting cavalry had become greatly exhausted by its repeated charges. But Wellington, foreseeing the probability of a serious attempt upon this weakened point of his line, and perceiving the approach of Chassé's division, (see page 84,) supplied the required remedy by desiring Lord Hill to bring forward troops from the second line. The zeal, intelligence, and activity which had ever characterized the hero of Almaraz and Arroyo del Molino when carrying out the designs of the Chief under whom he had acquired a lasting fame, seemed but to await this summons to the more immediate scene of action, to appear again in all their accustomed vigour. He immediately put in motion du Plat's infantry-brigade of the King's German legion. As the latter advanced across the Nivelles road, from its left, the 2d line battalion became the leading column. It was followed by the 4th, then by the 3d, and lastly by the 1st line battalion. As the 2d approached the crest of the ridge, several gunners ran in upon it for shelter from the enemy's cuirassiers, whose main body was now advancing directly against this battalion. The four light companies of the brigade, however, had just

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posted themselves close to the three small trees near this part of the crest of the ridge, and being armed with rifles, they delivered so destructive a fire into the cavalry as to compel it to withdraw. Some of the Allied cavalry then moved forward in pursuit, and du Plat's brigade continued its advance until the 2d line battalion had approached close to the hedge of the great orchard of Hougomont, whence a dropping fire was opened upon the Germans by the French skirmishers. The dragoons made a sudden and rapid retreat through the intervals of the columns, in left front of which a fresh line of hostile cavalry now presented itself. Captain Sympher, who, with his horse-battery of the legion, had accompanied du Plat's advance, instantly unlimbered, and poured round shot through the intervals of the columns, the latter maintaining, at the same time, a very effective independent file-fire. The cuirassiers gallantly advanced, notwithstanding this formidable resistance. They first became exposed to a flank fire from the left face of the 4th line battalion-square, and then again to that from the left face of the 3d line battalion: nevertheless, they resolutely attacked the battery, the gunners of which either flew to the last mentioned square for protection, or sought shelter under the carriages. At length, after having suffered severe losses by the unremitting fire from the nearest squares, the French cavalry retired in disorder, receiving a renewed discharge from the

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battery, which was again in full play. When du Plat's brigade moved down the slope, the 2d and 3d light, and 2d line, battalions of the Brunswickers, advanced a short distance over the crest of the ridge, in left rear of the former. Here they became exposed to a destructive fire of both artillery and musketry, the latter from the French skirmishers that had crept from along the eastern hedge of Hougomont, close under the brow of that part of the Anglo-allied position. They withstood this heavy fire, as also the subsequent charges of cavalry, with great steadiness and courage; but as soon as the French horsemen were driven back by a portion of the Allied cavalry, consisting of the 23d British light dragoons, the 1st light dragoons of the King's German legion, and the Brunswick hussars and lancers, the above-mentioned battalions withdrew from their exposed situation to the interior slope.

The French skirmishers, who had, during this last attack by their cavalry, pushed forward a very considerable force through the great orchard of Hougomont, and along its eastern boundary, now concentrated a most galling fire upon the squares of the legionary brigade, whose commander, du Plat, was mortally wounded: several officers fell, and all those that were mounted had their horses shot under them. The fire ceased; and in the next moment the cuirassiers, having rallied, renewed their charge, but with no greater success

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than before; and a third charge proved equally ineffectual against the determined bravery and patient endurance of the soldiers of the legion.

About the time that du Plat's brigade moved into the first line, a considerable body of French cuirassiers, which still remained in the hollow westward of La Haye Sainte, exposed to a fire from one or two of the Allied batteries, advanced at a walk, to make another effort to break the right centre of Wellington's line. This proved as unsuccessful as the previous attacks. The squares, reserving their fire until the close approach of the hostile cavalry, and then directing it against the latter in the most cool and deliberate manner, which the absence of all impetus in an attack at a walk enabled them to do with unerring effect, soon compelled the shattered squadrons once more to withdraw from a contest which the unexampled steadiness of the Allied infantry had rendered almost hopeless on their part.

The French cavalry that attacked the squares of du Plat's brigade, immediately in rear of Hougomont, had no sooner been driven off by the gallant resistance of the Germans, than the skirmishers, who, as before observed, had advanced in such numbers along the eastern inclosures of that post, crept close up under the brow of that part of the ridge on the interior slope of which was posted the main body of the Brunswick infantry. At this time, however, Lord Hill was bringing forward

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✓ Adam's British light infantry-brigade, having directed it to cross the Nivelles road, and to advance in columns up the slope, in rear of the Brunswickers. (The brigade had, some time before, been moved from the plateau on the right, close to the edge of the Nivelles road, in which position it had continued in immediate reserve.) Suddenly the summit in its front was crowded with the French skirmishers, who were almost as quickly concealed by the smoke from the rattling fire which they opened upon the Allied artillery and the squares. The gunners, whose numbers were fearfully diminished, were speedily driven back from their crippled batteries upon the nearest infantry, upon which the concentration of this galling fire threatened the most serious consequences. But succour was at hand. Wellington, in the midst of the shower of bullets, had galloped to the front of ✓ Adam's brigade, ordered it to form line, four deep, and then, pointing to the daring skirmishers on the height, called out, with perfect coolness and unaffected assurance, "Drive those fellows away!" With loud cheers, the brigade moved rapidly up the slope, eager to obey the Duke's commands. From the want of sufficient space, the 52d regiment was not formed in line with, but in rear of, the 71st, and 2d battalion of the 95th, regiment, to which it consequently served as a support. The French skirmishers began to give way as the firm and intrepid front of the brigade presented itself

to their view. Adam continued his advance, driving the French infantry before him. On crossing the ridge, the brigade brought forward its right shoulders, and, when halted, it stood in a slight hollow, which, commencing in front of the right of the position occupied by Maitland's brigade of guards, descends towards the north-east angle of the great orchard of Hougomont. At the former point the 2d battalion of the 95th regiment formed the left, and at the latter, the 71st regiment with the two companies of the 3d battalion of the 95th regiment formed the right, of this line. The enemy's cavalry having been perceived preparing for attack, the battalions of the brigade formed squares; and as the interval between the 71st and the 2d battalion 95th regiment, in this new position, was larger than was desirable, Colonel Sir John Colborne moved down the 52d regiment, in squares of wings of battalions, to fill up the space, which he reached just in time to throw a most effective oblique fire upon the cavalry which was in the act of attacking the 71st regiment.

The French carabiniers and horse-grenadiers of the guard made some gallant attacks upon the brigade. They generally advanced by *their* right of the Hougomont inclosures, then fell upon the 71st regiment, by which their charge was invariably broken, when such portions of them as continued in any degree of order, rushed onward in apparent infatuation upon the right wing square of the 52d

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regiment; from the front and right faces of which they received a close, well-directed fire, which completed their disorder and confusion. In one of these attacks, Major Eeles,* whose company of the 3d battalion 95th rifles was attached to the 71st regiment, upon observing the approach of the carabiniers towards the right angle of the front face of the square, moved his company to the right, in line with the rear face, and, placing himself in its front, prevented his men from firing until the carabiniers approached within thirty or forty yards of the square, when he ordered a volley, which, combined with the cross-fire from the 71st, brought down so many horses and men to the ground, at the same moment, that the further progress of the charge was most effectually frustrated. In an instant, one half of the attacking force was on the ground; some few men and horses were killed; more were wounded; but by far the greater part were thrown down over the dead, the dying, and the wounded. These, after a short interval, began to extricate themselves from the mass, and made the best of their way back to their supports, some on horse-back, but most of them on foot.

X

Adam's brigade, by means of the advanced position which it thus occupied, along the space between the Hougomont inclosures and the right

* Colonel William Eeles, K.H., of the Rifle Brigade, died on the 11th of October, 1837.

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front of Maitland's brigade, presented an effectual barrier to the advance of French cavalry against that portion of the Allied front line which was situated upon the right of the latter point. In the intervals between the charges of cavalry, it suffered severely from the enemy's artillery, more particularly the 71st regiment, and 2d battalion 95th rifles, the position of these regiments being somewhat more exposed than that of the 52d.

Halkett's Hanoverian brigade had moved from its previous position, near Merbe-braine, into the space within the angle formed by the Nivelles road and the hollow way which leads from the right of the front line down into the low ground below Hougomont; and it was shortly after Adam had moved into his forward position, that Halkett advanced, with the landwehr-battalions Osnabrück and Salzgitter, and took post on the exterior slope of the main ridge, in rear of du Plat's brigade. ✓

It was now about six o'clock. The formidable attacks made by the French, along the entire line of the Anglo-allied army, had been productive of no positive advantage: the advanced posts of Hougomont and La Haye Sainte had successfully resisted the furious assaults which had hitherto been directed against them; and the forward position taken up by Adam's British brigade, made it manifest to the French Emperor that, notwithstanding the gallantry, enthusiasm, and devotion displayed in those attacks, by the finest troops he

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had ever assembled together, headed, too, by generals of the highest celebrity, still greater efforts, and still greater sacrifices must be made, if he hoped to drive the British lion from the position which it yet proudly retained with so firm a footing, before the Prussian eagle, which, for some time past, had hovered over, and was at this moment darting at his extreme right, should alight, in the plenitude of its force, to satiate its thirst for vengeance in the fierce and sanguinary struggle.

Napoleon sent an order to Ney, to renew the attack upon the centre. To execute this with effect, however, fresh infantry was requisite, and the Marshal had none at his disposal. He therefore despatched his first aide-de-camp, Colonel Heymès, to represent to the Emperor the exhausted condition of his troops, half of which were placed *hors de combat*, and the other half overcome by fatigue, and failing in ammunition; and to request he would send him reinforcements. At this moment, however, Lobau's corps and the young guard were required for the security of the French right flank against the offensive operations of the Prussians; consequently, the battalions of the old guard, which constituted the only remaining reserve of infantry, could not be spared. To Ney's demand for fresh troops, Napoleon therefore replied,—“*Où voulez-vous que j'en prenne? Voulez-vous que j'en fasse?*” Ney, on being made acquainted with the manner in which his request had

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been received, saw very plainly that the battle was far from being gained; and darted off to animate, by his presence, the attack which was now renewed upon La Haye Sainte, and which was covered by a vigorous fire from the French artillery against that portion of the Anglo-allied line immediately in rear of this post, in order to disturb any attempt to relieve or assist its defenders. The united remains of Somerset's and Ponsonby's brigades, which were on the reverse slope, behind Ompteda's brigade of the King's German legion, and which were extended in single file for the purpose of making a *show* of force, suffered much from this cannonade. On perceiving its effects, Lord Uxbridge sent an aide-de-camp to recommend Lord Edward Somerset to withdraw his men from the range of the enemy's guns. The latter sent back word that, were he to do so, the Dutch-Belgian cavalry, who were in support, would immediately move off the field! Somerset retained his position until the end of the battle.

Shortly before the columns from Donzelot's division advanced to this attack of La Haye Sainte, a party of horse-artillery, which had been detached from Whinyates's rocket-battery, proceeded, under Captain Dansey,* along the Charleroi road, to the front of the centre of the Anglo-allied line, and came into action with rockets, near that farm,

* Now Lieut. Colonel Charles C. Dansey, Royal Artillery.

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leaving its two guns in the rear, under Lieutenant Wright.* Captain Dansey very soon received a severe wound, which obliged him to retire ; and the party, after firing a few rockets, fell back a little, to where its horses were standing. It was then commanded by a Serjeant, (Daniel Dunnett,) who, on perceiving the advance of the nearest French column towards the farm, dismounted his men as coolly and deliberately as if exercising on Woolwich Common, though without any support whatever ; laid rockets on the ground, and discharged them in succession into the mass—every one of them appearing to take effect. The advance of the column was checked, and was not resumed until Serjeant Dunnett, having expended all his rockets, retired with his party to rejoin the guns in rear.

Major Baring's detachment, after its extraordinary and successful exertions in repelling the previous assaults, was fearfully reduced in numbers ; but its excellent spirit and conspicuous bravery remained unshaken. One circumstance, however, could not fail to render unavailing all their efforts, their courage, and their endurance. Notwithstanding Major Baring's urgently repeated applications for a supply of ammunition, his men were still left without the means of adequately defending

* Major Amherst Wright, Royal Artillery, died on the 27th September, 1840.

their post against the host of enemies by which they were successively assailed.* They cheerfully repaired, as far as practicable, the gaps made in the walls by the French artillery, and betrayed no despondency as they looked upon the sad and numerous proofs that lay around them of the immense sacrifices they had already made. But when, upon counting the cartridges, they discovered that they had not, upon an average, more than from three to four each, their consciousness of the desperate situation to which they were reduced, and of the impossibility of holding out under such circumstances, led to remonstrances, which their gallant commander could not but admit to be reasonable. Yet no sooner did the latter, upon perceiving two French columns again advancing towards the farm, exhort them to renewed courage, and also to a careful economy of the ammunition,

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* Two different causes have been assigned for the non-compliance with Major Baring's requisitions for ammunition; namely, the interception of the communication between the post and the main line, and the difficulty in procuring *rifle* ammunition. The first appears scarcely tenable; for, although the communication was frequently cut off by the French, as they passed by the farm when attacking the main position, it was as frequently open and available. This is sufficiently proved by the different reinforcements that were sent into the farm: ammunition might have been escorted thither with equal facility; and yet Baring had made three distinct applications for a supply *before* the Nassau detachment was added to his force. The difficulty of procuring *rifle* ammunition certainly appears a more probable cause; but, even in this case, it is impossible to overlook the circumstance that, the post in question was immediately in front of the brigade to which its defenders belonged, and of which two out of the four battalions composing it were armed with rifles.

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than he received the unanimous reply,—“No man will desert you,—we will fight and die with you!”

The French, exasperated by the protracted resistance of this handful of brave defenders, now came on with redoubled fury. The open end of the great barn was first assailed. Again they succeeded in setting the building on fire; but the Germans, having recourse to the same expedient as on the previous occasion, again contrived to extinguish the flames. Baring's anxiety and uneasiness increased with every shot that was fired by his men; and he again sent to the rear for ammunition, coupling his demand with a distinct report, that he must and would abandon the place should no supply be forthcoming. This message, however, proved equally ineffectual. The fire of the garrison was gradually diminishing: perplexity was depicted in every countenance: many of the men now called out urgently for ammunition, adding,—“We will readily stand by you, but we must have the means of defending ourselves!” Even their officers, who, during the whole day had displayed the greatest courage, represented to their commander the impossibility of retaining the post under such circumstances. The French, who failed not to observe the distressing situation to which the defenders were reduced, now boldly broke in the door at that end of the long western building which is nearest to the entrance of the great barn, already so frequently assailed. The

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passage from the door through the building into the farm-yard having been barricaded, but few of the enemy could enter at a time. These were instantly bayoneted, and the rear hesitated to follow. They now climbed up the outer wall of the long building, and mounted the roof, from which they easily picked off the defenders, who, not possessing the means of retaliation, were completely at their mercy. At the same time, they pressed in through the open barn, which it was impossible to defend any longer. Baring was now reduced to the painful necessity of abandoning the place, and gave the order to retire through the dwelling-house into the garden. Many of the men were overtaken in the narrow passage through the house by the victors, who vented their fury upon them in the lowest abuse and most brutal treatment.*

* The passage through the farm-house to the garden in the rear was narrow, and here the officers endeavoured to halt the men, and make one more charge, but as the French had already commenced firing down the passage, this was found impracticable. Ensign Frank, on perceiving a French soldier levelling his musket at Lieutenant Græme, called out to the latter to take care; but, as he was still trying to rally his men, he replied, "Never mind, let the rascal fire!" At this instant the piece was levelled, but it fell to the ground with its owner, whom Ensign Frank had stabbed in time to save his friend. The French were now rushing into the house, and the foremost of them having fired at Ensign Frank, his arm was shattered by the bullet. Nevertheless he contrived to obtain shelter in a bed-chamber, and succeeded in concealing himself under the bed. Two of the men also took refuge in the same room; but the French followed close at their heels, crying, "Pas de pardon à ces coquins verds!" and shot them dead close to Ensign Frank, who had the well-merited good fortune of remaining undiscovered until the house again fell into the hands of the

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Baring having satisfied himself that the possession of the dwelling-house by the enemy must render the garden quite untenable, and finding that his officers fully agreed with him on this point, he made the men retire, singly, to the main position. The greater part of them, accompanied by their brave but disconsolate commander, descended into the high road by an opening in the bank adjoining the north east angle of the garden, and retired along the opposite side of the chaussée. Baring sent back to their respective regiments the remains of the reinforcements he had received, and, with the few men that were left of his own battalion, he attached himself to two companies of the 1st light battalion of the King's German legion, which were then posted in the hollow-way close to the right of the high road.

The surrender of La Haye Sainte, under the circumstances which have been described, was as purely honourable, as its defence against an overwhelming and furious host had been heroically brave. A thorough conviction that further resistance must have been marked by the sacrifice of the entire remnant of his courageous band, at once

Allies. Lieutenant Græme, who had continued in the passage, was suddenly seized by the collar by a French officer, who exclaimed to his men, "C'est ce coquin!" Their bayonets were immediately thrust at him, but he managed to parry them with his sword, and as the officer for a moment relinquished his grasp, Græme darted along the passage, the French firing two shots after him, and calling out, "Coquin!" but they did not follow him, and he succeeded in rejoining the remnant of his battalion.

suggested to the mind of a commander like Baring, gifted with the requisite discernment and forethought of a true soldier, the reservation of such gallant spirits for some other part of the great contest, in which they might yet face their enemies, if not on equal terms, at least in a manner that would render their bravery and devotion not altogether unavailable in the general struggle for victory.*

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Loud and reiterated shouts of triumph having announced to the French Emperor the capture of La Haye Sainte, he immediately ordered it to be followed up by a vigorous attack upon the centre of the Anglo-allied line, and by a simultaneous renewal of the assault upon Hougomont.

It was quite evident to Ney, that without an additional force of infantry, it would be impossible for him to follow up, with effect, the advantage which he anticipated from the capture of La Haye Sainte. The cavalry which Napoleon had placed at his disposal, had been nearly annihilated in the course of its numerous attacks upon the Anglo-allied line,—attacks executed throughout with the greatest gallantry, but unproductive of any solid or decisive result upon a single point of that line. If this arm, comprising the flower of the chivalric cavalry of France, had failed him when it sallied

* For a nominal list of the officers who were present at La Haye Sainte, in the glorious defence of that farm on the 18th of June, see Appendix 1.

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forth, gaily exulting in the freshness of its vigour, proudly conscious of the imposing attitude of its masses, and unrestrainedly impatient for the onslaught which was to exalt still more its already high renown, how could he calculate upon its efficacy, now that it was comparatively paralyzed? The state to which his infantry was reduced presented a prospect almost as cheerless. D'Erlon's corps, severely crippled by its signally unsuccessful attack upon the Anglo-allied left wing and centre, had still further exhausted its force by repeated assaults against La Haye Sainte, on its left; and, since the arrival of Bülow, it had been compelled to resort to active precautionary measures on its right. On the other hand, Reille's corps had suffered immense losses in its incessant, yet unavailing efforts to gain possession of the important post of Hougomont. But Ney, "*le plus brave des braves*," in whose character, resolution and perseverance were pre-eminent, was not to be deterred by this discouraging aspect, from fulfilling, to the best of his abilities, the task imposed upon him by his imperial master. There can be but little doubt that at the time he made his urgent demand upon the Emperor for a fresh supply of infantry, he had projected an assault upon the Anglo-allied right wing, in accordance with that prominent feature in the tactics of the empire,—the column of attack in mass of battalions—to be supported by his cavalry, whilst this arm still continued vigorous

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and effective. Now, however, his exhausted means precluded the execution of such a plan of attack, and he therefore had recourse, as far as was practicable with his reduced extent of force, to another system, which had been attended with so much success in the time of the republic, and which had always found great favour with the French soldiery—the grand attack *en tirailleurs*. In this way he would be better enabled to conceal the weakened condition of his troops, and he might also succeed in making such an impression upon some important point of the Allied line, as would induce the Emperor to seize upon the advantage gained, and, launching forth his reserve, strike the decisive blow.

The whole of Donzelot's division, supported by a part of Alix's division, as also a considerable body of cuirassiers, forming the gallant remnants of entire regiments, were put in motion against the centre of the Anglo-allied line; whilst fresh reinforcements were poured down from Reille's corps into the Hougomont inclosures. ✓

The first disposition made by the captors of La Haye Sainte was to avail themselves of the advantage which the possession of the farmhouse, the garden, and the adjacent high bank afforded them for pouring a commanding fire upon the two companies of the 95th British rifles, which occupied the knoll by the sandpit, on the opposite side of the road; when these, being at the same time

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pressed in front, finding their post no longer tenable, retreated upon their main body in the Wavre road. The French at the same time contrived to push two guns round by the garden-hedge to the bank of the high road, and immediately opened a fire of grape upon Kempt's brigade, posted along, and in rear of, the Wavre road, on the opposite side of the chaussée; but this was speedily silenced by the 1st battalion of the 95th British rifles, who, taking a deliberate aim at the artillery-men, destroyed them before they could discharge a second round. There then issued from under cover of the farm, a large body of infantry, which, as it ascended the main ridge, spread out into a very close line of skirmishers, who pressed boldly forward against the left of Alten's division.

Their concentrated fire was telling fearfully upon the devoted squares. Alten sent an order to Ompteda to deploy one of his battalions, if practicable, and advance against the enemy. Ompteda, as brave and high-minded a soldier as ever graced the profession of arms, was quite prepared to execute the order, but being fully aware, from previous observation, that in the hollow behind the curtain formed by the *tirailleurs* there lay in wait a body of the enemy's cavalry, he felt it his duty to represent the imminent risk which was likely to attend such a movement. At this moment of hesitation, the Prince of Orange rode up to Ompteda, and ordered him to deploy. The latter respectfully

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submitted the same opinion he had before expressed to Alten's messenger; whereupon his Royal Highness became impatient, repeated the order, and forbad further reply. Ompteda, with the true spirit of a soldier, instantly deployed the 5th line battalion, placed himself at its head, and gallantly led it against the mass of *tirailleurs*, who had continued to crowd forward, and under whose teasing fire the Germans displayed the greatest steadiness and bravery. The French gave way as the line advanced at the charge; and as it approached the garden of La Haye Sainte, they suddenly and rapidly sought shelter along the hedges. In the next moment, the battalion was furiously assailed by a regiment of cuirassiers, who, taking the line in its right flank, fairly rolled it up. This cavalry-charge, pre-concerted with great skill, and executed with amazing rapidity, proved awfully destructive to the courageous but unfortunate Germans; and fully, and fatally, confirmed the truth of the unheeded prediction of their intrepid commander. So severe was the loss sustained, that out of the whole battalion, not more than about 30 men with a few officers were gradually collected in the hollow-way that lay along the front of the left of the brigade. Amongst the slain was Ompteda himself, who, with his followers, thus fell a sacrifice to the absence of that precaution, the necessity for which he had vainly endeavoured to impress upon his superior officer.

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Whilst the French cuirassiers were cutting and stabbing in all directions, and completing their work of destruction amidst the unfortunate Germans, the 95th British rifles, who, from the other side of the high road, had been attentive observers of the scene, had already taken aim at the cuirassiers, but had refrained from firing, fearing to injure their friends, at length poured in amongst them a terrific volley, just at the very moment when the 3rd hussars of the King's German legion advanced to the rescue of their compatriots, which sent both sides flying, and completely cleared the front of Ompteda's brigade. Shortly afterwards the 3rd hussars again advanced, but the support of the cuirassiers having, in the mean time, ascended the slope, the former, so inferior in numbers, were brought to a stand, and, after a brief struggle, were compelled to withdraw.

A mass of *tirailleurs* now ascended by their left, from the hollow westward of La Haye Sainte, and pushed forward with great boldness against the advanced square of Maitland's British brigade, formed by the 3rd battalion of the 1st foot guards. Their fire, concentrated upon the square, and maintained with astonishing rapidity and vigour, was most galling to the British guards. Also upon their left another portion of their numbers poured a destructive fire upon the left square of Adam's brigade, formed by the 2nd battalion of the 95th rifles. The exposed situation of the 3rd battalion

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of guards, the fire from which in square was necessarily so vastly disproportioned to that by which it was assailed, caught the eye of the Duke of Wellington, who immediately rode up to the battalion, and ordered it to form line and drive the skirmishers down the slope. Its commander, Lieut. Colonel D'Oyley instantly wheeled up the right and left faces of the square,—the right half of the rear face accompanying the former, and the other half the left face,—into line with the front face, and charged the enemy down the hill. A body of French cavalry was now observed approaching, but the battalion re-formed square with great rapidity and regularity. The cavalry refused the square, but receiving its fire, and then dashing along the front of the 52nd regiment, it exposed itself to another vigorous fire by which it was nearly destroyed; whilst the 3rd battalion of the guards retired, in perfect order, to its original position.

The reinforcements from Reille's corps having moved to Hougomont, the skirmishers in and around this post were relieved upon all points. The wood, as also the fences on either flank, soon swarmed with *tirailleurs*; and the brisk rattle of musketry that followed, intermingled with shouts of "*En avant!*" seemed to betoken a determination on the part of the French that the capture of La Haye Sainte should not be their only triumph achieved in front of the Anglo-allied army.

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Everywhere the assault was bravely met by the gallant defenders of the post. The flank companies of the guards, within the walls and buildings, held at defiance every attempt of their assailants to dislodge them from their cover. By this time, all the outhouses were on fire, with the exception of those that fronted the wood. The roof and upper story of the château had fallen in, and flames continued bursting forth on all sides with the greatest fury. The heat had become so intense as to produce upon the men whose duty brought them within its influence, a feeling of suffocation; while the frequently emitted volumes of thick smoke gave an indistinctness to every object around them. Yet so admirable was the system of defence, so perfect were the discipline and the order, maintained throughout this trying scene, by the devoted garrison, that the enemy completely failed in forcing an opening at any one point. The well maintained fire from the walls was such as to deter the French from attempting an escalade. Whilst the central portion of the *tirailleurs* kept up an incessant fire from behind the hedge and trees facing the south buildings and the gardens, the remainder pressed on in crowds against the inclosures by which the post was flanked. On the right, the 2nd battalion of the Coldstream guards, lining the hedge that bordered the main approach to the château, successfully withstood this furious onset. On the left, the 2nd battalion of the 3rd

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guards, in the orchard, having suffered such frightful losses, found it impossible to stem the overwhelming torrent, and speedily fell back upon its friendly hollow-way. The French *tirailleurs*, pushing forward in pursuit, were staggered by the sudden and vigorous fire opened upon them by the troops within the eastern garden-wall ; and the 3rd guards having, in the mean time, been reinforced by the 2nd line battalion and the light companies of du Plat's brigade, drove the enemy back to the front hedge of the orchard ; whence, however, they were shortly, in their turn, compelled to retire. Again the flank fire from the eastern garden-wall, combined with that in front from the defenders of the orchard, as they reached the rear hedge, compelled the enemy to fall back. The 3rd guards once more lined the front hedge, and also, in conjunction with the light troops of du Plat's brigade, and the remains of both the Brunswick advanced-guard-battalion, and the 1st battalion of the 2nd regiment of Nassau, forced the entrance into the wood near the south-east angle of the garden-wall, and firmly established themselves in that quarter.

At the commencement of this last mentioned attack upon Hougomont, the right of Adam's brigade was considered too near the inclosures of that post, and exposed to be taken from thence in flank. It was therefore withdrawn further up the slope, towards the crest of the main position ; and after a brief interval, it retired to the reverse slope

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in order to be covered from the enemy's cannonade which had been directed against it.

It was now nearly ~~seven o'clock~~. The troops defending Hougomont and its inclosures had succeeded in repelling the last assault, and the contest in and around this post again degenerated into a *tirailade*, kept up with more or less vigour on all points. Along the front of the extreme right of the Anglo-allied line, the skirmishers from Mitchell's British infantry-brigade maintained their ground with great steadiness and gallantry. The main body of the Brunswick infantry stood on the interior slope, in rear of Adam's brigade; and Chassé's Dutch-Belgian infantry-division, which had arrived from Braine-la-leud, was deployed along, and in rear of, the Nivelles road, its centre intersected by the narrow road leading from the chaussée to the village of Merbe-braine, which position it had taken up on the advance of Adam's brigade to the general front line. In front of the Anglo-allied left, the skirmishers of both armies were continually engaged; and upon the extreme left the troops in Smohain, La Haye, Papelotte, and adjacent inclosures, successfully resisted all attempts of the enemy to dislodge them. The attack upon the centre of the Anglo-allied line had been incessant from the moment La Haye Sainte fell into the possession of the French. On their left of the Charleroi road, they debouched from that farm, and ascended the position in clouds

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of skirmishers. One portion of them crowded upon the artificial mound which abutted upon the high bank of the road, and was situated about sixty yards only in front of the hollow-way occupied by Ompteda's brigade. On the opposite side of the Charleroi road, the fire from the French troops on the knoll above the sand-pit was maintained with remarkable rapidity and perseverance. They continued, as before, to conceal themselves as much as possible under the brow of the knoll, exposing only so much of their bodies as was necessary to enable them to fire over its crest, in a kneeling position. This fire was replied to with the greatest spirit and determination on the part of Kempt's and Lambert's brigades. On the Allied right of the high road, the exhausted remnant of Ompteda's brigade was no longer a match for the daring *tirailleurs* that crowded together in its front. Its stock of ammunition had begun to fail: many who had not a cartridge left fell to the rear, and more than the usual number assisted the wounded out of action.

Exposed as Alten's division had been to the most furious assaults of artillery, cavalry, and infantry, the British and German brigades of which it was composed had become awfully diminished; and the facility which the possession of La Haye Sainte now afforded the French for continuing their desperate endeavours to force that part of the Allied line, rendered the situation of these

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troops extremely critical. Alten, who had throughout the day displayed that same coolness, intrepidity, and skill, which had characterized his career in the Peninsular war, and who, by his presence and example, had so powerfully sustained the energies of his men, was not permitted to witness the closing scene of their glorious exertions; for about this time he was wounded, and compelled to quit the field, leaving the command of the division to his gallant countryman, Kielmansegge.

At a short distance in rear of Lambert's brigade stood that of Pack, (with the exception of the 1st Royal Scots, then in front line,) in contiguous columns at quarter distance, its right resting on the high road, while further to the rear, as a reserve, was posted Vincke's Hanoverian brigade, having ~~two~~ of its battalions, Hameln and Gifhorn, in contiguous close columns on the left of the road, and the other battalions, Peine and Hildesheim, in a similar formation, on the right of the road, near the farm of Mont St. Jean.

The pertinacity and zeal displayed by the French in their attacks upon the centre of the Anglo-allied line, and the indications now manifested of following them up with increased force, were in accordance with Napoleon's great object of breaking that centre, and overthrowing the right wing, of the Duke's army; and for the execution of this latter part of his plan, he was preparing to strike another formidable blow, even now that the

Prussians were fairly *aux prises* with the troops constituting the extreme right of his army in and around Planchenoit. But previously to entering into the subject of the concluding scene of the struggle between the Anglo-allied and French armies, it will be necessary to revert to the operations of the Prussian forces, in order to arrive at a full and comprehensive development and due inter-connection of all the leading features and various bearings of the great battle, the result of which was to determine the issue of the campaign in Belgium.

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CHAPTER XIII.

Advance of the Prussians towards the field of Waterloo—Difficulties and impediments attending their march—The 15th and 16th Prussian brigades reach the wood of Paris—At half-past four o'clock, Blücher decides upon attacking the right flank of the French army with these brigades, without waiting for the arrival of more of his troops—Prussian cavalry driven back by Domont—Three Prussian battalions attack the extreme right of the French general front line, near Smohain, but are compelled to retire into the village—Napoleon detaches Lobau's corps in support of Domont—Blücher's dispositions—The French regiments of the old and middle guard take up the position, in reserve, on the heights of La Belle Alliance, vacated by Lobau's corps—Lobau becomes engaged with Bülow—The remainder of Bülow's corps reaches the field—Blücher's dispositions—Relative strength of Bülow's and Lobau's forces—Napoleon detaches the young guard to Planchenoit, in support of Lobau's right—At about six o'clock, Blücher is informed that Thielemann is attacked by a superior force at Wavre—He does not allow this circumstance to deter him from his present purpose—Bülow attacks Planchenoit—Contest in the village—The Prussian troops driven out—Having rallied, they renew their attack—Napoleon detaches two battalions of the old guard to Planchenoit—The Prussians are again driven out of the village, and pursued as far as their main position—French and Prussian cavalry become engaged—Napoleon, perceiving preparations on the part of the Prussians for renewing the attack upon Planchenoit, detaches General Pelet with another battalion of the old guard to that village—Critical situation of Napoleon—He resolves on making a renewed and formidable attack upon Wellington's line—Wellington despatches Lieut. Colonel Fremantle to the left, to seek for the Prussian forces expected on that flank—Situation of the Duke, and state of the Anglo-allied troops—Napoleon's dispositions for the attack—The advanced guard of Zieten's corps approaches the extreme left of the Anglo-allied line—Vivian's and Vandeleur's light cavalry-brigades are removed from that flank to the centre—Wellington's dispositions—Centre of the Duke's line vigorously assailed by the French troops collected in and about La Haye Sainte—Sudden and destructive fire opened upon Kielmansegge's brigade from French guns brought up to the very crest of the Allied position—The Prince of Orange is wounded whilst leading forward the Nassau troops to repel the French

attack upon that part of the line—Wellington reinforces the latter with five battalions of Brunswick infantry—These, together with Kielmansegge's, Ompteda's, and Kruse's brigades, are compelled to fall back a short distance—The Duke rallies the Brunswickers, who maintain their ground, as do also the before mentioned brigades—Vivian's hussar-brigade draws up in rear of these troops—Kielmansegge, on whom the command of the 3rd division has devolved, succeeds in establishing the latter upon its former position.

BLÜCHER's dispositions for the grand flank movement of his army towards the field on which Wellington had announced to him his intention of accepting battle from Napoleon, provided he might calculate on the Marshal's assistance, were fully described in Chapter VIII. Reconnoitring parties and patrols had been pushed forward, early in the day, to feel for the left of the Anglo-allied army, the communication with which was successfully established. It then became desirable to explore the ground that lay more to the right front of the Prussians, in the direction of the right flank of the main French army, in order to ascertain the nature of any precautionary measures adopted by Napoleon to impede the junction of the Allied commanders. Major von Lützow, of the Staff, was sent upon this duty, with a detachment of the 2nd Silesian hussars; and on reaching the wood of Paris, he not only found this unoccupied, but discovered that no steps whatever had been taken by the French to cover and secure their right flank. A Prussian troop of hussars advanced beyond the wood of Paris, to a point near Frischermont,

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whence it had a good view of both the French and Allied dispositions and movements ; and where it was not even menaced by the approach of any hostile party.

As Major von Lützow, fully alive to the importance of speedily occupying the wood of Paris, was returning to communicate the above intelligence to the Prince, he met General von Grolman, the quarter master general of the army, to whom he immediately represented how matters stood ; when this officer directly pushed forward the Silesian hussars and two battalions of infantry from Bülow's advanced guard, to take possession of the wood, these troops having fortunately just crossed the defile of St. Lambert. Grolman at the same time sent a message to the Prince, suggesting that the 15th and 16th brigades should be ordered to follow the advanced guard, as soon as they should be collected on the French side of the defile.

Great as had been the difficulties hitherto encountered along the Prussian line of march, the passage of the defile of St. Lambert seemed to present an almost insurmountable obstacle. The rain which had set in during the afternoon of the 17th, and had continued without cessation the entire night, had transformed the valley of the Lasne into a perfect swamp. The miry and watery state of the roads between Wavre and St. Lambert, had caused so many stoppages and breaks in the columns that they were frequently

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lengthened out for miles. Blücher showed himself on every point of the line of march, encouraging his exhausted soldiers, and inciting them to renewed efforts. The troops, after a short halt to collect their scattered ranks, entered the defile. As the ground yielded to their pressure, both cavalry and infantry became dispirited; and when the artillery were fairly checked, by the guns sinking axle-deep; and the men, already worn down by fatigue, were required to work them out, their murmurs broke forth in exclamations of—“We *cannot* get on.” “But we *must* get on,” was old Blücher’s reply; “I have given my word to Wellington, and you will surely not make me break it: only exert yourselves a few hours longer, children, and certain victory is ours.” This appeal from their venerated chief was not made in vain: it served to revive the drooping energies of the wearied, and to stimulate still further to successful exertion the more robust and able-bodied.

At length, after considerable delay and constant difficulty, the passage of the 15th and 16th brigades, as also of the reserve of both cavalry and artillery was accomplished, and by four o’clock these troops had ascended the opposite slope of the valley, and reached the plateau of the ridge which, constituting the narrow interval between the Lasne and the Smohain, with a rapid fall on either side towards those streams, presented a comparatively dry and firm soil, favourable for the

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As the troops reached the wood of Paris, they were disposed, with a considerable front, and in a close compact order, on each side of the road leading from Lasne towards Planchenoit. The artillery kept the road itself; and the cavalry was drawn up in rear of the wood, ready to follow the infantry.

The 13th and 14th brigades were expected to join in a short time; and Pirch's corps was following along the same line. It had been Blücher's intention to await the arrival of these troops, and then to debouch with the assembled force; but having watched the progress of the battle, he became apprehensive, on perceiving the tremendous cannonade, and the renewed attack after four o'clock, that the enemy might direct a still greater force against Wellington's line, and succeed in breaking the latter before he commenced the attack on his side of the field. He could clearly distinguish Napoleon's reserves, in rear of La Belle Alliance, evidently prepared for being launched against the Anglo-allied line, which had already sustained the most desperate attacks. The frequent and pressing communications he had received from the Duke, also showed how anxiously the latter relied on his support. These considerations satisfied the Prince, that the moment had arrived in which his appearance on the field would

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be productive of consequences the most favourable to the views of his ally, and the most influential on the development of their combined exertions; and he now gave the order for the attack to commence, even with the small amount of force then at his disposal, as also for the hastening of the march of the troops still in the rear.

It was half-past four o'clock when the 15th and 16th brigades debouched from the wood of Paris; the former on the right, the latter on the left; and each in the usual brigade-formation for advance peculiar to Prussian tactics. The direction of the attack was perpendicular to the right flank of the French army, and consequently, also, to the Charleroi road, which constituted the French main line of operation.

In order to cover the left flank, Colonel von Hiller, commanding the 16th brigade, detached both the 3rd battalions of the 15th regiment and the 1st Silesian landwehr, under Major von Keller, to keep a look-out in that direction as far as the rivulet of the Lasne; beyond which, Major von Falkenhausen was scouring the country with 100 horsemen of the 3rd regiment of Silesian landwehr-cavalry. General von Losthin, commanding the 15th brigade, detached three battalions towards Frischermont and Smohain, to cover the right flank. They were the 2nd battalion of the 18th regiment, and the 3rd battalion of the

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3rd Silesian landwehr, followed by the 1st battalion of the former regiment.

Domont's cavalry continued drawn up *en po-
tence*, and was at a considerable distance from the Prussian advance, when Blücher ordered a cannonade to open upon it, more with a view to make known his arrival to the Anglo-allied army, and to induce the French to withhold the employment of a still greater force against the latter, than from any motive affecting his own immediate operations at the moment.

Domont now sent forward a regiment of chasseurs à cheval to attack the Prussian column, whilst he followed with his whole line. Hereupon the 2nd Silesian hussars, and the 2nd Neumark landwehr-cavalry, moved through the intervals of the infantry, and formed up in front, the hussars to the left, and the landwehr to the right. They then advanced, followed by the 3rd Silesian landwehr-cavalry in support, and drove back the French chasseurs; but becoming menaced in flank, and observing Domont's whole line advancing, they were, in their turn, compelled to retire. This movement was covered by the horse-battery No. 11, and more particularly by Captain Schmidt's foot-battery of the 15th brigade, which drew up to oppose the pursuit of the French cavalry. The vigorous fire which continued to be maintained by both these batteries, combined with the advance of

the Prussian infantry-columns, induced Domont to decline following up his attack at the moment.

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The three battalions already mentioned as having been detached to the right, had, by this time, reached Smohain. Their advance in that direction had been conducted with so much caution, that they debouched from the south-eastern inclosures of the village most unexpectedly for both the Allied troops in that vicinity, and the infantry forming the extreme right of the French front line. The Prussians continued to advance; crossed the principal fence which separated them from the French extreme right, and drew up in line almost at right angles with the direction of the enemy's front—two battalions in line, with the third in support. It was half-past five o'clock when this took place. The French at once advanced against them, whereupon the Prussians retired, and after regaining the hedges in the valley, lined the latter as skirmishers, and maintained a vigorous and successful *tirailade* with their opponents.

In the mean time Napoleon, judging from the boldness of the Prussian advance, that considerable support was at hand, and apprehensive, no doubt, of the evil consequence likely to arise from that advance, if not promptly and effectually checked, had ordered the 6th corps, under Count Lobau, to move forthwith to the right from its

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reserve-station, in rear of La Belle Alliance, and, in conjunction with Domont's cavalry, take up a position favourable for repelling the attack by which he was menaced on that side of the field. Blücher, observing this disposition, the execution of which was effected with great rapidity and in good order, proceeded to give a broader and more imposing front to his own troops. He extended his right flank to the wooded heights of Frischermont, and rested his left upon a ravine descending to the Lasne, close to the wood of Virère. The reserve-cavalry, under Prince William of Prussia, was put in motion, in two columns, towards the left flank, on which it was subsequently formed up.

When Lobau's corps moved off to the right, the regiments of the old and middle guard advanced and took up the position, in reserve, which it had occupied on the heights in rear of La Belle Alliance.

As Lobau's corps advanced and passed Domont's cavalry, the latter was disposed as a support. Having crossed the valley which, commencing from the ridge above Planchenoit, on the north side of the village, descends towards Smohain, he opened a brisk fire from his guns upon Bülow's line. A spirited cannonade ensued, in the course of which the Prussian foot-battery No. 14 had three guns disabled. It was not long, however, before the remaining brigades of Bülow's corps,

the 13th and 14th, came up. Their batteries hastened to the front, and materially increased the force of the Prussian fire. ✓ 16th of June.

Blücher, who had now the whole of Bülow's corps at his disposal, was bent upon following up his original intention of directing his attack against the enemy's rear. With this view he made the 16th brigade take ground to its left, and brought up the 14th brigade in its rear, as a support; whilst at the same time he supplied the place of the former in the line by posting the 13th brigade on the left of the 15th. General von Hacke, who commanded the 13th brigade, detached the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 2nd Neumark landwehr to the right, in support of the troops in Smohain. A portion of this detachment occupied Frischermont, thus obtaining an *appui* for the Prussian right flank, and securing the communication with the Prince of Saxe-Weimar's brigade, posted among the inclosures in front of the extreme left of the Anglo-allied army. This flank was also covered by the West Prussian uhlands and the 2nd Neumark landwehr-cavalry, that had been detached from the reserve-cavalry of the 4th corps, under Prince William of Prussia, which was following, as a support, the left wing of Bülow's line, now advancing in the direction of Planchenoit. The artillery along the Prussian line had by this time assumed a formidable appearance, the following batteries of the corps having come successively

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into action,—the 12-pounder batteries Nos. 3 and 5, the 6-pounder batteries Nos. 2, 13, 14, and 21, and the horse-batteries Nos. 11 and 12—comprising altogether 64 guns.

The ground over which Bülow's corps was now in the act of advancing, was highly favourable for the development of a force destined to attack the flank of an army, the front of which was so completely *aux prises* with the enemy as was that of the French at this moment. Nearly at all points it commanded the position occupied by the French right *en potence*; the line was remarkably well *appui'd* on the flanks; and its front was parallel with the enemy's main line of operation.

The force which Lobau had at his disposal was greatly inferior to that of the corps he was sent to oppose. The former amounted to 16 battalions, 18 squadrons, and 42 guns—the latter (exclusive of the six battalions and eight squadrons detached to the right) consisted of 30 battalions, 27 squadrons, and 64 guns. He could not present a front sufficiently extensive and compact that would secure him from being turned in either flank. Hence, when he perceived that the principal force in this well-planned attack was advancing from the Prussian left, in the direction of Planchenoit, which then lay in his right rear, unoccupied by any French troops, he felt the necessity of retiring towards the Charleroi road, which he did by withdrawing his brigades *en échiquier*.

It was not long before several round shot from the Prussian batteries reached the Charleroi road ; 18th of June.
some of them falling both in front and in rear of La Belle Alliance, where Napoleon was then stationed. It was evident to the latter that, unless reinforcements were despatched in support of Lobau, his right flank, already so seriously menaced, would speedily be turned. His trusty guard, with which, in former campaigns, he had so frequently succeeded in stemming the current that had suddenly set in against him from some previously hidden source, and threatened to overwhelm him, constituted the sole reserve at his disposal. Engaged during so many hours in carrying on a desperate attack along his whole front, without having as yet secured one single point of vantage ground, he clearly foresaw that without some vigorous effort, by aid of a powerful reserve, no ray of victory would ever gleam upon his arms on that side of the field. But now that he was also engaged in defensive operations, along his right, against another enemy, by whom even his rear, and the main line of his retreat became endangered, the necessity of employing a portion of this reserve in a direction different from that which he had contemplated, was alike obvious and urgent. The appearance of Bülow's left bearing down upon Planchenoit, turning Lobau's right, and the powerful batteries along the Prussian front, admirably disposed in accordance with the favourable nature

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of the ground, over which the whole line was gradually approaching, distinctly indicated the immediate possession of that village in force, as the true and only measure that could be adopted for averting the impending danger. The two divisions of the young guard, posted on the plateau on the right of the chaussée close to Rosomme, and consisting of four battalions of voltigeurs, and four battalions of tirailleurs, were the nearest at hand for the occupation of Planchenoit, and Napoleon accordingly desired General Duhesme instantly to march thither with that force, accompanied by 24 pieces of cannon of the guard, and place himself on the right of Lobau's corps.

It was about this time (six o'clock) that Napoleon replied to Ney's demand for fresh infantry, "*Ou voulez-vous que j'en prenne? Voulez-vous que j'en fasse?*"* an expression, the force of which is rendered sufficiently obvious by the critical circumstances of his position.

It was also at this period that Blücher received intelligence that Thielemann was attacked by a superior force at Wavre, and that it was doubtful whether he would be able to maintain his ground. But the determination of the Prince to carry out his present plan of attack was fixed and irrevocable. He saw clearly that it was on the field where he himself stood, that the fate of the campaign must

* See page 104.

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be decided; and that by giving the fullest effect in his power to the combined operation which he had pre-concerted with Wellington, and which was already developing itself with so fair a prospect of success, he was pursuing the right, and the only course, by which the main army of Napoleon could be overthrown—a course founded upon the leading principle of all strategy, that of bringing the greatest mass to bear upon the decisive point. He immediately gave orders that Thielemann should be directed to hold out as well as he could, and to dispute every inch of ground with his opponents. At the same time he desired Bülow to continue pressing forward with his left, and to gain possession of the village of Planchenoit.

Colonel von Hiller, who commanded the 16th brigade, formed the latter into three columns of attack. Two battalions of the 15th regiment, under Major von Wittig, marched on the right against the village; two battalions of the 1st Silesian landwehr, under Major von Fischer, in the centre; and two battalions of the 2nd Silesian landwehr, under Lieut. Colonel von Blandowsky, formed the left column. The 14th brigade followed as a reserve, sending forward the 1st battalions of the 11th regiment and 1st Pomeranian landwehr, as a support to the columns of attack.

In the mean time the troops of the young guard had occupied Planchenoit, and made their dispositions for its defence. As the skirmishers that pre-

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ceded the Prussian columns approached the eastern inclosures of the village, they were received with a most destructive fire by the French tirailleurs. Some pieces of artillery were also brought to bear directly upon the columns, which, nevertheless, advanced with great bravery and steadiness, captured a howitzer and two guns, and gained possession of the churchyard. The occupation of this spot, which is naturally strong, being inclosed within a low stone wall, strengthened nearly all round by a steep outer bank, and commanding by its elevated position a very considerable portion of the village, appeared to offer great security to the Prussian troops, but the young guard, evidently prepared for this contingency, flew to the surrounding houses and gardens, whence they opened a concentrated fire upon the possessors of the churchyard. To this the latter replied with great spirit, and as the distance by which the hostile parties were separated was extremely limited, numbers fell in rapid succession on both sides. At length the French supports having come up and joined in this contest, and one of the columns having shown itself in rear of the Prussians, the latter were compelled to abandon the advantages they had acquired, and to withdraw altogether from the village. They were followed by some of Lobau's cavalry, which, however, having fallen into the line of fire of the Prussian battery, No. 2, was forced to retire.

The Prussian troops that had been driven out of

Planchenoit immediately rallied and re-formed. The 2nd battalions of the 11th regiment, and 1st Pomeranian landwehr now joined their respective 1st battalions, which had previously acted in support of the attacking columns, and advanced to a second assault, followed by the 15th regiment.

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Napoleon, perceiving the determination of the Prussian commander to persevere in his attack upon Planchenoit, as also his dispositions for completely turning the French right, ordered General Morand, colonel-in-chief of the chasseurs à pied of the old guard to march to the village with a battalion from each of the second regiments of grenadiers and chasseurs. These battalions reached the scene of action just as the Prussians had re-entered the village; and taking the lead in the contest, succeeded in driving them out of the place, pursuing them as far as their main position on the opposite heights. Here the French skirmishers penetrated amongst the Prussian batteries, but were overthrown and cut up by the 4th squadron of the 2d Silesian hussars. The French cavalry now showed a disposition to advance, and it was not long before a regiment of lancers, which took the lead, was attacked and defeated by the 8th Prussian hussars. In following up the pursuit, however, after their charge, the hussars were suddenly involved in the fire from a battalion of French infantry, and were forced to fall back. On the other hand, a regiment of French chasseurs à

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cheval was driven off in a similar manner by a Prussian battalion.

By the advance of the 16th and 14th brigades against Planchenoit, a vacant space had been created in the Prussian line between those troops and the 13th and 15th brigades, which still maintained their ground with great gallantry, in the open field on the right. This vacant space was now covered by the main body of the reserve-cavalry of Bülow's corps, commanded by Prince William of Prussia, which by its perfect steadiness and good countenance, not only induced the enemy to confine himself to the defensive, but advanced in support of the Prussian infantry, even into the midst of the opposing musketry fire, and here occupied the place which, had the line been complete, would have been held by infantry. On this occasion, the loss of the Prussian cavalry was considerable. The brigadiers, Colonel Count Schwerin, and Lieut. Colonel von Watzdorf, were killed. The latter, although previously wounded, would not quit the field, and was soon afterwards struck by a shot which deprived the Prussian army of a very distinguished officer.

Napoleon, observing preparatory dispositions for a renewal of the attack on Planchenoit by Bülow, who was only waiting for the co-operation and support of Pirch's corps which was now rapidly approaching, deemed it advisable to send a further reinforcement to the troops in the village.

This consisted of the 1st battalion of the 2nd regiment of the chasseurs of the guard, under General Pelet, to whom he represented the great importance of maintaining possession of Planchenoit. At the same time orders were sent to the 1st battalion of the 1st regiment of chasseurs of the guard, which was with the Emperor's baggage at Caillou, to march to the wood of Chantelet, for the purpose of covering the right of Planchenoit, and securing the village from being turned.

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The situation of Napoleon had become critical in the extreme. The Prussian attack seemed to be checked for the moment, and the occupation of Planchenoit in sufficient force held out the prospect of a protracted, if not a successful, struggle in that quarter, should the attack be renewed. Still it must have appeared sufficiently evident to the Emperor that Blücher was but awaiting either the arrival of an additional portion of his army, or the favourable moment when he might combine his attack with a simultaneous one by Wellington. Should the Prussian general succeed in defeating the troops comprising the French right *en potence*, Napoleon's line of retreat by the Charleroi road would be completely intercepted, and his main front line being thus taken in flank and rear, would become an easy prey to the Anglo-allied army. He might yet attempt a skilful retreat upon Nivelles, but with an army so exhausted by its repeated and ineffectual attacks upon Wellington's unshaken

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line, this would have been a hazardous operation. It is, moreover, very questionable whether the idea of retreat ever entered into his views ; for a retreat, after such sacrifices had been made, harassed and interrupted as it undoubtedly would be by the two hostile armies, which had succeeded in effecting a junction, must prove no less disastrous than a signal defeat, and equally involve the downfall of his military and political power. Hence his desperate resolve to peril the fate of his brave army and of his resuscitated empire upon another and a final struggle for victory over Wellington, whose troops had with such truly heroic courage, and such inflexible endurance, successfully withstood the most furious attacks which he had repeatedly launched against them during the whole day. By a victory alone, no matter how dearly purchased, could he hope to keep alive the national enthusiasm which he had again awakened, but which would assuredly relapse into irrecoverable apathy, should the *prestige* of returning glory be torn from the idol of the military portion of his subjects, and the empire become again exposed to be overrun by those foreign legions that had once more taken up arms, with a firm resolve finally to crush a power, the existence of which was incompatible with the security and independence of the states of Europe.

As the prospect of the consequences of failure thus flashed across his mind, Napoleon, like a des-

perate gambler, driven to his last stake, determined to risk his *all* upon another venture. The 18th of June. meditated blow was to be struck against his bold antagonist, Wellington, whose line was to be attacked along its entire front by a simultaneous effort, while its right and centre were to be forced at all hazards. He immediately ordered General Druot to collect all the battalions of the guard that were still in reserve, in front of La Belle Alliance. These were accordingly moved forward from their position near the house of De Coster ; and the ~~two~~ battalions of the 1st regiment of grenadiers, which had previously been stationed on the height in rear of La Belle Alliance, were now destined to form a reserve to the attacking columns. D'Erlon and Reille were at the same time ordered to advance the whole of the remaining disposable force against the enemy, with a view to second the main attack. The centre of the Anglo-allied line, immediately in rear of La Haye Sainte was not to be allowed a moment's respite from the attacks which continued to be made against it by the troops occupying, and debouching from, that farm. These were also to carry the centre by assault, as soon as the guard should reach the height. ✓

Wellington, who seemed to have acquired a thorough insight into his opponent's designs, having satisfied himself that his position was destined shortly to be again assailed by a formidable force, became anxious for the arrival of the Prussian

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troops expected on his extreme left. He desired his aide-de-camp, Lieut. Colonel Fremantle,* to proceed immediately in that direction, to hasten the advance of any corps he might fall in with, and to represent to its commander that if he would supply him with the means of strengthening those points along his line which had been so seriously weakened by repeated attacks, he entertained no doubt of not only maintaining his ground, but of also gaining the victory.

Although the Duke was fully aware that Bülow's corps was in active operation against the extreme right of the French army, the ground upon which that operation was mainly carried on was too remote from his own immediate sphere of action to admit of his calculating upon support from it, beyond that of a diversion of the enemy's forces; and it was only from the high ground on which the extreme left of the Anglo-allied line rested, that a general view could be obtained of the Prussian movements. As regards, however, the village of Planchenoit itself, the spire of the church was all that could be seen even from the point alluded to, so that it was scarcely possible to distinguish which was the successful party in that quarter. Napoleon might (as he really did) present an efficient check to the Prussian attack, and, at the same time, retain sufficient force where-

* Now Major General Fremantle, C.B.

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with he might make another vigorous assault upon the Anglo-allied army. When, therefore, the Duke beheld his line so fearfully reduced in numbers, which he had no means of replacing, and which the indomitable courage of his British and German troops alone had hitherto been able to supply, it is not surprising that he should have manifested some little impatience for the arrival of that portion of the Prussian forces which was to co-operate more immediately with his own army. The latter, with the exception of the Dutch-Belgian troops, which still continued in reserve, for it was useless to place them where they would be exposed to the brunt of the battle-shock, presented but a mere wreck of that proud array which it had displayed in the morning. But, if the vain confidence of strength had departed, the more noble pride of unflinching bravery still remained unshaken. Exposed, however, as they had been for so many hours to a tremendous cannonade, which only ceased at times but to give place to attacks of cavalry and musketry, their exemplary passive forbearance seemed, in some instances, to be approaching its utmost limits. Frequent messages reached the Duke from commanding officers, soliciting reinforcements and support, since their corps were reduced to skeletons; but the only reply they received was, that no reinforcements could be granted, and that they must hold their ground to the last man. Occasion-

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ally too, as he rode along the line, a murmur would reach his ear, indicative of impatience to be led against the enemy. This would draw from him some encouraging appeal, such as "Wait a little longer, my lads, and your wishes shall be gratified."

In all three arms of the service the losses had been awfully severe. Battalions, dwindled to mere handfuls of men, were commanded by either captains or subalterns. A vast number of guns along the whole extent of the line had been disabled. The British and German cavalry-brigades, with the exception of Vivian's and Vandeleur's on the left, were reduced to less than the ordinary strength of regiments—Somerset's and Ponsonby's brigades united did not comprise two squadrons. Many, it is true, had quitted the ranks to assist the wounded; but if among these were to be found the weak and faint-hearted, the brave spirits that remained nobly represented the valour and devotion which, under the guidance of a master-hand, were destined to be crowned with lasting triumph. Familiarized as the men had become with scenes, in rapid succession, of violent death, under almost every variety of aspect, from the sudden gush of life to the slow and lingering anguish—from the calm and tranquil sleep "that knows no waking," to the ghastly writhings of convulsive death-throes, the short and frequent command of "Close up!" as their comrades fell around them, was as

mechanically obeyed as would have been any common parade-order in a barrack-square.

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Such was the situation of the troops against which Napoleon was meditating an assault with all the force he could collect, in the hope—his last and only hope—of seeing his eagles soaring in triumph over those heights upon which the British standard continued to wave in proud defiance.

The battalions of the imperial guard which had ✓ been collected in front of La Belle Alliance, and which were to constitute the leading feature in the general attack upon the Anglo-allied line, consisted of ten battalions, exclusive of the two battalions of the 1st regiment of grenadiers, destined, as previously observed, to remain as a reserve. These ten battalions were formed into two columns of attack. The first comprised four battalions of the middle guard, namely, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 3rd regiment of grenadiers, and the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 3rd regiment of chasseurs. It was formed in mass of battalions, and destined to advance against the centre of the right wing of the Anglo-allied army. The second column of attack consisted of the four remaining battalions of the middle guard—namely, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 4th regiment of grenadiers, and the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 4th regiment of chasseurs—and of two battalions of the old guard, namely, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 1st regiment of

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chasseurs. These six battalions were moved down into the hollow adjoining the south-eastern angle of the inclosures of Hougomont, and there formed into a column in mass, which was to support the first column, and to direct its advance somewhat more to the left.*

In rear, and on the right and left, of these columns, stood the remains of that splendid cavalry, with which Wellington's line had been so furiously and so perseveringly assailed, occupying the interval that had been continually augmenting between d'Erlon's and Reille's corps. They formed the last and only cavalry-reserve remaining at Napoleon's disposal, for following up the attack by the guard, should the latter prove successful, or for covering its retreat, in the event of failure.

It was shortly before the columns of attack were put in motion that Vivian, whose hussar-brigade it will be recollected, was posted upon the extreme left of the Anglo-allied line, was informed by patrols which he had detached to look out to his left for the expected arrival of the Prussians, that the latter were advancing in force along the road

* At this time a French officer of cuirassiers galloped up to the Allied line, as a deserter, and joining Lieut. Colonel Sir Augustus Fraser, (commanding the British horse artillery,) and Major Blair, (brigade major to Major General Adam's brigade,) who were together in rear of the 52d regiment, he announced to them that the line would be attacked, within half an hour, by Napoleon with the imperial guard. Sir Augustus, after having requested Major Blair to look to the deserter, rode off to communicate this information to the Duke. Blair sent the French officer to the rear, in charge of a serjeant of the 52nd regiment.

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from Ohain. Having satisfied himself as to the fact, and perceiving their advanced cavalry coming on, Vivian felt that there could be no longer any apprehension of the left of the army being turned; and, having previously understood from Sir William Delancey* and other staff officers, that fresh cavalry was much wanted in the centre, he proposed to Vandeleur, who was on his right, and who was his senior officer, that the two brigades should move towards the centre, where they might be of service. Vandeleur declined to act without orders; whereupon Vivian put his own brigade in motion, passing along the rear of Vandeleur's, and soon after having commenced his march he met Lord Uxbridge, who was much pleased to find that the Duke's wishes had thus been anticipated, and sent orders to Vandeleur to follow, accompanying the former brigade himself towards the centre, passing along the foot of the slope in rear of the position of the left wing of the Anglo-allied line.

The Prussian troops, whose approach had thus induced Vivian to quit the extreme left, were the advanced guard of Zieten's corps, and consisted of a part of the 1st infantry-brigade, namely, the 3rd battalion 12th regiment, the 1st and 2nd battalions 24th regiment, the 3rd battalion 1st Westphalian landwehr, and the 1st and 3rd Silesian rifle companies; as also of a part of the reserve-cavalry,

* Colonel Sir William Delancey, K.C.B., Deputy Quarter Master General, was mortally wounded in this battle.

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namely, the 1st ~~Silesian~~ hussars, the Brandenburg uhlans, the Brandenburg dragoons, and the 2nd Kurmark landwehr-cavalry. They had already been joined by Lieut. Colonel Fremantle, who delivered to Zieten the Duke's message,* in reply to which that general remarked that he did not feel himself authorized to detach his corps in the manner proposed, adding, however, that the great mass of the Prussian army was arriving upon the field.

✓ The remainder of the reserve-cavalry which was commanded by Lieut. General von Röder, together with the main body of the corps, were still considerably in the rear. They were met by Captain Jackson† of the British staff-corps, who had been sent to look for them. These troops did not reach the field of battle until after the victory had been decided.‡

Wellington, finding that there was no chance of his shattered line being strengthened by the arrival, in sufficient time, of a Prussian force from his left, to support his weak points of defence, and that he must therefore depend solely on his own resources for the means of warding off the desperate blow which Napoleon was about to strike, immediately made such dispositions as the circumstances of the moment appeared to him to demand.

* See page 144.

† Now Major Basil Jackson, h.p. Royal Staff corps.

‡ The effective strength of the Prussian troops on the field of Waterloo, is given in Appendix II.

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The incessant attacks made by the French light-troops debouching from La Haye Sainte, from the moment that farm fell into their possession, had caused great havoc in the centre of his line, where the want of reinforcement became most apparent. To meet this deficiency, he ordered the Brunswick battalions, which stood at this time in rear of Maitland's and Adam's brigades—namely, the 2nd and 3rd light, and the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd line, battalions, to move by their left into the interval between Halkett's British, and Kruse's Nassau, brigades. To occupy the ground thus vacated by the Brunswickers, he put in motion d'Aubremé's Dutch-Belgian infantry-brigade from its recently-assumed position in rear of the Nivelles road; whence the other brigade of Chassé's Dutch-Belgian division, under Major General Ditmer, was shortly afterwards ordered to move in the direction of the left of Maitland's British brigade. The remains of his cavalry stood in rear of the centre, towards which Vivian's and Vandeleur's brigades were now moving from the left, as previously explained.*

* It was about this time that the Duke, having observed six guns on the right of Captain Bolton's battery, abandoned by the Belgians, desired Colonel Sir George Wood (who commanded the artillery) to have them withdrawn from the front line to the rear, a duty which was immediately assigned to, and executed by, Lieutenant Anderson,¹ and a party of the before-mentioned battery, with the exception of one gun, which being more in advance, and the French columns approaching, covered by their skirmishers, could not be removed with safety.

¹ Now Major William C. Anderson, Royal Artillery.

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Whilst the imperial guard was forming for attack, the French troops in possession of La Haye Sainte and its inclosures, now consisting of the entire of Donzelot's division, from the left of d'Erlon's corps, renewed, with redoubled vigour, their assault upon the centre of the Allied line; the object being evidently either to force that point previously to the arrival of the guard on its left, and thus facilitate the assault to be made by the latter, or to harass it in such a manner that, should the effort of the guard prove successful, they would be enabled completely to overthrow the Allied centre. The fire from the skirmishers that had located themselves between the farm and the position, and from those on the knoll by the sandpit, on the opposite side of the high road, had been incessant since the capture of that post. Ompteda's brigade of the King's German legion, which had hitherto occupied the hollow-way that descends into the chaussée, was reduced to a mere handful of men: the two squares in which Kielmansegge's Hanoverian brigade, the next on the (Allied) right, had stood its ground so many hours, were fearfully diminished; Kruse's Nassau brigade, still further to the right, formed in three contiguous columns, (two in front and one in rear,) began to evince symptoms of hesitation; and the interval between this and Halkett's British brigade had become much greater than was consistent with the due security of this part of the line. So weakened indeed was the

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latter at this period, that, to remedy the evil, in some degree, it had been deemed advisable, with a view rather of giving it the appearance of greater strength than of affording any very active support, to draw close up in its rear, the skeleton remains of the Scots Greys and of the 3rd hussars of the King's German Legion. On the Allied left of the high road, an unremitting fire was maintained against their opponents by the 95th and 4th British regiments in extended order along the front hedge of the Wavre road, commencing from the Charleroi chaussée, as also from the 40th, 79th, 1st, and 28th British regiments, deployed behind the embanked hedge on the rear side of that road. The 27th British regiment had been brought up by Lambert, and posted in square, in the angle formed by the junction of the above roads, having one face parallel with, and close to, the chaussée, for the purpose either of throwing a flank fire upon the French troops on the opposite side, should these succeed, as appeared very probable, in compelling Ompteda's and Kielmansegge's brigades to retire, or, of pouring a close, deadly volley upon any column endeavouring to penetrate along the high road itself. The artillery on the Allied right of the high road, in front of these brigades, was at this moment completely disabled. Two British artillerymen were observed vainly endeavouring to serve a couple of guns, but were

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compelled to desist from the want of all material for loading.

Such was the state of things in the centre of the Anglo-allied army, when the continued popping fire from the French skirmishers suddenly quickened into a fierce tirailade, which threatened to bear down every thing opposed to it. The bank along the high road, beyond the garden of La Haye Sainte, and the mound adjoining it, which latter was quite close to the Allied position, became all at once thickly crowded with skirmishers. Those that lined the bank seemed intent upon keeping down the fire from the British regiments of Kempt's and Lambert's brigades, along the Wavre road, while those under cover of the little mound in advance, as if aware of the object of the formation of the 27th British regiment, and sensible of the necessity of securing their right flank in their meditated forcing of the position, opened such a close, sharp, fire upon that regiment, that, within the brief space of a few minutes, it lost more than half of its numbers. At the same time, taking advantage of the crippled state of the Allied artillery in this quarter, the French brought up two guns in advance of the north-western angle of the garden of La Haye Sainte, in which position they were covered from any fire from the opposite side of the high road, by the skirmishers occupying the bank and the mound. From these

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guns a smart fire of grape was opened, and maintained without intermission, upon the left square of Kielmansegge's brigade, (consisting of the field-battalions Grubenhagen and York,) at the short distance of 150, and afterwards of scarcely 100, paces. The square manifested the most exemplary submission and forbearance, notwithstanding the ravages that continued to be made in its ranks; not venturing to reply to the fire, by the apprehension of cavalry being under the brow of the position, prepared to take instant advantage of any favourable opportunity for a charge. The right square (consisting of the field-battalions Bremen and Verden) also suffered most severely. Some other guns, which had accompanied the columns in rear of the French skirmishers, were suddenly brought forward, and opened so destructive a discharge of grape upon this latter square, that one of its sides was literally completely blown away; the remainder being left standing in the form of a triangle. The commander, and many other officers, were wounded. The ammunition was failing rapidly. The combined fire of grape and musketry continued to increase in violence; and the square finally dwindled into a mere clump of men. The French *tirailleurs* continued pressing forward in a very compact line, whilst the sound of drums beating the *pas de charge* announced the advance of the columns immediately in their rear. The Prince of Orange, perceiving the probability of

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the centre of the Allied line being forced, unless some great effort were made to check the enemy's advance, ordered the 1st and 2nd Nassau battalions of Kruse's brigade to charge, gallantly placing himself at their head. His Royal Highness was soon struck by a bullet in the left shoulder ; the attack failed ; and the Nassauers were falling back, when the reinforcement which Wellington had provided for this part of the line,* consisting of five battalions of Brunswick infantry, moved rapidly into the interval between Kruse's Nassau, and Halkett's British, brigades. But so unexpectedly did the Brunswickers find themselves placed under a most destructive fire, and so suddenly were the heads of their columns assailed, that they were unable, in the midst of the thick smoke in which they became involved, to recover from the partial irregularities by which, under such circumstances, their advance was accompanied, and to form up in sufficient order, before they came in close contact with the enemy, whose vigorous attack compelled them, as also Kruse's, Kielmansegge's, and Ompteda's brigades, to fall back about a hundred paces.

At this critical moment, Wellington hastened to the spot in person, to avert so alarming a catastrophe as that of having his centre broken, at a time, too, when he was preparing to receive a for-

* See page 151.

midable attack, directed against another point of his line, situated at but a short distance on the right of that centre. He addressed himself to the Brunswickers, and succeeded, by the electrifying influence of his voice, gesture, and presence, in rallying the discomfited columns. The 3rd line-battalion, under Major von Normann, was the first to re-form in good order: it then boldly stood its ground; and, when the enemy's infantry approached, received it with so destructive a fire as completely to check its further advance. ✓

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By dint of example and encouragement on the part of all the commanding officers, the brigades on the left of the Brunswickers were also rallied and formed up: upon seeing which, the Duke galloped off to the right.

Just at this time, Vivian's hussar-brigade drew up immediately in rear of these troops—relieving the exhausted remains of the Scots Greys and 3rd hussars of the King's German legion—the 10th and 18th British hussars in front, and the 1st hussars of the King's German legion in second, line. The presence and appearance of this fresh cavalry tended very considerably to restore confidence to that part of the line. The brigade had previously, in consequence of a mistake in the transmission of orders, been halted on the left of the high road about midway between the front line and the farm of Mont St. Jean; whence, however, it was

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speedily brought forward, and posted as above by Lord Uxbridge.*

The Prince of Orange, Alten, Halkett, and almost all the superior officers of the 3rd division

* To the troops comprising Vivian's and Vandeleur's brigades, as they arrived quite fresh from the extreme left, the air of ruin and destruction which met their view in rear of the centre of the line—the desperate struggle which appeared to be carried on upon the crest of the main ridge by a single line of infantry, evidently exhausted by the continuous fight—the almost total absence of *British* cavalry in support of that line—the numbers of wounded retiring both singly and in groups—the whole scene was calculated to inspire them with thoughts by no means akin to anticipations of victory. They quickly partook of the feeling of extreme doubt and uncertainty which pervaded the rest of the army as to the result of the contest, and many imbibed the idea that they had been brought from the left for the purpose of covering a contemplated retreat. “Where is your brigade?” said Sir Hussey Vivian to Lord Edward Somerset. “Here!” replied his lordship, as pointing firstly to a small band of horsemen, amounting to little more than a squadron, and then to the ground covered with dead and dying, clad in red, and with mutilated horses, wandering or turning in circles, he displayed to him the wreck of what had been the household and union brigades of cavalry combined—a force amounting at the commencement of the action, to upwards of 2000 dragoons. Sir Denis Pack, whose brigade consisted altogether of a mere handful of men, posted with its right resting on the Charleroi road, rode up to Sir John Vandeleur, and having told him he had received orders to hold his ground to the last, consulted him as to the most advisable course to be pursued in case of a retreat. But, notwithstanding the gloomy appearance which affairs had assumed, no despondency was perceptible on the part of that portion of the army whose fate it was to bear the whole brunt of the battle; and which, firmly relying on its own indomitable courage, and on the oft-proved skill of its chief, still cherished the hope that by persevering a little longer in those mighty efforts by which the enemy had, during so many hours, been kept at bay, such heroic exertions, though unaided by those on whose effective support they had calculated, would yet be crowned with success. This feeling was aptly expressed by Colonel Sir Felton Harvey, of the Duke's staff, who having ridden to the 18th British hussars, to change his wounded charger, exclaimed as he was in the act of mounting a troop-horse belonging to that regiment—“The Duke of Wellington has won the battle if we could but get the d——d —— to advance.”

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had been wounded. But Kielmansegge, who now commanded in this part of the field, was fully alive to the critical circumstances under which the 3rd division was placed, and exhibited great ability, coolness, and determination, by the manner in which he succeeded in restoring it to order. Still, the persevering and incessant *tirailade* kept up against these troops by the French was such, that the fire thrown out from their shattered and enfeebled ranks was quite inadequate to repress it. The French skirmishers again crowded close up to the line; maintaining a most rapid and destructive fire. The Allied infantry was once more on the point of giving way. One battalion of the Brunswickers was retiring in close column, but in good order, having totally exhausted its ammunition. The Nassauers were falling back *en masse* against the horses' heads of the 10th hussars, who, keeping their files closed, prevented further retreat. Vivian and Captain Shakespeare* of the 10th, (acting as his extra aide-de-camp,) rendered themselves conspicuous at this moment by their endeavours to halt and encourage the Nassauers. The Hanoverians and the German legion on the left, led by Kielmansegge, now resolutely dashed forward, at the double quick—their drums rolling. The enemy fell back. The Brunswickers took up the

* Captain Arthur Shakespeare, of the 10th hussars, afterwards on half-pay of the 99th regiment, retired from the service on the 11th July, 1826.

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movement, as then did also the Nassauers—Vivian and his aide-de-camp cheering them on ; whilst the hussars followed in close support. In this manner, Kielmansegge succeeded in leading back the shattered remnants of the division to the place they had so long and so honourably occupied on the ridge.

Vivian's brigade, by its proximity to these troops, against which so close and unremitting a fire of musketry was maintained, was placed in a very trying situation for cavalry, and suffered much in consequence. As soon, however, as the infantry had rallied and resumed their former position in the line, Vivian withdrew his brigade under the crest of the ridge, a distance of not more than thirty yards, to place his men a little out of fire ; and when thus posted, he was better prepared to make an attack if required.

The fire from the enemy's infantry in front of this part of the line suddenly slackened ; and it was soon manifest that they were falling back : the change arose out of occurrences on their left, which will be explained in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XIV.

Commencement of Napoleon's last grand attack upon Wellington's line—Napoleon stations himself so that the guard may pass by him as it advances to the attack—Disposition of d'Erlon's and Reille's corps—The leading column of the imperial guard suffers severely from the fire of the Allied artillery, as it approaches the Duke's line—Contest between the leading column of the French imperial guards and Maitland's brigade of British guards—The former completely defeated and dispersed—Conduct of d'Aubremé's Dutch-Belgian brigade—Advance of the second attacking column of the imperial guard—Charge upon French cuirassiers by a squadron of the 23rd light dragoons—The second column of the imperial guard charged in flank by Adam's brigade—Its defeat and dispersion by this charge—Adam's brigade continues its forward movement, supported on its right by a battalion of Lieut. Colonel Halkett's Hanoverian brigade—State of d'Aubremé's Dutch-Belgian brigade—Upon the extreme left of the Anglo-allied line, the skirmishers of Durutte's division endeavour to establish themselves in the houses and inclosures in the valley, on that flank, and become engaged with the Prussians in and about Smohain—Blücher's dispositions—Formation and advance of Bülow's left wing for the third attack upon Planchenoit, and of his right wing for a simultaneous attack upon Lobau—Junction of the advanced guard of Zieten's corps with the troops constituting the extreme left of the Anglo-allied army—General view of the disposition of the Prussian forces relatively with that of the Anglo-allied troops—General view of the state of the Anglo-allied army at the period of the attack and defeat of the French imperial guard—Prompt decision and admirable skill evinced by Wellington in seizing upon the advantage presented by the discomfiture of the French guards—Advance of Vivian's hussar-brigade to the attack of Napoleon's reserves near La Belle Alliance—Disposition of these reserves—Brilliant charge by the 10th British hussars—Charge by the 2nd light dragoons of the King's German legion—Adam's brigade, continuing its advance, reaches the nearest French height, intersected by the Charleroi road, and on which three squares of the imperial guard are posted—General advance of the Anglo-allied line—The Duke orders Adam to attack the squares of the imperial guard—The Earl of Uxbridge falls, severely wounded—The imperial guard retires from the

charge by Adam's brigade—Gallant charge by the 18th British hussars near La Belle Alliance—Charge by a party of the 10th British hussars upon a square of the grenadiers of the old guard ; which retires, and eventually disperses—The right, and part of the centre, squadron of the 10th hussars, continuing their pursuit, after the first charge, make another charge upon both infantry and cavalry, on the right, and beyond La Belle Alliance—A party of the 18th hussars makes a dashing but ineffectual charge upon a square, still further in advance—Gallant charges by the 2nd light dragoons of the King's German legion—Lieut. Colonel Halkett, with the Osnabrück landwehr-battalion, pursues a column of the old guard, and captures General Cambronne—Singular situation of the Duke of Wellington.

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It was during the fierce and desperate conflict just described as having taken place in the centre of the Anglo-allied line, that the French imperial guard moved forward to the attack ; and this was the signal for the simultaneous advance of all the disposable battalions of d'Erlon's and Reille's corps. In the preliminary pause which occurred in the fire from the French batteries, from the first moment of the advance until the columns had sufficiently descended from the heights to be below the range of their guns, the thunder of Bülow's artillery upon the French extreme right, and of the guns brought to bear against it, was so distinctly audible that Napoleon, apprehending its evil effects upon the troops, on whose bravery, discipline, and devotion, his fate now hung, despatched aides-de-camp along the line, to spread the false intelligence of the arrival of Grouchy, and to declare that it now required but a little firmness to secure the victory to which they were advancing. The loud shouts with which this an-

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nouncement was received by the troops, who had then descended below the range of the guns, were speedily drowned in the roar that burst forth from the entire line of the French batteries. The effects of this terrific cannonade upon the skeleton ranks of the Allied front line, combined with the aspect of the advancing hosts, tended not in the slightest degree to shake that noble and unequalled courage with which the British and German troops had hitherto sustained every assault. The scene of havoc and devastation which met their view as they looked around them, the constant ravages which they had been destined passively to endure for so many hours, their ranks repeatedly torn open, and their files scattered asunder, as shot and shell plunged in amongst them,—all conduced to excite in the breasts of men of such impenetrable mould, a feeling of exultation and relief, as they observed the approach of the enemy's infantry, and panted for the long-wished-for moment when they might grapple with their deadly foe at close quarters, in a hand-to-hand encounter. Most fully did they realize the expectations entertained of them by their enemy, but admirer, the brave General Foy, who had felt it his duty, prior to the commencement of the battle, to declare to the Emperor, that his Majesty had an infantry opposed to him which he had never known to yield.

The French troops, perceiving their whole front line in motion, felt conscious that the final struggle

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was at hand, and assured that the varied fortunes of the day were to be wound up by some splendid triumph. The guard proudly took the lead in this grand attack—that sacred cohort, whose glory had ever shone conspicuously when a great crisis summoned forth those energies by which its valour and its prowess had acquired for it imperishable renown. The greatest enthusiasm reigned amidst the devoted defenders of the imperial diadem, which was now to be strengthened by the fame of their renewed successes, and adorned with fresh wreaths of never-fading laurels.

Napoleon, nervously anxious to strain to its utmost tension, the daring spirit and high resolve which animated his troops, galloped forward to the inner gentle slope of the eminence on the left of the Charleroi road, which, overlooking the farm of La Haye Sainte, formed the most prominent point of his whole line, and by which was to pass the leading column of the guard, there to strengthen, by the magic spell of his immediate presence, the link which bound their fortunes to his own fate, and to the destiny of the empire. As they approached, he pointed significantly to the Allied position; a gesture which drew forth renewed shouts of “*Vive l’Empereur!*” The fond regards which he seemed to cast upon these, his old and tried campaigners, and the air of confidence he assumed, as he contemplated their advance, riveted upon him the affectionate gaze of the de-

voted band, to hundreds of whom it proved the last look upon the idol for whom they were to sacrifice their lives. 18th of June.

At this time, d'Erlon's corps presented an advance of columns in *échelon* between the Charleroi road and its right flank, which was engaged with the Prussians; whilst Reille's corps, descending in columns, some into the wood, others into the inclosures on the right, and some also, still more to the right, outside of Hougomont, and close upon the centre of the line, seemed bent upon carrying that post by main force, and upon seconding, with one mighty effort, the main attack by the imperial guard. This general advance of columns was preceded by a host of skirmishers, whose line spreading along the valley in front of d'Erlon's corps, gradually became engaged with the light troops of the left wing of the Anglo-allied army, and the sudden impulse given to the rattle of musketry in the wood of Hougomont, betokened that the brave defenders of this post were already engaged in a renewed and desperate struggle for the maintenance of its possession. The French skirmishers between the wood of Hougomont and the extreme left of their army, continued to maintain a desultory warfare with the Allied light troops in their front, consisting of the 3rd regiment of British guards, the light companies of the 14th and 23rd British regiments, and six companies of the 51st British regiment. Piré's light

18th of June. cavalry-brigade was still in the position it had occupied upon the extreme left of the French front line, having a few vedettes thrown out, which were narrowly watched by those belonging to Captain Wodehouse's squadron of the 15th British hussars.*

As the leading column of the imperial guard began to ascend the slightly inclined tongue of ground that projects from that part of the ridge of the Duke's position in rear of the crest of which Maitland's brigade of guards was lying down at the time, it became very much exposed to the concentrated fire from nearly all the batteries of the Anglo-allied right wing, by which the most frightful havoc was dealt amidst its devoted ranks. The line of skirmishers which preceded it, now pushed rapidly and boldly forward up to the very summit of the Duke's position, for the purpose both of concealing by their veil of smoke the precise direction of the advance of the columns, and also of driving away the artillerymen from the guns, by the fire of which the guard was suffering so severely.

Notwithstanding the terrible havoc made in the ranks of the leading column of the imperial guard, it continued its advance in admirable order, and with the greatest enthusiasm. Several of its superior officers placed themselves at its head.

* See page 76.

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Ney's horse having been shot under him, he drew his sword, and chivalrously led the way on foot, sustaining to the last his appropriate and well-earned *nom de guerre*—" *le plus brave des braves*." General Eriant, who commanded the grenadiers, fell severely wounded. General Michel, colonel *en second* of the chasseurs, was killed a few moments afterwards. The fall of the latter occasioned some hesitation—the 1st battalion of the 3rd regiment of grenadiers halted; but at the call of General Poret de Morvan, who commanded it, it renewed its advance at the *pas de charge*, amidst loud shouts of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" As the column neared the rise of ground which constituted the highest point of the ridge occupied by the right wing of the Duke's line, it gradually passed the line of fire hitherto directed upon it by the greater portion of the batteries on the British right of that point. Wellington rode up to the British foot-battery posted on the immediate right of Maitland's brigade of guards, with its own right thrown somewhat forward, and addressing himself to an artillery officer, (Lieutenant Sharpin,*) hastily asked who commanded it. The latter replied that Captain Bolton, having just been killed, it was now under the command of Captain Napier. The Duke then said, "Tell him to keep a look-out to his left, for the French will soon be

* Now Lieutenant William Sharpin, h. p. Royal Artillery.

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with him." The message had scarcely been communicated when the bear-skin caps of the leading divisions of the column of the imperial guard appeared just above the summit of the hill. The cannonade hitherto directed upon this point from the distant French batteries, now ceased, but a swarm of skirmishers opened a sharp and teasing fire among the British gunners. In the next moment, however, they were scattered and driven back upon the main body by a sudden shower of canister, grape, and shrapnel shells, poured forth from Napier's guns, which now kept up a terrific fire upon the column, within a distance of forty or fifty yards. Nevertheless the French guards continued to advance. They had now topped the summit. To the astonishment of the officers who were at their head, there appeared in their immediate front no direct impediment to their further advance. They could only distinguish dimly through the smoke extending from Napier's battery, the cocked hats of a few mounted officers, little imagining, probably, that the most prominent of these was the great Duke himself. Pressing boldly forward, they had arrived within fifty paces of the spot on which the British guards were lying down, when Wellington gave the talismanic call—"Up, guards; make ready!" and ordered Maitland to attack. It was a moment of thrilling excitement. The British guards springing up so suddenly in a most compact four-deep line, ap-

peared to the French as if starting out of the ground. The latter, with their high bonnets, as they crowned the summit of the ridge, appeared to the British, through the smoky haze, like a corps of giants bearing down upon them. The British guards instantly opened their fire with a tremendous volley, thrown in with so much coolness, deliberation, and precision, that the head of the column became, as it were, convulsed by the shock, and nearly the entire mass staggered under the effect. In less than a single minute more than three hundred of these brave old warriors fell, to rise no more. But the high spirit and innate valour which actuated the mass were not to be subdued by a first repulse. Its officers, placing themselves conspicuously in its front and on its flanks, called aloud, waved their swords, and, by encouraging words and gestures, commenced a deployment in order to acquire a more extended front. But the head of the column being continually shattered and driven back upon the mass, by the well-sustained and rapidly destructive fire by which it was assailed within so extremely limited a space, this attempt altogether failed. The front of the column was becoming momentarily more disordered and broken up; men were turning round and disappearing by the flanks, whilst others in the rear began firing over the heads of those before them. The confusion into which the French guards had now been thrown

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became manifest. The Duke ordered Maitland to charge; whilst, at the same instant, the gallant Lord Saltoun, equally alive to the real situation of the column, called out, "Now's the time, my boys!" The brigade sprang forward, with a loud cheer, to the charge. Numbers of the French guards nearest to the British, threw down their arms and knapsacks, and dispersed. The flanks began rapidly to spread out; and then the mass partaking more generally of the panic, appeared as if rent asunder by some invisible power. At the same time, Halkett, notwithstanding the fierce conflict in which Alten's division was then engaged, most judiciously pushed forward his two right regiments, the 33rd and 69th, a short distance, to cover, if possible, Maitland's brigade from any flank attack that might be attempted by a part of Donzelot's troops, and such advanced position offered considerable security to the brigade of guards as it subsequently retired to re-form.

The British guards had continued their charge some distance down the slope of the hill, when Maitland perceived the second attacking column of the imperial guard advancing on his right, and exposing his brigade to the imminent risk of being turned on that flank. He accordingly gave the order to face about and retire; but amidst their victorious shouts, and the noise of the firing of cannon and other arms, the command was imper-

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fectly understood, and the first sense of danger led to a cry of "Form square" being passed along their line, it being naturally assumed that the enemy's cavalry would take advantage of their isolated position; which, however, was not the case. The flanks of battalions gave way as if to form square. Saltoun conspicuously exerted himself in endeavouring to rectify the mistake, but in vain; and the whole went to the rear. The confusion in which they retired was unavoidable; but it was not the confusion consequent upon either defeat or panic: it resulted simply from a misunderstanding of the command; and no greater or more distinguished proof could be afforded of the excellent order, cool self-possession, and admirable discipline of these troops, than the steadiness, alacrity, and intelligence with which, upon regaining the crest of the ridge, they obeyed the command then given of "Halt, front, form up;" mechanically resuming their four-deep line, which having its left thrown somewhat forward, now became parallel with the front of the advancing second attacking column of the imperial guard.*

* The desperate attack at this critical moment made by Donzelot's columns, with artillery in their intervals, against Alten's division, as previously described (see page 159), was extremely galling to Halkett's brigade, in consequence of its more advanced position, particularly since Halkett had pushed forward his two right regiments in support of the charge by Maitland's brigade; and so great was the pressure upon it, in this exposed situation, that it fell into some confusion. The Duke observing this, said to some of his staff, "See what's wrong there." Major

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How marked a contrast did such conduct on the part of the British guards, who thus, in the battle's front, so gloriously upheld their country's honour, offer to that of a considerable body of the Allied troops then posted in second line as their support! D'Aubremé's infantry-brigade of Chassé's Dutch-Belgian division, which, as before stated, had been moved into the space in rear of Maitland's brigade, previously occupied by the Brunswickers, was now formed into three large squares, of two battalions each. These troops,

Dawson Kelly,¹ of the quarter-master-general's department, immediately rode up to the brigade, and while addressing himself to Sir Colin Halkett, the latter, at the instant, received a wound in the face, a ball passing through his mouth, and he was consequently obliged to retire to the rear. Lieut. Colonel Elphinstone, commanding the 33rd regiment, then ran up, and asked Major Kelly if he had any orders. The latter replied, "None, beyond inquiring into the cause of the confusion." Lieut. Colonel Elphinstone then stated that they were much pressed, and the men exhausted; that Colonel Harris of the 73rd had been severely wounded, and that the command of the brigade had devolved upon him. At this period, the attacking column was again retiring, and Major Kelly, having observed that the different battalions of the brigade had got intermixed, from the frequent formations of squares, he advised Lieut. Colonel Elphinstone to direct both officers and men to resume their respective stations, and get into order, covering themselves as well as they could by lying down, and prepare to meet the next attack. At the same moment, one or two sergeants of the 73rd came up and told Major Kelly that they had no one to command them, their officers being all killed or wounded. It being his own regiment, he considered it his duty to remain with them, and upon his saying so, they cheered, and instantly got into order. This was scarcely done when Donzelot's columns again pressed boldly forward, and renewed their assault, as the second attacking column of the imperial guard approached the Allied line.

¹ Colonel Dawson Kelly, C.B., on half pay of the 73rd regiment, died in March, 1837.

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on hearing the loud shouts of the second advancing column of the French imperial guard—of that very column which had been moving in rear of the British guards while the latter were retiring from their triumphant charge towards their original position—became so unsteady, and evinced so decided a disposition to quit their ranks, that Vandeleur, whose brigade of British light dragoons was at this time drawn up in their rear, deemed it advisable to close his squadron-intervals, the better to impede their contemplated retreat; and was induced, along with several of his officers, on perceiving that the squares were on the point of giving way, to dart forward and endeavour, partly by menaces, and partly by exhortations, to induce them to maintain their ground. The Dutch-Belgian officers exerted themselves in restoring order and confidence, but their men were evidently bent upon abandoning their position in this part of the field. Between them and the attacking column intervened the crest of the main ridge, occupied by the Duke's first line; the latter holding out to them a bright example of perfect discipline, of unflinching steadiness, and patient endurance. Of the attacking column itself they could see absolutely nothing; but its shouts alone seemed sufficient to scare them off the ground! Besides, they had but just entered the immediate field of action, and had not hitherto been engaged with the enemy, whereas the British brigade of

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guards had been exposed during eight hours to an incessant cannonade, and to numerous and desperate attacks of both cavalry and infantry. Of such materials was composed the Duke's second line in rear of the main point of attack by the French army at this, the most critical moment of the whole battle!

The second attacking column of the French imperial guard, which, as before explained, had been formed in the hollow adjacent to the south-east angle of the Hougomont inclosures, advanced in a line parallel with, and at a very short distance from, the hedge forming the eastern boundary. On reaching the foot of the British position, however, the column diverged a little to its right, either to take advantage of a slight undulation of the ground which seemed to offer a partial cover from the tremendous fire of artillery that continued to pour upon it, or solely for the purpose of directing its advance upon the point at which it perceived the first attacking column was engaged, and at which it might be better enabled to follow up any success that column might obtain. Between the heads of the two attacking columns there was a distance, during their advance, of from ten to twelve minutes' march. Whether this difference in the time of their movement was intentional, or arose from a misunderstanding in the conveyance of orders, or from any other accident, is uncertain, but it is quite evident that by forming

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two separate attacks, they subjected themselves to the imminent risk of being defeated in detail—a risk which, as will be presently shown, was speedily converted into a reality.

The second, like the first, column of attack, advanced with great boldness, and in excellent order, and appeared animated by the best possible spirit. Its left front was covered by a cloud of skirmishers, in order to conceal its movement as much as possible from the view of the British line. The battalions of Adam's brigade threw out each a company for the purpose of checking them. During the advance of the column, and more especially as it descended the gentle declivity eastward of the great orchard of Hougomont, it suffered severely from the British cannonade. So destructive indeed had been the fire from some of the British batteries on the right of Maitland's brigade, from the commencement of the advance of the imperial guard, that the French were at length induced suddenly to push forward a body of cuirassiers to endeavour to silence these guns. In this they partially succeeded; the cuirassiers having gallantly charged one of the batteries, and forced the gunners to seek shelter in the rear of the infantry—driving in, at the same time, the skirmishers of the 2nd battalion of the 95th regiment, and those of the 52nd regiment. They were checked, however, by the to them sudden and unexpected appearance of Adam's brigade, which

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had just been moved, in its four-deep line, close up to the narrow road that runs along the summit of the ridge. The 52nd regiment, which was more directly opposed to them, came down to the "Prepare for cavalry!" As a renewal of the attack seemed probable, a squadron of the 23rd British light dragoons, under Captain Cox,* was detached across the ridge, down the outer slope, towards the great orchard; from the rear of which it charged the cuirassiers as they advanced again towards the guns, overcame them, and pursued them across the plain, far in rear of the second attacking column of the imperial guard, until it fell into a fire thrown out upon it from the head of a French column of infantry, by which its files were scattered, and the whole compelled to make a hasty retreat towards the Allied position.†

Had the second column of attack continued in the original direction of its advance, it would

* Captain Philip Zachariah Cox, 23rd Light Dragoons, retired from the Service on the 24th January, 1818.

† This isolated charge, carried into the rear of the attacking columns of the imperial guard, and continued until checked by the French reserves, was gallantly executed under Lieutenant Banner,¹ the squadron having scarcely crossed the ridge when Captain Cox was obliged to leave the field from the effects of a severe stun in a previous charge, occasioned by his horse falling upon him. At the time the squadron was detached on this duty, the remainder of the 23rd light dragoons proceeded to the centre, where it was attached to the remnant of the household brigade of cavalry.

¹ Major John Banner, 93rd Highlanders, died on the 24th December, 1837.

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have come upon the centre of Adam's brigade, but having, as it began to ascend the exterior slope of the main ridge of the Allied position, slightly diverged to its right, as before observed, by following the direction of a very gentle hollow, constituting the re-entering angle formed by the tongue of ground that projected from the front of Maitland's brigade, and that part of the ridge occupied by Adam's brigade, it, in some degree, lent its left flank to the latter. This circumstance was not only observed, but had been in a great measure anticipated by Lieut. Colonel Sir John Colborne, commanding the 52nd regiment, an officer of great repute in the British army. He had been watching with intense anxiety, the progress of the enemy's column, and, seizing the most favourable moment, he, without orders, and upon his own responsibility, wheeled the left company of the 52nd to the left, and then formed the remainder of the regiment upon that company, for the purpose of bringing its front nearly parallel with the flank of the French column. At this moment Adam rode up, and asked Colborne what he was going to do, to which the latter replied, "to make that column feel our fire." Adam, approving of this, ordered Colborne to move on, and galloped off to bring up his right regiment, the 71st. The Duke, who had just seen Maitland's brigade re-formed and posted in the best order, parallel with the front of the attacking

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column, was at this moment stationed on the right of Napier's battery. He despatched an aide-de-camp (Major the Hon. Henry Percy*) to direct Sir Henry Clinton to advance and attack the imperial guard; but a single glance at Colborne's forward movement satisfied him that his intention had been anticipated; and he immediately pushed forward the 2nd battalion 95th regiment to the left of the 52nd. The head of the French column had by this time nearly reached the brow of the ridge, its front covering almost the whole of Napier's battery, and a portion of the extreme right of Maitland's brigade. It was still gallantly pressing forward, in defiance of the most galling fire poured into its front by the battery and by the British guards, when the sudden and imposing appearance of the four-deep line of the 52nd regiment bearing directly towards its left flank, in the most admirable and compact order imaginable, caused it to halt. In the next instant, wheeling up its left sections, it opened a rapid and destructive fire from the entire length of its left flank against the 52nd regiment. Colborne, having brought his line parallel to the flank of the imperial guard, also halted, and poured a deadly fire into the mass; and almost at the same moment the rifles of the 2nd battalion 95th

* Lieut. Colonel the Hon. Henry Percy, C.B., retired from the service in September, 1821.

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regiment, then coming up on the left, were levelled and discharged with unerring aim into the more advanced portion of the column. The 71st regiment was, at this time, rapidly advancing, on the right, to complete the brigade-movement. Colborne, eager fully to carry out his projected flank attack upon the enemy's column, caused his men to cease firing, and then gave the command, "Charge! charge!" It was answered by three hearty British cheers that rose distinctly above the shouts of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" and the now straggling and unsteady fire from the column. The 2nd battalion 95th regiment hastened to join in the charge on the left. The movement was remarkable for the order, the steadiness, the resoluteness, and the daring, by which it was characterized. The column of the imperial guard, which already seemed to reel to and fro under the effect of the front and flank fire which had been so successfully brought to bear upon it, was evidently in consternation as it beheld the close advance of Adam's brigade. Some daring spirits—and it contained many within its ranks—still endeavoured to make at least a show of resistance; but the disorder, which had been rapidly increasing, now became uncontrollable; and this second column of the imperial guard, breaking into the wildest confusion, shared the fate of the first; with this difference, however, that in consequence of the combined front and flank fire in which it had

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been so fatally involved, and of the unrestrained pursuit which deprived it of the power of rallying its component parts, it became so thoroughly disjointed and dispersed, that with the exception of the two rear battalions, which constituted the 1st regiment of chasseurs (old guard), it is extremely doubtful whether any portion of it ever re-united as a regularly formed military body, during the brief remaining period of the battle—certainly not on the Allied side of La Belle Alliance, towards which point it directed its retreat. It is necessary to remark that this regiment of the old guard which was commanded by General Cambronne formed a separate column of support in *échelon* to, and immediate left rear of, the four battalions of the middle guard; but so close to each other were the two columns, that although an interval was observed between them by Adam's brigade when the latter stood in the general front line of the Allied position, they appeared to it but as one column when charged in flank, and may to all intents and purposes, be considered as having formed one general column of attack. Cambronne's battalions, however, forming the rear of the column, did not become exposed to the fire from Adam's brigade, inasmuch as neither the 71st regiment nor the 3rd battalion 95th regiment could complete the brigade flank movement in time to open a fire upon the mass before the actual charge was commenced. Hence, although

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they turned, along with the rest of the column, yet, unlike the latter, they retained a considerable degree of order.

Troops could scarcely be placed in a more critical situation than was this second attacking column of the imperial guard from the moment it came to a halt. With its front immediately facing a battery within sixty or seventy yards' distance, the double-shotted guns of which continued ploughing through the mass, and tearing up its ranks; with its left flank faced outwards to repel a formidable attack on that side, and its right flank at the same time exposed to the oblique fire from the greater portion of the line of British guards; the interior of the mass, enveloped in smoke, feeling a pressure from both front and flank, and yet perceiving no indication of the means of extricating itself from so perilous a position, it was truly a most trying moment even to such veteran warriors as those which constituted the renowned imperial guard of France. Any attempt at deployment to its right, while thus attacked on its left, was of course out of the question. Had it continued to advance until Adam's brigade had approached quite close to its left flank, the charge of the latter must have brought it to a stand, and rendered the efforts of the head of the column abortive. If, on the other hand, after having faced altogether to the left, and converted that flank into a compact line, it had advanced to meet the 52nd regiment when it first

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✓ became aware of this attack, it would still have been exposed on the right (its previous front) to the havoc created by Napier's guns, as also to a charge by Maitland's brigade, which, by bringing forward its left shoulders, might have rendered the situation of the column so hopeless, as probably to have led to its immediate and unqualified surrender on the spot. The dilemma into which these veterans were thus thrown was mainly attributable to the fatal neglect of not accompanying the column with an effective support of cavalry. A strong body of the latter on each flank, or in its immediate rear, would have secured the column from any such flank attack as that which so successfully arrested its progress, and so completely effected its dispersion.

The direction given to Adam's line by its "right-shoulder-forward" movement having brought it perpendicular to the general front of the French position, that officer became naturally anxious for support upon his right flank, to secure the latter from the enemy's cavalry, which, it was to be presumed, would now be brought forward from his reserve, since none of it had been employed in immediate support of the last attack. He urgently requested for this purpose, the aid of troops from the other part of Clinton's division, and Lieut. Colonel Halkett, seeing what was required, immediately advanced with the nearest battalion of his Hanoverian brigade, the Osnabrück landwehr, in

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column at quarter distance, and close up in right rear of the 71st regiment.* Thus Adam's brigade, maintaining its four-deep line, and being flanked by the Hanoverian battalion which could form square at any moment, was sufficiently secured against cavalry.

The confused and disordered mass of the imperial guard, from the first impulse given to it by the flank charge, hastened a short distance in a direction parallel with that of the Anglo-allied line, and then, naturally inclining towards the French position, it fell into nearly the same track as that pursued by the first attacking column, namely, towards the first rise of ground intersected by the Charleroi road, a little beyond the southern extremity of the orchard of La Haye Sainte. As it approached the rear of those columns of d'Erlon's corps which had been so desperately opposing Alten's division, it became infected with the panic, and commingled with the flying guard. Adam's brigade continued its triumphant advance, at first parallel, for a short distance, to the Allied line, and then, bringing forward its left shoulders, swept proudly onward in the direction of the French height before-mentioned; crowds of fugitives hurrying along and striving to escape from the pursuing wave that

* During the advance, Halkett sent his brigade-major, Captain von Saffe, to bring up the two battalions of his brigade that were posted in rear of Hougomont; but that officer having been killed on his way, the message was not delivered, and the Osnabrück battalion continued to be separated from the rest of the brigade during the remainder of the battle.

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seemed every instant on the point of engulfing them.

During its advance, the front of Adam's brigade was partially crossed by the squadron of the 23rd light dragoons, under Lieutenant Banner, retiring in disorder from its charge.* Mistaken for hostile cavalry, these dragoons were unfortunately fired upon by the 52nd regiment, and it was not until the foremost of them had fallen close upon the bayonets, that the error was discovered. Immediately after this incident, a fire of grape was opened upon the 52nd by three French field pieces in the prolongation of its right flank. This enfilading of the regiment in its four-deep line was a judicious measure on the part of the French artillery, and well calculated to derange the advance of Adam's brigade. It was, however, very gallantly and speedily checked by the wheeling up and advance of the right section of the 52nd, under Lieutenant Gawler,† who succeeded in driving off the guns, whilst the rest of the regiment continued its pursuit.

Wellington, as soon as he saw that the success of the charge by Adam's brigade was so decisive, requested Uxbridge immediately to launch forward some fresh cavalry to check the probable advance of that of the enemy, and to second the efforts of the infantry in front, by boldly attacking the

* See note at page 176.

† Now Lieut. Colonel George Gawler, K.H., Unatt.

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French reserves, which appeared collected in front of La Belle Alliance, the critical point of Napoleon's line. Lieut. Colonel Lord Greenock,* Assistant Quarter Master General of the cavalry, was despatched to Vivian with orders for him to move his hussar-brigade to its right from its position in rear of Alten's division, so as to get clear of the infantry, and then to advance directly to the front by the right of Maitland's brigade of guards. At the same time, the Duke turned round to order up the nearest supports to the space which had been vacated in his front line by the advance of Adam's brigade. But what a spectacle met his view! The three Dutch-Belgian squares, into which d'Aubremé's brigade had been formed, and whose unsteadiness, previously described, had greatly augmented as the firing and shouting on the exterior slope of the ridge, of which they could see nothing, became more continuous and intense, were now in a state bordering on dissolution. The faces of the squares were already broken at intervals by groups in the act of abandoning their ranks; whilst several officers of Vandeleur's brigade, which, as before observed, was drawn up in their rear, were zealously exerting themselves in endeavouring to induce these troops to stand fast. The Duke, observing this, called out, "That's right; tell them the French are retiring." This

* Now Lieut. General Earl Cathcart, K.C.B.

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intelligence, quickly caught up and spread through their ranks, had the desired effect of restoring them to order. They shortly afterwards formed into columns, and advanced to the front line.

In order to preserve a distinct and connected view of the combined operations against Napoleon, it will be necessary, previously to describing the general advance of the Allied line, consequent upon the failure of the attack by the French imperial guard, to revert to the movements of the Prussians.

It will be recollected that Vivian's, and subsequently, Vandeleur's brigade, quitted the left of the Anglo-allied line, on the approach of the advanced guard of Zieten's corps towards that point. Shortly before the arrival of these troops, the French skirmishers in front of Durutte's division, which constituted the angle of the *potence* on which stood the extreme right of Napoleon's army, having been considerably reinforced, were pushed forward for the purpose of establishing themselves in the houses and inclosures in the valley below them, and of impeding, by this means, the connection between Bülow's corps and the Anglo-allied left. The Nassauers, of Prince Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar's brigade, fell back from the houses of the hamlet of Papelotte, but firmly maintained their ground on the Allied side of the valley, retaining possession of the farms of Papelotte and La Haye. The French skirmishers,

passing further to their right, pressed on to the village of Smohain, where they became warmly engaged with the Prussian troops that had been so judiciously posted in that quarter. Blücher, perceiving the infantry of the advanced guard of Zieten's corps upon the height above Smohain, sent an order for its moving by the shortest way to engage the enemy in the valley. The Prussian General von Müffling, attached to the headquarters staff of the Duke of Wellington, was at that moment in this vicinity, and gave the requisite instructions to the staff officer sent forward from Zieten's corps.

About this time, the 5th and 6th infantry-brigades, as also the reserve-cavalry of Pirch's corps, reached the field, in rear of Bülow. Pirch, placing himself at the head of his leading brigade (the 5th), immediately conducted it in the direction of Planchenoit; and, on coming up with the 14th and 16th brigades, he began, in conjunction with Colonel Hiller, to make the necessary dispositions for the third attack upon that village. The 6th brigade was ordered to follow as a reserve; and the attack was to be supported by a simultaneous advance of the right wing of Bülow's corps against Lobau's line, which was exceedingly well drawn up, and exhibited every indication of making a determined stand. Blücher had despatched an order to the 7th brigade (of Pirch's corps) to move together with the 4th Kurmark landwehr-cavalry,

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upon Maransart, on the south side of the Lasne, for the purpose of covering his left flank. The remaining brigade (the 8th) of Pirch's corps, which had been detained in consequence of the rear-guard affair near Wavre, received orders from Pirch to quicken its advance. The reserve-cavalry of Pirch's corps was deployed in three lines on the right of the cavalry of the 4th corps. The first line consisted of the Pomeranian hussars and the Brandenburg hussars; the second, of the Silesian uhlan, two squadrons of the 6th Neumark dragoons, and the Queen's dragoons; and the third, of the 5th Kurmark and Elbe landwehr-cavalry. These lines of cavalry thus occupied the interval between the wings of Bülow's corps, and, at the same time, served to impose, by their display of force, upon the French cavalry, under Domont, which was then in reserve.

Blücher, judging the re-capture of Planchenoit to be a most essential aid in the general operations against the French, as affording the means not only of turning the right of Lobau's corps, but also of molesting the rear of the French army, and of endangering its main line of retreat, ordered the immediate advance of the troops destined for the third attack upon that village. They were formed in the following order:—The second and third battalions of the 2nd regiment (5th brigade) made the attack in the direction of the church; the first and second battalions of the 5th West-

phalian landwehr, formed into one, were directed upon the French left of the village; the first battalion of the 2nd regiment followed in rear of the central space between these two columns; Major von Witzleben led the third battalion of the 25th regiment (5th brigade) towards the heights on the (French) right of the village; and the remainder of this regiment, which had occupied the outer hedge of the wood of Virère on the left, also advanced. The 11th regiment and the 2nd Pomeranian landwehr, belonging to the 14th brigade, and the first and second battalions of the 15th regiment, with the first and second battalions of the 1st Silesian landwehr, belonging to the 16th brigade, followed in support of this attack. The whole force was disposed in chequered columns, preceded by a strong line of skirmishers, and covered by the Prussian batteries on the heights in rear. The horse-battery, No. 6, posted on the high ground upon the right of the wood of Virère, was principally occupied in diverting the fire from a horse-battery of the reserve-artillery of the French imperial guard, which had one half of its guns above the hollow-way formed by the road leading down into Planchenoit from La maison du Roi, and the other half detached to an elevated spot in the south part of the village, whence it had a commanding view of a considerable portion of the advancing columns.

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Simultaneously with this third attack upon Plan-

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chenoit, the 13th and 15th brigades, which constituted Bülow's right wing, advanced against Lobau's line, covered by a force of artillery much superior to that which the French could bring to bear against them. They were disposed in chequered columns of battalions, in the following manner:—In front line were the second battalion of the 18th regiment and the third battalion of the 3rd Silesian landwehr; in the second line were the first and third battalions of the 18th regiment, the first and second battalions of the 3rd Silesian landwehr, and the 1st battalion of the 10th regiment; in the third line were the three battalions of the 4th Silesian landwehr, and the second battalion of the 10th regiment. The three battalions of the 3rd Neumark landwehr followed in reserve. The right of this advance was supported by the West Prussian uhlands and the 2nd Neumark landwehr-cavalry.

In the meantime, the first infantry-brigade of Zieten's corps, having continued its descent into the valley, passing Hacke's infantry in and about Smohain on its left, advanced upon La Haye and Papelotte, and mistaking the Nassauers for French, through the similarity of uniform, opened a sharp fire upon them, and drove them from their post. The latter at first replied to this fire, which was kept up for some minutes, killing and wounding on both sides, until the error was discovered. These troops then began pressing forward, conjointly

with those from Smohain, against the French skirmishers. 18th of June.

The advanced cavalry of Zieten's corps which had been seen approaching the left of Wellington's line, had now joined. The Brandenburg dragoons and Brandenburg uhlands, drew up in line in rear of the Wavre road, and on the immediate left of Best's Hanoverian infantry brigade. The 1st Silesian hussars formed upon the outer slope of the ridge, in rear of the lane leading from the Wavre road down to Papelotte. The 2nd Kurmark landwehr-cavalry drew up in the hollow in rear of the interval between the landwehr-battalions Osterode and Verden of Best's brigade. It was on the ground immediately in front of this interval that Captain von Rettberg's Hanoverian foot-battery had been posted throughout the day, and as the latter had expended the whole of its ammunition, it withdrew to the rear as the Prussian horse-battery, No. 7, came up, by which it was then relieved, and the Prussians opened a cannonade from this point upon the opposite heights.* The

* Captain von Rettberg was occupied with his ammunition-waggons immediately in rear of the knoll on which his battery was posted, and on the right of a patch of brushwood, when his attention was arrested by trumpet sounds with which his ear was unacquainted, and he perceived the advance of the Prussian cavalry. Lieut. General von Zieten was at the head of the latter, and asked Captain von Rettberg the shortest way to the high road that passes by La Haye Sainte; whereupon Captain von Rettberg conducted him to the point at which that road is intersected by the one from Wavre. It was shortly after this that the general advance of the Allied line took place.

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Prussian foot-battery, No. 7, quitting the Wavre road proceeded some way down the outer slope of the ridge to seek a favourable point whence it could by its fire cover the advance of the infantry in the valley.

Such was the general disposition of Blücher's forces relatively with that of Wellington's army at the time when the latter had defeated the attacking columns of the French imperial guard; and was following up its triumph by boldly assailing the very centre of Napoleon's position, at which point the latter had collected his sole remaining reserves. Perhaps a more comprehensive view of this relative disposition of the Prussian troops may be afforded by simply stating, by way of a summary, that the advanced portion of Zieten's corps had joined the left of the Allied line, that part of Pirch's corps (including his reserve cavalry,) had joined Bülow; and that the latter was on the advance—his right to attack Lobau, and his left to make a third assault upon Planchenoit—the French opposed to them evincing, at all points, every indication of making a firm and determined stand.

We must now resume the detail of the brilliant and decisive dispositions of the Duke of Wellington, whom we left triumphantly defeating the French imperial guard, and requesting the Earl of Uxbridge to bring forward fresh cavalry, to aid the advancing infantry in taking immediate advantage of the disorder and confusion into which the

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enemy had been thrown by the failure of his last grand attack.

There is not, perhaps, an instance in modern history, in which the threatening tide of battle, has, through the lightning-light promptitude of decision, and the energetic application of yet remaining resources, been so suddenly and powerfully controlled, and so majestically and irresistibly hurled back, overwhelming all and every thing that, in the previous plenitude of its force, it had borne aloft, with buoyant hopes, and carried along exultingly in its course, as it was by the immortal Wellington in this his last, his crowning victory. Never did a battle-field present so complete, so magical a transition of scene as that which succeeded the defeat of the imperial guards of France by the guards of the sovereign of England and the British light infantry-brigade. The state of the Duke's army at the time of Napoleon's last grand attack has already been adverted to, but let us glance again, for a moment, at the awfully diminished numbers, and almost exhausted energies, of those heroic bands which, in front line, had been exposed to the incessant and concentrated cannonade from a range of batteries forming almost the entire arc of which that line was the chord; subjected to repeated and vigorous attacks of all arms during so many hours; and now called upon to resist "to the death" another assault more fierce and determined than any they had yet en-

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countered—look at the rear of that line, and observe the palpable defection in the ranks of an ally, whose contingent, whilst it constituted so great a proportion of the Duke's entire force, had already afforded too evident proofs that in a calculation of available resources, its services must be thrown entirely out of the scale—see, too, at increased intervals, the wrecks of the British and German cavalry, with, however, the fortunate exception of the two light brigades so opportunely brought from the extreme left to the rear of the menaced point of attack—how discouraging an aspect, when compared with that of the French army advancing to its last grand attack ! Is it to be wondered that at that moment, doubts as to the issue of the great contest should have prevailed in the minds even of those who were prepared to support their noble chief to the last drop of their blood ? And yet, with such apparently inefficient elements, the bare contemplation of which might have both weighed down the energies, and altered the purpose, of another general, did the British chief not only successfully defeat this most formidable assault, but finally gain a signal and resplendent victory. It would, however, be unjust to the abilities, and to the fame of the Duke, to ascribe such victory solely to his defeat of the attacking columns of the imperial guard upon his own position ; though such, no doubt, was the foundation upon which he erected the structure of his final

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triumph. The ten battalions of the guard, of which the attacking columns had been composed, were defeated; but these, it must be borne in mind, constituted but the *van* of the attacking force, which comprised no less than the whole front line of the French army. D'Erlon's corps from the right, and Reille's corps from the left, were pouring forth their numerous columns, the principal portion of which had already reached more than midway towards the Allied position, and presented a formidable array, whilst from the heights which they had quitted, their artillery thundered forth as vigorously over their heads, upon the exhausted line of the Allies, as at any previous period of the battle. The four battalions of the first attacking column of the guard had been rallied with great rapidity by Napoleon, and posted on a commanding eminence, intersected by the Charleroi road in front of his centre. Near La Belle Alliance, reserves had been collected, principally of cavalry; and though the latter consisted entirely of the remains of corps that had previously suffered great losses, they might have been wielded with powerful effect against any point at which the advancing infantry should succeed in making an impression. Besides these, there stood on the French extreme left, a brigade of light cavalry, which had not been engaged during any part of the day, and had never yet moved out of its position. On the other hand, too, however

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glorious the result of the struggle with the imperial guard, it could not but tend to cripple still further the slender physical means which the Duke yet retained at his disposal. Victory, hovering over the brave conquerors of the imperial guard, alighted for a moment at the feet of Wellington, and ere the goddess could be scared away by the still threatening countenance of the enemy, Britain's hero secured her favour by the display of that extraordinary foresight, prompt decision, and unflinching determination, which, though at all times his distinguishing characteristics, now shone forth with more than ordinary brilliancy. His perfect knowledge of the character and composition of the French army plainly told him that a signal defeat of the imperial guard, a force employed only on occasions of great and critical emergency, would be certain to exercise a powerful influence upon the *morale* of the enemy's troops; but it also told him that, unless instant advantage were taken of that defeat, unless it were followed up in such a manner as to render the incipient panic which it had created, general and uncontrollable, that same army might, through the powerful influence and indefatigable exertions of such men as Napoleon and Ney, rapidly recover the shock; d'Erlon's and Reille's columns, although faltering for a moment might pursue their advance with determined effort to regain the footing which the guard had lost; the veterans composing the latter force, resolved

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to avenge their defeat, might speedily rally, and, with desperate resolution, renew their attack, aided by a more direct and effective support by the cavalry-reserves collected in front of La Belle Alliance. This view had scarcely passed across the mind of the Duke, when his decision was fully made. With those critically slender means, to which allusion has more than once been made, and which in the hands of many a commander would have been deemed totally inadequate for even the maintenance of the position, at such fearful odds, Wellington determined to compensate for the awfully reduced and exhausted state of the fighting portion of his troops, and the utter want of confidence in the remainder, by one of those bold and daring acts, which, when hazarded at the right moment, carry with them the *prestige* of conscious superiority, and allow an enemy no time to discover deficiencies, or to calculate mischances. No sooner was the second attacking column of the imperial guard defeated and dispersed, than he ordered it to be vigorously pursued, and the rallied force of the first column to be attacked, by Adam's brigade; whilst at the same moment he launched forth Vivian's hussar-brigade against the cavalry-reserves near La Belle Alliance, before these had made their dispositions for attack, and even before they had recovered from the surprise and hesitation which prevailed amongst them on witnessing the discomfiture of the guard.

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Vivian, the moment he received the order to advance, wheeled his brigade, half-squadrons to the right. Thus the 10th hussars became the leading regiment, the 18th hussars followed, and the 1st hussars of the German legion, which had stood in second line, moved off, as soon as its front was clear, in rear of the latter corps. The brigade proceeded, at a trot, a short distance in rear of the infantry, and parallel to the crest of the position; and, as it approached the right of Maitland's brigade of guards, Vivian, ordering the leading half-squadron to wheel to the left, through Napier's battery, led it perpendicularly to the front.* As the column thus advanced across the ridge, in left front of Vandeleur's light cavalry-brigade, it was saluted by the latter with cheers of encouragement; and in a similar manner by Maitland's brigade of guards as it passed their flank. The

* On this occasion, the officer commanding the leading half-squadron, not correctly catching the word of command, in consequence, probably, of the noise created by the fire from Napier's battery, which it had closely approached, as also by the shouts from Adam's brigade, which was following up its triumph, wheeled to the right instead of to the left; a mistake which, considering the wavering disposition of the Dutch-Belgian troops posted in rear of that point, might have caused great confusion, had it not been for the alacrity and promptitude with which it was rectified by Vivian in person, who immediately galloped to the flank of the second half-squadron, and, with a considerable degree of emphasis (and, it must be admitted, with a good hearty d—n), called out that it was *towards* and not *from* the enemy they were to wheel. He took the flank officer's place, and led the column down the hill in the direction he wished to move, until the proper leading half-squadron was brought up into its place, when he proceeded to the flank of the latter, and continued for some time longer at the head of his brigade.

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smoke lay heavily along the entire position, and especially, at this moment, over that part of the exterior slope of the ridge on which the struggle with the French imperial guard had taken place, and across which Vivian was now leading his brigade. On advancing further, and getting clear of the smoke, he obtained a more distinct view of the dispositions of the enemy's forces in his direct front. A very considerable portion appeared in great confusion; disordered columns of infantry were hurrying back to the main position, up the slope, on which were numerous stragglers of all arms, and in various uniforms, mixed together and retiring in crowds. Guns were firing from different points to cover the retreat, and the discharge of musketry in and about Hougomont continued very brisk. On arriving about midway towards the enemy's position, well formed bodies of troops were observed on the French left of La Belle Alliance, posted as if fully prepared to resist the threatened attack. They consisted of two squares of infantry, with cavalry and guns formed on the flanks and between them. The cavalry on their left was somewhat advanced, comprising separate bodies, partially covering one another, but presenting a general front, and posted on some rising ground about 200 yards on the Allied left of the south-east angle of the Hougomont inclosures. The two squares here alluded to were the two battalions of the grenadiers of the old guard, which had been

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placed in reserve of the main attack by that force as previously explained.* The cavalry on the left was thus disposed—first, on the slope of the little eminence, a portion of the lancers of the imperial guard; then, in right rear of the latter, were two squadrons of the dragoons of the guard; in right rear of these again, and on the summit of the eminence, stood the brigade of carabiniers. In rear of these, and of the squares themselves, as also on the right of the latter, were collected the remainder of that portion of the French cavalry which had made such repeated attacks upon the Duke's line during the day. All these different bodies of cavalry were but mere wrecks of their former selves—regiments, and, in many instances, entire brigades, were diminished to less than squadrons. In the morning, as they came fresh into the field, they constituted the flower of the French cavalry; now, so severe had been their losses, they presented a mere phantom of their former splendour.

Vivian, as soon as he perceived this disposition of the enemy's forces in his immediate front, decided upon forming a front line with the 10th and 18th British hussars, and upon holding the 1st ✓ hussars of the German legion in second line, in support. For this purpose, and also with a view to oppose, and, if possible, to turn, the left of the enemy's cavalry, he made the leading regiment,

* See page 147.

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the 10th hussars, incline to its right. Shortly afterwards, Vivian was joined by Colonel Sir Colin Campbell* of the staff, who brought him an order from the Duke that he was not to attack before the infantry came up, unless he felt confident of success. Vivian remarked that as the Allied infantry in its anxiety to get on, was probably not in compact order, its safety might be seriously endangered should it be exposed to a cavalry-attack; and that, in his opinion, it would be better that not a moment should be lost on his part in driving off the cavalry which appeared in his front. Sir Colin Campbell coincided in this opinion, and returned to the Duke. After the very short pause at the head of the column, consequent upon this little discussion, Vivian, continuing the advance, ordered the 10th hussars to form line on the front half-squadron, and, at the same time, sent orders to his two other regiments also to form line on their leading half-squadrons respectively, but then to remain in support. Just at this moment the right half-squadron of the 10th was attacked by a squadron of the cuirassiers, which, however, it immediately beat back. The rapid pace which had been maintained by the head of the column, and the incline to the right which had been given to it, required great activity on the part of the left half-squadrons to get up into line; and as

* Now Lieut. General Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B.

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Vivian ordered the charge as soon as the first squadron was formed, it was executed not in line but rather in *échelon* of squadrons, which, under the circumstances of the moment, as will presently be seen, was the preferable and more desirable formation. Just as the charge was ordered, the ✓ 2nd light dragoons of the King's German legion, in a column of squadrons, which had been detached from the main position, almost simultaneously with the advance of Vivian's brigade, came up on the right of the 10th hussars, and in a direction rather crossing the front of the latter regiment, which had its left thrown somewhat forward whilst the Germans were moving straight to their front. The lancers, before mentioned as the nearest French cavalry on the gentle eminence, perceiving the advance of the 2nd light dragoons directly towards them, immediately prepared to attack. They couched their lances, and made a very gallant charge down the hill towards the Germans, but just as they were on the point of closing with the latter, the right squadron of the 10th hussars came upon them, taking them in flank, and fairly driving them off. The French heavy dragoons next appeared, charging down in support of the lancers, but they were met and attacked by the centre squadron of the 10th; which cut in amongst them, and entirely dispersed them. The left squadron of the 10th had scarcely closed with the enemy, before the whole of the cavalry on the (French) left of the

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squares of the guard, was in full flight. Vivian, perceiving the complete success of this brilliant charge, ordered a halt; and then returned as quickly as possible to the 18th hussars.* But previously to describing his subsequent proceedings it is necessary to revert to other matters in order to connect them with the general disposition of the main army.

Adam's light infantry-brigade had, in the mean time, been steadily advancing from the moment of its charge upon the left flank of the second attacking column of the French imperial guard, sweeping along the front of the right centre of the Anglo-allied position, and bringing forward its left shoulders as it neared the Charleroi road, so that its left skirted the orchard of La Haye Sainte. It had now reached the hollow immediately under the nearest French height which was intersected by that road, and upon which the troops that had composed the first attacking column of the guard had been rallied by Napoleon, and formed into three squares. The 2nd regiment of chasseurs of the old guard having formed the extreme left of the attacking force had been closely observed by Lieut. Colonel Halkett, who continued to fol-

* On his way to the 18th hussars, Vivian was attacked by a cuirassier. His right hand was in a sling, in consequence of a wound received at Croix d'Orade, near Toulouse. Taking the reins in this hand, which was barely capable of holding them, he contrived to give the cuirassier a thrust in the neck with his left hand, whilst at the same moment he was joined by his German orderly, who cut the Frenchman off his horse.

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low it very steadily with the Osnabrück landwehr-battalion as it retired towards the high road, inclining to La Belle Alliance.

Wellington, perceiving the confusion in which the columns of the French imperial guard fell back after the decided failure of their attack—a confusion which was evidently extending itself with wonderful rapidity to a vast portion of the troops in their vicinity who witnessed their discomfiture; remarking also the beautiful advance of Vivian's hussar-brigade against the French reserves posted close to La Belle Alliance, and in the very heart of Napoleon's position; as well as the steady and triumphant march of Adam's brigade, which, driving a host of fugitives before it, had now closely approached the nearest rise of the French position contiguous to the Charleroi road; finally, observing that Bülow's movement upon Planchenoit had begun to take effect, perceiving the fire of his cannon, and being also aware that part of a Prussian corps had joined his own left by Ohain,—he ordered a general advance of the whole of his line of infantry, supported by the cavalry and artillery.

As this long wished-for command rapidly passed along the line, loud and joyous were the shouts with which it was received. The passive endurance, not unaccompanied by murmurs, with which the Allied troops had, during so many hours, withstood the incessant attacks of cavalry, infantry,

and artillery, to which so vast, so awful a proportion of their comrades had fallen a sacrifice, now gave place to feelings of intense exultation, of intoxicating triumph. At the same time, when they saw that the advance was general, that the enemy had retired in confusion from his last grand attack; and that the brigades detached to the front were boldly assailing his reserves, the conviction flashed across their minds that if the Duke had hitherto resisted their demands to be led to the attack, his consummate and unerring judgment had caused him to defer the advance until that attack could be undertaken with every probability of success.

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Just at this decisive moment, the faint rays of the setting sun shone forth, and as they struggled to penetrate the almost universal haze created by the hitherto unremitting volumes of smoke which a close, dense atmosphere appeared incapable of altogether dissipating, they cast upon the varied and multitudinous objects on the field, a lurid light, imparting to them a colouring so strikingly impressive, as can never be effaced from the memories of those who witnessed that magnificent battle-scene. In front of the line, on the rise occupied by Maitland's brigade of guards, stood prominently in view, the great and noble Duke himself, his hat raised high in air, as the signal for the commencement of the general advance; leaders in front of their divisions and brigades,

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appearing, by their animated gestures, to take the tone from their great chieftain; unfurled colours raised aloft, proudly displaying their shattered remnants; drums, bugles, trumpets, sending forth their warlike sounds to commingle with the enthusiastic and tumultuous cheering of the troops; artillerymen occupied in working out their guns from the soft soil in which they had become so deeply imbedded; squadrons and supports pressing forward to gain the ridge, as this became vacated by the first line, to behold, and participate in, the glorious triumph; numerous isolated soldiers, hurrying on, wherever they could be spared from attending the wounded, to join their ranks, and share in the inspiring excitement of such a moment; in the distance, in front, the retiring masses of the French, intermingled with crowds of fugitives of all arms, mounted and dismounted; far away to the left, the dark columns of the Prussians, and the smoke ascending from their batteries; on the right, and somewhat in advance, the dense vapour still slowly circling upwards from the glowing embers of Hougomont, assuming a reddish glare as it floated over the heads of the brave defenders of that post of honour;—all appeared to the eyes of the beholder illumined, as it were, by a light partaking rather of the supernatural, than of the ordinary effects of sunshine. It was of brief duration. The sun sank rapidly below the horizon, and if the gorgeous colouring which departed with it had been

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congenial to the exhilarated feelings of the victors, so, in an equal degree, must the succeeding twilight, rendered still more gloomy by a clouded sky, have toned in with the dejected and gloomy spirits of the vanquished. With these there prevailed no other sentiments than those of a vexed and mortified perplexity, or an extreme dismay. The panic which had set in was extending itself widely and speedily throughout the line, and despondency was depicted in every countenance.

The Duke galloped off to Adam's brigade, which was then in the valley immediately below the height on which the three squares of the French guard were posted; and as these appeared inclined to make a stand, he ordered Adam to attack them. The latter, however, suggested to his Grace that as the brigade, in consequence of its rapid advance over the heavy soil in the valley, encumbered too as the latter was with dead and dying men and horses, both singly and in heaps, had become somewhat loose in its formation, it might be advisable to halt it, to allow the files to close in. This was accordingly done. But after a few moments only had elapsed, the Duke said, "They won't stand—better attack them;" and being at the time close to the colours of the centre regiment, (the 52nd,) he called out, "Go on, Colborne, go on!"

Colonel Sir Colin Campbell now rejoined the Duke, and explained the grounds upon which Vivian had decided upon attacking the French ca-

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valry-reserves ; on learning which Lord Uxbridge, who was present,* determined upon personally leading the attack with the hussars, and participating in the final and decisive triumph of the British cavalry ; and was on the point of darting off to that part of the field, when his intentions were suddenly frustrated by a grape-shot from the battery on the height above him striking and severely wounding his right leg. Reluctantly compelled to desist from further exertion, this gallant and noble warrior, who had so bravely, so chivalrously, so skilfully, and so successfully, led the British cavalry throughout the day, had still the satisfaction of feeling and knowing that although not permitted to witness the closing triumph of that branch of the service of which he was at once the chief, the ornament, and pride, he had well and truly performed his duty to his sovereign and his country. He was supported for some moments by Sir Colin Campbell, and was shortly afterwards, with the assistance of a party of the 23rd light dragoons, carried into the high road, along which he was borne to Waterloo ; and, when subsequently under-

* Previously to this, and at the time when his lordship ordered forward Sir Hussey Vivian's brigade, he rode up to Major Lautour,¹ then commanding the 23rd light dragoons, on the left of the household cavalry, and asked him for a troop-horse, his own charger being tired or wounded. Major Lautour immediately dismounted Serjeant Major Stride, and gave his mare to Lord Uxbridge, who proceeded to the front, and rejoined the Duke.

¹ Now Colonel Peter Augustus Lautour, C.B., K.H. ; h.p. 23rd light dragoons.

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going, at that village, the necessary operation of amputation, so great were the satisfaction and contentment which had been wrought in his mind as he calmly reflected on the brilliant exploits that had marked the arduous and varied struggle, that observing the anxious and compassionate looks of his friends around his couch, he exclaimed, "Who would not lose a leg for such a victory?" Seldom indeed has a cavalry-chief more distinguished himself in the field than did the Earl of Uxbridge on this great day. As he flew from one point to another, now boldly rushing into the fight at the head of a glorious charge, then skilfully covering a retreat under the pressure of overpowering numbers; here zealously endeavouring by his own personal example to stimulate and rouse into action the lukewarm energies of the cavalry of an ally, there collecting and rallying, for further high enterprise, the remnants of the devoted bands of his own nation; restlessly vigilant in watching and preparing for the manœuvres of a renowned and powerful cavalry, admirably appointed and equipped, and led by a Kellermann, a Guyot, and a Lefebvre-Desnouettes; evincing the most cool and resolute confidence in the prowess of his followers, as he dashed forward either to break asunder the combined advance of the enemy's masses, or to follow up the advantage already gained by the Allied infantry—he seemed to blend and embody in his own character, in a pre-eminent degree, the

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heroic valour of ancient chivalry, with the skilled address of modern cavalry tacticians.*

As Adam's brigade ascended the hill, in compliance with Wellington's orders, to charge the French squares, it was received with a heavy fire from their front and flanks. The Duke, being at this time close to the centre of the advancing line, against which point this fire was principally directed, incurred great personal risk ; and as the shot flew fast and thick about him, Sir Colin Campbell said to him, " This is no place for you—you had better move." To this the Duke replied, " I will when I see those fellows off." On the near and imposing approach of the brigade, in the attitude of charging, the imperial guard ceased firing, faced to the rear, and commenced a retreat by word of command. As they withdrew, his Grace rode up the valley in the direction of his right front, and came upon the plain, on which Vivian was successfully attacking the French reserves.

The gallant charge made by the 10th hussars upon the French cavalry posted in its right front, has already been described. After ordering the halt and rally, Vivian galloped towards the 18th hussars, which regiment he found well formed in line, and in perfect order. In its front stood the

* In consideration of his distinguished services, the Prince Regent was pleased to grant him the dignity of a Marquess, by the name, style, and title of " Marquess of Anglesey."

two squares of the grenadiers of the old guard ; in its left front, and much nearer to it, were posted artillery and cavalry, in advance of the proper right of the squares. This cavalry consisted principally of cuirassiers—the wrecks of entire brigades. Nearer to, and partly in rear of, the squares, stood the chasseurs, and grenadiers à cheval, of the imperial guard, greatly diminished in numbers. It was immediately evident to Vivian that the attack must in the first instance be directed against the advanced cavalry and artillery ; and having put the line in motion, he placed himself in front of the centre, beside Lieut. Colonel the Honorable Henry Murray, the commanding officer, for the purpose of putting the regiment into the required direction. This having been effected, he ordered the charge ; when the hussars dashed forward with the greatest impetuosity, and, at the same time, with as much steadiness and regularity as if they had been at field-day exercise on Hounslow heath. Thus, the direction of the charge by the 18th diverged as much to the left, as that by the 10th had inclined to the right. Just as the charge commenced, some French artillery coming from their right, and slanting towards the right of the 18th, made a bold push to cross the front of the latter at a gallop. But the attempt failed, and the hussars were instantly among them, cutting down the artillerymen and drivers, and securing the guns. In the next moment they fell upon the

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advanced cavalry, which they completely dispersed, and then, bringing forward their left shoulders, they attacked the cavalry and guns that stood more to the right front, and near to the right square, which was now retiring. This cavalry appeared, at first, determined upon making a stand; and an officer in its front dashed forward, and fired at Lieut. Colonel Murray; but, in another moment, the 18th were fiercely and dexterously plying their swords amongst them. They were forced to give way, the artillerymen were driven from their guns, and the whole fled in disorder. The charge then ceased to be compact, for the assailants and the flying were intermingled pell-mell; all riding as fast as the confusion of the *mêlée* would permit; a part of them along the high road, but the principal portion on the Allied right of the latter; the whole, however, passing by La Belle Alliance, and leaving the two squares of the guard on their right.

Vivian, satisfied with the complete success of the charge, ordered the regiment to halt and reform; whilst he proceeded himself to bring up the 1st hussars of the legion, which corps he had left in reserve. On his way, he found Major the Honorable Frederick Howard, with a small body of the 10th hussars, which he had collected from among those of the regiment that had not joined in the pursuit of the French cavalry more to the right, carried on by Lieut. Colonel Lord Robert

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Manners,* then commanding the 10th. This small body, by no means amounting to a squadron, stood forward within a short distance of the left square of the grenadiers of the guard, from the fire of which it was losing men fast. Vivian doubted for a moment how far it might be advisable to attack the square, but perceiving an infantry-regiment in red advancing on his left, and calculating on its immediately charging the face and angle of the square next to it, he ordered Major Howard to charge the face and angle to which he was opposed. This was executed with the greatest gallantry and determination. Vivian himself joined in the charge, on the right of the squadron. The hussars charged home to the bayonets of the French guard, and a fierce conflict ensued. Major Howard was killed at the head of his men. He was shot in the mouth, and fell senseless to the ground, when one of the imperial guard stepped out of the ranks, and brutally beat his head with the butt-end of his musket.† Two other officers, Lieu-

* Major General Lord Robert Manners, C.B., died on the 15th Nov. 1835.

† This officer was highly esteemed, not only by his own regiment, but by all who knew him. One of my informants, who was a brother-officer of his, says—"I never knew Howard do or say a thing one could wish otherwise. He was an excellent officer too; and, I know, a sincerely attached husband." Byron's lines are as just to the memory of the chivalrous soldier, as they are honourable to the feelings of the noble bard:—

"And his was of the bravest, and when shower'd
The death-bolts deadliest the thinn'd files along,
Even where the thickest of war's tempest lower'd,
They reach'd no nobler breast than thine, young, gallant Howard."

The same brother-officer, above mentioned, has favoured me with some

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tenants, Arnold* and Bacon,† were wounded. Lieutenant Gunning was killed immediately previous to the attack. The regiment of infantry, however, did not charge, as Vivian had expected, but continued pursuing a separate column in its own immediate front on the high road.

Although the square, a very strong one, cannot be said to have been broken by the shock, for the veteran soldiers of whom it was composed knew too well their power of resistance against such a handful of horsemen, still the manner in which the latter, notwithstanding the rapid diminution of their number, continued cutting at the ranks, parrying bayonet-thrusts, and pertinaciously pressing on, reflects the highest credit upon the 10th British hussars. The men fought with desperation; maddened probably by the fall of their officers. The square, yielding to the pressure, continued to fall back until it reached the hollow-way formed by the narrow road that leads from the chaussée in rear of La Belle Alliance, towards the left of the French position. Into this the

lines which he wrote, in 1822, upon his friend's death, when in a transport (not, as he humorously related to me, a *poetical* one, but a *troop-ship*), crossing to Ireland with the regiment. This effusion, whilst it breathes the outpourings of a generous heart and noble mind, presents so truly graphic a description of that part of the closing scene of Waterloo, connected with the proceedings of Vivian's hussar-brigade, that I have been induced to append it to this work.—See Appendix III.

* Lieut. Colonel Robert Arnold died, whilst in command of the 16th lancers, on the 20th August, 1839.

† Now General Bacon in the Portuguese service.

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guard hastily descended in confusion, and escaping by either outlet, mingled with the host of fugitives hurrying along the general line of retreat of the French army.

In the mean time, the remainder of the 10th hussars, consisting of the right, and part of the centre, squadron, that had, in the course of the first charge, crossed over to the right of the rise of ground on which the reserve-cavalry had been posted, had continued its course, under Lord Robert Manners, down into the valley, south-east of the Hougomont inclosures. The routed cavalry spread out in the utmost confusion—cuirassiers, of an almost gigantic size, galloped as hard as they could; and numbers tumbled off their horses to save themselves. The hussars now came upon retiring infantry, that appeared seized with a panic as their routed cavalry dashed past them—the large bear-skin caps, worn by several of them, betokened a portion of the imperial guard—they commenced throwing down their arms, numbers of them loudly calling out “*Pardon!*” Then, crossing the same narrow road, before mentioned as leading from La Belle Alliance to the left of the French position (but on the Allied right of the hollow-way by which the square of the guard effected its escape), the hussars brought up their right shoulders, and ascended the height in rear of the hollow-road. Upon the slope of the hill,

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about half a battalion of the French guard had rallied and formed, with some cavalry close behind them, and opened a sharp fire upon the 10th. Part of the 18th hussars, at this time, reached the hollow-way, an obstacle, however, which rendered *their* attack wholly impracticable. Lord Robert Manners halted for a minute, when within about forty paces from them, to allow his men to form up. He then gave a cheer and charged; when the imperial guard and the cavalry instantly turned and fled; the greater portion of the former throwing themselves down, and many of the latter tumbling off their horses. The hussars pursued up to the brow of the hill; on the further or south side of which was a deep hollow, and beyond this a knoll, (on the Allied right of the Charleroi road and nearly opposite De Coster's house,) upon which another square of infantry had formed, and appeared very steady. At this time a party of the 18th hussars—not more than from 30 to 35 men—continuing the charge, before described, close along the right of La Belle Alliance and Trimotion, and crossing the narrow road near its junction with the Charleroi road, dashed down the hollow, and ascending the height above mentioned, charged the square in most gallant style; but, as might have been expected, was checked and turned by the latter. Lord Robert Manners and Captain Taylor had rallied a party of the 10th hussars,

with a view to support the 18th, should these be charged in their turn, which, however, did not occur.

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The 2nd light dragoons of the King's German legion having, after the check given by the first charge of the 10th hussars to that of the French lancers which bore down towards them, brought up their left shoulders, and moved down into the valley in their right front, charged a body of cuirassiers. These at first appeared disposed to resist the Germans, and received them with a tolerably effective carbine-fire from their rear ranks, but the former charged home, cut down several of the enemy's horsemen, and made some prisoners. In following up the charge, however, the regiment exposed its right flank to another body of cuirassiers, by which it was thrown into disorder. Lieut. Colonel de Jonquières, the commanding officer, ordered the halt and rally to be sounded, but in the next moment he was wounded, as was also Lieut. Colonel von Maydell.* Major Friedrichs,† who was next in command, highly distinguished himself on this occasion by the spirited manner in which he rallied several of his men together; and as those that had been dispersed, rapidly

* Lieut. Colonel Charles von Maydell retired from the King's German legion in 1826.

† Now Colonel Augustus Friedrichs, C.B., K.H., on the Hanoverian retired list.

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placed themselves on his flanks, and thus extended his new line, he made another charge, which sent the enemy's cavalry about, and put it to flight. The regiment then continued moving forward, with proper caution, along the base of the higher ground on the left, over which the 10th and 18th British hussars were also charging and advancing.

The two last-mentioned regiments had, by this time, been thrown so much into disorder by their charges, that it became necessary to check their further advance, in order to gain time for collecting and re-forming their ranks. Although this measure was supported by the coming up of the 1st hussars of the legion to take post in front of the brigade, and was also rendered secure by the advance, on the right, of Vandeleur's brigade, (which had come up on Vivian's right, and between him and the inclosures of Hougomont, in column of squadrons, at the moment he was preparing to charge the square of the imperial guard with the party of the 10th hussars under Major Howard,) still the rallying and re-forming of those two regiments was attended with considerable difficulty, inasmuch as they had become completely intermingled with the fugitives.

It is now necessary to recur to Adam's brigade, which we left advancing, and driving before it, near the Charleroi road, the three squares of the guard that had retired as it approached to charge

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them. It will be recollected that upon the brigade first advancing from the Allied position, Lieut. Colonel Halkett followed it in immediate rear of its right flank, with the Osnabrück battalion of Hanoverian landwehr. When Adam reached the three squares above mentioned, Halkett, having the shortest space of ground to move over, soon came up in line with the brigade, still pursuing the column formed by the two battalions of chasseurs of the old guard. The Osnabrückers having then become much annoyed by a fire that opened upon them obliquely from a French battery within a very short distance of their right, their 1st company broke into subdivisions and, supported by the sharpshooters of the battalion, made a dash at the artillery, and captured six guns. During the greater part of the advance, they had been in almost close contact with the column formed by the two battalions of chasseurs of the old guard; and Halkett frequently called out to them to surrender. Having for some short time fixed his eye upon an individual whom he took to be the general-officer in command of the guard, from his being in full uniform, and from the animation he displayed in his endeavours to induce his men to stand their ground, and observing that the column, after receiving the fire of the Osnabrückers, left the general with two officers in its rear, he ordered the sharpshooters to dash on, whilst he, at the

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same time, darted forward at full gallop to attack the general. When he had come up with him, and was about to cut him down, the latter called out that he would surrender. Cambronne, for he it was, then preceded Halkett as he returned to the Hanoverian battalion, but had not gone many paces before Halkett's horse was wounded, and fell to the ground. In a few seconds, however, Halkett succeeded in getting him on his legs again, when he found that his prisoner was escaping in the direction of the French column; he instantly overtook him, seized him by the aiguillette, brought him to the battalion, and gave him in charge to a Serjeant of the Osnabrückers who was to deliver him to the Duke.*

Adam's brigade had by this time crossed to the opposite side of the Charleroi road, and, bringing forward its left shoulders, was continuing its ad-

* I have entered somewhat into detail concerning the capture of General Cambronne, in consequence of the statements put forth by several French writers that, when the imperial guard was called upon to surrender, this officer replied, "*La garde meurt et ne se rend pas*," an expression which the author of "*L'histoire de l'ex-garde*," who insists upon its veracity, has affixed as a motto to his work. But even this writer is compelled to admit the difference of opinion that exists as to whether Cambronne really uttered the words imputed to him. Doubts are also entertained on this point by the authors of the "*Victoires, conquêtes et désastres des Français*," and no mention is made of the matter in the "*Mémoires historiques de Napoléon, Livre IX.*" There can be no doubt as to the identity of the French general, as Cambronne declared himself to Lieut. Colonel Halkett, his captor, and was afterwards, along with Count de Lobau and other prisoners, sent to Ostend.

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vance, in pursuit of the defeated squares, in a direction parallel with that road; whilst Halkett, by continuing on the inner flank, and following the battalions of the chasseurs of the old guard, had got somewhat in advance, or rather, in right front of that brigade; and had, shortly before, reached the immediate vicinity of that part of the field on which Vivian was in the act of preparing to charge the square of the grenadiers of the old guard with the party of the 10th hussars under Major Howard. The Osnabrückers will here be recognised as the regiment of Allied infantry already alluded to in the description given of that charge.

Adam, after his repulse of the three squares of the imperial guard, perceiving that he was so much in front of the main line of the Anglo-allied army, and not being aware of Vivian's advance, had become apprehensive of an attack upon his right flank; and he therefore desired his brigade-major, Major Blair,* to proceed in the prolongation of his right flank, and observe whether there was any threatening appearance of the enemy's cavalry in that quarter. The latter, pursuing his errand, met the Duke of Wellington moving at a quick pace, followed by a single individual, to whom Major Blair addressed himself, but who immediately checked him by remarking, "*Monsieur, je*

* Now Colonel Hunter Blair, C.B., Unatt.

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ne parle pas un seul mot d'anglais!" Major Blair then explained to him, in French, the order he had received, to which he replied, "*Le Duc lui-même a été voir; il n'y a rien à craindre;*" whereupon the former returned to Adam, with this satisfactory information.

Here, then, was the great chieftain himself, still in the battle's front, vigilantly watching, and eagerly seizing advantage of, the course of events; braving every peril, and acting solely upon his own personal observation; his staff, and even orderlies, almost all killed or wounded; the very few that remained untouched, carrying messages; his only attendant, a foreigner, (Major Count de Sales,* a Sardinian officer,) attached to his suite! It is impossible not to recognise in the extraordinary degree of security with which this great man so fearlessly exposed himself throughout the entire day, the protecting interposition of an all-wise and merciful Providence. At this moment, too, he was not only upon the track of his great antagonist, but, in all probability, within the shortest distance that ever separated these wonderful men from each other; the one, alone, and in front of his advancing line, borne forward on the wings of victory, and upheld by the knowledge of his might

* Now His Excellency Lieut. General Count Paul François de Sales, the Sardinian Ambassador in Paris.

and the fulness of his glory; the other, seeking shelter amidst his devoted, yet broken and dispirited cohorts, abandoning himself to despair, and flying from the fatal field on which the sceptre he had usurped was signally and irrecoverably struck from his iron grasp.

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CHAPTER XV.

Advance of Vandeleur's light cavalry-brigade—It charges and disperses a large column of French infantry, and captures a battery—Adam's brigade continues driving the enemy before it along the left side of the Charleroi road—Effect produced upon the right wing of the French army by the advance of Adam's, Vivian's, and Vandeleur's brigades—Its effects also upon the French left wing—Napoleon takes shelter within a square of the imperial guard—Continuation of the advance of the Anglo-allied army—In the centre, La Haye Sainte is re-taken : on the right, Hougomont is cleared of the enemy : on the left, Durutte's division, forming the right of the French front line, takes to flight—The left wing captures the opposite line of batteries—Disorder and flight of the whole of d'Erlon's corps along the rear of Lobau's corps, which, being at the same time assailed by part of Bülow's corps, partakes of the panic, and mingles with the fugitives—The British troops near La Belle Alliance fall into the line of fire from a Prussian battery, to which Wellington sends directions to cease firing—French infantry dispersed, and a battery captured, by the 52nd British regiment—Capture of a battery by the 71st British regiment—Last French gun fired by Adam's aide-de-camp—A battery captured by the Osnabrück Hanoverian battalion, under Halkett—The British advanced cavalry is in the midst of crowds of defeated French soldiers—Remarkable steadiness of the French grenadiers-à-cheval—Contest in Planchenoit—Gallant conduct of Pelet and a portion of the chasseurs of the guard—The French troops that have been engaged at Planchenoit, retire in disorder and confusion towards the high road between Rossomme and Maison du Roi, the former of which points the British advanced brigades have already reached—Partial collision between the 18th British hussars and a Prussian regiment of cavalry—The 1st hussars of the King's German legion narrowly escape coming into serious collision with the 11th and 16th British light dragoons—Wellington halts the main body of his army upon the original French position—Blücher undertakes the pursuit—Wellington having satisfied himself, by his observations from the high ground beyond Rossomme, that the victory is secured beyond a doubt, returns towards Waterloo—On reaching La Belle Alliance, he meets Blücher—Dispositions made by the latter for

effecting a vigorous pursuit—The Prussian troops in advance, headed by Gneisenau, reach Genappe, where they capture a quantity of baggage, including Napoleon's travelling-carriage—Napoleon at Quatre-Bras—Direction of the retreat of the French troops—Napoleon proceeds to Charleroi whence he despatches Jerome with orders to rally the troops between Avesne and Maubeuge—Gneisenau continues the pursuit, passing through Quatre-Bras, and not resting until he arrives beyond the heights of Frasne—Losses sustained by the respective armies—Remarks upon the battle—Relative numerical strength of the combatants—Relative proportions in which the troops of the Anglo-allied army were actively engaged—Conduct of these troops—Extent of the actual share taken in the battle by the Prussians.

THE very forward movement of Vivian's brigade, and the vigorous attack which it made against the centre of the French position, having rendered obvious the necessity of an immediate support, Vandeleur's brigade was despatched across the ridge in column of half squadrons, right in front, at the moment of the general advance of the line. It proceeded at a smart trot along the east side of the Hougomont inclosures, and then descended into the valley in rear of the latter, passing Vivian's brigade on its left. Here it fell in with disordered columns of the French infantry in full retreat, as also cavalry of all kinds mixed together, the cuirassiers throwing off their armour to facilitate their flight. In the midst of this confusion, however, there stood higher up the valley a large column on the opposite side of the road which connects the centre with the left of the French position, forming square, and seemingly determined to oppose the further advance of the brigade. The latter, receiving the fire from the column, charged,

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and the French giving way, the whole of them were taken or destroyed. In this charge the 11th light dragoons, forming the right of the brigade, captured a battery on the height to which the before-mentioned road ascends. It was the last which had maintained the cannonade from the French left wing. Vandeleur's brigade continued to press forward, driving a host of fugitives before it. It was by this time in advance, and rather in right front, of Vivian. Colonel Sir Felton Harvey, of the staff, came up to its then commander, Lieut. Colonel Sleigh, of the 11th light dragoons,—Vandeleur having taken the command of the cavalry upon the fall of Lord Uxbridge,—and informed him that a French cavalry-brigade was moving along the heights on the right (or western) side of the valley. This cavalry did not, however, venture to descend into the lower ground, where it might have fallen upon Sleigh's right flank, but continued its course along the high ground towards some point on the Charleroi road, quite in rear of the main French army, apparently with the intention of protecting the retreat and rallying the fugitives. It was Piré's light cavalry-brigade, that had been stationed throughout the day on the extreme left of the French line.

In this manner, Vivian's brigade, which had not only broken, but completely pierced, the centre of the French position, had its right effectually protected, and due advantage was promptly taken of

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the disorder into which its bold and successful advance had thrown those French troops that had been moving in that quarter. At the same time, Vivian's left was secured by the advance of Adam's brigade, which continued to drive before it, along the left side of the Charleroi road, the squares of the guard, as also the cuirassiers by whom they were supported. These cuirassiers, it should be observed, had fronted, and evinced a disposition to charge as the brigade crossed the high road. Adam, however, feeling secure in his four-deep formation, continued pressing towards them; and when, along that part of his line against which the attack was threatened, the British bayonets were lowered, the cuirassiers declined the contest.

Having thus detailed the brilliant successes of these three British brigades, with which Wellington had so boldly assailed the centre, and effectually destroyed the last reserves, of the enemy, it is now time to consider their important consequences in conjunction with the general advance of the Anglo-allied army; and for this purpose it will be necessary to take a more extended view of the prominent features which the field of battle presented at this period of the day.

On no part of the French army, beyond the immediate sphere of action of the above brigades, did the advance of the latter, exercise so powerful an influence as on d'Erlon's corps, which constituted its right wing. The defeat of the second

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attacking column of the imperial guard, it will be recollected, involved in it the retreat of Donzelot's division of that corps, which, from the cover afforded it by the possession of La Haye Sainte, and from the hollow on its left of that farm, had so furiously assailed the central portion of the Duke's line, occupied by Alten's division. On the opposite side of the Charleroi road, from the knoll above the sand-pit, part of Alix's division was still maintaining a most destructive fire upon the remains of Picton's division and of Lambert's brigade posted along the Wavre road. The remainder of this division, as well as that under Marcognet, were advancing across the valley which separated the Anglo-allied left, from the French right, wing, and presented an array of columns between the knoll on the left of La Haye Sainte and the left of Durutte's division, which latter was now operating in concert with Lobau's corps in maintaining a defensive position against the advance of the Prussians. When, therefore, Wellington so suddenly launched forth Vivian's hussar-brigade against Napoleon's reserves, then posted close to La Belle Alliance, in the very centre of the French army, and also pushed forward Adam's light infantry-brigade past the farm and orchard of La Haye Sainte towards the eminence on which stood the three rallied squares of the imperial guard, he completely turned the left of d'Erlon's corps, and by means of the brilliant success which

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attended these movements, he gradually established himself in rear both of d'Erlon and of Lobau; the latter of whom was still defending himself against Blücher's advance. In like manner, the columns of Reille's corps, comprising the left wing of the French army, and which were advancing through, and contiguously to, the Hougomont inclosures, were turned in their right flank.

Thus, by this bold and masterly manœuvre, the whole front line of the French army, which, a short time before, had presented so menacing an appearance, was thrown into disorder and confusion; and supported as that manœuvre was by the advance, at the right moment, of the Duke's entire line, any attempt, on the part of the French, to rally and resume the offensive, was entirely frustrated. The firm, decided, and determined attitude which Wellington had assumed, had, in fact, struck terror and dismay into the ranks of his opponent, who, perceiving the hasty and confused retreat of his troops, as also the extreme pressure upon his right by the formidable and now more general attack on the part of Blücher, became completely paralyzed; and conscious of the utter futility of attempting to stem the torrent, he threw himself for temporary shelter into the square of the second battalion of the 2nd regiment of chasseurs of the guard.

The Anglo-allied line continued its magnificent advance, which was in truth a march of triumph,

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not of attack, since all fled before its approach. In the centre, Lambert's division, together with the 1st or royal Scots, crossed to the Charleroi road, and took possession of La Haye Sainte, which was found entirely abandoned to the wounded and the dying, who constituted its sole but numerous occupants. The troops that had stood in rear of Hougomont, now poured into its inclosures, aiding and supporting those who had so bravely maintained that important post,* in completely clearing it of its assailants, as many of the latter, in the wood, ignorant of what was passing in the open field, still endeavoured to hold their ground. The light troops on the right of Hougomont crossed the Nivelles road without opposition, not only the infantry in their front having retired, but Piré's light cavalry-brigade, which had formed the extreme left of the French army during the whole day, having been ordered to proceed to the rear of the centre to cover the general retreat. The extreme left of the line was flanked by the Prussian regiments of cavalry, belonging to Zieten's corps, previously mentioned as having joined shortly before the general advance; and the battalions of the first Prussian infantry-brigade, together with the Nassau brigade under Prince Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, were

* A list of the British officers who were present at the defence of Hougomont is given in Appendix IV.

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pressing up the heights against the left of Durutte's division, posted at the apex of the angle of *potence* on which stood the extreme right of the French army. As the Allied left descended the outer slope of the position, those columns of d'Erlon's corps which had advanced to attack it, were hastily retiring; part of them, indeed, along and near the Charleroi road, had already fallen back in disorder the moment they became aware of the defeat of the troops on the other side of that road, and of the advance of Adam's brigade, by which their left flank was completely turned, and their rear most seriously endangered. Durutte's division, forming, as before observed, the right of d'Erlon's corps, and posted in the angle of *potence*, perceiving in its direct rear, the retreat of the imperial guard, followed by British infantry, as also that of the columns of its own corps on its left, followed by the Anglo-allied line, besides the attack of the Prussians in its front and on its right, and which was increasing every moment in vigour and effect, at once saw the certainty of its being cut off if it remained in its present attitude, and, hence, aware of its own helplessness, it took to flight.

In the next moment the renewed cheering along the Anglo-allied left wing, announced that it had reached and captured the strong line of batteries, by the fire of which, maintained during the entire day, its ranks had been so awfully diminished. Zieten's battalions took possession, also, of the batteries

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which had protected the apex of the angle of *potence*, and which had been covered by Durutte's division. Notwithstanding the confused retreat of the flank columns of d'Erlon's corps, those which constituted the central portion of his line had hitherto retired in some little degree of order, but now they began rapidly to dissolve as the Allied line approached, and, soon spreading out, they broke forth into one general crowd of fugitives. The flight of these troops immediately along the rear of Lobau's line, at the very moment of its being most vigorously assailed by the 13th and 15th infantry brigades of Bülow's corps, covered by an overpowering cannonade, involved its ranks in the general panic which had become uncontrollable. The whole corps rushed wildly into the stream of fugitives which, with overwhelming force, had set in towards Rossomme and Maison du Roi, on the Charleroi road, the direct line of retreat.

By this time, (about a quarter past eight o'clock,) Adam's brigade, pursuing its course on the left side of the high road, was ascending the higher ground in rear of La Belle Alliance. Here it fell into the line of fire of one of Bülow's batteries, which had immediately followed up the retreat of Lobau's corps, and opened a cannonade from the previous position of the latter, at a distance of about 700 yards. Wellington, perceiving that this fire might occasion serious injury to his advancing troops, directed Count de Sales (who was still his

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sole attendant*) to proceed to the Prussian battery, and cause it to cease firing, its commanding officer not being aware that its shot were falling amongst British troops. Bülow, on becoming acquainted with this circumstance, immediately checked the fire of his artillery, and, at the same time, ordered the infantry of his right to refrain from firing during its forward movement.

The road which leads from the chaussée across the height in rear of La Belle Alliance, towards Planchenoit, becomes, after a distance of about a hundred yards, a complete hollow-way. As it was approached by Adam's brigade, a column of artillery and infantry, from the French right, was hastily retreating up that part of it which was in front of the 52nd regiment, quite unaware of its having fallen into the immediate vicinity of British infantry. Astonished by the sudden appearance of the latter along the bank, the column hesitated for a moment what course to adopt. The infantry at first presented some little show of defence, but soon threw down their arms, dispersed and escaped as best they could. The artillery made a dash at the opposite bank, but some of the horses of each gun were instantly brought down by a fire from the British, and the attempt failed. The commanding officer of the battery, as if in a fit of desperation, standing in the centre of his guns,

* See page 222.

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waved his sword above his head in defiance. A soldier from the 52nd regiment sprung forward, parried his thrust, closed with him, threw him on the ground, and bayoneted him. The guns were immediately abandoned. On the right of the brigade, the 71st regiment having gained the height on which a reserve-battery of the imperial guard had been posted the entire day, and had just made an attempt to draw off into the high road, was captured by that corps; when some men of the right flank company of the latter (Captain Reed's),* under Lieutenant Torriano,† immediately turned round one of the guns, which was then discharged into the retiring columns of the imperial guard by Captain Campbell, aide-de-camp to Major General Adam, and was, there is reason to believe, the last French gun fired on that day.

Lieut. Colonel Halkett, who, with the Hanoverian battalion Osnabrück, had entered the Charleroi road, near La Belle Alliance, continued to press before him the two battalions of the chasseurs of the old guard, under the protection of which, Napoleon with several of his principal staff officers were retiring from the field. Halkett soon found himself in the midst of a great but disordered mass of the enemy's cavalry, which menaced

* Lieut. Colonel Samuel Reed, h.p. 71st regiment, died on the 13th of July, 1842.

† Lieutenant William Torriano, 71st regiment, retired from the service in May, 1824.

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the battalion in a most vociferous manner, but, after receiving the fire from the latter, it went off in all directions. Further on, perceiving several guns in full retreat, he sent the sharpshooters of the battalion, supported by a company, amongst them, who, by their fire, increased the confusion, and then made many prisoners, and cut the traces of the horses from the leading guns.

The regiments of Prussian cavalry belonging to Zieten's corps, before mentioned as having joined the left of the Anglo-allied army, after crossing the valley and ascending the French position, had got somewhat in advance of the left of the Anglo-allied infantry, taking the direction of Rossomme, but they soon found their progress most seriously obstructed and retarded by the vast crowds of fugitives of all arms intermingled in the wildest confusion. Such was also the case with the much more advanced British light cavalry-brigades under Vandeleur and Vivian on the right of the Charleroi road. In fact, the cavalry thus situated in the van of the Duke's victorious army, had now become almost helpless: it seemed as if carried aloft on the billows of the agitated sea, yielding rather to its impulses than controlling the angry element. As might have been expected, there were innumerable instances in which the rage and disappointment of the conquered foe gave rise to covert assaults, which, however, were speedily repressed, more especially by the Prussians against whom a

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word or look sufficed to draw down their vengeance upon an enemy whom they held in detestation. The 10th and 18th British hussars of Vivian's brigade, whilst endeavouring to re-form between La Belle Alliance and Rossomme, found themselves in the midst of an immense crowd, composed partly of defeated soldiers of the imperial guard, who could but ill conceal their mortification, and who seized every opportunity that offered to gratify their hatred and revenge. Lieut. Colonel the Hon. Henry Murray, commanding the 18th was very nearly bayoneted by one of them; and his orderly was compelled, for the security of his master, to cut down five or six in rapid succession.

A remarkable exception to the general disorganization of the French army was manifested about this time in front of Vandeleur's brigade, which was the furthest in advance of any of the Allied troops. In the midst of the crowd of fugitives which impeded the progress of the brigade, there appeared a regiment of cavalry, moving at a walk, in close column, and in perfect order, as if disdaining to allow itself to be contaminated by the confusion that prevailed around it. It was the "*grenadiers à cheval*." The 12th British light dragoons were the nearest to it, having got in advance of the rest of the brigade, and were opposite the right flank of the column, whence a few pistol or carbine shots were fired at them. The

12th made a partial attack, but they were so much inferior in numbers, (being very weak at this period,) and were so greatly obstructed in their movements by the crowd, that they were unable to produce any impression upon so compact and steady a body of cavalry; which literally walked from the field in the most orderly manner, moving majestically along the stream, the surface of which was covered with the innumerable wrecks into which the rest of the French army had been scattered. As Napoleon and his staff were at this time retiring along the high road, on the right flank of this cavalry of the guard, it is reasonable to infer that the latter was therefore induced to maintain the admirable order in which it was thus seen, to secure the Emperor's retreat.

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Whilst the great mass of the French army, in a state of thorough disorganization, was thus driven by Wellington's victorious troops across the whole extent of ground which had constituted its general position, as also, on its right, by that portion of the Prussian troops consisting of part of Zieten's, and of the right wing of Bülow's, corps, the battalions of the French imperial guard in Planchenoit were maintaining a most desperate and obstinate contest with Bülow's left wing, aided by a part of Pirch's corps, to which the attack of the village had been confided. The principal force of the imperial guard having taken post within the central portion of the village, and strongly occupied the

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church-yard, the headmost columns of this third Prussian attack met with a most destructive fire as they pressed forward through the lanes that led towards the eastern side of the church. The supporting columns now came up, and joined in the *fusillade* that was maintained with the French in the church-yard, the stone wall encircling which, lined with troops, gave to it the appearance of a little fortress. The Prussians extending their front so as to envelope a considerable portion of the church-yard, and taking advantage of the houses and inclosures which they had reached on their own side, maintained a terrific fire upon their opponents, and as the latter appeared resolved to keep them at bay to the last, a great loss of life occurred on both sides. The soldiers of the imperial guard fought desperately, and so greatly was their animosity excited, that some officers of the 15th Prussian regiment, and of the Silesian landwehr, who had been made prisoners in the previous attack, were with difficulty saved by General Pelet's personal exertions from becoming a sacrifice to their fury. Reinforcements were moved into the church-yard from the reserves on its western side, and the pertinacity with which the attacks upon it were repelled showed very plainly that other means than that of a front assault must be resorted to for forcing the French from a post which afforded them such superior advantages in the defence of the village. If the Prussians attempted to outflank the

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church-yard by advancing along the low open space on its right, they became exposed to the commanding fire from its wall, to that from the opposite houses, and in front, to the reserves. If they ventured to pass close by its left they had but a narrow road open to them, bounded by the church-yard wall on one side, strongly lined by the defenders, and by houses on the other, which the enemy still occupied, and presenting also at its further extremity a farm house and its offices in flames, situated so close to the church-yard as to conceal by its smoke any column of reserve that might be posted in that quarter. Hence it was determined to act upon a broader extent of front, and to turn the entire village on both flanks, so as either to force or to intercept the retreat of the enemy from his stronghold in the church-yard. On the Prussian left, Major von Witzleben, with the fusilier-battalion of the 25th regiment, had already crossed the rivulet which divides the village into two nearly equal parts, and was attacking that portion of the French guard which was posted upon the narrow ridge which lies between that rivulet and the Lasne. His skirmishers were joined upon their left by those that had preceded the 1st and 2nd battalions of this regiment, and which latter having pushed through the wood of Virère, were now following close up in support of the attack on this part of Planchenoit. These skirmishers were also connected on their left with

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those of the fusilier-battalions of both the 15th regiment and the 1st Silesian landwehr, under Major von Keller, who was advancing along the right bank of the Lasne. Along the crest of this ridge runs a narrow road, with several cottages on either side of the latter ; the ground is throughout intersected with hedges, and studded with trees ; and altogether admirably adapted for a protracted defence by light troops. Every house, every lane, and every hedge was gallantly contested. The Prussians not only boldly attacking in front, but skilfully and gradually turning the ridge on both sides, at length gained possession of all this portion of the village, and thus outflanked the troops in the church-yard, who maintained to the last the most desperate defence. In the meantime, the houses and inclosures on the left of the church had also been turned on that side by the right of the Prussian attack, and principally by the 5th Westphalian landwehr, the skirmishers of which had beaten back their opponents close under the walls of the burning buildings ; the bright flames from which, gleaming upon the combatants, who rent the air with their shouts, gave a peculiar wildness to this scene of mortal strife. But still more wild and awful must have been the scene within the church, as the red flood of light which they poured through the windows of the aisles, fell upon the agonized and distorted features of the wounded and the dying, with which that sacred

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edifice was at this moment filled. The Prussians continued pressing forward along both flanks of the village, driving the imperial guard from house to house, from hedge to hedge, and from tree to tree, until at length it became obvious to the French that their rear would soon be intercepted. The latter were also by this time fully aware of the *déroute* of the main army, and, giving up all for lost, as they fell back upon the western portion of the village, they made a hasty and disorderly retreat towards Maison du Roi. The chasseurs of the old guard were the last to quit the churchyard, and suffered severely as they retired. Their numbers were awfully diminished, and Pelet, collecting together about 250 of them, found himself vigorously assailed by the Prussian cavalry from the moment he quitted the confines of Planchenoit and entered upon the plain between the latter and the high road. At one time, his ranks having opened out too much, in the hurry of their retreat, some of the Prussian troops in pursuit, both cavalry and infantry, endeavoured to capture the eagle, which, covered with black crape, was carried in the midst of this devoted little band of veterans. Pelet, taking advantage of a spot of ground which afforded them some degree of cover against the fire of grape by which they were constantly assailed, halted the standard-bearer, and called out, "*A moi, chasseurs ! sauvons l'aigle ou mourons autour d'elle !*" The chasseurs immediately pressed

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around him, forming what is usually termed the rallying square, and, lowering their bayonets, succeeded in repulsing the charge of cavalry. Some guns were then brought to bear upon them, and subsequently a brisk fire of musketry, but notwithstanding the awful sacrifice which was thus offered up in defence of their precious charge, they succeeded in reaching the main line of retreat, favoured by the universal confusion, as also by the general obscurity which now prevailed; and thus saved alike the eagle and the honour of the regiment.

The reserve-cavalry of the 2nd and 4th Prussian corps received orders to pass to the front through the infantry: that of the 4th corps, under Prince William of Prussia, moved by the right of Planchenoit, as also through the village itself; but its progress was greatly impeded by the fugitives that crowded towards Maison du Roi.

In the mean time, the Prussian battalions that had been detached for the protection of the left of the attack upon Planchenoit, namely the fusilier-battalion of the 15th regiment, and that of the 1st Silesian landwehr, under Major von Keller, as also that of the 25th regiment, under Major von Witzleben, had turned the village, and followed the enemy nearly in the direction of Maison du Roi. They met with some resistance on the part of the battalion of the grenadiers of the imperial guard, which had advanced from Caillou, in pursuance of

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the orders it had received, into the wood of Chan-telet; but they soon forced their way to the high road, and by their presence added greatly to the disorder in which the enemy was flying from the field. Major von Falkenhausen, having remarked the retreat of the French, as he stood on the height of Seroulx, to which he had been detached with 100 horsemen of the 3rd Silesian landwehr-cavalry, also moved down upon the high road, and charging the flank of the flying foe, tended still further to augment the alarm and confusion that prevailed.

When the French imperial guard was falling back from Planchenoit in disorder and confusion, towards the high road between Rossomme and Maison du Roi, Wellington's advanced brigades had reached the former place. It was about half-past eight o'clock—perhaps somewhat later—and the darkness, which had been rapidly setting in, had become so great as to render it difficult to distinguish one particular body of troops from another. Some little time before this, one of the Prussian advanced regiments of cavalry, suddenly entering the high road between La Belle Alliance and Rossomme, came into partial collision with the 18th British hussars, who, not anticipating the presence of any other foreign troops in that vicinity than those of the French army, commenced an attack upon them: cuts were exchanged, and some few lives lost, before the error was corrected. The 1st hussars of the German legion, while advancing

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along the right of the high road, came upon the rear of Vandeleur's brigade, and were all but in collision with the 11th and 16th British light dragoons, which regiments, having previously ascertained that a brigade of French cavalry (Piré's) was on their right, and perceiving, though but dimly, in the dark, the approach of a strong body of horsemen towards their rear, concluded that an attempt was made to intercept their retreat. They immediately went "threes about," and struck into a charge. On the other hand, the 1st German hussars, not being aware that any British cavalry was in their front, and misled in a great measure by the sudden clamour of French voices proceeding from the numerous fugitives who, taking the alarm, were endeavouring to get out of the way, prepared to charge, and gave a loud cheer. This cheer was fortunately recognized by the British dragoons, when in the act of charging, as that of the 1st German hussars, and was thus the means of preventing a rencontre that might have been productive of the most fatal consequences to the parties concerned.

Wellington had, previously to this, given orders that the main body of his army should halt upon what had been the French position, in the line of La Belle Alliance; having arranged, by communication with Blücher, that the latter, whose troops were comparatively fresh, should take up the pursuit: and, as the Prussians continued moving for-

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ward in great force towards the high road, he directed his own troops to proceed to the right of the latter, so as to leave it clear for their advance. The Prussian regiments, on passing the British, caused their bands to play the national anthem, "God save the King," a compliment which was greeted, on the part of the latter, by hearty and friendly cheers.

The Duke now stood with his advance of both infantry and cavalry, on the elevated ground beyond Rossomme, overlooking Maison du Roi. The moon had risen, and by the light it gradually spread over the field, as also by the objects set fire to at intervals along the high road, the retreating line of his vanquished foe became sufficiently perceptible to satisfy him that the brilliant victory he had gained was rendered secure beyond a doubt. Having ordered his advanced brigades to take up their bivouacs for the night, he returned from this distant part of the field, and proceeded leisurely along the Charleroi road back towards Waterloo. Adam's brigade bivouacked on the spot it had reached;* Vandeleur's, on the right, near the

* Lieut. Colonel Halkett, with the Hanoverian battalion of Osnabrück landwehr, having continued in advance of Adam's brigade, along the high road, and having received no order to halt, moved on with the Prussians, until he reached some houses on the left of the chaussée, near Genappe; when, finding his men fatigued, and perceiving no British troops in his rear, he halted, and occupied those houses during the night, after having detached the Major of the battalion with a company into Genappe, to see what was going on in that place.

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wood of Callois, in which stood the observatory ; while Vivian, inclining somewhat to his right, led his hussars much further in advance of the army, on the French side of the observatory, and established his bivouac close to the hamlet of Hilaincourt. On approaching La Belle Alliance, Wellington ordered the whole of his army to bivouac on the field of battle. On reaching that point, he met Blücher, and mutual congratulations took place between them on the splendid victory achieved. The latter, taking advantage of the designation of the house as felicitously applicable to the meeting of the two commanders, and considering also that it had constituted the direction-point for the advance of the main portion of his troops, styled this glorious contest, the Battle of La Belle Alliance. With the promise of vigorously following up the pursuit, and allowing the enemy no opportunity of rallying within a march from the field, he took his leave of the Duke ; who then continued to ride leisurely towards Waterloo, where he passed the night. The circumstance of the Duke having established his head-quarters in this village, and the name of the latter being more consonant to English pronunciation than that of any other place nearer to the field, acquired for this ever-memorable struggle, the designation, by the British, of the BATTLE OF WATERLOO.

Blücher, determined to allow no breathing-time to the flying enemy, and to deprive him of all

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power of rallying, at least on this side of the French frontier, gave orders that Bülow's corps should undertake the pursuit along the Charleroi road; that Zieten's corps should follow in support of Bülow; and that Pirch's corps should march by Aywiers, and cross the Dyle, for the purpose of intercepting Grouchy's troops, which, it was presumed, would soon be retreating from Wavre towards the Sambre.

The Prussian battalions, already mentioned as having turned the village of Planchenoit, and entered the high road near Maison du Roi, accompanied by only three squadrons of uhlans, formed the advance of the pursuing army. Gneisenau, placing himself at their head, proceeded to carry into effect the commands of his veteran chief and friend. The cavalry, under Prince William, followed; and then the infantry of the two corps.

At Genappe, the first important defile through which the main French army retired, an immense number of carriages and waggons of all kinds had been collected together—some having been withdrawn from the field, and others, such as those of the commissariat or ordnance departments, having come up to join, or to follow in the track of the French army. By judicious management, these materials, combined with a suitable defence, would have afforded the means of seriously impeding the further pursuit by the victors. Some intention of this kind appeared to have been

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entertained, as several waggons had been upset, so as to obstruct the crossing of the bridge, a narrow passage only being left to admit stragglers. But no sooner did the Prussian advance appear, in the moonlight, descending from the heights overlooking Genappe, with drums beating and bugles sounding, than the rearmost of the French troops, (for rear-guard there was none to an army from which all semblance of order and regularity had vanished,) immediately after firing a few shots, fled from the place. This was at about eleven o'clock. The quantity of baggage that was collected here presented a rich booty to the Prussians; but the most valuable and most interesting object consisted of Napoleon's travelling carriage, which with all its contents, fell into the hands of the fusilier-battalion of the 15th regiment. The infantry of Bülow's and Zieten's corps halted at Genappe, but as soon as the Prussian advance, including the cavalry under Prince William, had succeeded in forcing its way through the immense mass of waggons and carriages of all kinds with which this defile had been blocked up, Gneisenau, moving the infantry along the road, and flanking it on each side by the cavalry, continued the pursuit. He succeeded in driving the French from not less than seven bivouacs, which they had taken up in succession, but each of which they abandoned the moment they heard the sounds of the Prussian drums or bugles.

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It was an hour after midnight when Napoleon reached Quatre-Bras, whence he despatched several officers to make known to Grouchy the loss of the battle, and to order him to retire upon Namur. The officers whom he had previously detached from Genappe to Ligny, for the purpose of moving Girard's division, which had been left there, into position at Quatre-Bras, now brought him word that they had not succeeded in finding it. There appeared to be no possibility of presenting, at this point, any effectual check to the Prussian pursuit. General Nègre of the artillery was here with the parks of reserve, but accompanied by a very feeble escort. The soldiers of the 1st and 2nd corps, who, during the advance of the 15th, had crossed the Sambre by the bridge of Marchiennes, had quitted the high road, both at Quatre-Bras and at Gosselies, to proceed in the direction of that point, and with so much precipitation that they could not be halted for the purpose of forming something like a rear guard. The 6th corps, the imperial guard and part of the cavalry, retreated upon Charleroi, whither Napoleon himself proceeded, after having sent his brother Jerome to Marchiennes, with orders to rally the troops between Avesne and Maubeuge.

In the mean time, Gneisenau continued his wild nocturnal chase, which was truly "*Liitzow's wilde verwegene Jagd*." His followers, however, having

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been on the march or in action, since daybreak, were becoming weary, especially the infantry; besides which, several, impelled by hunger, stopped on the way to plunder provision-waggons; so that their numbers had greatly diminished. But Gneisenau, who was the life and soul of the pursuit, and who seemed bent on pushing forward whilst a man and horse remained, now had recourse to a stratagem, which, as regarded its effect upon the enemy, fully compensated for the exhaustion of his infantry. Observing that the fugitives always took alarm at the sound of the drum, which announced the presence of even infantry, thus far in pursuit, and close upon their rear, ordered the last remaining drummer, who was unable to proceed further on foot, to mount one of the horses that had been disengaged from Napoleon's travelling-carriage, and then to keep up with the cavalry, and beat the drum without intermission. In this manner Gneisenau passed through Quatre-Bras, which had been abandoned on his approach; and even the heights of Frasne were left free to him; whilst the affrighted foe, completely scattered and dispersed, endeavoured to escape by Gosselies, Marchiennes, and Charleroi. Upon reaching the inn of "*à l'Empereur*," on the high road, beyond Frasne, this favoured companion of Blücher halted his followers, who then consisted but of a few squadrons, and a party of the 15th regiment, and

allowed them to take rest, satisfied with having thus, by mere beat of drum and shouts of triumph, succeeded in scaring the remnant of the French army across the Sambre. 18th of
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Such was the termination of this ever-memorable battle—a battle, remarkable for the spectacle it afforded, on the one hand, of a bravery the most noble and undaunted; of a passive endurance, the most calm, dignified, and sublime; of a loyalty and patriotism, the most stern and inflexible: and, on the other, of a gallantry in assault the most daring and reckless; of a devotion to their chief, the most zealous and unbounded; and, lastly, of a physical overthrow and moral annihilation unexampled in the history of modern warfare. Such was the consummation of a victory, the most brilliant in its development, the most decisive in its operation, and the most comprehensive in its result, of any that had occurred since the commencement of that revolution which it was thus the instrument of bringing to the termination so long and so ardently desired by the suffering and indignant nations of Europe.

From the contemplation of the triumph, the glory, and the result, of such a battle, we are impelled to turn our thoughts upon the melancholy spectacle of the awfully severe losses sustained by both the victors and the vanquished; whose heroic exertions and noble endurance could not but be attended with immense sacrifice.

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The following table shows the losses sustained by the troops composing the Anglo-allied army :—

	KILLED.			WOUNDED.			MISSING.		
	Officers.	Non-com. Officers, Trumpeters, Drummers, and Privates.	Horses.	Officers.	Non-com. Officers, Trumpeters, Drummers, and Privates.	Horses.	Officers.	Non-com. Officers, Trumpeters, Drummers, and Privates.	Horses.
*British	85	1334	1319	365	4560	719	10	532	708
*King's German Legion	27	335	194	77	932	144	1	217	54
*Hanoverians . .	18	276	..	63	1035	..	3	207	..
*Brunswickers . .	7	147	77	26	430	..	..	50	..
*Nassauers . . .	5	249	..	19	370	..	..	..	..
Total	142	2341	1590	550	7327	863	14	1056	762

If to this loss be added that of the Dutch-Belgian troops—about 4000†—the total number of non-commissioned officers, trumpeters, drummers, and privates, killed, wounded, and missing, amounted to 14,728.

* For detailed returns of the losses of these troops, see Appendix V., VI., VII., VIII., and IX. The Hanoverian return, in Appendix VII, has been furnished by Major Benne, K.H., of the Hanoverian staff, (see p. 29, vol. I.) It embraces the casualties from the 16th to the 18th of June, inclusive; but in order to obtain the numbers in the above table, the Hanoverian losses incurred on the 16th, as stated in the "London Gazette" of the 8th July, 1815, have been deducted. A List of all British officers who were present in the actions of the 16th, 17th, or 18th of June, distinguishing those who were killed, wounded, or missing, is given in Appendix X. Lists of the King's German legion, Hanoverian, and Brunswick officers, killed, wounded, and missing, are given in Appendix XI., XII., and XIII.

† A detailed return of the losses of the Dutch-Belgian troops on the 16th, 17th, and 18th of June, will be found in Appendix XIV.

The losses of the Prussian army in the battle were as follows :—

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	KILLED.			WOUNDED.			MISSING.		
	Officers.	Under-Officers, Trumpeters, Drum- mers, and Privates.	Horses.	Officers.	Under-Officers, Trumpeters, Drum- mers, and Privates.	Horses.	Officers.	Under-Officers, Trumpeters, Drum- mers, and Privates.	Horses.
Zieten's corps .	..	34	18	8	164	21	..	111	2
Pirch's do. .	1	36	9	3	192	7	4	93	9
Bülow's do. .	21	1133	259	151	3869	328	35	1143	89
Total	22	1203	286	162	4225	356	39	1347	100

Total under-officers, trumpeters, drummers, and privates, killed, wounded, and missing, 6,775.*

In the absence of all returns it is difficult to estimate the losses of the French army. They were, however, immense; besides which, the whole of their artillery, ammunition-waggons, and baggage, fell into the possession of the victors. Of the French generals, Friant was killed, Prince Jerome and several others were wounded; and Lobau, Compans, Duhesme, and Cambronne, were taken prisoners.

The minuteness of detail with which the fore-

* A detailed return of the losses of the Prussian troops at the battle of Waterloo is given in Appendix XV.; and a list of the Prussian officers killed, wounded, and missing, at this battle, in Appendix XVI.

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going history of the battle of Waterloo has been written, the gradual development which has been presented of the motives and dispositions of the commanders, and the circumstantial description which has been afforded of the movements of the troops engaged—of the working, as it were, of the machinery in the hands of the three most renowned captains of the age—obviate the necessity of further comment upon those points; but it would be unjust to the honour, the fame, and the glory, of the actors in that memorable scene, to omit putting forth certain important considerations which are essential to enable an impartial public, and an unprejudiced posterity, to arrive at correct and satisfactory conclusions upon other points, hitherto involved in doubt and obscurity.

These refer chiefly to the relative numerical strength of the combatants, the relative proportions in which the troops of the Anglo-allied army were actively engaged with the enemy, the conduct of these troops respectively, while so engaged, and, lastly, the extent of the actual share taken in the battle by the Prussians.

The most simple, and at the same time the most rational, mode of computing the relative strength of armies is by placing in juxta-position their respective numbers of battalions, squadrons, and guns. According to this rule, the Anglo-allied and French armies, as they stood in front of each

other at the commencement of the battle, were constituted as follows :—

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	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.
Anglo-allied army . . .	73	98	140
French	104	121	246

Napoleon having, about one o'clock, detached the light cavalry-divisions of Domont and Subervie, as a corps of observation upon his right flank, the opposed forces, from that hour until about six o'clock, stood as follows :—

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.
Anglo-allied army . . .	73	98	140
French	104	103	234

During this period of the battle, the Anglo-allied army was thus composed :—

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.
British	26	49	78
King's German Legion . .	8	16	18
Hanoverians	18	*	12
Brunswickers	8	5	16
Nassauers	3	.	.
Dutch-Belgians	10	28	16
Total	73	98	140

Almost all these battalions were at one time or another in the front line, and all conducted them-

* The Cumberland hussars not having been engaged, but, on the contrary, withdrawn from the field by their commanding officer who was subsequently cashiered and degraded for such conduct, are not included in the above table.

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selves in the most courageous and exemplary manner, with the exception of five of the Dutch-Belgian battalions, which hastily retreated as the French approached, when making their first grand attack upon the Anglo-allied centre and left wing, and took no further active part in the battle. The remainder of the above 10 battalions in the service of the King of the Netherlands, were three battalions forming the 2nd regiment of the Nassau contingent, and two battalions of Orange Nassau, under Prince Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, and occupied the houses and inclosures in the valley in front of the extreme left of the Allied line.* These troops behaved very well.

Of the squadrons above mentioned, a large proportion, nearly one third, consisted of the Dutch-Belgian cavalry; but although their numbers serve to augment the amount of the Anglo-allied cavalry, *on paper*, the actual value of their services in the battle was by no means commensurate with their display of strength, and hence it was that the brunt of the cavalry contest devolved almost exclusively upon the British and German dragoons. The same observation applies in an equal degree to the artillery.

About six o'clock the relative strength of the contending forces was altered, on the part of the French army, by the detaching of Lobau's corps

* Excepting the 1st batt. 2nd regt. of Nassau, which was at Hougomont.

and the young guard to oppose the Prussians, and on that of the Anglo-allied army, though somewhat later, by the bringing into the field of Chassé's Dutch-Belgian division ; so that they stood about that time as follows :—

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	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Guns.
Anglo-allied army .	85	98	156
French army .	76	103	186

Of the assistance derived by the Duke of Wellington from this augmentation of the 12 Dutch-Belgian battalions, a sufficient estimate may be deduced from the foregoing history of the battle—one half of them were with great difficulty prevented from abandoning the field, although, at the moment, they were not in contact with, nor did they even see, the enemy ; and the other half only joined the front line (on the left of Maitland's brigade) at the time of the general advance.

Whatever may have been the cause of the comparative supineness of the Dutch-Belgian troops ; whether produced by dislike entertained towards recent political arrangements, which alienated each party from its native country, without securing to either its national independence, or, by predilections imbibed for the chief against whose arms they were now opposed, and in whose ranks they had formerly served ; the fact of such supineness is too well attested to admit of any doubt respecting the value to be attached to their co-ope-

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tion in the great struggle, so courageously and resolutely sustained by the remainder of the Anglo-allied army; and becomes a most important point for consideration in any calculation of the relative strength of the combatants, when taken in conjunction with the actual proportion of the entire Dutch-Belgian force brought into the field to that of each of the Allies, as appears by the following table :—

Amount of the effective Strength of the Anglo-allied Army at the Battle of Waterloo.

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Total Men.	Guns.
British	15,181	5,843	2,967	23,991	78
King's German Legion	3,301	1,997	526	5,824	18
Hanoverians . .	10,258	497	465	11,220	12
Brunswickers . .	4,586	866	510	5,962	16
Nassauers . . .	2,880	..	..	2,880	..
Dutch-Belgians . .	13,402	3,205	1,177	17,784	32
Total * .	49,608	12,402	5,645	67,661	156

Hence it appears that the Dutch-Belgian contingent, compared with the British troops alone, consisted, in infantry, as 13,402 to 15,181; in cavalry, as 3,205 to 5,843; and, in guns, as 32 to 78. It is needless now to speculate upon what might have been the result, had this large proportion of force been replaced by a corresponding number of either British or German troops. The

* See Appendix XXX. vol. i.

fact testifies abundantly, in addition to what has been already related, as to the heroic firmness and enduring courage with which the brave British and Germans stood the brunt of that remarkable contest ; and this, too, be it remembered, with unquestionably the finest army which even Napoleon had ever collected together, formed exclusively of one nation—of that nation whose legions had at one time subjugated nearly the whole of Europe—imbued with inveterate hatred against its foes, cherishing the most enthusiastic devotion to its chief, and filled with the ardent desire of restoring the fallen glory of the Empire.*

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* As in no former history of the battle, the conduct of the Dutch Belgian troops has been so fully developed, my remarks may by some be considered unduly severe ; but I have advanced nothing beyond the limits of the most ample testimony, which has been afforded me by eye-witnesses : and, in a work designed to furnish the fullest details respecting all the dispositions and movements that were made by the respective chiefs, it would have been utterly impossible for me to have fulfilled my task, without entering into the explanation which that conduct rendered requisite for such a purpose. I have suggested as the probable cause of this comparative apathy, the dislike which they entertained towards those political arrangements by which Holland and Belgium had been incorporated in a Kingdom of the Netherlands ; but it is not for me to inquire more particularly into the cause, whatever it may have been ; it is with *facts* which I have to deal, and considering the important proportion which the number of these troops bore to the amount of the remainder of the Duke of Wellington's forces, I could not have omitted facts such as have been detailed, without inflicting a gross injustice both upon the merits of the other troops engaged, and upon the skill of him who fought the battle under so great a disadvantage. 'Magna est veritas et prevalebit ;' and a period of twenty-eight years may surely be considered a lapse of time sufficient for the subsidence of private feelings, in favour of historical truth. One great step has already been taken towards this desideratum by the gallant compiler of the Duke of Wellington's despatches, in the last volume of which we learn

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Of the conduct of the British infantry, of its heroic valour, its indomitable resistance, its proud defiance, and its admirable discipline, the history of the battle affords abundant testimony: further comment is superfluous. The superior prowess of the British cavalry also shone most conspicuously on this great day. The combined charge of the two heavy brigades against the French cavalry and infantry which attacked the centre and left wing of the Anglo-allied army, between one and two o'clock, whether we regard the brilliancy of

that the Duke, with unexampled modesty and forbearance, endeavoured to dissuade a certain literary gentleman from writing a history of the battle, evidently from a feeling that the real history could not be told without an exposure of the want of due zeal displayed on the part of a portion of his troops, as may be seen by the following remarks:—

“ Then the faults or the misbehaviour of some gave occasion for the distinction of others, and perhaps were the cause of material losses; and you cannot write a true history of the battle without including the faults and misbehaviour of part at least of those engaged.” Again, the following significant postscript is appended to the Duke of Wellington's letter, transmitting to the King of the Netherlands his Grace's report of the battle;—

“ P.S.—J'ai marqué au crayon des paragraphes dans mon rapport que je prie votre Majesté de ne pas laisser publier.”²

That there were many honourable exceptions to the general lukewarmness on the part of these troops is perfectly true. Their officers appeared, for the most part, well disposed, and were frequently seen endeavouring to rouse into action the apparently dormant energies of the men; and the circumstance of a Dutch major, with a squadron of hussars, having voluntarily followed Vivian's brigade when it advanced to attack the centre of the enemy's position, shows that the Dutch-Belgian army contained within its ranks those who were willing and even eager to prove themselves brave and gallant soldiers.

¹ Despatches, &c., vol. xii. page 590.

² Despatches, &c., vol. xii. page 501.

its execution, or the magnitude of its success, is perhaps without a parallel in the last war; and when we consider the preponderance of the enemy in this arm, the frequency of his charges, and the masses with which he advanced, it is impossible to advert to the heroism of Britain's cavalry, without at the same time according the praise so pre-eminently due to the skill of the noble and gallant chief who was the life and soul of its movements throughout the arduous and desperate struggle, and who so judiciously economized its strength, that when at the critical moment its services were required for securing the victory, he was enabled to bring forward two fresh brigades, which fulfilled those services in a style the most brilliant that can be conceived, and with a success which commanded the admiration of all who witnessed it.* The British artillery, which had to contend against an immense preponderance of metal, evinced, during the whole day, a degree of bravery, zeal, activity, and intelligence, which can never be surpassed, and nobly sustained its long and honourably acquired pre-eminence.

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Of the troops of the King's German legion, whether cavalry, infantry, or artillery, it is impossible to speak in terms of too high praise; suffice

* The French historians invariably attribute the final *déroute* of their army to the charges made by the British light cavalry launched against it immediately after the attack by the imperial guard.

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it to remark that their conduct was, in every respect, on a par with that of the British.

Of the four Hanoverian infantry-brigades, that of Kielmansegge, and a part of Halkett's, were the most actively engaged: Best's stood almost the entire day on the extreme left of the front line of the Anglo-allied infantry; and Vincke's, in reserve in front of Mont St. Jean. They had been but recently and hastily raised; and yet the manner in which such raw soldiers withstood, as Kielmansegge's brigade did, for so great a length of time, the most furious assaults made by the gallant and well-disciplined troops of France, would have conferred honour on long-trying veterans.

The Brunswickers, who were also composed of young soldiers, performed a glorious part in the battle, and amply avenged the death of their Prince. Some of their battalions were much shaken at the moment Alten's division was driven back a short distance, but they speedily rallied, and resumed their lost ground. Altogether, their bravery, which was frequently called into action, and their endurance, which was severely tested, merited the strongest commendation.

The troops constituting the Nassau brigade under Kruse, (or more properly the 1st regiment of the Nassau contingent,) were attached to Alten's division. They were, consequently, often in the thick of the fight; and though, on the occasion above alluded to, they were thrown into disorder

and driven in by a furious onset of the enemy, they conducted themselves generally throughout the day with great steadiness. 18th of June.

It is impossible to allude in terms of adequate praise to the services of that most important branch of the army, the general staff; the officers of which distinguished themselves no less by the zeal, the daring, and the activity, with which they carried into execution the commands of their respective chiefs, than by the alacrity and intelligence which they evinced in catching and imparting the true spirit of their instructions. The constant exposure to which their peculiar duties necessarily subjected them could not but entail upon them severe losses.* Few indeed were those who escaped unhurt throughout this arduous conflict.†

* As far as the French accounts would lead us to infer, it appears that the losses among Napoleon's staff were comparatively trifling. On this subject, perhaps the marked contrast afforded by the following anecdotes, which have been related to me on excellent authority, may tend to throw some light. At one period of the battle, when the Duke was surrounded by several of his staff, it was very evident that the group had become the object of the fire of a French battery. The shot fell fast about them, generally striking and turning up the ground on which they stood. Their horses became restive, and "Copenhagen" himself so fidgety that the Duke, getting impatient, and having reasons for remaining on this spot, said to those about him, "Gentlemen, we are rather too close together—better to divide a little." Subsequently, at another point of the line, an officer of artillery came up to the Duke, and stated that he had a distinct view of Napoleon, attended by his staff; that he had the guns of his battery well pointed in that direction, and was prepared to fire. His Grace instantly and emphatically exclaimed, "No! no! I'll not allow it. It is not the business of commanders to be firing upon each other."

† The Duke's feelings on the loss of so many friends, to whom he was warmly attached, as also on that sustained by his gallant troops, by whose

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The co-operation of the Prussians in this battle has been gradually developed and fully detailed.

heroic exertions his plans were carried out with such signal success, are beautifully expressed in the following letters :—

To the Earl of Aberdeen, K.T.

‘Bruxelles, 19th June, 1815.

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘You will readily give credit to the existence of the extreme grief with which I announce to you the death of your gallant brother,’ in consequence of a wound received in our great battle of yesterday.

‘He had served me most zealously and usefully for many years, and on many trying occasions; but he had never rendered himself more useful, and had never distinguished himself more, than in our late actions.

‘He received the wound, which occasioned his death, when rallying one of the Brunswick battalions which was shaking a little; and he lived long enough to be informed by myself of the glorious result of our actions, to which he had so much contributed by his active and zealous assistance.

‘I cannot express to you the regret and sorrow with which I look round me, and contemplate the loss which I have sustained, particularly in your brother. The glory resulting from such actions, so dearly bought, is no consolation to me, and I cannot suggest it as any to you and his friends; but I hope that it may be expected that this last one has been so decisive, as that no doubt remains that our exertions and our individual losses will be rewarded by the early attainment of our just object. It is then that the glory of the actions in which our friends and relations have fallen will be some consolation for their loss.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘WELLINGTON.’

To the Duke of Beaufort, K.G.

‘Bruxelles, 19th June, 1815.

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘I am very sorry to have to acquaint you that your brother Fitzroy² is very severely wounded, and has lost his right arm. I have just seen him, and he is perfectly free from fever, and as well as any body could be under such circumstances. You are aware how useful he has always been to me; and how much I shall feel the want of his assistance, and what a regard and affection I feel for him; and you will readily believe how much

¹ Lieut. Colonel the Honourable Sir Alexander Gordon.

² Now Lieut. General Lord Fitzroy Somerset, K.C.B.

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That the communications which Wellington received from Blücher led him to expect that co-operation at a much earlier period, is beyond a doubt; but setting aside all consideration of the causes of the delay which attended the arrival of the Prussian forces, it is equally doubtless that the tardiness of that co-operation had a more decided influence on the general result of the battle than if they had reached the field at an earlier period. For, supposing the Prussians to have arrived in force before the French had become so seriously and desperately engaged with the Anglo-allied army, Napoleon was too much a master of his art to have risked a decisive battle with the combined forces of his antagonists. In this case, he would, in all probability, have fallen back upon his frontier, have called in all available reserves from the interior, and by means of his triple line of fortresses, as well as by skilful manœuvring, have endeavoured to separate once more the opposing armies, and to obtain another chance of beating them in detail. As it happened, however, he was too deeply involved in the contest with Wellington, he had suffered too severely in his repeated

concerned I am for his misfortune. Indeed the losses I have sustained have quite broken me down; and I have no feeling for the advantages we have acquired. I hope, however, that your brother will soon be able to join me again; and that he will long live to be, as he is likely to become, an honour to his country, as he is a satisfaction to his family and friends.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘WELLINGTON.’

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attacks, to admit of a retreat, under such circumstances, being looked upon, even by his friends in Paris, in any other light than that of a defeat; and he knew too well that with a defeat, however it might be produced, would vanish the only tie which yet bound him to the nation—the implied belief in his invincibility, and the firm reliance on his ability to re-establish and maintain the military glory of France. It is to this conviction alone that we can attribute the desperate resolve with which he risked the fate of the empire and his own political existence, upon the issue of his final attack upon Wellington's line, at a moment when the armies opposed to him had effected their junction; and which, by calling the whole of his force into requisition, deprived him of an adequate reserve, by aid of which he might have succeeded in effecting an orderly and honourable retreat.

Had the Prussians succeeded in driving the French out of Planchenoit half an hour earlier, such a circumstance, combined with the general advance of the Anglo-allied line, would no doubt have caused the whole of Lobau's corps, and perhaps also d'Erlon's, to lay down their arms and surrender at discretion, since their retreat towards Maison du Roi would thus have been cut off, whilst the British advance would have frustrated any attempt to retire across the Charleroi road. On the other hand, a similar result might have ensued, at least as regards Lobau's corps, had that

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general advance occurred half an hour earlier, while the French right was engaged with the Prussians at a greater distance from the Charleroi road. In the former case, however, the final attack was judiciously delayed until, by the arrival of the additional force which was fast approaching, such a simultaneous attack could be made along the whole of the French right as would insure most decided success: and in the latter case, the final attack could not have been made at a more opportune moment, and with a greater prospect of success, than immediately after the signal defeat of the French imperial guard upon the Anglo-allied position. Indeed, contingencies of this kind might be brought forward with reference to any battle whatever, and when it is considered that there exists no example in modern warfare of so complete a victory, the result must appear as glorious as decisive, and as comprehensive as the most stern and rigid calculator of the chances of battle could have desired.

As regards the actual share which the Prussians had in the battle, it may be truly affirmed that the contest maintained between Bülow's corps and Lobau's troops in conjunction with a portion of the imperial guard, was most obstinate and sanguinary. In the three successive struggles for the possession of Planchenoit, especially, the deadly animosity mutually cherished by the troops of both nations, was fearfully exemplified, and the losses sustained

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by the Prussians in the comparatively brief period during which they were engaged, afforded ample proof of the value of their co-operation. It is undeniably true that the blow which decided the victory was that given by Wellington, when, after having completely defeated the grand attack by the French imperial guard, he instantly followed up that defeat by boldly attacking and penetrating the centre of the enemy's lines, and sustaining this movement by the general advance of his whole army; but it is, at the same time, equally true, that the powerful diversion effected by the Prussians diminished the strength of those French lines by the corps of Lobau, which had not hitherto fired a single shot in this campaign, by twelve battalions of the imperial guard, which had suffered scarcely any loss at Ligny, and, finally, by eighteen squadrons of cavalry. The vigorous attack which was made by Bülow upon Lobau's line simultaneously with the last assault upon Planchenoit, contributed most materially to the general and fatal panic which seized upon the whole of the French army. The Prussians too, by the energetic pursuit which they kept up during the night, under the guidance of the indefatigable Gneisenau, rendered the victory still more complete and decisive, and effectually deprived the enemy of every opportunity of recovering himself on the Belgian side of the frontier. In short, both armies admirably and honourably performed the parts respectively assigned to

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them—the one, holding its defensive position with unparalleled bravery, and unmitigated perseverance, until the moment when its chief, having defeated the last desperate attempt of his opponent to force his line, leads it on to victory; the other, operating a powerful diversion by which the effect of that advance is made still more decisive, and rendering the victory complete by a harassing and vigorous pursuit—and thus was consummated the tactical solution of the plan which had been, with so much skill and foresight, strategically preconcerted by the Allied commanders.

The Duke, when writing his despatch descriptive of the battle, in which he stated that his own army “never, upon any occasion, conducted itself better,” was not unmindful of the important aid he had derived from the Prussians. “I should not,” he said, “do justice to my own feelings, or to Marshal Blücher and the Prussian army, if I did not attribute the successful result of this arduous day to the cordial and timely assistance I received from them. The operation of General Bülow upon the enemy’s flank was a most decisive one; and, even if I had not found myself in a situation to make the attack which produced the final result, it would have forced the enemy to retire if his attacks should have failed, and would have prevented him from taking advantage of them if they should unfortunately have succeeded.”

On the other hand, the Prince, although, as is

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manifest upon a perusal of a similar despatch on his part, was not aware of the circumstances under which Wellington had attacked the very centre of the French lines, and had pushed his advanced brigades along the rear of those troops to which he himself had been exposed, nevertheless did ample justice to the bravery of the British army, which, he remarked, "fought with a valour which it is impossible to surpass."*

* The description given, in the present work, of the distribution of the Prussian troops at the moment of the defeat of the attacking columns of the French imperial guard by Maitland's and Adam's British brigades, being at variance with the representation of those troops upon the Model of the Battle of Waterloo when the latter was first submitted to the public, some explanation of the grounds upon which this deviation from my original arrangement is founded, appears to be requisite.

Having applied to the Prussian government for the information I required concerning the disposition of their troops at that particular moment represented on the model, it was most readily and liberally supplied to me by the officers of the head-quarters staff in Berlin, at the instance of the Prussian minister of war. This information, which was given with minute detail, was rendered more complete by the distribution of the troops having been laid down upon a plan, drawn on a large scale. On comparing these data with the evidence I had collected from officers of rank and intelligence, posted, some throughout the greater part of the battle, and others, during the whole day, on the left of the Anglo-allied line, whence the Prussian movements could be distinguished, I felt perfectly satisfied that there could be no doubt as to their accuracy on certain points, whilst upon others, this evidence was of too vague a nature, as regarded *time* and *situation*, to enable me either to corroborate or to rectify the details with which I had been furnished by the Prussian authorities. Thus, for instance, the junction of the leading column of Zieten's corps with the left of the Anglo-allied line, the forming up of the cavalry of that column on the flank, and in the rear, of Best's Hanoverian brigade, the relief of a Hanoverian battery by a Prussian battery upon the summit or knoll on which the Anglo-allied left rested, as also the previous conflicts in and about both Planchenoit and Smohain, upon the extreme right of the French army, are facts satisfactorily confirmed by corroborative evidence. But, as regards the disposition of the Prussian troops between the extreme left of the Anglo-allied

Long may Great Britain and Prussia cherish
that mutual amity which was engendered by the

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line and the immediate vicinity of Planchenoit, I feel equally satisfied, after a most careful and diligent investigation of the whole question of the Prussian co-operation, in all its bearings, that, according to the original arrangement of the figures upon the model, the Prussian troops distributed along that intervening space, immediately in front of Lobau's corps, were represented in too forward a position. It was only subsequently, when collecting that further information which has enabled me in the present work to describe with such minuteness of detail those brilliant dispositions of the Duke of Wellington, by which he not only defeated the French imperial guard upon his own position, but secured the victory, that I discovered the error into which the Prussian authorities had been unconsciously but naturally led, when laying down for me the distribution of their troops along that part of the field to which I have particularly adverted, and which distribution gave the appearance of a much greater pressure upon the French right flank than could have occurred at the *moment* represented on the model. The cause of this error is very simple, and is easily explained. All the Prussian accounts of the battle, more especially those two which have appeared "under authority,"—I allude to that published in 1825, by Colonel Wagner, of the Prussian staff, and to the more recently published history by Major von Damitz of the same staff, founded upon materials furnished by General von Grolman, who was employed in the capacity of quarter-master-general of the Prussian army during the campaign of 1815—concur in representing the Duke of Wellington's defeat of the attacking columns of the imperial guard, and the advance of his whole line, as happening *at one and the same moment*; whereas, in reality, there was an interval of *at least* twelve minutes between these two incidents. The Prussian authorities have not hitherto been cognizant of the fact that when the British line advanced, Vivian's light cavalry-brigade was attacking and dispersing Napoleon's last reserves of both cavalry and infantry posted on the French left of La Belle Alliance, the very centre of the enemy's lines; that Adam's light infantry-brigade was attacking and defeating the rallied force of the first attacking column of the imperial guard upon the height situated midway between La Belle Alliance and La Haye Sainte; and that Vandeleur's light cavalry-brigade was pushed forward in support of Vivian. These attacks, planned with consummate judgment and electric decision, and carried into execution with perfect order and unequalled gallantry, could not, from the configuration of the ground, be observed by the Prussian army; to which circumstance may be attributed the origin of that miscalculation concerning the actual disposition of the Duke of Wellington's forces at the moment of the general advance of his line, which induced the Prussian authorities to confound that advance

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zealous and successful co-operation of the armies of these two great nations in bringing to so prompt and satisfactory a termination a war, which originating in the re-assumption of the throne of France by that ambitious soldier and extraordinary man, who had once already overrun the

with the defeat of the attacking columns of the imperial guard. When, therefore, those authorities, with a liberality and good feeling for which I can never feel sufficiently grateful, furnished me with the information I solicited relative to the distribution of the troops "at the moment of the defeat of the imperial guard upon the crest of the British position," they did so under the impression that that event and the general advance of the Anglo-allied line were *coincident*. Hence the fact of the Prussian troops, along the central portion of their line, having continued advancing against the French right up to the moment of the general forward movement of the Anglo-allied line, has rendered it necessary, in order to afford a more correct representation, to make such alteration upon the model in the dispositions and movements of those troops as shall accord in point of *time* with the defeat of the attacking columns of the imperial guard, instead of their being made to conform, as they previously did, with the moment of the general advance of the Duke of Wellington's army; which advance, it should be remembered, was made by his Grace to follow up a victory he had *already* secured, and, in conjunction with the Prussian attack, to render the overthrow of the enemy complete in every respect. This arrangement, which has been observed upon the illustrative plan accompanying the present work, will, I feel persuaded, present the nearest attainable approximation to truth, and I trust, at the same time, prove satisfactory, by means of the foregoing explanation, to those of either nation who have shared in, or studied, the memorable events of the glorious 18th of June.

I may take this opportunity of remarking that notwithstanding the complicated details which must necessarily be comprised in a modelled representation of a battle, like that of Waterloo, at so late a period of the action, only one single instance of inaccuracy has been pointed out to me as occurring in the distribution of the Anglo-allied troops—namely, the posting of the 3rd battalion of the 1st or royal Scots, in second, instead of front, line—an error which will be duly corrected. Such a result has indeed exceeded my most sanguine expectations, and I shall feel great confidence in submitting my amended arrangement of the model, as offering a true and faithful representation of the battle at the most critical moment of the day.

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continent with his legions, subjugating emperors and kings to the influence of his mighty will, threatened once more to involve the nations in all the calamities and horrors which before had followed in the train of his triumphant but desolating career. The general peace, which was the ultimate result of their united efforts, still happily continues, and on every successive anniversary do the British and German troops commemorate their glorious and crowning victory ; and Europe, grateful for the lasting and inestimable blessings conferred upon her, emblazons forth in the pages of her history, the heroic deeds of the defenders of her liberty and independence.

“ thou fatal Waterloo !
 Millions of tongues record thee, and anew
 Their children's lips shall echo them, and say —
 Here where the sword united nations drew,
 Our countrymen were warring on that day !
 And this is much, and all which will not pass away.”

CHAPTER XVI.

Upon the appearance of Vandamme's corps in front of Wavre, Thielemann decides on maintaining the position at that point instead of following the remainder of the Prussian army towards the field of Waterloo—The field of Wavre—Disposition of the different brigades of Thielemann's corps—Disposition of Grouchy's forces—The light troops of Vandamme's corps gain possession of that part of the town of Wavre which lies on the right bank of the Dyle—Gérard makes an unsuccessful attack upon the mill of Bierge—Vandamme fails in his efforts to carry the bridge of Wavre—Grouchy, in person, leads another attack upon the bridge of Bierge, which proves as fruitless as the former attempt, and on which occasion Gérard falls severely wounded—Pajol gains possession of the bridge of Limale by a cavalry-attack—Grouchy, having pushed a portion of Gérard's corps across the Dyle, by Limale, disposes these troops so as to turn the right of Thielemann's corps—They are attacked by the Prussians, who are defeated, and forced to fall back upon the wood near Point du Jour—The contest for the possession of the bridges and town of Wavre is continued until late in the night, the Prussians sustaining and repelling thirteen assaults—Disposition of the contending forces on the morning of the 19th of June—Contest between Thielemann's right, and Grouchy's left, wing, during which the French gain possession of part of the wood of Rixansart—Teste's division makes another attack upon Bierge—Thielemann takes up a second position—About eight o'clock he hears of the overthrow of Napoleon's army at Waterloo—He renews the attack, which is attended with complete success, and re-takes the wood of Rixansart—The wood again falls into the possession of the French—The latter capture the village of Bierge—Thielemann decides upon effecting a retreat—The Prussians abandon the town of Wavre—The French cross the Dyle, both at Wavre and at Bierge—The retreat is covered by cavalry under Colonel von der Marwitz—Proceedings of General von Borcke, who had marched his brigade on the previous evening to St. Lambert—Thielemann retires along the road to Louvain, and takes up a position at St. Achtenrode—Losses sustained by the Prussians and French—Remarks upon the battle and its results—Grouchy decides on retiring upon Namur.

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It was explained at the conclusion of the eighth chapter that Thielemann, who had been ordered

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by Blücher to defend the position of Wavre in the event of the enemy advancing in force, or, if otherwise, to follow the main army in the direction of Couture, was on the point of fulfilling the instructions appertaining to the latter contingency, when Vandamme's corps arrived in front of that position, about four o'clock in the afternoon, and its artillery immediately opened a cannonade upon the Prussian troops.

All the brigades (the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th) of Thielemann's corps had, at that time, received the order to commence the general movement to the right. A detachment of only two battalions, (the fusilier-battalions of the 30th regiment and of the 1st Kurmark landwehr,) under Colonel von Zepelin, from the 9th brigade, which had not yet crossed the Dyle, was to be left in occupation of Wavre. The 12th brigade was already in full line of march, and the 11th had been just put in motion.

When General von Borcke, who commanded the 9th brigade, fell back upon Wavre, for the purpose of carrying out his instructions, he found the bridge already barricaded, and therefore proceeded with his brigade to Bas Wavre; and having crossed the Dyle at this point, left a detachment there, consisting of the sharpshooters of the fusilier-battalion of the 8th regiment, and of those of the 1st battalion of the 30th regiment, under Major von Ditfurth, whom he directed to destroy the

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bridge immediately. He then detached the 2nd battalion of the 30th regiment and his two squadrons of the 3rd Kurmark landwehr-cavalry, as a reinforcement to Colonel von Zepelin at Wavre; and, with the remainder of his brigade, continued his march.

In the mean time, French tirailleurs were observed extending along the opposite heights, and, in their rear, considerable masses of the enemy's troops appeared advancing. It soon became manifest that they contemplated forcing the passage of the river. Thielemann, judging by the want of vigour displayed in the French pursuit, and by the enemy not having attempted to secure the passages of the Dyle at Moustier, Limelette, and Limale, that it was only a weak detachment of the enemy that was advancing upon Wavre, confining itself to the design of creating some little uneasiness by its movement along this road to Brussels, had hitherto been of opinion that the occupation of Wavre by a few battalions, as directed by Bliicher, would be quite sufficient; but he now plainly saw that the moment had arrived which required him, in pursuance of his instructions, to maintain the position at Wavre, and he accordingly ordered the halt of his whole corps for this purpose.

The town of Wavre is situated on the left bank of the Dyle; having a suburb on the opposite side of the river, with which it is connected by two stone bridges, the principal one leading towards

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the middle, and a small one towards the upper end, of the town. Higher up the stream, at the mill of Bierge, at Limale, and at Limelette, as also below the town, at Bas Wavre, there are wooden bridges. The river is not deep, but at the period of the battle it was swollen by the recent heavy rain. The low range of heights on either side of the valley is covered in many places with wood. The heights on the right bank are generally more elevated, but those on the left have steeper declivities, and offer a greater command of the river and its passages. The shortest road from Namur to Brussels passes through the town, besides which there are numerous cross roads practicable for the movements of all arms. The great number of hollow-ways forms a prominent feature in the vicinity, and these, being in a miry state from the rain, were unfavourable to the progress of troops passing through them.

The position was thus occupied:—the 12th brigade, (Colonel von Stülpnagel,) with the horse-battery No. 20, was posted on the height in rear of Bierge. The bridge in front of this village was barricaded, and the mill occupied for the defence of the bridge. The 10th brigade (Colonel von Kämpfen) stood upon the height in rear of Wavre, its right resting on a wood which lay between it and the 12th brigade. The 11th brigade (Colonel von Luck) was formed across the Brussels road. The reserve-cavalry was drawn up, near La Ba-

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vette, in columns of squadrons. The artillery was distributed along the heights. The horse-battery No. 18 remained in reserve. That part of the town of Wavre which lies on the right bank, or, more properly, the suburb, was occupied by light troops only. The great bridge was barricaded as well as time and circumstances would admit. The houses adjoining the left bank of the river were hastily loop-holed. The smaller bridge was left perfectly open. A detachment of two companies of light infantry, under Major von Bornstädt was detached to reinforce the troops at the bridge of Bas Wavre.

Thielemann intended that the 9th brigade should be posted in rear of this general disposition of his troops, so that its services might be made available according as circumstances might require ; but through some misunderstanding in the transmission of the order, General von Borcke was induced, after having moved along the Brussels road until near La Bavette, thence to turn off to his left, and continue his march, according to his original instructions, in the direction of Fromont, Bourgeois, and St. Lambert, towards Couture ; being under the impression that the whole corps had already commenced this march, in pursuance of the general plan, and that his brigade was destined to cover the movement. The departure of the brigade was not immediately discovered, and thus, by this misunderstanding,

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Thielemann's force suffered an unexpected reduction of six battalions and the foot-battery No. 18 ; and consisted, therefore, of only 15,200 men, with which number he had now to contend against Marshal Grouchy's force, amounting altogether to 32,000 men.

Thielemann's position was certainly a very favourable one, and the occupation of it was arranged with great skill. As it was impossible to foresee in what manner the attack upon it would be conducted ; whether it would be directed against one particular bridge, or against all the bridges, with the design of carrying the whole line by storm, Thielemann limited the occupation of the town and of the line of the river, to the number of light troops which might be sufficient for sustaining any sudden assault ; taking care to have supports close at hand for that purpose, but disposing his reserves, which comprised his main force, so that they might become available at any point which might be pressed, or, should the enemy develope greatly superior numbers, as was subsequently the case, serve to guard against any flank attack.

As before explained, it was Vandamme's corps which arrived in front of Wavre between three and four o'clock. Two batteries, of which one consisted of 12-pounders, were drawn up on the right of the road overlooking the valley, and opened the cannonade. These were subsequently

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reinforced by a third battery, posted on the left of the road. Excelmans' cavalry-corps was posted in right rear of Vandamme. Gérard, with the 4th French corps, was still in the rear on the march; and Pajol, with his light cavalry, had only just passed through Tourrines, situated scarcely half-way between Gembloux and Wavre. Marshal Grouchy sent word to both these officers to accelerate their march.

Whilst the French skirmishers were gradually forcing back the Prussian light troops into the valley, Grouchy, hearing a powerful cannonade in the distance to his left, rode off a little way in that direction, and concluding that Napoleon was closely engaged with Wellington, conceived that as he had now reached the Prussians, he would best fulfil his instructions by vigorously attacking them, so as to prevent their detaching reinforcements to the Anglo-allied army. He was quite ignorant as to the strength of the enemy in his front, and was in doubt whether the whole Prussian army was before him, or merely a strong detachment. Of the fact that three Prussian corps were on the march to co-operate with Wellington's forces, he of course knew nothing. In this state of uncertainty, and with his troops *aux prises* with the Prussians, he was fearful of detaching to his left, since by so doing, he would expose himself to the risk of his main force becoming overpowered by superior numbers, and his detachment cut off.

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Independently of other considerations which might have assisted in dissuading Grouchy from detaching a portion of his force at this period, such as the length of time his troops had been upon the march, along bad and miry roads, he was perfectly justified, under all the circumstances of his then position, in adopting this course of proceeding. And even if he had been fully cognizant of the actual disposition of the Prussian army, he could at this time have rendered no essential service to Napoleon; the opportunity for doing so had been suffered to pass by, as was fully explained in Chapter VIII. His total ignorance, however, of Blücher's proceedings, and of all that was then taking place between Wavre and the field of Waterloo, afforded undeniable proof of his having completely failed in acting up to the spirit of the instructions he had received, not to lose sight of the Prussians, and in exercising that degree of enterprise, energy, and decision, which Napoleon had so naturally anticipated from a general of Grouchy's note and experience, especially when intrusted with so important a command, under such highly critical circumstances.

A message having reached Grouchy from Pajol, communicating his having fallen into the Marshal's line of operation, he directed that general to move upon Limale. His right flank, however, continued to be protected by the 17th dragoons, detached from General Berton's cavalry-brigade (of Excel-

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mans' corps) *en reconnaissance*, towards the road leading from Namur to Louvain.

In the mean time, a vigorous cannonade was maintained between Vandamme's and the Prussian batteries across that part of the valley in which lay the town of Wavre. Under cover of the French guns, the skirmishers pressed down upon that portion of the town situated upon the right bank of the river, and of which they soon gained possession, the Prussians having previously decided upon not making any effort to retain it. On reaching the river, however, they were met by a most destructive fire of musketry from the opposite houses and the bridge. The contest now became desperate, and the defence of the passage of the Dyle was obstinately maintained by the Prussians. The skirmishers rapidly extended on either flank along both banks of the river from Bierge as far as Bas Wavre. All the Prussian brigades pushed forward their sharpshooters. Those of the 4th Kurmark landwehr took up the line between the town and Bas Wavre, those of the 3rd Kurmark landwehr took post in the town, between the two bridges; on the right of the latter stood the sharpshooters of the 10th brigade; and those of the 12th brigade formed the right wing of the whole line at Bierge.

This tiraille had continued about an hour, when General Hulot's division of Gérard's corps d'armée reached the field, and received orders to

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take possession of the mill of Bierge, and to cross the Dyle at that point. A battalion of Vandamme's corps was at the time vainly attempting to effect a passage. Upon the height opposite Bierge were several guns of the 3rd corps, endeavouring to keep down the fire from the Prussian batteries on the other side of the valley. Grouchy desired Gérard to relieve the battalion attacking the mill of Bierge by one from his own corps, whereupon the latter directed General Hulot to push forward with a battalion of the 9th light infantry for that purpose. The battalion descended into the valley, covered by the fire from the guns on the height. Its advance was much impeded by the swampy nature of the ground at the foot of the declivity, and by the numerous broad and deep drains by which the valley is intersected; and its order was still further deranged by the fire from the artillery on the opposite heights, as also by that of the Prussian skirmishers posted along the left bank of the river, and strongly occupying the mill. The banks of the river at this part, more particularly the left bank, are mostly lined with trees, which tended still further to increase the means of resistance on the part of the Prussians to the advance of the French troops. The latter on reaching the mill, and relieving Vandamme's troops, made an attack, but without success.

Grouchy was on the point of ordering this attack to be renewed, when he received, between six

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and seven o'clock, Soult's despatch, addressed to him from the field of Waterloo at one o'clock in the afternoon;* and desiring him to manœuvre always in that direction, to maintain a close communication with the main army, and to lose not a moment in joining the latter, and attacking Bülow's corps d'armée, which, it added, could then be seen upon the heights of St. Lambert.

The circumstances in which Grouchy found himself at the time this despatch reached him, held out no prospect of his being able to fulfil, even partially, the instructions which it contained. Vandamme's efforts to force the bridges of Wavre, and to capture the town were completely frustrated by the most gallant defence maintained on the part of the Prussians. The issue of the attack upon the mill of Bierge appeared very doubtful. Neither the main body of Gérard's corps, nor General Teste's division of the 6th corps, nor even Pajol's light cavalry had as yet arrived. Grouchy, becoming impatient, rode hastily towards la Baraque, accompanied by Gérard, to meet the first mentioned force; and on coming up with the columns, directed their march upon Limale, his object now being to turn the right of Thielemann's position, and to prevent the retreat of the latter upon Brussels, and at the same time open his direct road to St. Lambert. This he might succeed in effecting,

* See page 400, vol. i.

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but it is sufficiently evident from the above view of his position, at so late an hour of the day, that any important diversion on his part in favour of Napoleon, was quite out of the question.

On returning with Gérard to Wavre, Grouchy found that notwithstanding the furious assaults that were made in rapid succession upon the bridges, supported by the vigorous cannonade from the heights, and the incessant fusillade along the banks of the river, no further progress was effected. As if determined that the passage should be forced, he dismounted from his horse, and placing himself at the head of a battalion, led on another attack upon the mill of Bierge. But the bravery of the troops, though so strongly excited by the noble example of the Marshal, could avail nothing against the indomitable resistance of the Prussian defenders of this important post. Gérard, who had accompanied the Marshal in this attack, fell severely wounded by a shot which struck him in the breast.

Grouchy now decided upon leaving Vandamme's corps and Excelmans' cavalry in front of Wavre and Bierge, and proceeding himself with that portion of Gérard's troops which was at hand, along the right bank of the Dyle, towards Limale, and uniting them to the remainder of the corps which had been ordered to march in the direction of that point from la Baraque. This movement occupied considerable time, in consequence of the diffi-

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culties opposed to the march of troops along the side of the river. At length, having arrived in front of Limale, and formed a junction with Pajol's cavalry, preparations were made for an attack.

Limale was at that time occupied by Lieut. Colonel von Stengel with the three battalions of the 19th Prussian regiment, two squadrons of the 6th uhlands, and one squadron of the Westphalian landwehr-cavalry. It was the detachment left by Zieten for the purpose of covering the right flank of the 3rd corps d'armée. It had unaccountably neglected to adopt any measures for barricading the bridge, the defence of which, if conducted with the same energy and resolution by which that of the bridges lower down the stream had been distinguished, might have been the means of preventing the French from crossing the Dyle at all on that day.

Pajol, having reconnoitred the place and discovered this neglect, succeeded in gaining possession of the bridge by means of a brisk cavalry-attack. Hulot's infantry-division of Gérard's corps reached it shortly afterwards, and it was soon made manifest to Lieut. Colonel von Stengel that he was attacked by a force much superior to his own. Nevertheless he continued to fall gradually back, in good order, until Thielemann pushed forward the 12th brigade to his support. Three battalions of the 10th brigade moved into the position thus vacated by the 12th ; and a general movement was

made to the right by all the troops that could be spared from the defence of Wavre and Bierge. 18th of
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The 4th Kurmark landwehr, belonging to the 11th brigade, crossed the Brussels road. The reserve-cavalry was ordered to move upon Limale, in support of the 12th brigade.

When Colonel von Stülpnagel was ordered to move his brigade (the 12th) upon Limale, he left three battalions for the defence of the bridge of Bierge. With the remaining six battalions he came up close to the enemy, who was posted on a height in advance of Limale, his left thrown considerably forward and covered by his cavalry, and his right resting upon some houses, which he had occupied with infantry. This line, which was perpendicular to the direction of the original position of the Prussians, had been taken up with great skill by Grouchy, notwithstanding the difficulties with which the movement had been attended. His troops had to ascend the heights during the obscurity of the night, in rear of Limale, by a narrow, rugged road, in the immediate proximity of the Prussians, whose fire reached the head of the defile, and he was fully occupied until a very late hour, in posting the battalions in their proper places, as they filed out of the road, on reaching the height; whilst, in the mean time, Pajol's light cavalry pushed rapidly round by the left.

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Colonel von Stülpnagel posted the fusilier-battalion of the 5th Kurmark landwehr, and his battery, in reserve, in rear of the small wood on the right of Bierge, and advanced to the attack, late as it was, with his five remaining battalions, having Lieut. Colonel von Stengel with his detachment on the right. The darkness of the night prevented the Prussians from correctly ascertaining the position and strength of the French, but nevertheless it was decided that an attempt should be made to regain Limale, and drive back the enemy across the Dyle. The attack was thus formed. Two battalions in front, closely followed by the remaining three battalions. Both the brigade-squadrons joined the three squadrons under Lieut. Colonel von Stengel; and the whole of the reserve-cavalry formed in support. In this movement, however, the mutual connection of the advancing troops was greatly impeded by the darkness of the night. The two battalions in front line were on the point of passing a hollow-way when they received a volley from two French battalions on the opposite side, by which their further advance was checked. The three battalions of the second line had inclined too much to the left, where they became engaged with French tirailleurs. Lieut. Colonel von Stengel's detachment, in attempting to push forward, was checked by the French cavalry, and as the latter made a dispo-

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sition which menaced his right flank, that officer fell back with his detachment as far as the wood near Point du Jour.

The decided failure of the attack induced Colonel von Stülpnagel to withdraw all his troops to the wood, leaving only the first battalion of the 6th Kurmark landwehr in support of the chain of advanced posts. The reserve-cavalry bivouacked in rear of the wood. Thus ended the contest on this part of the field. The Prussian and French picquets were so close to one another during the night, that the patrols were constantly clashing, and the whole line kept upon the *qui vive*.

Upon the Prussian left, the conflict for the possession of the town and bridges of Wavre continued to be carried on with unabated fury on both sides until late in the night. Vandamme devoted the whole of his corps to the attack; constantly pushing forward fresh troops to relieve those who had failed in their attempts to dislodge the Prussians. The latter, who exhibited on this occasion an extraordinary degree of bravery and resolution, succeeded in repelling no less than thirteen different assaults, and even dislodged, in five instances, the French from the houses they occupied, from the commencement, on the right bank of the Dyle. At one time the French had already gained possession of the great bridge and some houses on the left bank, when they were driven back again to their own side of the river by the Prussian

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reserves—these having advanced to the relief of their comrades. The struggle was desperate, and apparently interminable. When the French attacked the houses nearest the bridge, they succeeded in bursting open the doors, and, by superiority of numbers, in possessing themselves of the ground floors. But even this did not induce the heroic defenders to relax their exertions; on the contrary, with increased fury, they defended the upper stories of the houses, and held out most gallantly until relieved by the arrival of their supports.

This brilliant defence of Wavre was distinguished, on the part of the Prussians, not only by the unflinching bravery of the troops, but also by the judicious disposal of the reserves, by means of which the enemy was foiled in every attempt to gain a permanent footing in the town. While the skirmishers and their supports were posted along the Dyle and the adjacent houses, the reserves were concealed in the nearest streets, that lay in a direction parallel with that of the river; and at the moment the French columns of attack, already crippled by the fire concentrated from the skirmishers, endeavoured to force the bridge, these reserves rushed forward from their cover in the side streets, and presenting themselves in mass before the enemy, invariably drove them back with great slaughter. It was in this manner that the fusilier-battalion of the 30th regiment, under Major von

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Sprenger, and the third battalion of the 1st Kurmark landwehr, under Major von Bornstädt, constantly repulsed, with admirable bravery, the attacks made with such superior numbers during the earlier part of the contest. One of these attacks having been attended with a somewhat favourable result, the second battalion of the 30th regiment, under Major von Beaufort, was brought forward; and, at a similarly critical moment, the first battalion of the 4th Kurmark landwehr, under Major von Grolman, came up, when both battalions succeeded in compelling the enemy to retire. These battalions then took post in the streets lying parallel with the river, in the manner before explained, and, with heroic courage, overcame every renewed attempt on the part of the French to establish themselves in the town. When, finally, it is considered that from four o'clock until night, four Prussian battalions successfully maintained their ground against a whole corps d'armée, with which they were constantly and desperately engaged during the whole of that period, the merits of Colonel von Zepelin and his brave troops are beyond all praise, and present one of the brightest examples of the defence of a town and of the passage of a river, recorded in military history.

Both the bridges of Wavre remained in the possession of the Prussians, and the smaller one was barricaded during the night. At a late hour, as the fire on both sides began to slacken, the com-

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batants bivouacked on their respective sides of the river. Upon the Prussian extreme left, at Bas Wavre, the French had only shown one battalion. This occupied an isolated building, and was supported by two squadrons and a piece of artillery. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to gain the bridge, which, at nightfall, continued in the possession of the Prussians.

Grouchy was occupied late in the night in making his preparations for renewing the attack on the following morning. General Teste's division of the 6th corps having at length arrived, his left wing, which was thus considerably reinforced, bivouacked upon the height westward of Bierge, separated by this village and the Dyle from his right wing which lay in front of Wavre. He had not yet received any intelligence of Napoleon's signal defeat at Waterloo, and was therefore resolved upon following up, at daybreak, the advantages he had already gained, by forcing back the Prussian right flank. Thielemann, on the contrary, having despatched an officer of Marwitz's cavalry-brigade *en reconnaissance* to the right, ascertained through this means that the Allied armies had gained a complete victory, and he therefore fully expected that Grouchy would be compelled to effect an immediate retreat.

With the first dawn of the 19th of June, Colonel von Stengel, whose detachment was posted on the extreme right of Thielemann's corps, took upon

himself to march off by St. Lambert, to join his corps d'armée (the 1st), the grounds for which proceeding remain to the present time as unaccountable as his neglect on the previous day to secure the bridge of Limale. In consequence of this movement, the 12th brigade was necessitated to extend its line too much to the right, and to retain a reserve of only three weak battalions upon the road leading through the wood to Point du Jour. The wood to the right was occupied by a battalion and two companies from each of the remaining regiments of the 12th brigade. The left wing of this line, which rested upon Bierge, was formed by six battalions of the 10th brigade.

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Colonel von Luck, commanding the 11th brigade, was directed to support this position, which was much too weak, with the three battalions of the 3rd Kurmark landwehr; but to leave the two battalions of the 4th Kurmark landwehr, as also the brigade-squadrons, in rear of Wavre, in a hollow near the windmill, where they served to cover the 12-pounder battery No. 7.

The mill of Bierge was occupied by two battalions of the 12th brigade: Wavre and Bas Wavre were held by the same troops which defended those points on the previous day. The barricades and preparations for defence were rendered more complete.

Lieut. Colonel von Ledebur, whose detachment, consisting of the 10th hussars, a squadron of land-

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wehr-cavalry, and two guns from the horse-battery No. 12, had formed on the 18th the advance of the rear-guard which Thielemann's corps was considered to constitute, having reached St. Lambert before Grouchy's attack became so decided, remained there during the night. Early on the 19th, Grouchy sent off three cavalry-regiments to his left to watch these troops. They showed no indication of an intention to attack, and when, later in the day, they retired and disappeared from Ledebur's view, the latter passed the defile, for the purpose of proceeding to join his corps d'armée (the 4th), which, however, he did not reach before the 20th.

This, as well as Colonel von Stengel's detachment, thus withdrew from the field, without any apparent necessity, reducing Thielemann's numbers, already too weak, and taking up a line of march, along which their services were comparatively useless.

Thielemann, concluding from the account he had received of the defeat of Napoleon, that the French would commence a retreat, renewed the combat at daybreak by an attack with his cavalry. Colonel von Marwitz was sent forward with the 8th uhlans and two squadrons of the 6th Kurmark landwehr-cavalry, towards the plateau above Limale, occupied by Grouchy's left wing; whilst General von Hobe followed this movement with the 5th and 7th uhlans, and formed up on the left

of the advanced cavalry. The 5th uhlans were immediately afterwards advantageously posted in a hollow in support of Colonel von Marwitz.

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The horse-battery No. 20, subsequently reinforced by the foot battery No. 18, opened a cannonade upon the enemy's columns at the plateau, which displayed a great superiority of numbers, and were supported by a considerable force of cavalry. The preponderating number of guns in the enemy's line answered the fire of the Prussians with great vigour, and as the intervening space was very limited, the numbers of killed and wounded were very great. The Prussian artillery lost five guns on this occasion.

Grouchy delayed not a moment in making his disposition for an attack on his part. His force on this side of the field consisted of the three divisions of Gérard's corps, and of Teste's division of the 6th corps. The latter and two of the former were posted in front line; the remaining division, in reserve. He formed three columns of attack. That on the right consisted of Teste's division, and was directed upon Bierge; the central column was put in motion against the Prussian centre; and that on the left against the right of the Prussian formation.

The head of each column was accompanied by a battery, and preceded by a swarm of skirmishers. At the same time, Pajol put his cavalry in motion, and threatened to turn the Prussian right.

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Thielemann resolved upon not only offering to the enemy a vigorous opposition, but also upon assuming the offensive himself, and immediately gave the necessary orders for that purpose. He also reinforced his right with two more companies, and his left with an additional battalion. It was soon made manifest, however, that this attack failed to check the forward movement of the enemy. The ten Prussian battalions were forced to give way to the advance of twenty-two French battalions, which were followed by six more in support. The French gained possession of that part of the wood of Rixansart which was on the right of the Prussian position, and drove back the 12th brigade. The battalions of the latter collected again immediately in rear of the wood, under the protection of the three beforementioned battalions of the 11th brigade and of a battery of fifteen guns.

General Teste's division had in the mean time attacked Bierge, which was bravely defended by the two battalions of the Kurmark landwehr. Whilst the engagement continued at this point, Thielemann took up a second position in rear of the first, with four battalions of the 10th brigade, and occupied the small wood in rear of Bierge. The Prussian cavalry-brigade, under Colonels von Marwitz and Count Lottum, comprising twelve squadrons, secured the right towards Chambre.

About eight o'clock, just at this position had

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been taken up, Thielemann received, through General von Pirch, the decisive and authentic intelligence that a great victory had been gained by the Allies on the previous day, as also a communication of the fact of the 2nd Prussian corps d'armée having marched to intercept Grouchy's retreat upon the Sambre. Advantage was immediately taken of these joyful tidings to raise the spirits of the troops, and to excite them to a renewed attack. With loud cheers the Prussian batteries advanced to the attack, which was attended with complete success, and even the wood of Rixansart was again taken.

The enemy appeared irresolute, and as if impressed with the idea that Thielemann had received reinforcements ; but observing that no further progress was made, he renewed the attack, on his part, and re-took the wood of Rixansart.

It was not until about this time—towards nine o'clock—that Teste's division gained possession of the village of Bierge, on which occasion General Penne, an officer of considerable distinction in the French army, was killed. The French were prevented for some time from debouching from the place, by the determined opposition of the tirailleurs of the 31st Prussian regiment, under Major von Natzmer.

Thielemann had now done all which could possibly have been expected from any general under similar circumstances—with a force not equal to

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one half of that of the enemy, he had endeavoured, whenever an opportunity offered, and in defiance of superior numbers, to force back the French left wing upon the Dyle; but now that he had failed in effecting this object, and that Bierge, the key of his position, had been taken from him, whilst the French left was pressing forward with increased numbers, to gain the Brussels road, he saw very plainly that to attempt to maintain his ground any longer would be, to expose himself to the imminent risk of total overthrow, and that no other course was left for him but to order a general retreat.

It was about ten o'clock in the morning when the Prussian troops began to retire from the field. The town of Wavre had not been attacked on the 19th, and Colonel von Zepelin abandoned it without being much pressed upon his line of retreat. Colonel von Marwitz was ordered to form the rear-guard, which was furnished from the 7th and 8th uhlans, and the 3rd and 6th Kurmark landwehr-cavalry. It was accompanied by three batteries of horse, and one of foot, artillery. With these troops Colonel von Marwitz took post, at first, in front of the Brussels road; placing three batteries on his left, and the remaining one in reserve. Thielemann gave the rear-guard an express order not to march off until Wavre had become completely evacuated.

In the mean time, Gérard's corps d'armée had crossed the Dyle both at Bierge and at Wavre.

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The two battalions of the 4th Kurmark landwehr which had been posted in the hollow in rear of the town, for the protection of the 12-pounder battery, became closely pressed in consequence of this movement. One of the battalions, under Major von Schmade, had advanced against an enemy's column near the Brussels road, when it unexpectedly received the fire of three French battalions, which were pushing forward under cover of an eminence, and followed by some cavalry. The battalion succeeded in reaching the small wood near la Bavette, and as the enemy attempted to turn the latter, it suddenly attacked and drove him back, after which it came up with the rear-guard. The other battalion, commanded by Major von Schwerin, attacked a French battalion which was advancing against it, threw it back in confusion, and then continued its retreat. The gallantry and steadiness displayed in this affair by the Kurmark landwehr, acquired for the latter great and well-merited renown.

The French cavalry debouched from the wood of Rixansart and drew up, with its left resting upon Chambre. Vandamme now advanced the columns of his corps towards the heights of la Bavette, and pushed forward some cavalry along the high road. The latter, however, was driven back by Colonel von Marwitz.

It has been explained that General von Borecke,

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instead of posting his remaining six battalions in rear of the position at Wavre, as intended by Thielemann, proceeded on his march to Couture, by St. Lambert. This place he reached about nightfall, when he despatched an officer to Blücher to report his arrival. The latter, in reply, desired him to bivouac on the spot where he was, and to await further orders on the following morning. The brigade was still in its bivouac at seven o'clock the next morning, when Colonel von Stengel passed through St. Lambert with his detachment.* The latter informed General von Borcke that he had defended the bridge of Limale, and had been followed by the enemy's troops. Borcke, on hearing this, immediately broke up his bivouac, and decided upon securing the wood which extends from St. Robert as far as Rixansart. He deployed two battalions of the 8th regiment along the edge of the wood, and held the remaining four battalions of his brigade, then with him, in reserve. Perceiving the French cavalry, at the time of their first attack, marching into the wood of Rixansart for the purpose of advancing through it upon Chambre, he opened a fire upon them from his battery, with the hope of checking their movement. The only effect it produced was that of their detaching three regiments of cavalry towards

* See page 292.

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his brigade. These, however, contented themselves with watching his movements. It is curious that the 9th brigade, as if bent upon continuing the blunder committed the previous day of detaching itself from its corps, should not have attempted, with its six battalions, to effect a more important diversion upon the enemy's extreme left, from which it was not more than 3,000 paces distant. It was then eight o'clock, and the battle was maintained until about eleven, and yet General von Borcke allowed the three cavalry-regiments to move off and join the remainder of the French cavalry, towards ten o'clock, at Chambre, without even attempting to molest their movement.

Thielemann effected his retreat, in several columns, by Ottenburg and St. Achtenrode, at which latter place (about half-way to Louvain) he took up a position. The French cavalry followed as far as the Brussels road, and the infantry occupied the heights of la Bavette.

Between Wavre and Louvain the country assumes a new character, being covered with hedges, hollow-ways, ditches, and gardens, and is altogether much intersected. From Ottenburg as far as St. Achtenrode, there is almost one continued defile. In this cavalry cannot act with advantage, and it was therefore fortunate for the Prussian cavalry that it was followed but slowly by the French.

The loss experienced by Thielemann's corps d'armée in this battle of the 18th and 19th of

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June, amounted to 2,476 men.* No returns whatever of the losses sustained by Grouchy's army are forthcoming, but they could not have been less than those of the Prussians.

Such was the battle of Wavre; a battle the result of which was of no advantage to Napoleon on the 18th, and of positive disadvantage to him on the 19th. On the former day it did not prevent the march of the great mass of the Prussian army towards the field of Waterloo, and, on the 19th, the continuance of the contest, while Napoleon was in full flight, exposed this, the only remaining intact portion of the French army, to the imminent risk of being completely cut off from all retreat. Nor can this defeat of Thielemann be looked upon as having shed additional lustre upon the French arms, when it is considered how long and successfully the Prussians battled against them with less than half their strength. The errors which led to the circumstance of the force under Grouchy—constituting, as Napoleon himself has been pleased to term it, the right wing of the French army—becoming exclusively occupied in attacking a single corps of the Prussian army, whilst the remaining three corps of the latter were wending their way unmolested towards the decisive field of battle, have already been sufficiently discussed; and now that their result has been fully

* There does not appear to be any *detailed* returns extant of these losses.

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exhibited, it is scarcely necessary to draw attention to the proof which the latter affords of the entire ignorance of each other's proceedings which characterised the conduct of Napoleon and Grouchy, great generals as they were, in this memorable campaign. The former received intelligence, before he began the battle with Wellington, that the right wing was to follow the Prussians to Wavre, and to act in such a manner as to prevent these from detaching towards the Anglo-allied army, and therefore felt satisfied that his general plan of operations was in successful progress. But in less than two hours from the commencement of the battle, the fatal consequence of both generals having unaccountably neglected to maintain a vigilant reconnoissance and an uninterrupted communication, was made manifest, and the first intimation Napoleon received of the advance of the Prussians towards La Belle Alliance was the distant view which he himself had, from his own field, of Bülow's corps descending the heights of St. Lambert, at about one o'clock.

The leading principle of the French Emperor's plan was to endeavour, by all means in his power, to beat the armies opposed to him *in detail*. It was therefore incumbent on him, in order to insure the success of that plan, to adopt such precautionary measures as should procure for him the earliest and the clearest information concerning the movements of his enemies. If he found it

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necessary temporarily to divide his force, and act upon two lines, those measures became still more indispensable, and at the same time admitted the greater facility of execution. Several reconnoitring parties, both upon the flanks of the army and in front of the interval between the two lines of operation, under the guidance of experienced, active, and intelligent officers, would have obtained for both generals that insight into the movements and designs of their opponents which was so essential for the attainment of their common object, whilst parties detached from each wing, for the sole purpose of maintaining a close and direct communication between them, would have afforded the ready means of regulating each other's proceedings according to the circumstances under which they might have found themselves respectively placed. That there should have been so total a disregard of any measure of the kind, appears almost incredible; yet such was the fact; and hence it came to pass that the despatch sent to Grouchy, at one o'clock, from the heights in rear of La Belle Alliance did not reach him until seven in the evening, at which time, as before explained, it was too late to admit of the instructions it conveyed being fulfilled; and hence, also, Grouchy was left battling with his entire force—not less than a third of the whole French army—against a single incomplete Prussian corps, under Thielemann, from daybreak until about eleven o'clock in

the forenoon of the 19th, when he was first made acquainted with the fact that during the whole of that time the army under Napoleon, having been most signally defeated and completely scattered on the preceding evening, was flying across the frontier in the wildest confusion.

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On receiving this latter intelligence, Grouchy's first idea was to march against the rear of the main body of the Prussian army ; but, calculating that his force was not adequate for such an enterprise, that the victorious Allies might detach to intercept his retreat, and that he should be closely followed by that portion of the Prussians which he had just defeated, he decided on retiring upon Namur, where he would regulate his further operations according to the intelligence he might gain in that quarter concerning the real state of affairs.

CHAPTER XVII.

Retreat of the French army from the field of Waterloo—On the 19th of June the Prussian army pursues in the direction of Charleroi, Avesnes, and Laon; the Anglo-allied army, in that of Nivelles, Binch, and Peronne—Bülow's corps reaches Fontaine l'Evêque; and Zieten's corps halts for the night at Charleroi—Thielemann continues during the night of the 19th at St. Achtenrode—Pirch's corps proceeds, on the evening of the 18th, in the direction of Namur, for the purpose of intercepting Grouchy's retreat—On the 19th, it halts at Mellery—The Anglo-allied army occupies Nivelles and its vicinity during the night of the 19th—Napoleon's flight through Charleroi—He desires Soult to collect the troops and march them to Laon—Grouchy retires upon Namur—Disposition of the respective armies on the evening of the 19th—The Duke of Wellington's views on entering the French territory; and his general order to the troops on the 20th of June—The Saxon corps d'armée is placed under his Grace's command—The Anglo-allied army reaches Binch and Mons—Grouchy's retreat to Namur—He is pursued by Thielemann and Pirch—Contest at Namur—The Prussians gain possession of this place—Remarks upon Thielemann's and Pirch's proceedings in connexion with Grouchy's retreat to Namur and Dinant—Disposition of the respective armies on the evening of the 20th—Wellington crosses the French frontier on the 20th—Blücher places Pirch's corps under Prince Augustus of Prussia, to be employed in besieging the fortresses left in rear of the main army—Avesnes captured by Zieten's corps—Blücher's farewell address to the Belgians—Disposition of the respective armies on the evening of the 21st—Wellington's proclamation to the French people—Contrast between the conduct of the Prussian troops and that of the Anglo-allied army towards the inhabitants of the country through which they pass: attributable to the dissimilarity of views entertained by their chiefs—Influence of Wellington's measures upon the cause of Louis XVIII.

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It would be difficult to discover, in the whole history of the wars of modern times, an instance in which so fine, so splendid, an army as that of Na-

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pooleon, one composed almost exclusively of veterans, all men of one nation, entirely devoted to their chief, and most enthusiastic in his cause, became so suddenly panic-stricken, so completely disorganized, and so thoroughly scattered, as was the French army when it lost the battle of Waterloo. A defeated army usually covers its retreat by a rear-guard, but here there was nothing of the kind; and hence that army cannot be said to have retreated, but truly to have fled from the field of battle. No attempt to rally was made on the Belgian soil, and it was not until some of the scattered fragments of the immense wreck had been borne across the French frontier that their partial junction on different points indicated the revival of at least some portion of that mighty mass of warriors who, but three days before, had marched across this same frontier in all the pride of strength, and in all the assurance of victory.

The rearmost of the fugitives having reached the Sambre, at Charleroi, Marchienne, and Châtelet, by daybreak of the 19th, indulged themselves with the hope that they might then enjoy a short rest from the fatigues which the relentless pursuit by the Prussians had entailed upon them during the night; but their fancied security was quickly disturbed by the appearance of a few Prussian cavalry, judiciously thrown forward towards the Sambre from the advanced guard at Gosselies:

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they resumed their flight, taking the direction of Beaumont and Philippeville.

It had been arranged by Wellington and Blücher, on the field of Waterloo, that the Prussian army, not having been so much crippled and exhausted by the battle, should undertake the further pursuit, and proceed by Charleroi towards Avesnes and Laon, whilst the Anglo-allied army, after remaining during the night on the field, should advance by Nivelles and Binch towards Peronne. On the following morning, the pursuing cavalry belonging to the 1st, 4th, and partly to the 2nd Prussian corps d'armée, reached the vicinity of Frasne and Mellet. The 4th corps marched at daybreak from Genappe, where it collected together the brigades which had been so much broken up by the continued pursuit. The 8th Prussian hussars, under Major von Colomb, were detached from this corps towards Wavre, to observe Marshal Grouchy. They were supported by the 1st Pomeranian landwehr-cavalry, and, shortly afterwards, the 2nd Silesian landwehr-cavalry, under Lieut. Colonel von Schill, also followed in the same direction.

After some hours' rest, the 4th corps d'armée marched to Fontaine l'Evêque, where it bivouacked. It had received orders to communicate from this place with Mons. The advanced guard, under General von Sydow, was pushed forward, as far as Lermes, on the road to Thuin, it being in-

tended that this corps should proceed by the road to Maubeuge, along the Sambre.

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The 1st corps d'armée, which had from the beginning followed the 4th as a reserve, now advanced in pursuit of the enemy by the direct road to Charleroi. The light cavalry at the head of the column reached the passages of the Sambre at Châtelet, Charleroi, and Marchienne, without meeting any sort of opposition or impediment; nor did it perceive any thing of the enemy on the other side of the river. The corps halted for the night at Charleroi; having its advanced guard at Marchienne, and its outposts occupying the line from Montigny by Louverval, as far as Châtelet. Detachments from the reserve-cavalry were sent in the direction of Fleurus, to secure the corps from any molestation on the part of Grouchy, of whose proceedings nothing positive was then known at the Prussian head quarters.

It was not until nearly five o'clock in the evening of the 19th, that General von Borcke, whose brigade, the 9th, was still in the vicinity of St. Lambert, discovered the retreat of Grouchy's troops. He immediately communicated the fact to General von Thielemann, who ordered him to cross the Dyle the next day (the 20th) and march upon Namur. The French rear-guard of Gérard's corps d'armée continued to occupy Limale until nightfall. Thielemann remained posted, during

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the night of the 19th, at St. Achtenrode, having his advanced guard at Ottenburg.

On the evening of the 18th, Pirch received orders to march from the field of Waterloo with his corps d'armée, (the 2nd,) in the direction of Namur, for the purpose of turning Marshal Grouchy's left flank and intercepting his retreat upon the Sambre. Pirch made this movement during the night, passing through Maransart, where he was joined by his 7th brigade, and crossing the Genappe rivulet at Bousseval, as also, subsequently, the Dyle, on his way to Mellery, which place he reached at eleven o'clock in the forenoon of the following day. His corps was much divided on this occasion. He had with him the 6th, 7th, and 8th, infantry-brigades, and 24 squadrons of cavalry; but the 5th infantry-brigade, and the remaining 14 squadrons, were with that portion of the Prussian army which was pursuing the enemy along the high road to Charleroi. The corps being greatly fatigued by the night-march and its exertions on the previous day, Pirch ordered the troops to bivouac and to betake themselves to rest.

During this march, Lieut. Colonel von Sohr had pushed on with his cavalry-brigade, as an advanced guard; and now he was required to gain intelligence concerning the enemy's movements, and to seek a communication with Thielemann. He

found the defile of Mont St. Guibert strongly occupied by the enemy, but could obtain no information respecting Thielemann's corps. 19th of June.

When it is considered how very near to Mellery Gérard's corps d'armée must have passed, in order to fall into the Namur road at Sombref, it seems extraordinary that Pirch, who reached that place at eleven o'clock in the forenoon of the 19th,—the same hour at which Grouchy, then beyond Wavre, received the first intimation of the defeat of Napoleon, —should have permitted Gérard to continue his retreat unmolested. His troops required rest, it is true, but had he maintained a good look-out in the direction of Gembloux, he would, in all probability, after the lapse of a few hours, have been enabled to fulfil his instructions so far as to have completely intercepted the retreat of a considerable portion of Grouchy's army. That part of the enemy's force which Lieut. Colonel von Sohr observed at Mont St. Guibert, was probably the advanced guard only of Gérard's corps d'armée, since its rear-guard remained at the bridge of Limale until nightfall. Taking all the circumstances into consideration, more especially the express object of the detached movement of the 2nd Prussian corps d'armée, it must be admitted that, on this occasion, there was a want of due vigilance on the part of General von Pirch.

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It was on the 19th, also, that Prince Blücher issued, whilst at Genappe, a proclamation to his army, in which he thanked the troops for their conduct during the recent struggle.

At daybreak of the 19th, that portion of the Duke of Wellington's army which had fought the battle of Waterloo, broke up from its bivouac, and began to move along the high road to Nivelles. Those troops which had been posted in front of Hal during the 18th, consisting of Stedmann's Dutch-Belgian division, Anthing's Dutch-Belgian Indian brigade, and Colonel Estorff's Hanoverian cavalry-brigade, under Prince Frederick of the Netherlands, as also of Johnstone's British infantry brigade, and Lyon's Hanoverian infantry-brigade, under Lieut. General Sir Charles Colville, were likewise directed to march upon Nivelles. The army occupied Nivelles and the surrounding villages during the night of the 19th, in the course of which the Duke arrived from Brussels, and established his head-quarters in the town.

An hour's rest was all that the harassing pursuit by the Prussians permitted Napoleon to enjoy at Charleroi; and he was compelled to fly across the Sambre, without the slightest chance of being enabled to check that pursuit on the Belgian side of the frontier.

The following inscription, which has been cut over the centre of the archway of the Charleroi

gate, is singularly appropriate to the flight of Napoleon on this memorable occasion:—

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‘ABIIT · EXCESSIT · EVASIT · ERVPIT.’

The circumstances, however, under which the flight of Cataline, here described, and that of Napoleon, took place, form a strange contrast. The former, subdued in the senate by the indignant philippics and burning eloquence of Cicero, escaped from Rome to the rebel camp of Manlius, to take up arms against his native city for the purpose of satisfying the cravings of his profligate ambition; and the latter, defeated in the battle-field, fled to the capital, in the vain hope of obtaining from the senate of his country further means of waging war against the legitimate sovereign.

From Charleroi, Napoleon proceeded to Philippeville, whence he hoped to be able to communicate more readily with Grouchy. He continued here four hours, which he employed in expediting orders to Generals Rapp, Lecourbe, and Lamarque, to advance with their respective corps d'armée by forced marches to Paris; and also to the commanders of fortresses, to defend themselves to the last extremity. He desired Soult to collect together all the troops that might arrive at this point, and conduct them to Laon, for which place he himself started with post-horses, at two o'clock in the afternoon.

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The general disposition of the respective armies on the evening of the 19th, was as follows :—

The Anglo-allied army, which constituted the right wing of the advancing forces, was at Nivelles and in its vicinity.'

The Duke of Wellington's head-quarters were at Nivelles.

Of the Prussian army, which formed the left wing, its 1st corps d'armée was at Charleroi ;

2nd corps on the march to Mellery ;

3rd corps at St. Achtenrode ;

4th corps at Fontaine l'Evêque ;

5th brigade of the 2nd corps at Anderlues, near Fontaine l'Evêque.

Prince Blücher's head-quarters were at Gosselies.

The disorganized force of the main French army was in the vicinity of Beaumont, Philippeville, and Avesnes.

Napoleon was posting towards Laon.

The detached portion of the French army under Grouchy was on the march to Namur.

The Duke of Wellington, in whose character the highest military talents of the warrior, were so intimately blended with the most comprehensive views of the statesman, did not allow the dazzling allurements which beset the path of a conqueror, to divert him for a single moment from that fixedness of purpose, or to dim that penetrating foresight, which so peculiarly distinguished his proceedings on all great occasions of a similar nature, involving the peace, the honour, and the security of not only his own sovereign and country, but also of all the Allied powers, in whose interests he

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was so actively engaged. He did not view the great battle he had gained in the light of an event to be followed up by an irruption into the enemy's country, conducted in such a manner as to humble to the dust the national pride of the French people, and to impose upon them the whole weight and burthen of the oppressions, ravages, and horrors which generally follow in the train of a victorious and lawless soldiery over the face of an enemy's country. His sole aim was directed to the carrying out of the great object of the war, which comprised not only the annihilation of the power of Napoleon and of the adherents to his cause, but also the restoration of the legitimate sovereign to the throne of France. With the latter sovereign he had been in constant communication, devising means for his protection during his temporary exile in the Netherlands, and now that the armies were on the point of crossing the frontier, counselling him to hasten forward and show himself in the midst of his people, in order that by identifying his cause with the common object of the Allied powers he might avail himself of all the influence and advantages to be derived from the recent victory, and become, as it were, a participator in the brilliant successes which attended their arms on the glorious 18th of June. In proof of the sincerity of his intentions, and as a first step towards securing the good will, if not the friendly dispo-

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sition, of the French people, more especially of the legitimists and the well and peaceably disposed, the Duke issued the following general order to the whole of the troops under his command :—

Nivelles, 20th June, 1815.

General Order.

1. As the army is about to enter the French territory, the troops of the nations which are at present under the command of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, are desired to recollect that their respective sovereigns are the Allies of His Majesty the King of France, and that France ought, therefore, to be treated as a friendly country. It is therefore required that nothing should be taken either by officers or soldiers, for which payment be not made. The commissaries of the army will provide for the wants of the troops in the usual manner, and it is not permitted either to soldiers or officers to extort contributions. The commissaries will be authorized either by the Field Marshal or by the generals who command the troops of the respective nations, in cases where their provisions are not supplied by an English commissary, to make the proper requisitions for which regular receipts will be given ; and it must be strictly understood that they will themselves be held responsible for whatever they obtain in way of requisition from the inhabitants of France, in the same manner in which they would be esteemed accountable for purchases made for their own government in the several dominions to which they belong.

2. The Field Marshal takes this opportunity of returning to the army his thanks for their conduct in the glorious action fought on the 18th instant, and he will not fail to report his sense of their conduct in the terms which it deserves to their several sovereigns.

WELLINGTON.

On the same day, the Duke, in consequence of a report received by him from Lieut. General Lecoq, and of a previous communication made to him by the King of Saxony, consented to take command of the Saxon corps d'armée, amounting to nearly 17,000 men. He directed the above general to march these troops to Antwerp, and there await further orders.

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The Anglo-allied army marched this day to Binch and Mons. The British cavalry moved into villages between Roeulx and Mons. Vivian's hussar-brigade took the outpost duties on the Sambre. The Hanoverian cavalry furnished outposts towards Maubeuge. The Duke fixed his head-quarters at Binch.

Blücher, having secured the passage of the Sambre in the neighbourhood of Charleroi, continued his pursuit of the enemy, and crossed the French frontier on the 20th. He directed Zieten to march the 1st corps d'armée from Charleroi to Beaumont, to throw forward his advanced guard as far as Solre le Château, to detach a party of observation to the left, towards Florenne, and to watch the road from Philippeville to Beaumont.

As the 1st corps d'armée advanced, it discovered at every step fresh proofs of the extreme disorder in which the French army had retreated, and found twelve pieces of artillery which they had hitherto

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contrived to save from the great wreck at Waterloo, but had now abandoned to their pursuers. On arriving at Beaumont, the corps took up a bivouac. Its advanced guard, under General von Jagow, consisting of the 3rd infantry-brigade, the 1st Silesian hussars, and a horse-battery, reached Solre le Château upon the road to Avesnes.

The Prince, at the same time, ordered Bülow to move the 4th corps d'armée as far as Colleret, where the road to Thuin intersects the high road from Beaumont to Maubeuge, and to push on the advanced guard to Beaufort. Bülow accordingly directed General von Sydow to proceed with an advanced guard, consisting of a cavalry-brigade, a horse-battery, and two battalions of infantry, which had the day before reached Lermes on the road to Thuin, and to ascertain very particularly whether the French had established themselves on the Sambre, to secure the bridges both here and at Lobbes, and further, to restore these passages, should they have been destroyed by the enemy. Another detachment, under Colonel von Eicke, consisting of two fusilier-battalions, the two squadrons attached to the 13th brigade, and of the 2nd Silesian hussars, was sent forward to take possession, in the first instance, of the passages of the Sambre, and then to join General von Sydow, who, proceeding by Colleret towards Beaufort, was to form both detachments into an advanced guard

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on reaching the latter place. In the mean time, the mass of the 4th corps, headed by the reserve-cavalry under Prince William of Prussia, followed in one column.

The progress made by this portion of the Prussian army on the 20th, was not so rapid as was desirable. Considerable delay arose in consequence of the degree of caution imparted to the movements, by the impression which Bülow entertained that the enemy would defend the passages, and endeavour to maintain himself along the opposite side of the river. Hence the advanced guard of the corps only reached Ferrière la petite; part of the main body proceeded as far as Montignies, and the remainder, with the reserve-artillery, did not get farther than the bridges across the Sambre.

The 5th brigade (belonging to the 2nd corps d'armée) had started at daybreak from its bivouac at Anderlues, near Fontaine l'Evêque, and directed its march, by Binch, upon Villers, towards Maubeuge. The brigade was reinforced by 100 dragoons under Major von Busch, and half a horse-battery, which detachment arrived at Villers at five o'clock in the afternoon. This cavalry was employed in observing the fortress of Maubeuge, from the Mons road, as far as the Sambre, and the brigade bivouacked at Villers. A Hanoverian regiment of hussars also observed the fortress on

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the right of the Prussian cavalry upon the Bavay road.

The left wing of the Prussian army, comprising the 3rd, and part of the 2nd, corps d'armée, came into collision with the enemy, this day, when pursuing that part of the French army which was under Grouchy. Thielemann, having learned that the latter had commenced his retreat upon Gembloux, marched at five o'clock in the morning from St. Achtenrode to Wavre, where he further ascertained that already on the afternoon of the 19th, the French had effected their retreat across the Dyle, leaving only a rear guard on the left bank of the river.

Grouchy, when he decided on retiring upon Namur, ordered General Bonnemains to move on rapidly, by Gembloux, with the 4th and 12th dragoons, as an advanced guard, and to reach that town as soon as possible, and secure the passage of the Sambre. They were followed by the remainder of Excelmans' cavalry, and the reserve-artillery, together with the wounded. The infantry was put in motion in two columns; the one, consisting of the 3rd corps d'armée, proceeding by Gembloux, and the other, comprising the 4th corps, passing more to the right, and falling into the Namur road in rear of Sombref. The light cavalry was principally with the rear guard. To deceive Thielemann, Grouchy left his rear guard in Wavre and Limale, with

cavalry picquets thrown out towards the Prussians, until near evening, when it followed the main body to Namur.

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Thielemann, having placed the whole of his cavalry, with eight pieces of horse-artillery, at the head of his column, now ordered them to move on at a trot, for the purpose of overtaking the enemy; but it was not until they had passed Gembloux that they discovered the rear of Grouchy's force, consisting of a few regiments of cavalry. These, however, now made so rapid a retreat, that it was impossible to bring them to action. At length, on arriving near the village of Fallize, within about three miles from Namur, the Prussians found Vandamme's rear guard posted on the brow of the declivity at the foot of which lay the town, in the valley of the Meuse. It presented about two battalions of infantry, three regiments of cavalry, and four guns, and was formed to cover the retreat of the French troops.

The Prussian battery immediately opened a fire, during which Colonel von Marwitz moving out to the right, with the 1st cavalry-brigade, and Count Lottum to the left, with the 2nd, turned the enemy in both flanks. The latter brought forward a reserve of cavalry, when the 8th Prussian uhlans, under Colonel Count Dohna, at the head of the column that turned the enemy's left, made a most gallant attack upon the French dragoons, who met it with a volley from their carbines,

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but were overthrown. The 7th uhlans and a squadron of the 12th hussars also charged on this occasion, and captured three pieces of French horse-artillery, which were in the act of moving off, as also fifty cavalry-horses. The enemy's infantry now threw itself into the adjacent wood, with which the declivities that here lead down into the valley of the Meuse are covered, and thus succeeded in preventing the Prussians from following up their success.

At this moment, intelligence was received that General von Pirch was pursuing the enemy with the 2nd corps d'armée upon the high road leading from Sombref to Namur, whereupon the cavalry of the 3rd corps was moved into this direction. A French column, consisting of about 12 battalions and 2 batteries, but without any cavalry, was perceived marching along that road. They belonged to Gérard's corps d'armée, which had effected its retreat by Limale, through Mont St. Guibert. Upon the height on which the château of Flavennes is situated, was posted a detachment from Vandamme's corps, consisting of from 4 to 5 battalions with a battery, and a regiment of cavalry, for the purpose of receiving Gérard's column as it fell back, and of protecting its retreat. As the enemy continued its retrograde march in close column and in good order, it was not deemed advisable to undertake an attack with the two Prussian cavalry-brigades of the 3rd corps, which were much fatigued; but

the horse-battery was drawn up, and discharged several rounds of shell and grape at the French troops during their retreat upon the town. The latter, therefore, quitted the high road, and moved along the adjacent heights until they reached the battalions which had been drawn up in support, and which now opposed the further advance of Pirch's corps d'armée. At this time, Thielemann's cavalry withdrew, leaving the further pursuit of the enemy to the latter corps—to the movements of which it is now necessary to recur.

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It was not until five o'clock in the morning of the 20th that Pirch received intelligence that the enemy was retiring by Gembloux upon Namur. Lieut. Colonel von Sohr was immediately detached, in all haste, to Gembloux with his cavalry-brigade, a battery of horse-artillery, and the fusilier-battalions of the 9th, 14th, and 23rd regiments, as an advanced guard. On approaching that town, Lieut. Colonel von Sohr ascertained that Thielemann's cavalry was pursuing the enemy along the high road from Gembloux to Namur. He therefore decided upon marching by the narrow road on the right of the chaussée leading from Sombref, in full trot, covered by the wood, to overtake the French troops in retreat. At Temploux, the latter presented a force of two battalions, some cavalry, and four pieces of artillery, in position, prepared to cover the retreating column. Lieut. Colonel von Sohr immediately attacked with both the

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regiments of hussars, supported by the battery of horse-artillery, and defeated this portion of the enemy's forces. It was at this moment, too, that a cannonade was opened upon the latter by the horse-battery, before mentioned, of Thielemann's corps, whereupon it fell back upon the favourable position taken up near Flavinnes, and in which the enemy appeared determined to make a stand.

Pirch immediately ordered the attack, and directed that it should be supported by Major General von Krafft with the 6th brigade, which had closely followed the advanced guard, and had come up with the latter at four o'clock in the afternoon. Three columns of attack were formed. The first consisted of the 1st battalion of the 9th regiment, the fusilier-battalion of the 26th regiment, and the 1st battalion of the 1st Elbe landwehr. It was under the command of Major von Schmidt, and detached to the left of the road, to drive back the enemy's troops posted in the wood and upon the heights. The second consisted of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 26th regiment and the 1st battalion of the 9th regiment, under Colonel von Reuss, and of the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the Elbe landwehr, under Colonel von Bismark. This column, which advanced partly on the right, and partly on the left, of the road, was supported by the battery No. 5, and led by Major General Krafft in person. The third column comprised the fusilier-battalions which had constituted the

infantry of the advanced guard, and was detached more to the right, towards the Sambre, to support the general advance upon Namur.

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General von Krafft, after having kept up a fire, for a short time, upon the enemy with his artillery, ordered the attack with his infantry. Colonel von Reuss threw out his skirmishers, who were quickly followed by the columns of attack. The enemy, after some little resistance, was fairly driven into Namur by a charge with bayonets, and suffered much loss.

In the mean time, Major von Schmidt, with his column of three battalions, had turned the enemy's right flank on the Louvain road ; and the French were now limited to the defence of the suburb, which, however, was maintained with great obstinacy. The Prussian columns of attack, advancing at the *pas de charge*, drove the enemy out of the suburb, and endeavoured to gain possession of the gates of the town. Colonel von Zastrow, the second in command of the 6th brigade, wished to burst open the gate which leads to the Louvain road, but was repulsed by a most murderous fire of musketry and grape, directed upon the assailants from the walls of the town. On repeating the attempt, the Prussian battalions fought with distinguished bravery, but with a great sacrifice of life. Colonel von Zastrow was killed at their head ; Colonel von Bismark also fell ; Colonel von Reuss

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was wounded ; and the 6th brigade alone lost 44 officers, and 1274 under-officers and privates.

The main body of Grouchy's army was at this time in full retreat upon Dinant, along the defile of the Meuse. The troops left in Namur to keep the Prussians at bay as long as possible, consisted of General Teste's division. They carefully barricaded all the gates, lined the walls facing the Prussians, and made a most gallant resistance. The officers, finding that their men continued so perfectly steady as not to require their attention, armed themselves with the muskets of the wounded, and assisted in maintaining the fire from the walls. The greatest order prevailed in the town. The wounded, the provisions, and ammunition, had already been removed, and were on the line of march.

General von Pirch was well aware that the French defended the town solely for the purpose of covering their retreat, and had therefore no intention of undertaking any serious attack ; he wished simply to possess himself of the suburbs, and to hold the enemy in check by detaching troops to the Porte de Fer and the St. Nicholas gate. He thought that a demonstration against the latter gate would raise apprehensions in the minds of the French, respecting the security of the bridge over the Sambre. With this view, he ordered General von Brause to relieve, with the

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7th brigade, the troops then engaged, and together with the advanced guard under Lieut. Colonel von Sohr, to blockade the town. At the same time he directed the remainder of the corps to bivouac near Temploux.

General von Brause proceeded to post the fusilier-battalion of the 22nd regiment in the direction of the Porte de Fer, and the fusilier-battalion of the 2nd Elbe landwehr towards the Brussels gate. The main body of the 7th brigade, under Colonel von Schon, was stationed in rear of the suburb. The first mentioned battalion stood, under cover, at 400 paces distance from the Porte de Fer, having its tirailleurs in the avenue near the gate. Just as General von Brause rode up to examine its formation, an alarm was spread in front that the enemy was making a sortie. The general desired the commanding officer, Major Jochens, to lead his battalion quickly against the defenders, to overthrow them, and then, if possible, to penetrate into the town along with the retreating troops. As Major Jochens approached the gate, he found in its immediate vicinity the tirailleurs of the 6th brigade, still maintaining the contest in that quarter. The attacking column and the tirailleurs now rushed towards the gate and the walls, which the French, probably not deeming themselves strong enough to resist this pressure, abandoned in the greatest haste. General Teste had, in fact, prepared every thing for his retreat,

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and had so well calculated the time which the enemy would require in forcing an entrance by the *Porte de Fer*, that he succeeded in filing his battalions along the parapets of the bridge, which had been barricaded, and thus withdrew them to the south bank of the Sambre. The Prussians found it impossible to force open the gate. The windows of the adjoining house of the *douaniers* were therefore driven in, and a small iron door which led from the interior of the house into the town was opened, and, in this manner, an entrance was effected for the assailants, who were conducted by Major Jochens, of the 22nd, and Major von Luckowitz, of the 9th regiment, across the market-place, and as far as the bridge over the Sambre, which the French had barricaded, as before stated, and behind which they had again established themselves. These troops were closely followed by Major von Schmidt, with the 9th regiment, and lastly by the 2nd Elbe landwehr, in close column, under Majors von Mirbach and von Lindern.

The Prussians immediately occupied the captured portion of the town; posted a column of reserve on the market-place, and, with loud cheers, made themselves masters of the bridge over the Sambre. An attempt had been made to gain the enemy's rear, by means of a ford in this river, but it proved unsuccessful. The French were driven with so much impetuosity towards the gate leading out to Dinant, that there appeared every proba-

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bility of a considerable number of them falling into the hands of the Prussians. The former, however, had heaped up large bundles of wood, intermingled with straw and pitch, against the gate, and set them on fire on the approach of the Prussian troops. The gate and the street were soon in flames, and the pursuit was thus obstructed; but even had this not occurred, the great fatigue of the troops, who during the previous sixteen hours, had been either marching or fighting, was sufficient to deprive them of the power of following the retreating enemy with any degree of vigour.

After nine o'clock in the evening, the town was in the possession of the Prussians. Major von Schmidt took the command at the Dinant gate and Major Jochens at the bridge over the Sambre. The remaining troops of the 7th, and some battalions of the 6th, brigade, were posted by General von Brause upon the market-place. The fusilier battalions of the advanced guard, which had supported the attack, more to the right, had also advanced into the town, towards the bridge over the Sambre. They had been sharply cannonaded by the enemy from the right bank of the Sambre. A small party of cavalry, under Captain von Thielemann, of the Pomeranian hussars, was sent forward a short distance on the road to Dinant, to form the advance of the troops destined to pursue the enemy at daybreak.

General Teste's division retired slowly, and in

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good order, by the Dinant road, as far as Profondeville, where it took up a position during three hours. At midnight it resumed its march, and arrived at Dinant at four o'clock on the following morning.

This retreat of Grouchy by Namur upon Dinant was executed in a skilful and masterly manner; and the gallant defence of the former town by General Teste's division, unaided by artillery, merits the highest commendation.

In this action the Prussians suffered a loss, including that already mentioned as having occurred to the 6th brigade, of 1,500 men; and the French are supposed to have lost about the same number. In the last attack, the latter abandoned 150 prisoners they had previously taken from the Prussians.

The 2nd Prussian corps d'armée occupied Namur during the night. The cavalry of the 3rd corps bivouacked at Temploux; the infantry of the latter, (which had been rejoined on the march from Wavre by the 9th brigade,) near the town of Gembloux.

The circumstances under which the French army, generally, was placed on the 19th of June rendered it sufficiently obvious that Grouchy would be compelled to effect his retreat by Namur, and further, that whatever show of resistance he might offer on that point would be solely intended to gain time for the security of his troops whilst

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retiring in one column only, by the long and narrow defile of the Meuse which leads to Dinant. Aware that Napoleon's defeated army was retiring along the direct line of operation, the Charleroi road, he immediately saw the imminent risk of his own retreat becoming intercepted, and the consequent necessity of his effecting the latter in a parallel direction, with a view to his rejoining the main army as soon as practicable. To retire, therefore, by Gembloux upon Namur, and thence along the line of the Meuse, by Dinant and Givet, naturally presented itself as the true and proper course to be pursued. To generals in command of corps d'armée, such as Thielemann and Pirch, a little reflection upon Grouchy's critical position must have led to a similar conclusion. The inactivity of the former, during the afternoon and evening of the 19th, is probably to be explained by his having satisfied himself that the longer Grouchy continued in the vicinity of Wavre, the greater became the chance of his retreat being cut off by a portion of the Allied armies, which, in their advance, would reach the Sambre much sooner than it would be in the power of the French marshal to do, and that, therefore, it would be injudicious on his part to attempt to force the latter from the position which appearances induced him to believe he still occupied with his entire force, on the Dyle. He may also have been strengthened in this opinion by the circumstance of his

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not having received any positive instructions as to his future dispositions, or any reinforcements to secure for him a preponderance over Grouchy. With Pirch, however, the case was very different. He received distinct orders, on the evening of the 18th, to march at once from the field of Waterloo, and continue his movement during that night, so as to cut off Grouchy's retreat upon the Sambre. It has already been explained, that on reaching Mellery, at eleven o'clock on the following morning, he halted to give his troops rest ; that he subsequently ascertained, through Lieut. Colonel von Sohr, who had been despatched, during the march, with his cavalry-brigade to reconnoitre on the left, that the French occupied the defile of Mont St. Guibert in force. This intelligence might have satisfied him that Grouchy had not yet reached Namur ; but, if he entertained any doubts on that point, these could easily have been settled by means of a reconnoitring party, detached from Mellery, by Gentinne, and St. Géry, to Gembloux, a distance of seven miles. He would then have learned, that no portion whatever of Grouchy's force had hitherto crossed this line, in retreat ; that he had, consequently, gained considerably on his rear, and had it in his power, after allowing a few hours rest to his troops, to march them by the road which leads directly from Mellery into the high road near Sombref, and to anticipate Grouchy in the possession of Namur.

In this case, Grouchy, on approaching the latter place, and finding it occupied by Pirch, would, in all probability, have hesitated to risk the loss of so much time as an attempt to force the town and the Pont de Sambre would necessarily incur, and have preferred endeavouring to pass his troops across the Sambre by some of the bridges and fords between Charleroi and Namur, and retire upon either Philippeville or Dinant; but, with a Prussian corps d'armée at each of those points, and another in his rear, this would have been, to say the least of it, a most hazardous undertaking; and if he attempted to cross the Meuse below Namur, his chance of regaining Napoleon's army would have been still more remote.

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But setting aside the circumstance of Pirch's not having, in this manner, taken due advantage of the position in which he stood relatively with Grouchy during the 19th, and passing to the fact, that he first learned, at five o'clock on the morning of the 20th, whilst still at Mellery, that the enemy was retiring along the high road from Gembloux to Namur, pursued by Thielemann's cavalry, it seems strange that, inferring, as he must naturally have done, that Grouchy would only endeavour to hold out long enough at Namur to effect his passage by the Pont de Sambre, and to cover his retreat to Dinant, he did not immediately move off by his right, and push his troops across the Sambre by some of the bridges and

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fords higher up the stream, and then, marching in the direction of Profondeville, under cover of the wood of Villers within the angle formed by the confluence of the Sambre and the Meuse, intercept Grouchy's retreat through the long and narrow defile in which the road to Dinant winds by the side of the last mentioned river. The situation in which Grouchy would have been placed by a movement of this kind—his troops in a long, narrow, precipitous, defile, obstructed in front by Pirch, and attacked in rear by Thielemann—would have been perilous in the extreme. Pirch probably felt that his corps d'armée, part of which was then attached to the army pressing the enemy by the Charleroi road, was not equal to cope with Grouchy's troops ; but in the case here supposed, by judiciously disposing his force then present so as to command the defile at some favourable point in its course, he would have secured for himself an advantage which, under such circumstances, would have fully compensated for his deficiency in regard to numbers.

The scattered remnants of the main French army continued to be hurried forward in wild confusion across the frontier. Some of the fugitives hastened towards Avesnes, others to Philippeville, whilst a very great proportion of them sought no temporary rest of this kind, but, throwing away their arms, fled into the interior, to return to their homes ; the cavalry, in many instances, disposing

of their horses to the country people. Several of the superior officers hastily collected such of the troops as appeared better disposed, and conducted them in the direction of Laon. Napoleon reached the latter town in the afternoon of the 20th. After conferring with the *préfet*, he desired M. de Bussy, one of his aides-de-camp, to superintend the defence of this important place, and despatched General Dejean to Avesnes, and General Flahaut to Guise. In the mean time, a body of troops had been discerned in the distance, moving towards the town. Napoleon sent an aide-de-camp to reconnoitre it; when it proved to be a column of about 3,000 men, which Soult, Jerome, Morand, Colbert, Petit, and Pelet, had succeeded in rallying and preserving in order. Napoleon now appeared intent upon remaining at Laon until the remainder of the army had re-assembled; but he subsequently yielded to the force of the arguments expressed in opposition to this determination, by the Duke of Bassano and others who were present; and took his departure for Paris, purposing at the same time, to return to Laon on the 25th or 26th of the month.

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The following was the general disposition of the respective armies on the evening of the 20th:—

The Anglo-allied army had its right at Mons, and its left at Binch.

The British cavalry was cantoned in the villages of Strepy, Thieu, Boussoit-sur-Haine, and Ville-sur-Haine: Vivian's brigade

21st of June. in those of Merbes-Ste. Marie, Bienne-le-Hapart, and Mont : and the Hanoverian cavalry in those of Givry and Croix. The reserve was at Soignies.

The Duke of Wellington's head-quarters were at Binch.

The Prussian army had its 1st corps d'armée at Beaumont : 4th corps at Collerets : 2nd corps at Namur, with the exception of the 5th brigade, which was on the march to blockade Maubuge, and bivouacked at Villers : 3rd corps was at Gembloux, with its cavalry bivouacked at Temploux.

Prince Blücher's head-quarters were at Merbes le Château.

The French army under Napoleon was completely dispersed. A few of the troops took refuge in Avesnes, others in Guise, and the principal body of them, evincing any kind of order, but not exceeding 3000 men, reached Laon.

The French forces under Grouchy were at Dinant. Napoleon quitted Laon for Paris.

On the 21st, the Duke of Wellington crossed the French frontier, moving the principal portion of his army to Bavay, and the remainder from Mons upon Valenciennes, which fortress was immediately blockaded, and established his head-quarters at Malplaquet, celebrated as the scene of the glorious victory gained by the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene over the French under Marshals Villars and Boufflers, on the 11th of September, 1709. Both the Allied commanders had now reached the triple line of fortresses, which, until the campaign of 1814 proved the contrary, had been considered by so many military men as presenting an insurmountable barrier to the advance of hostile armies into France by its north-eastern frontier. It was most essential that some

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of the principal fortresses should be secured, and made to constitute a new basis whence to direct the operations now contemplated against the interior. The following, which first presented themselves on the respective lines of advance of the two commanders, were destined to be immediately blockaded :—Valenciennes, Lequesnoy, and Cambray, by the Anglo-allied army; and Maubeuge, Landrecy, Avesnes, and Rocroi, by the Prussians. The general arrangements for the besieging of the fortresses, and the planning of the further operations, above alluded to, were to form the subject of a conference to be held very shortly between the chiefs.

Prince Blücher having, on this day, received reports from Pirch and Thielemann, detailing their proceedings during the two previous days, and showing that Grouchy had succeeded in effecting his escape by Dinant, immediately ordered that the 2nd corps d'armée should move upon Thuin, and place itself under the orders of Prince Augustus of Prussia, who was to undertake the besieging of the fortresses to be left in rear of the Prussian army; and that the 3rd corps should march by Charleroi, and follow the 1st and 4th corps as a reserve.

It will be recollected that Captain von Thielemann was sent forward, from Namur, with a party of the Pomeranian hussars, on the night of the 20th, a short distance along the road to Dinant.

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He was joined at daybreak of the 21st by Lieut. Colonel von Sohr, with the fusilier-battalions of the 14th and 23rd regiments, the Brandenburg and Pomeranian hussars, and five pieces of horse-artillery ; when the whole force followed the enemy towards Dinant. The latter had, during his retreat, seized every favourable opportunity in narrow and rocky parts of the defile, to barricade the road, and offer every obstruction to the pursuit ; by means of which precaution, and the previous night-march, the French contrived to gain so considerably in advance, that Lieut. Colonel von Sohr deemed it prudent when near Dinant, to forego all further pursuit, and to endeavour to effect a junction with the main body of the Prussian army, by moving upon Florennes and Walcour. At the former place he halted his detachment during the night of the 21st, and, in this manner, covered the left flank of the main army.

Anxious to gain intelligence concerning the assembling and marching of the French troops on the left of the Allied armies, Prince Blücher despatched Major von Falkenhausen, with the 3rd regiment of Silesian landwehr-cavalry, to scour the country in the vicinity of the road by Rettel to Laon. A detachment of 50 dragoons was posted at Bossule le Valcourt, in observation of Philippeville.

The 4th corps d'armée was ordered by the Prince to advance, this day, as far as Maroilles,

upon the road from Maubeuge to Landrecies. Its advanced guard, under General von Sydow, was directed to proceed still further, and to blockade the latter fortress.

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Zieten, in pursuance of orders which he had received the night before, marched with the 1st corps d'armée upon Avesnes; which fortress the advanced guard, under General von Jagow, was directed to blockade on both banks of the Helpe. The march of the corps was made in two columns: the right, consisting of the 1st and 2nd brigades, proceeded by Semonsies, and halted at the junction of the road from Maubeuge with that from Beaumont to Avesnes; the left, comprising the 4th brigade, the reserve-cavalry, and reserve-artillery, marched by Solre le Château towards Avesnes, and bivouacked near the 1st and 2nd brigades. Two companies of the 4th brigade, with 20 dragoons, were left to garrison Beaumont; but after the capture of Avesnes, they were ordered to move on to the latter place.

It was between three and four o'clock when the advanced guard of the 3rd brigade, consisting of the 1st Silesian hussars, two rifle companies, and a fusilier battalion, arrived in front of the fortress of Avesnes. The commandant having rejected Zieten's summons to surrender, the latter ordered the bombardment to be commenced forthwith. Ten howitzers, of which six were 10-pounders, and four 7-pounders, drew up on the flank of the cavalry, and

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fired upon the town. The houses of the latter being all strongly built, the shells failed in setting any part on fire ; and a 12-pounder battery produced no great effect upon the firm masonry of the works. At nightfall the bombardment was suspended, with the intention, however, of resuming it at midnight. When it ceased, a sortie was made by the French tirailleurs ; but these were immediately encountered and gallantly driven in by the Silesian rifles, who lost ten men on this occasion. Immediately after midnight the Prussian batteries re-commenced their fire. At the fourteenth round, a 10-pounder shell struck the principal powder-magazine, when a tremendous explosion ensued, by which forty houses were involved in one common ruin ; but it occasioned no damage whatever to the fortifications. The panic, however, which it created amidst the garrison was such as to induce the latter to express its desire to capitulate. Such a desire could only have proceeded from the want of sufficient energy on the part of the commandant, or from a bad disposition evinced by the garrison, for when the Prussians subsequently entered the place, they found in it 15,000 cartridges for cannon, and a million musket-ball cartridges. There were also in the fortress 47 pieces of artillery, mostly of heavy calibre, which were now made available in the besieging of the remaining fortresses. The garrison, comprising three battalions of national guards, and 200 veterans, were made prisoners of

war. The national guards were disarmed, and sent off to their respective homes; but the veterans were conducted to Cologne.

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The possession of Avesnes, gained too with so little sacrifice of life, and with none of time, was of essential importance to the Prussians; offering as it did a secure depôt for their material and supplies, upon their new line of operation. It also served for the reception of their sick, and all who had been rendered incapable of keeping up with the army.

On the 21st, the French army continued collecting its scattered remnants between Avesnes and Laon.

The following was the general disposition of the respective armies on the evening of the 21st:—

The Anglo-allied army had its principal force at Bavay, and its right at Valenciennes, which it blockaded.

The Duke of Wellington's head-quarters were at Malplaquet.

The Prussian army had its 1st corps d'armée near Avesnes.

The 4th corps at Maroilles; its reserve-cavalry blockading Landrecy.

The 2nd corps at Thuin, except the 5th brigade which blockaded Maubeuge.

The 3rd corps at Charleroi.

Prince Blücher's head-quarters were at Noyelles sur Sambre.

The defeated portion of the French army lay between Avesnes and Laon.

Grouchy's force was at Philippeville.

The Duke of Wellington, steadfastly pursuing that line of policy which led him to constitute as

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an important feature of his plan, the practical assurance to the French people, that, although entering their country as a conqueror, he did so in hostility to none, save the usurper and his adherents, issued the following proclamation, previously to his quitting Malplaquet :—

PROCLAMATION.

‘ Je fais savoir aux Français que j’entre dans leur pays à la tête d’une armée déjà victorieuse, non en ennemi (excepté de l’usurpateur, prononcé l’ennemi du genre humain, avec lequel on ne peut avoir ni paix ni trêve), mais pour les aider à secouer le joug de fer par lequel ils sont opprimés.

‘ En conséquence j’ai donné les ordres ci-joints* à mon armée, et je demande qu’on me fasse connaître tout infracteur.

‘ Les Français savent cependant que j’ai le droit d’exiger qu’ils se conduisent de manière que je puisse les protéger contre ceux qui voudraient leur faire du mal.

‘ Il faut donc qu’ils fournissent aux réquisitions qui leur seront faites de la part des personnes autorisées à les faire, en échange pour des reçus en forme et ordre ; et qu’ils se tiennent chez eux paisiblement, et qu’ils n’aient aucune correspondance ou communication avec l’usurpateur ennemi, ni avec ses adhérens.

‘ Tous ceux qui s’absenteront de leur domicile après l’entrée en France, et tous ceux qui se trouveront absents au service de l’usurpateur, seront considérés comme ses adhérens et comme ennemis ; et leurs propriétés seront affectées à la subsistance de l’armée.

‘ Donné au Quartier Général à Malplaquet, ce 22 de juin, 1815.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

No proclamation of a similar nature was issued by Prince Blücher, nor were any direct orders

* The orders in question are given in p. 316.

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given by the latter to remind his troops that France was "to be treated as a friendly country," or to forbid them taking any thing "for which payment be not made."* Hence, in the advance to Paris a marked contrast was observed between the conduct of the Prussian, and that of the Anglo-allied, army: the troops of the former committing great excesses and imposing severe exactions along their whole line of march; whilst the British and German troops under the Duke of Wellington acquired from the outset the good will and kindly disposition of the inhabitants of the country through which they passed. The Anglo-allied troops inspired the people with confidence: the Prussians awed them into subjection. Much of the cause of all this may be traced to the different views entertained by the two great commanders. Blücher's extreme hatred of the French would not allow him to modify, still less to abandon, the opinion which he had imbibed from the first moment he heard of the escape of Napoleon from Elba, that they ought not only to be thoroughly humbled, but also severely punished. Neither he nor his soldiers could ever forget the monstrous cruelties and grinding extortions which their own country had been compelled to endure when overrun by the French; and now that they were once more brought into the land of their bitterest enemies, and another

* See General Order, p. 316.

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period of retribution had arrived, but one sentiment pervaded the whole Prussian army—that those who had not scrupled to inflict the scourge of war throughout the whole continent, should, in their turn, be made duly sensible of its evils. A contrary train of ideas, or a different course of proceeding, on the part of the Prussians, was scarcely to be expected. Hence the value of the excellent and orderly conduct of the British troops operating as a salutary counterpoise to the domineering and revengeful spirit which actuated the Prussians. Blücher felt equally with Wellington that the advance upon Paris before the approach of the Allied armies, which were then only crossing the Rhine, was a departure from strictly military principles, and that this could only be justified by the extraordinary moral effect which would be produced by the signal defeat of Napoleon. But his views were limited to the military part of the plan, which was to make a dash at the capital, and, if possible, to intercept Grouchy whilst endeavouring to rejoin the routed force under Soult. Wellington's admirable policy embraced a wider field. He invariably kept in view the great object for which the war had been undertaken. The information which he contrived to obtain relative to the effect which Napoleon's disaster produced upon the minds of the leading men of the great political parties by which France was then agitated, and upon the members of the two chambers of par-

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liament generally, combined with the knowledge he had already acquired of the disposition of the inhabitants of the department of the North, which, in fact, had not evinced that enthusiasm attendant upon the return of Napoleon from Elba that was manifested throughout the greater part of the nation, convinced him that by adopting measures calculated to impress upon the French people that the Allies were friendly towards them, though inveterately hostile to Napoleon, and by seizing every advantage afforded by the presence and the influence of their legitimate monarch, he was, by such means, insuring the security of the operations upon Paris more effectually than could have been accomplished by additional military force applied under different circumstances.

The aid which such a line of conduct, on the part of the Duke, gave to the cause of Louis XVIII. was immense. The people of the northern departments, who, in general, were wearied by the continuance of wars undertaken for the sole purpose of aggrandizing and upholding the power of Napoleon, and who now longed to enjoy the blessings of peace, saw in the friendly disposition of the Allies, and the support which these yielded to the King's authority, a pledge of their determination to crush the war-party, and, at the same time, to cement their alliance with the legitimate sovereign. The white flag was soon seen to wave from countless steeples. The tide of royalty,

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favoured in no small degree by the versatile nature of the French character, was already setting in fast, and as it rolled steadily on towards the capital, the Duke's customary foresight and good tact gave it an impulse, which not only bore him along with it in easy triumph, but, when it subsequently reached the goal, swept away every vestige of the government usurped by Napoleon and his adherents.

CHAPTER XVIII.

On the 22nd of June, the Anglo-allied army reaches Le Cateau—The corps under Prince Frederick of the Netherlands is destined to be employed in besieging the fortresses—Blücher, in order to bring his 1st, 4th, and 3rd corps into closer communication, moves the two former only half a march on the 22nd: the latter reaches Beaumont—Disposition of the 2nd corps—Decline of the political influence of Napoleon—His arrival in Paris on the 21st—His consultation with his ministers—Policy of Fouché—Debates in the chamber of deputies—Speech of La Fayette—Resolutions adopted by the chambers—Their effect upon Napoleon—His message to the chambers—Renewed debates—A commission appointed—Its report—Sensation produced by the speeches of M. Duchesne and General Solignac—Napoleon abdicates the throne in favour of his son—Independent character of the French parliament—On the 23rd, Wellington and Blücher give their troops a halt—Force detached under Colville to attack Cambray—The Allied commanders have an interview at Catillon, and arrange their plan of advance upon Paris—On the 24th, Wellington reinforces the troops under Colville—Capture of Cambray—Proposals are made at the outposts of the Allied armies for a suspension of hostilities—These are rejected—Louis XVIII. arrives at Le Cateau—Guise surrenders to Zieten's corps—The Prussians are one day's march in advance of the Anglo-allied army—Disposition of the respective armies on the evening of the 24th—Proclamation issued by the Provisional Government in Paris—Surrender of the citadel of Cambray—On the 25th, the Anglo-allied army reaches Joncour—The fortress of La Fère on the Oise invested by part of Zieten's corps—The advanced guard and cavalry of the right Prussian column reach Montescourt—The main body of Bülow's corps arrives at Essignyle grand—Blücher's reply to an application by the commissioners from the French chambers for a suspension of hostilities—The French troops collected at Laon march to Soissons, towards which point Grouchy's force is also approaching—Soult, finding himself superseded in the command, quits the army—Disposition of the respective armies on the evening of the 25th—Napoleon quits Paris—His address to the army.

On the 22nd of June, the 2nd and 4th British divisions, as also the cavalry, of the Anglo-allied

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army marched to Le Cateau and its vicinity. The 1st and 3rd British divisions, the divisions of Dutch-Belgian infantry attached to the 1st corps, the Nassau troops, and the Dutch-Belgian cavalry were encamped near Gommignies. The 5th and 6th British divisions, the Brunswick corps, and the reserve-artillery, were encamped about Bavay. The advanced guard (Vivian's brigade) was at St. Benin. Troops of the corps under Prince Frederick of the Netherlands blockaded Valenciennes and Le Quesnoy.

The Duke of Wellington's head-quarters were at Le Cateau.

Prince Blücher being desirous of bringing his different corps d'armée into closer connection, moved the 1st and 4th only half a march this day. The former proceeded from Avesnes to Etroeung, sending forward its advanced guard to La Capelle, and patrols as far as the Oise: the latter marched along the road leading from Landrecy towards Guise, as far as Fesmy; pushing forward its advanced guard to Henappe, and detachments to Guise. Scouring parties of cavalry were also detached from the 1st corps, in the direction of Rocroi.

The 3rd Prussian corps d'armée advanced from Charleroi to Beaumont, detaching towards Philippeville and Chimay, for the security of its left flank.

The 2nd Prussian corps, which was destined to

operate against the fortresses, moved from Thuin. It was disposed in the following manner :—The 5th and 7th brigades, with the cavalry, blockaded Maubeuge ; the 6th brigade was on the march to Landrecy ; and the 8th brigade was moving upon Philippeville and Givet.

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Prince Blücher's head-quarters were at Catillon sur Sambre.

Grouchy's troops, on this day, reached Rocroi.

The remains of the vanquished portion of the French army continued retiring upon Laon, and collecting in its vicinity. Soult had established the head-quarters at this place. The men and horses of the artillery-train were moved on to La Fère, to be supplied with new ordnance ; and every means was adopted to replace this branch of the service on an efficient footing. Grouchy was effecting his retreat upon Soissons, by the line of Rocroi, Rethel, and Rheims ; and it was considered, that as soon as the latter should be able to unite his force to the remains of the army collecting under Soult, it would yet be found practicable, with the additional aid of reserves, to stem the advance of the Allies. But where was the chief whose presence had heretofore been the spell by which a turbulent and restless soldiery was wont, when subdued by the *fortune de la guerre*, to be restored to its former self, and to be imbued with new life and renovated strength by the prospect of acquiring fresh glory in retrieving a great

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national disaster? Had he flown towards the nearest corps d'armée of Rapp and Lecourbe, to lead them, along with all the reserves that he could possibly collect together, including the regimental dépôts, the gend'armerie, and even the douanerie, against the flank of the victorious armies of Wellington and Blücher, during their hazardous advance upon the capital, and, in combination with Soult and Grouchy, to effect their separation, perhaps, their destruction? No! The sword by which the empire had been raised and held in subjection, by which Europe itself had been enthralled and all but conquered, had fallen powerless from his grasp. In him were no longer centred the might and the will of imperial France. These had been delegated through the constitution, to the organs of the nation, the elected representatives of the people. He no longer possessed, in his own person, the administrative and the executive; but was under the control of that power which, as before observed, when he quitted Paris to join the army, he dreaded more than the enemy he was going to confront—the power of public opinion legitimately expressed. If he had so keenly felt its force before his downfall on the battle-field, how great, nay, how hopeless, must have appeared to him the task of endeavouring to soothe its excitement, and to obtain its sanction to renewed sacrifices, when suddenly appearing in Paris on the afternoon of the 21st of June—but

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one short week from the time of his assuming the command of his army—himself to announce the disastrous result of his enterprise. The imperialists in the capital, who had indulged in the most extravagant hopes, engendered by the news of the victory at Ligny, had scarcely manifested their exultation, when sinister rumours began to spread of some sudden reverses which had befallen the cause of Napoleon; and presently all doubts and suspense were removed by the unexpected appearance of the Emperor himself, which gave rise to the most gloomy anticipations.

Napoleon immediately summoned a cabinet council. He frankly explained to his ministers the critical state of affairs; but, at the same time, with his usual confidence in his own resources, declared his conviction, that if the nation were called upon to rise *en masse*, the annihilation of the enemy would follow; but that if, instead of ordering new levies and adopting extraordinary measures, the chambers were to allow themselves to be drawn into debates, and to waste their time in disputation, all would be lost. "Now that the enemy is in France," he added, "it is necessary that I should be invested with extraordinary power, that of a temporary dictatorship. As a measure of safety for the country, I might assume this power, but it would be better and more national that it should be conferred upon me by the chambers." The ministers were too well ac-

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quainted with the general views and disposition of the chamber of representatives to pronounce a direct approval of this step; but Napoleon, perceiving their hesitation, called upon them to express their opinion upon the measures of public safety required by existing circumstances. Carnot, the minister of the interior, conceived it to be essential that the country should be declared in danger; that the *fédérés* and national guards should be called to arms; that Paris should be placed in a state of siege, and measures adopted for its defence; that at the last extremity the armed force should retire behind the Loire, and take up an intrenched position; that the army of La Vendée, where the civil war had nearly terminated, as also the corps of observation in the south, should be recalled, and the enemy checked until sufficient force could be united and organised for the assumption of a vigorous offensive, by which he should be driven out of France. Decrès, the minister of the marine, and Regnault de Saint-Jean-d'Angely, the secretary of state, supported this opinion; but Fouché, the minister of police, and the remaining ministers, remarked that the safety of the state did not depend upon any particular measure which might thus be proposed, but upon the chambers, and upon their uniting with the head of the government; and that by manifesting towards them confidence and good faith, they would be induced to declare it to be their

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duty to unite with Napoleon in the adoption of energetic measures for securing the honour and independence of the nation.

This advice on the part of Fouché was an artful piece of dissimulation. No man in France possessed so intimate a knowledge of the secret workings of the public mind; he knew precisely the dispositions and views of the different factions, as also the character and temperament of their leaders. He knew also that the great parties in the chambers, with the exception of the imperialists, who were in the minority, but whom he secretly flattered with the prospect of a Napoleon II., were fully prepared to depose the Emperor, in favour of full constitutional freedom, and liberal institutions. This knowledge, obtained with an adroitness and precision quite peculiar to this celebrated minister of police, he made completely subservient to his own personal views. These had been, from the commencement of Napoleon's second reign, to coquet with the factions in such a manner as to induce each to consider him an indispensable instrument in the realization of its hopes, and to exert this extraordinary influence either to support or to undermine the power of Napoleon, according as the fortunes of the latter might be in the ascendant or on the decline. The resolute attitude assumed by the Allies soon satisfied him that, although the Emperor might once more dazzle the world with some brilliant feat of

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arms, he must eventually succumb to the fixed determination of the sovereigns to crush his usurped authority, and to the overwhelming masses with which Europe was preparing to subjugate the country. He had been, and was still, in secret communication with the ministers and advisers of Louis XVIII. and was consequently in full possession of the general plans and intentions of the Allies. When, therefore, Napoleon's enterprise had so signally failed, and the re-occupation of Paris appeared to be its necessary consequence, Fouché foresaw clearly, that were the proposed dictatorship to be assumed by means of a sudden and forced dissolution of the chambers, implying that the recent reverses had been produced by treachery on the part of the representatives, and were new levies to be raised *en masse*, in support of the force that yet remained available, the result would inevitably be anarchy and confusion in the capital, disorder and excesses throughout the whole country, renewed disasters to the nation, together with an awful and useless sacrifice of life. To prevent such a catastrophe, it was necessary to lull Napoleon's suspicions of the intentions of the chambers, with which, at the same time, Fouché was fully acquainted. Hence it was, that to gain sufficient time for the development of these intentions, Fouché gave to the council the advice before mentioned. He strongly expressed his disapproval of the projected dissolution of the cham-

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bers, and assumption of the dictatorship, declaring that any measures of that kind would only tend to create distrust, and, not improbably, a general revolt. But, at the same time, his agents were making known throughout Paris the fullest extent of the disasters that had befallen Napoleon, and which had caused his sudden and unexpected return; and the deputies were assembling in all haste, and in great numbers, to take a bold and decided step in this great national crisis.

In thus dissembling from his master the real disposition of the great political parties, and the true state of the public mind, Fouché, no doubt, betrayed the trust reposed in him; but, setting aside the question whether he was really influenced by patriotic motives, or merely acting upon a system of deep duplicity and time-serving expediency, there can also be no doubt that, by pursuing the line of conduct which he did on this important occasion, he became the means of preserving his country from the infliction of a still further accumulation of evils.

The cabinet council continued in discussion; some supporting, and others disapproving, the propositions of Napoleon, who, at length, yielding to the arguments of Fouché and Carnot, declared he would submit himself to the loyalty of the chambers, and confer with them as to the measures which the critical position of the country might render necessary. In the mean time, the deputies

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had met, and commenced their deliberations on the existing state of affairs. M. de la Fayette, the acknowledged leader of the liberal party, having received intelligence of the subject of discussion in the council, and aware that not a moment was to be lost in averting the blow with which their liberties were menaced, ascended the tribune, and thus addressed the chamber, amidst the most profound silence, and breathless suspense :—

‘ Representatives ! For the first time during many years you hear a voice, which the old friends of liberty will yet recognize. I rise to address you concerning the dangers to which the country is exposed. The sinister reports which have been circulated during the last two days, are unhappily confirmed. This is the moment to rally round the national colours—the tri-coloured standard of 1789—the standard of liberty, equality, and public order. It is you alone who can now protect the country from foreign attacks and internal dissensions. It is you alone who can secure the independence and the honour of France. Permit a veteran in the sacred cause of liberty, in all times a stranger to the spirit of faction, to submit to you some resolutions which appear to him to be demanded by a sense of the public danger, and by the love of our country. They are such as, I feel persuaded, you will see the necessity of adopting :—

‘ I. The chamber of deputies declares that the independence of the nation is menaced.

‘ II. The chamber declares its sittings permanent. Any attempt to dissolve it, shall be considered high treason. Whosoever shall render himself culpable of such an attempt, shall be considered a traitor to his country, and immediately treated as such.

‘ III. The army of the line, and the national guards, who have fought, and still fight, for the liberty, the independence, and the territory of France, have merited well of the country.

‘ IV. The minister of the interior is invited to assemble the

principal officers of the Parisian national guard, in order to consult on the means of providing it with arms, and of completing this corps of citizens, whose tried patriotism and zeal offer a sure guarantee for the liberty, prosperity, and tranquillity of the capital, and for the inviolability of the national representatives.

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‘V. The ministers of war, of foreign affairs, of police, and of the interior, are invited to repair immediately to the sittings of the chamber.’

No one ventured to oppose these bold resolutions, and, after a brief discussion, in which their instant adoption was urged in the strongest manner, they were carried by acclamation, with the exception of the fourth, which was suspended on account of the invidious distinction which it appeared to convey between the troops of the line and the national guards. They were then transmitted to the chamber of peers, where, after a short discussion, they were adopted without amendment.

The message from the chambers, conveying these resolutions, reached the council in the midst of its deliberations. Napoleon was staggered by an act which he looked upon as an usurpation of the sovereign authority. To him, who had so long exercised an almost unlimited control in the state, who had led mighty armies to victory, and who had subjected powerful nations to his despotic sway, this sudden and energetic voice of the people, conveyed through the medium of their representatives, aroused him to a full sense of the wonderful change which had been effected in the public

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mind, and in his own individual position, through the intervention of a constitution. He was alike indignant at what he conceived to be a daring presumption, and mortified at his own miscalculation in having convoked the chambers. "J'avais bien pensé," he remarked, "que j'aurais dû congédier ces gens-là avant mon départ." After some reflection, he determined, if possible, to temporize with the chambers. He sent Regnault de Saint-Jean-d'Angely to the chamber of deputies, in his capacity of member, to soothe the irritation that prevailed, to relate that the army had been upon the point of gaining a great victory, when disaffected individuals created a panic; that the troops had since rallied, and that the Emperor had hastened to Paris to concert, with the ministers and the chambers, such measures for the public safety as circumstances seemed to require. Carnot was directed to make a similar communication to the chamber of peers. Regnault vainly endeavoured to fulfil his mission: the deputies had lost all patience, and insisted upon the ministers presenting themselves at the bar of the house. The latter at length obeyed the summons, Napoleon having consented, though with great reluctance, to their compliance with the mandate. He required them, however, to be accompanied by his brother Lucien, as an extraordinary commissioner, appointed to reply to the interrogatories of the chamber.

At six o'clock in the evening, Lucien Buonaparte

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and the ministers made their appearance in the chamber of deputies. Lucien announced that he had been sent there by Napoleon as a commissioner extraordinary, to concert with the assembly measures of safety. He then placed in the hands of the president the message of which he was the bearer from his brother. It contained a succinct recital of the disasters experienced at Mont St. Jean; and recommended the representatives to unite with the head of the state in preserving the country from the fate of Poland, and from the reimposition of the yoke which it had thrown off. It stated, also, that it was desirable that the two chambers should appoint a commission of five members, to concert with the ministers the measures to be adopted for the public safety, and the means of treating for peace with the Allied powers.

This message was far from being favourably received. A stormy discussion ensued, in the course of which it was soon made manifest that the deputies required a more explicit declaration of Napoleon's opinions and designs; one, in fact, more in accordance with the views which the majority of them evidently entertained, and was apparently determined to enforce. One of their number significantly remarked, as he addressed himself to the ministers, "You know as well as we do, that it is against Napoleon alone that Europe has declared war. From this moment, separate the cause of

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Napoleon from that of the nation. In my opinion, there exists but one individual who stands in the way between us and peace. Let him pronounce the word and the country will be saved!" Several of the members spoke in a similar strain, and the debate was kept up with great animation, until at length it was agreed, that in conformity with the terms of the imperial message, a commission of five members should be appointed, consisting of the president and vice-presidents of the chamber, to collect, in concert with the cabinet and with a committee from the house of peers, the fullest information upon the state of France, and to propose suitable measures of safety. The committee consisted of Messrs. Lanjuinais, La Fayette, Dupont de l'Eure, Flangergues, and Grenier.

Lucien now presented himself in the same capacity of commissioner extraordinary, to the chamber of peers. After hearing the message, the latter also appointed a committee, which consisted of Generals Drouot, Dejean, Andreossy, and Messrs. Boissy d'Anglas and Thibaudeau.

Napoleon, being fully informed of the proceedings of the chamber of deputies, and of the general tenor of the debates, hesitated a long time whether to dissolve the assembly, or to abdicate the imperial crown. Some of his ministers, on perceiving the direction of his views, assured him that the chamber had acquired too firm a hold of

the public opinion to submit to any violent *coup d'état*, and expressed their opinion, that by withholding the act of abdication, he might eventually deprive himself of the power of vacating the throne in favour of his son. Nevertheless he appeared determined to defer this step to the very last moment, trusting in the mean time some favourable event might occur, tending to modify the present disposition of the chamber.

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The deputies again met, at an early hour on the following morning. The utmost impatience was manifested for the report of the committee. Two hours having elapsed, the members became greatly excited. Some of them proposed that the exigencies of the state were such, that it was their duty to adopt immediate and decisive measures, without waiting for the report. At length, in the midst of the agitation and tumult which prevailed, General Grenier, the reporter of the committee, suddenly made his appearance. He stated that, after a deliberation of five hours, the committee had resolved :—

‘ That the safety of the country required that the Emperor should consent to the nomination, by the two chambers, of a commission, charged to negotiate directly with the coalesced powers ; stipulating only that they should respect the national independence, the territorial integrity, and the right which belongs to every people, of adopting such constitutions as it may think proper ; and that these negotiations should be supported by the prompt development of the national force.’

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This statement excited general murmurs of disapprobation. But the reporter, aware of the expectations of the chamber, proceeded :—

‘ This article, gentlemen, appears to me insufficient. It does not fulfil the object which the chamber proposes to itself, because it is possible that your deputation may not be admitted. I would not, therefore, urge the adoption of this measure, had I not reason to believe that you will soon receive a message, in which the Emperor will declare his wish, that the effect of this should first be tried, and that, should he then prove an insuperable obstacle to the nation being permitted to treat for its independence, he will be ready to make whatever sacrifice may be demanded of him.’

This produced an extraordinary sensation in the assembly. It was looked upon as an artful design upon the part of Napoleon to create delay by proposing to the chambers a proceeding which he was well aware would prove unsuccessful, and to seize the first favourable opportunity of destroying their independence, and re-establishing his despotism—to re-enact, in short, the eighteenth of Brumaire. The tumult had reached a fearful height. Many members exclaimed vehemently against the report. At length, one of them, M. Duchesne, ascended the tribune, and spoke in the following energetic and decided manner :—

‘ I do not believe that the project proposed by the committee is capable of attaining the desired end. The greatness of our disasters cannot be denied : they are sufficiently proved by the presence of the chief of our armies in the capital. If there are no bounds to the energies of the nation, there are limits to its

means. The chambers cannot offer negotiations to the Allied powers. The documents which have been communicated to us demonstrate that they have uniformly refused all the overtures which have been made to them; and they have declared that they will not treat with the French as long as they shall have the Emperor at their head.'

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The speaker was here interrupted by the president, who announced that the message to which the reporter had referred would speedily be received. The interruption, however, at this most important point of the debate, renewed the tumult in the chamber. Some exclaimed, "It is a concerted plan to make us lose time." Others cried out, "Some plot is concerting;" and the majority vociferated, "Proceed, proceed; there is no middle course."

Duchesne continued :—

'It is necessary that we should be certain of finding in the development of the national force, a defence sufficient to support our negotiations, and to enable us to treat with success, concerning our honour and independence. Can that force be developed with sufficient rapidity? May not circumstances again lead victorious armies to the capital? Then, and under their auspices, will re-appear the ancient family.' ("Never! never!" exclaimed several voices.) 'I freely express my opinion. What may be the consequences of these events? We have only *one* certain means left, which is, to engage the Emperor, in the name of the safety of the state, in the sacred name of a suffering country, to declare his *abdication*.'

No sooner was this word pronounced than the entire assembly rose; and amidst the clamour that

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ensued were heard a hundred voices exclaiming, "Seconded ! seconded !" When, at length, the president succeeded in restoring some degree of order, he said—

‘ I cannot hope to arrive at any result, unless the agitation of the assembly be repressed. The safety of the country depends on the decision of this day. I entreat the chamber to wait for the Emperor’s message.’

The proposition of Duchesne was instantly supported by General Solignac, an officer who, during the last five years, had been made to suffer the severest mortifications, arising from the hatred entertained towards him by Napoleon, in consequence of his refusal to be the servile instrument of his ambition ; and, therefore, the curiosity of the chamber was naturally excited to hear what course he was about to adopt.

‘ And I also,’ said the general ; ‘ I share in the uneasiness of him who has preceded me at this tribune. Yes ! we ought to consider the safety of the empire, and the maintenance of our liberal institutions ; and, while the government is inclined to present to you such measures as tend to this end, it appears important to preserve to the chamber the honour of not having proposed an object which ought to be the free concession of the monarch. I move that a deputation of five members shall be appointed to proceed to the Emperor, which deputation shall express to His Majesty the urgency of his decision. Their report will, I trust, satisfy at once the wish of the assembly, and that of the nation.’

This proposition was most favourably received, and the president was on the point of putting it to

the vote, when Solignac again appeared in the tribune.

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‘I wish,’ said he, ‘to propose an amendment to my motion. Several persons have intimated to me that we shall soon be informed of His Majesty’s determination. I consequently think it necessary that we should wait for *one hour*, to receive the message, which it seems is to be addressed to the chambers. I therefore move that we adjourn for that time.’ (This part of his speech was met with great disapprobation on the part of the chamber.) ‘Gentlemen!’ continued the general, ‘we all wish to save the country; but can we not reconcile this unanimous sentiment with the laudable desire that the chamber should preserve the honour of the chief of the state?’ (Cries of “Yes! yes!”) ‘If I requested that we should wait until this evening or to-morrow, some considerations might be opposed—but, one hour’—(“Yes! yes! To the vote!” was the general exclamation; and the chamber adjourned.)

In the mean time, Napoleon had been made acquainted with the disposition of the chamber of representatives, by Regnault de Saint-Jean-d’Angely, who hastened to warn him that if he did not immediately abdicate, his deposition would, in all probability, be declared. He was enraged at the idea of this contemplated violence. “Since that is the case,” he said, “I will not abdicate at all. The chamber is composed of a set of jacobins, impracticables, and intriguers, who are seeking for disorder, or for place. I ought to have denounced them to the nation, and given them their dismissal. The time that has been lost may yet be recovered.” Regnault, however, urged him in the strongest

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manner to yield to imperious circumstances, and to renew the noble and generous sacrifice he made in 1814. He assured him that if he did not take this step, he would be accused by the chamber, and even by the whole nation, of having, out of personal considerations alone, prevented the possibility of obtaining peace. Solignac and other deputies were then announced. They boldly declared to him that he had no other course open to him but that of submission to the desire entertained by the representatives of the nation. Solignac described to him the scene in the chamber of deputies, and the difficulty he had experienced in inducing the latter to suspend, even for one hour, their decision, which, if not anticipated by a voluntary abdication, would entail upon him the disgrace of forfeiture. Even his brothers, Lucien and Joseph, now gave their opinion that the moment for resistance had passed. When the paroxysm of rage, to which these representations gave rise, had subsided, Napoleon announced his determination to abdicate in favour of his son ; and, desiring his brother Lucien to take a pen, he dictated to him the following declaration :—

‘ Frenchmen! In commencing the war for maintaining the national independence, I relied on the union of all efforts, of all desires, and the concurrence of all the national authorities. I had reason to hope for success, and I braved all the declarations of the powers allied against me.

‘Circumstances appear to be changed. I offer myself a sacrifice to the hatred of the enemies of France. May they prove sincere in their declarations, and have really directed them solely against my power. My political life is terminated; and I proclaim my son, under the title of NAPOLEON II., Emperor of the French.

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‘The present ministers will form provisionally the council of the government. The interest which I take in my son induces me to invite the chamber to form the regency by a law without delay.

‘Unite all for the public safety, in order to remain an independent nation.

‘NAPOLEON.’

This was the last great act of his political life. Defeated and humbled by foreign enemies, subdued and controlled by the representatives of the nation, he was forced to descend from a throne whence he had at one time swayed the destinies of sovereigns rendered dependent on his mighty will. Almost all the previous changes and gradations in his extraordinary career had been preluded or accompanied by some magnificent scene of dramatic effect, or a violent *coup d'état*; but, in this instance, the transition was attended by no circumstance more remarkable than the quietude with which it was effected. The cessation of the political existence of such a man would have been most naturally looked for as an event coincident only with the termination of a life which, if not closed upon the pinnacle of glory, would be sought for amidst the shock of battle, or in the vortex of a state-convul-

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sion. That he meditated a second 18th of Brumaire, there can be no doubt; but the decided tone of the debates in the national assembly, the solicitations of his friends, and the hope of securing the throne to his family, induced him to abandon all idea of such a project. It is, besides, more than probable that, aware as he was of the bad feeling that existed, to a great extent, both in the chambers and in the country, towards the Bourbons, as also of the conflicting principles of the different factions, he calculated upon the chances of a revolution, productive of anarchy and confusion, which he might yet be called upon to reduce to order and submission.

When it is considered that the great mass of the army of the line was devoted to Napoleon, that the rallied army of the North was falling back upon Paris, where it would concentrate its strength and be reinforced from the regimental depôts, and, further, that the armies on the Eastern frontier were still holding their respective positions, and that even in La Vendée the imperial troops had succeeded in quelling the insurrection,—when, in addition to all this, it is considered how great, how extraordinary, was the influence induced by the *prestige* of Napoleon with the majority of the nation, dazzled as the latter had been by countless victories, that outweighed, in its estimation, those fatal disasters which it ascribed solely to the united power of the great European league established

against France,—it is impossible not to be struck by the firm, bold, and determined attitude assumed by the French parliament. France, on this critical occasion, displayed one of the brightest examples the world has yet beheld of the force of constitutional legislation. Under all the attendant circumstances, it was a remarkable triumph of free institutions over monarchical despotism.

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It is now necessary to revert to the operations of the Allied armies.

On the 23rd of June, Wellington and Blücher gave to the great mass of their troops a halt, not merely for the sake of affording them rest, but also for the purpose of collecting the stragglers, and bringing up the ammunition and the baggage.

The only movement made on the part of the Anglo-allied army, on this day, was that by Major General Lyon's 6th Hanoverian brigade, which, together with Grant's hussar-brigade, Lieut. Colonel Webber Smith's horse-battery, Major Unett's and Major Brome's foot-batteries, marched, under the personal command of Sir Charles Colville, to attack Cambray, the garrison of which, the Duke had been led to believe, had abandoned the place, leaving in it at most 300 or 400 men. Colville was furnished with a letter from the Duke to the governor, summoning him to surrender, as also with some copies of his Grace's Proclamation of the 22nd to the French. The 1st Brunswick light battalion was sent forward from the reserve at

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Bavay, to watch Le Quesnoy, which fortress was still occupied by the enemy.

The 3rd Prussian corps d'armée was pushed forward to Avesnes, by which means the three corps destined to advance upon Paris were so placed that they could form a junction, with only half an ordinary march, and this relative position was maintained throughout the remainder of the line of advance.

The Allied Commanders had an interview on this day at Catillon, for the purpose of arranging their plan of combined operations. The intelligence they had procured having satisfied them that the enemy was collecting his forces at Laon and Soissons, they decided upon not pursuing him along that line, since their progress towards the capital might, in that case, be impeded by affairs of advanced and rear-guards, but upon moving by the right bank of the Oise, and crossing this river at either Compiègne or Pont St. Maxence. By thus turning the French left, they hoped to intercept the enemy's retreat, or at all events to reach Paris before him; and in order to deceive him as to these intentions, he was to be followed by Prussian cavalry, assuming to be the advanced guard of the Allied armies. It was also settled, that as they might find it necessary to throw bridges across the Oise, the British General should bring forward his pontoon-train, that possessed by the Prussians being inadequate for the purpose. In

order to secure a good base whence to conduct these operations, it was further arranged that the corps under Prince Frederick of the Netherlands should remain, for the purpose of besieging the fortresses situated on the Scheldt, and between that river and the Sambre; and that the following corps should undertake the besieging of the fortresses on the Sambre, and between this last river and the Moselle, namely, the 2nd Prussian corps d'armée, commanded by General von Pirch, the corps d'armée of North Germany,* commanded at first by General Count Kleist von Nollendorf, and subsequently by Lieut. General von Hacke, as also a portion of the garrison-troops of Luxemburg, commanded by Lieut. General Prince Louis of Hesse Homburg,—the whole of these German forces being placed under the chief command of Prince Augustus of Prussia.

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This plan of operations was such as might have been expected from the combined councils of such leaders as Wellington and Blücher, and was undoubtedly the one best calculated to attain the object they had in view; and it was carried into effect with all that mutual cordiality and good

* This corps had crossed the Rhine at Coblenz and Neuwied on the 12th of March, and taken up a position on the Moselle and the Sarre; in which it remained until the 16th of June, when; in consequence of the repulse of the army under Blücher, it received orders to fall back upon St. Vith. From this point it was now pushed forward across the French frontier by Bastogne and Neufchâteau, to attack Bouillon and Sedan.

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June. fellowship which had invariably characterized their
proceedings.

On the morning of the 24th, the Duke of Wellington, in consequence of a report which he had received from Sir Charles Colville, directed Lord Hill to march the two brigades of the 4th division then at Le Cateau, towards Cambray, where they would join the other brigade of the division, and also to send with them a 9-pounder battery.

On the arrival of these troops, Colville made his preparatious for the attack, which took place in the evening, in the following manner. Three columns of attack were formed. One commanded by Lieut. Colonel Sir Neil Campbell, (Major in the 54th regiment,) escalated at the angle formed by the Valenciennes gateway and the curtain of the body of the place. A second, commanded by Colonel Sir William Douglas, of the 91st regiment, and directed by Lieutenant Gilbert of the royal engineers, escalated at a large ravelin near the Amiens road. A third, consisting of Colonel Mitchell's brigade, and directed by Captain Thompson of the royal engineers, after having forced the outer gate of the Couvre Port, in the hornwork, and passed both ditches, by means of the rails of the drawbridges, attempted to force the main Paris gate, but not succeeding in this, it escalated by a breach on that side, which was in a state of reparation. The three batteries of Lieut. Colonel Webber Smith, and Majors Unett and

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Brome, under the direction of Lieut. Colonel Hawker, rendered the most essential service in covering these attacks, which having succeeded, the town speedily fell into the hands of the assailants. The citadel continued to hold out, but the governor solicited a suspension of hostilities which, however, could not be granted.*

Of the Anglo-allied army, the 1st and 3rd British divisions, the Dutch-Belgian infantry attached to the 1st corps, and the Dutch-Belgian cavalry, were moved this day from Gommignies to Forest, upon the road to Le Cateau, and then encamped between the villages of Croix and Bousies.

The 2nd British division continued at Le Cateau.

The Duke made no movement in advance, having found it necessary to afford additional time for the coming up of the pontoons and supplies. The reserve, consisting of the 5th and 6th divisions, of

* The facility with which the noted fortress of Cambray was captured, is thus commented upon by the late Major General Sir James Carmichael Smyth, Bart., (then Commanding Officer of Engineers in the Duke of Wellington's Army,) in his instructive account (published in 1817) of the Attacks upon the Fortresses by the British and Prussian Armies in the Campaigns of 1814 and 1815:—'The easy capture of Cambray affords another lesson to statesmen and military men, (in addition to the many with which both ancient and modern history abounds,) not to suffer the fortresses of a state to be neglected or to fall into disrepair. The boar in the fable is represented as whetting his tusks, although no enemy was in sight; well knowing that he would have no time to spare, when he might require them. Had the escarp of Cambray been in order, or the ditch near the Paris gate been kept clear of mud and reeds, the place could not have been carried by assault in the easy manner it was. The escarp of Cambray is from 40 to 70 feet high, where the ditch is dry; and from 30 to 40 where the ditch is wet. Such an escarp, if in order, it is evident is not to be despised.'

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the Brunswick corps, and the reserve-artillery, was moved nearer to the main body, and cantoned and encamped in and about the villages of Engle-Fontaine, Rancour, and Préau au Bois.

On this day proposals were made to the advanced posts of this corps under Prince Frederick of the Netherlands, near Valenciennes, as also to those of the 1st Prussian corps d'armée, for a suspension of hostilities, upon the grounds that Napoleon had abdicated in favour of his son, that a provisional government had been appointed, consisting of Fouché, Caulincourt, Grenier, and Quinette, and that these persons had sent ministers to the Allied powers to treat for peace. Both Wellington and Blücher considered that they would not be acting in accordance with the spirit and intentions of the alliance of the powers of Europe were they to listen to such proposals, and therefore peremptorily refused to discontinue their operations. Those which were addressed to the Prussian commander emanated from General Count Morand, who commanded the rear-guard of the French army at Laon, and to whom Blücher replied, that no armistice could be entered into, except in the case of Napoleon being delivered up, and the fortresses in rear of the armies being abandoned, and conceded as guarantees for its fulfilment.

Louis XVIII., acting on the advice so urgently tendered to him by the Duke of Wellington, ar-

rived at Le Cateau late in the evening, followed by a numerous train; and only awaited the surrender of the citadel of Cambray to fix his temporary residence in the latter town. 24th of
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The Prussian army renewed its operations on the 24th, according to the plan agreed upon the day before by the Allied commanders. At break of day, Lieut. Colonel von Schmiedeberg was despatched with the Silesian regiment of uhlans, and some horse-artillery, towards Laon, for the purpose, in conjunction with the detachments already sent from the 1st corps d'armée, of watching and deceiving the enemy. Blücher disposed his three corps d'armée in two columns. The left column, which was the one nearest to the enemy, consisted of the 1st and 3rd corps, and was to move close along the Oise—the 3rd corps remaining half a march in rear of the 1st. The right column, formed by the 4th corps d'armée, was to advance along a parallel road, keeping on a line with the former, and at the distance of about half a march. The left column moved upon Compiègne, the right upon Pont St. Maxence.

At nine o'clock, the 1st corps d'armée (Zieten's) commenced its march from Etroeung towards Guise. The advanced guard, under Major General von Jagow, to which were attached the 8th foot-battery, and two 10-pounder howitzers, halted when opposite to St. Laurent, a suburb of Guise, in order to observe the fortress on this side; whilst

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Zieten sent an infantry-brigade, a regiment of cavalry, together with a horse, and a foot, battery, by St. Germain and La Bussière, across the Oise, to menace the place from the other side.

The enemy, on finding himself completely invested, withdrew his troops into the citadel, whereupon preparations were immediately made by the Prussians to open their batteries against that part, but previously to giving the order to commence the cannonade, Zieten sent a summons to the commandant to surrender; with which the latter did not hesitate to comply. The garrison, consisting of 18 officers and 350 men, laid down their arms on the glacis, and were made prisoners of war. The Prussians found in the place, 14 pieces of cannon, 3,000 muskets, 2,000,000 musket-ball cartridges, a quantity of ammunition, and considerable magazines; and gained, what was of more importance, another strong point in their new base of operations, without having fired a single cannon-shot. Major Müller, with the two weak fusilier-battalions of the 28th regiment, and of the 2nd Westphalian landwehr, remained to garrison the place.

As soon as the remainder of Zieten's corps arrived near Guise, which was before the place surrendered, the advanced guard, consisting of the 3rd brigade, moved on, but did not reach Origny before nine o'clock in the evening. The 1st regiment of Silesian hussars pushed on as far as Ribe-

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mont. Parties were also detached from the reserve-cavalry towards Crecy, Pont à Bussy, and La Fère, to observe the Serre.

Thielemann, with the 3rd corps d'armée, moved from Avesnes upon Nouvion, which he reached about four o'clock in the afternoon. The detachments of observation which had been previously sent out to the left from this corps, to endeavour to gain intelligence concerning Grouchy's army, reached Hirson and Vervin in the evening. Scouring parties were also sent towards the road leading from Mezières by Montcornet towards Laon.

Bülow, with the 4th corps d'armée, which formed the right Prussian column, marched from Femy to Aisonville and Bernonville. Parties of cavalry, detached from the corps, reached Chatillon sur Oise, and found St. Quentin unoccupied. This circumstance having been made known to General von Sydow, upon his arrival at Fontaine notre Dame, with the advanced guard, he pushed on, and took possession of that important town. A detachment of from 500 to 600 French cavalry had marched from this place on the previous day towards Laon. The troops which had been employed in the investment of Landrecies rejoined the 4th corps on this day.

By means of these movements, and of the halt of the Duke of Wellington at Le Cateau, the Prussians were a day's march in advance of the Anglo-allied army.

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Grouchy's troops this day reached Réthel.

The positions of the respective armies on the evening of the 24th were as follows :—

The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd divisions of the Anglo-allied army were in and around Le Cateau Cambresis : the 4th division at Cambray ; the 5th and 6th divisions, the Brunswick corps, and reserve-artillery, at, and in the vicinity of, Engle-Fontaine.

The Duke of Wellington's head-quarters were at Le Cateau Cambresis.

The 1st Prussian corps d'armée was at Guise, the 3rd at Muvion, and the 4th at Aisonville and Bernonville.

Prince Blücher's head-quarters were at Henappe.

The French troops under Soult were at Laon ; those under Grouchy at Réthel.

On the 24th, the Provisional Government in Paris, which had been appointed on the previous day, after a stormy discussion in both chambers on the subject of the recognition of Napoleon II., and which consisted of the Duke of Otranto (Fouché), minister of the police ; the Duke of Vicenza (Caulincourt), minister for foreign affairs ; Carnot, minister of the interior ; General Grenier ; and M. Quinette ; issued the following proclamation :—

‘ Frenchmen !

‘ Within the period of a few days, brilliant successes and dreadful reverses have marked your destinies.

‘ A great sacrifice appeared necessary to your peace and that of the world ; and Napoleon abdicated the imperial throne. His abdication forms the termination of his political life. His son is proclaimed.

‘ Your new constitution, which possesses as yet only good

principles, is about to undergo its application, and even those principles are to be purified and extended.

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‘ There no longer exist powers jealous of one another. The space is free to the enlightened patriotism of your representatives; and the peers feel, think, and vote, as they are directed by the public opinion.

‘ After twenty-five years of political tempests, the moment has arrived when every thing wise and sublime that has been conceived respecting social institutions may be perfected in yours. Let reason and genius speak, and from whatever side their voices may proceed, they shall be heard.

‘ Plenipotentiaries have been despatched, in order to treat in the name of the nation, and to negotiate with the powers of Europe that peace which they have promised on one condition, which is now fulfilled.

‘ The whole world will, like you, be attentive to their reply. Their answer will make known whether justice and promises are accounted any thing on earth.

‘ Frenchmen ! be united ! Let all rally under circumstances of such vast importance. Let civil discords be appeased. Let dissensions be silent at this period, in which the great interests of nations are to be discussed. From the northern frontier to the Pyrenees, and from La Vendée to Marseilles, let all France be united.

‘ Who is the man, that, born on the soil of France, whatever may be his party or political opinions, will not range himself under the national standard, to defend the independence of the country ?

‘ Armies may in part be destroyed, but the experience of all ages, and of all nations, proves that a brave people, combating for justice and liberty, cannot be vanquished.

‘ The Emperor, in abdicating, has offered himself a sacrifice. The members of the government devote themselves to the due execution of the authority with which they have been invested by your representatives.

‘ THE DUKE OF OTRANTO,

‘ T. BERLIER, Secretary.

‘ June 24, 1815.’

25th of
June.

On the 25th, Louis XVIII., at the suggestion of the Duke of Wellington, despatched an officer, Le Comte d'Audenarde, with a summons, in His Majesty's name, for the governor, Baron Roos, to surrender the citadel of Cambray. The summons was obeyed, and the garrison capitulated; when the Duke immediately gave over the fortress entirely to His Majesty.

The main body of the Anglo-allied army advanced this day to Joncour. The 4th division continued at Cambray. The reserve moved on to Marets.

The 1st Prussian corps d'armée marched this day from Guise to Cérisy, on the road from St. Quentin to La Fère: its advanced guard pushed on to Fargnières, near the latter place. An officer and thirty dragoons were detached across the Oise, to cut off the communication between this fortress and Laon, by which means the investment of the place was effected. Along the right bank of the Oise, La Fère was protected by inundations, and no favourable points presented themselves for the establishment of batteries. On this account, preparations were made in the night to cross the river below the place, and gain the heights which command the fortress on the Laon side.

During the march of the advanced guard, Major General von Jagow, who commanded it, sent a detachment of the 1st Silesian hussars to Chauny, which communicated by its left, through St. Gobain,

with Captain von Goschitzky in Crespy, and by its left, with the outpost at Jussy, of the advanced guard of the 4th corps. The parties detached on the previous day to Crecy, Pont à Bussy, and along the Serre, were now called in.

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The 3rd Prussian corps d'armée marched from Novion to Homblières and its vicinity. Two of its brigades occupied passages across the Oise, namely, the 9th at Origny, and the 12th at Neuville. The 11th brigade bivouacked at Marey, and the 10th at Homblières and Menil St. Laurent. The detachments sent out from this corps on the previous day towards the road leading from Mezières to Laon, brought in word that at eleven o'clock on the forenoon of the 24th, the French troops had abandoned Aubenton, and marched off to Monternet; also that Grouchy's army had reached Rocroi on the 23rd, and Réthel on the 24th; and it was presumed that his next march was to be on Soissons. On the receipt of this intelligence, these detachments were drawn back, and their observation limited to the ground nearest to the left bank of the Oise.

The advanced guard of the 4th Prussian corps d'armée was closely followed by the reserve-cavalry, and all these troops were placed under the command of Prince William of Prussia. The cavalry marched along the road leading to Chauny, as far as Montescourt, where it bivouacked. The main body of the corps reached Essigny le grand.

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June.

At St. Quentin, Prince Blücher received a letter from Laon, addressed to the Allied commanders by the commissioners sent from the two chambers of the French parliament; in which they communicated the fact of Napoleon's abdication, and of the elevation of his son to the throne, and stated that they had been deputed by the provisional government to negotiate an armistice. To this the Prince replied verbally, by an aide-de-camp, that he would suspend hostilities on arriving at Paris, provided Buonaparte was given up to him, and several fortresses on the frontiers delivered up as sureties; and provided, also, that the Duke of Wellington should agree to what might be proposed.

According to the accounts which were this day received from Lieut. Colonel von Schmiedeberg, it was presumed that the enemy was still at Laon. The reports from the detachments of the 3rd corps d'armée also confirmed this view, and intimated that Grouchy's troops were yet two marches distant from Laon. This intelligence, combined with the attempts made by the French to induce the Allies to enter into negotiations, clearly showed the importance of endeavouring, by means of a forced march, to gain the passages of the Oise, and then to intercept the enemy's line of retreat by Soissons upon Paris. In the night of the 25th, however, decided information was received that the French army had marched from Laon to Soissons, a fact from which it was naturally concluded that the

enemy was no longer deceived as to the advance of the Prussians towards Laon, and that he was therefore bent upon effecting his further retreat, or, perhaps, even of anticipating their movements towards the Oise, and detaching towards Compiègne. Hence, not a moment was now to be lost in securing the points of passage, particularly that at Compiègne, to which Prince Blücher attached so much more importance from the circumstance that his army had no pontoons; and that the British pontoon-train was still far behind, and not to be calculated upon. The Prince decided upon moving his left column (the 1st and 3rd corps) on Compiègne, and his right column (the 4th corps) upon Pont St. Maxence; the latter to secure the passage both at this place and at Creil, lower down the Oise.

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June.

Soult, who had been indefatigable in collecting at Laon the remains of the defeated portion of the French army, marched the latter, on the 25th, to Soissons, where it was to be joined by the force under Grouchy, who, having preceded his troops which were yet a march and a half distant, had arrived in that town, to take the command of the whole army, according to instructions conveyed to him from the Provisional Government. Soult, as soon as he found himself thus superseded in the command, quitted the army, and repaired to Paris, disgusted with the abrupt and uncourteous manner in which he had been treated.

25th of
June.

The positions of the respective armies, on the evening of the 25th, were as follows :—

Of the Anglo-allied army, the advanced guard (Vivian's brigade) was at Crisour, near St. Quentin.

The 2nd division, the Nassau troops, and the British cavalry, were encamped in the vicinity of Joncour.

The 1st and 3rd divisions, the Dutch-Belgian infantry attached to the 1st corps, and the Dutch-Belgian cavalry, were encamped near Serain and Premont.

The 4th division, with Grant's light-cavalry brigade, was at Cambrai.

The 5th and 6th divisions, the Brunswick infantry and cavalry, and the reserve-artillery, were encamped at, and in the vicinity of, Marets.

The Duke of Wellington's head-quarters were at Joncour.

The 1st Prussian corps d'armée was at Cérisy ; the 3rd at Homblières ; and the 4th at Essigny le grand.

Prince Blücher's head-quarters were at St. Quentin.

The right wing of the French army, led by Vandamme, was at Rheims ; the left, with Grouchy, at Soissons.

On the 25th, Napoleon withdrew from the capital to the country palace of Malmaison, whence he issued the following address to the army :—.

‘ SOLDIERS !

‘ While obeying the necessity which removes me from the French army, I carry with me the happy assurance that it will justify, by the eminent services which the country expects from it, the praises which our enemies themselves have not been able to refuse it.

‘ Soldiers ! I shall follow your steps, though absent. I know all the corps ; and not one of them will obtain a single advantage over the enemy, but I shall give it credit for the courage it may have displayed. Both you and I have been caluminated. Men,

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June.

very unfit to appreciate your labours, have seen in the marks of attachment which you have given me, a zeal of which I was the sole object. Let your future successes convince them that it was the country, above all things, which you served in obeying me ; and that if I had any share in your affection, I owe it to my ardent love for France—our common mother.

‘ Soldiers ! Some efforts more, and the coalition will be dissolved. Napoleon will recognise you by the blows which you are about to strike. Save the honour, the independence, of France ! Be, unto the last, the same men which I have known you for these twenty years, and you will be invincible.

‘ NAPOLEON.’

‘ De la Malmaison, le 25 juin, 1815.’

CHAPTER XIX.

On the 26th, the main body of the Anglo-allied army moves to Vermand—Capture of Peronne—Colville's division rejoins the main army—Wellington's reply to the French commissioners—La Fère holds out against the Prussians—The 1st and 4th Prussian corps advance by forced marches towards Compiègne and Pont St. Maxence—Disposition of the respective armies on the evening of the 26th—Early on the morning of the 27th the advanced guard of Zieten's corps secures the bridge and town of Compiègne, when the French, under d'Erlon, are within half an hour's march of that point—The latter, after an unsuccessful attempt to take the place, retire upon Soissons—Movements of Zieten's and Thielemann's corps upon Soissons, Villers-Cotterets, and Crespy—Bülow secures the bridge over the Oise at Creil—Affair at Senlis—Blücher succeeds in securing the line of the Oise—Grouchy endeavours to effect his retreat to Paris by forced marches—The main body of Wellington's army crosses the Somme and marches to Roye—The Duke's anger and indignation excited by the conduct of the Dutch-Belgian troops on the march—Disposition of the respective armies on the evening of the 27th—Affair at Villers-Cotterets between the advanced guard of Zieten's corps and the French troops under Grouchy and Vandamme—Affair at Nanteuil between part of Zieten's corps and Reille's corps—Reille succeeds in effecting a junction with d'Erlon—Direction of the retreat of the imperial guard and 6th corps; also of the 3rd and 4th French corps—The advanced guard and the reserve-cavalry of Zieten's corps, under Prince William of Prussia, fall upon Reille's troops in full retreat, attack them, and make 2,000 prisoners—The main body of Thielemann's corps moves on to Crespy in support of Zieten—The Prussian operations have the effect of cutting off the retreat of the French troops to Paris by the great Soissons and Senlis roads—The French Provisional Government sends another deputation to request the Allied commanders to agree to a suspension of hostilities—Disposition of the respective armies on the evening of the 28th—On the 29th, Bülow's and Zieten's corps take up a position in front of Paris—The remains of the French grand army of the north retire within the lines of the capital—The Anglo-allied army reaches different points between Gournay and Pont St. Maxence—Positions of the respective armies on the evening of the 29th—Composition of the garrison of Paris—Its means of defence—Policy of the Provisional Govern-

ment—Napoleon quits Paris for Rochefort—His narrow escape from falling into the hands of the Prussians—New commissioners appointed by the government to wait upon the Duke of Wellington for the purpose of negotiating a suspension of hostilities—Sound judgment and extraordinary foresight evinced in his Grace's reply to their proposals.

ON the 26th, the Duke of Wellington marched the main body of his army to Vermand, and its vicinity.

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Major General Sir John Byng, who was now in command of the 1st corps, having heard, on passing that village, that the Duke himself was there, immediately waited upon His Grace for any orders he might wish to give him. The Duke, on seeing him, said, "You are the very person I wish to see—I want you to take Peronne. You may as well take with you a brigade of guards, and a Dutch-Belgian brigade. I shall be there almost as soon as yourself." Byng having given the necessary orders for Maitland's brigade, and a Dutch-Belgian brigade of Chassé's division attached to his corps, to proceed on this duty, the former was immediately put in motion. The Duke, on reaching Peronne just as these troops arrived there, summoned the garrison, and then proceeded, in person, to reconnoitre that fortress; and perceiving the possibility of taking it by storm, gave orders to prepare for an assault. His Grace then directed the attack to be made upon the horn-work which covers the suburb on the left of the Somme. Lieut. Colonel Lord Saltoun immediately led on the light troops of Maitland's brigade, stormed, and carried the out-

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work, with but little loss; on observing which, the Duke, being satisfied the place would prove an easy capture, returned to Vermand. Some pieces of Dutch artillery were now brought into the horn-work, and a cannonade was opened upon the town, but the fire kept up on both sides was trifling, and of short duration, for Byng having sent forward his acting Assistant Quarter Master General, Lieut. Colonel the Hon. J. Stanhope,* with a white flag, the civil authorities interfered, and urged the garrison to capitulate; whereupon the maiden fortress of Peronne surrendered, on condition that its defenders should lay down their arms, and be allowed to repair to their homes. Byng,† on returning to Vermand, to report the capture of the fortress to the Duke, met the Dutch-Belgian brigade, which had been ordered to move to Peronne at the same time as the guards, about half way towards that place!

Colville's division rejoined the main body of the army from Cambray, which place was handed over

* Lieut. Colonel the Hon. J. Stanhope, h.p., Portuguese service, died in March, 1825.

† In the course of the battle on the 18th, this officer, (the present Lord Strafford,) experienced a hair-breadth escape, of a very singular nature. It was with him a habit, when tired with long sitting on horseback, to raise and extend an arm by way of temporary relief. He had just raised his right arm in this manner, when a round shot, grazing his right breast, entered the folds of his cloak, immediately under the shoulder of that arm, and tore its way through the cloak, behind his back, towards his left. The gallant general was thrown from his horse by the concussion, and remained insensible for a short time; after which he re-mounted, and continued at the head of his division.

to the troops of the King of France, under the Duke of Berry. 26th of June.

The reserve moved on to Bellicourt and Belle Englise.

Upon returning in the night to his head-quarters at Vermand, the Duke of Wellington found a note from Prince Blücher, forwarding to him the letter from the French commissioners, before referred to,* and to which his Grace immediately replied, as follows :—

‘ Head Quarters, 26th June, 1815.—10 P.M.

‘ As Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington has only at this moment returned to his quarters, he has only now received from Marshal Prince Blücher the letter of their Excellencies, and which their Excellencies had sent to the Prussian outposts.

‘ When the Field Marshal last heard from the head-quarters of the Allied Sovereigns, the 21st instant, their Majesties were at Heidelberg, and they must still be in that direction. It must be obvious to their Excellencies that the Field Marshal can neither prevent nor aid their Excellencies in reaching their Majesties ; but if he has it in his power, or if their Excellencies think proper to pass through the countries in which the troops are under his command, the Field Marshal begs they will let him know in what manner he can facilitate their journey.

‘ The Field Marshal was not aware that any officer commanding an advanced post had agreed verbally, or in any other manner, to a suspension of hostilities.

‘ Since the 15th instant, when Napoleon Buonaparte, at the head of the French armies, invaded the dominions of the King of the Netherlands, and attacked the Prussian army, the Field Marshal has considered his Sovereign, and those Powers whose

* See page 382.

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armies he commands, in a state of war with the Government of France; and he does not consider the abdication of Napoleon Buonaparte of his usurped authority, under all the circumstances which have preceded and attended that measure, as the attainment of the object held out in the declarations and treaties of the Allies, which should induce them to lay down their arms.

‘The Field Marshal cannot consent therefore to any suspension of hostilities, however desirous he is of preventing the further effusion of blood.

‘As the only object on which their Excellencies desired to converse with the Field Marshal was the proposed suspension of hostilities, they will, probably, after the perusal of his sentiments and intentions, as above declared, consider any interview with him an useless waste of their time; but, if their Excellencies should still do him the honour to desire to have an interview with him, the Field Marshal will be ready to meet them at the time and place they shall appoint.

‘The Field Marshal begs their Excellencies will receive the assurance of his high consideration.

‘WELLINGTON.’*

From the moment that Prince Blücher had become aware of the retirement of the French troops from Laon upon Soissons, he was most anxious to secure the passage across the Oise at Compiègne, Verberie, Pont St. Maxence, and Creil. In the middle of the night of the 25th, he therefore sent an order for the advanced guard of the 1st Prussian corps d’armée to proceed on the following day, from Fargnières, by forced march, as far as the first named place. In the afternoon of the 26th, it reached Noyon, where it halted for a

* Despatches, vol. xii. p. 512.

rest, having marched five leagues, and having nearly an equal distance before it to Compiègne. The 12-pounder battery and the four 10-pounder howitzers which had been attached to this advanced guard (the 3rd brigade under Major General von Jagow) were, by Zieten's order, left under the protection of a battalion, to be employed with the 1st brigade, which was directed to make an attempt upon the fortress of La Fère. The advanced guard, after having sent on a squadron of the 1st Silesian hussars, under Major von Hertel, to Compiègne, with orders to push forward a detachment thence upon the road to Soissons, resumed its march in the evening. It was still in movement about midnight, when Major General von Jagow received a communication from the front that Major von Hertel had, with his squadron, entered Compiègne at eight o'clock, in the evening, and had learned from the mayor that a French corps was on the march from Soissons to that town, in which it had already bespoken 10,000 rations. Von Jagow immediately communicated this important circumstance to Zieten, and ordered his troops, after another short but indispensable halt, to continue their toilsome march.

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On the morning of this day, the 1st brigade of Zieten's corps d'armée completed the investment of La Fère. The troops that had been previously detached to this point by General von Jagow were moved off to follow this officer's brigade on the

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road to Compiègne. Notwithstanding the vigorous bombardment which the Prussians maintained against the fortress until noon, and by which several buildings were set on fire, they failed to induce the garrison to surrender. As it was not intended, however, to attempt any more serious attack, the brigade, after leaving the fusilier-battalion of the 12th regiment and a squadron of the Brandenburg uhlans to watch the fortress, followed the corps d'armée, which had marched to Noyon, but it did not even reach Chauny, scarcely seven miles from La Fère.

Zieten, on arriving at Chauny at eight o'clock in the evening, with the remainder of his corps—the 2nd and 4th brigades, the reserve-artillery, and a reserve cavalry-brigade—considered his troops too much fatigued to fulfil Blücher's intentions that they should march as far as Noyon, and he therefore ordered them to bivouac at Chauny.

The 3rd Prussian corps d'armée marched from the vicinity of Homblières to that of Guiscard; partly by Jussy, and partly by St. Quentin and Ham. It was only the 11th brigade, with the greater portion of the reserve-cavalry and artillery that took the latter road. These troops on reaching the fortified town of Ham, found it occupied by the enemy, who seemed prepared to oppose their passing through the place. General von Hobe, who commanded them, summoned the commander of the garrison to open the gates and allow the

troops to march through, and on perceiving that this summons was disobeyed, he tried the effect of a few cannon-shot, which quickly procured a free passage for his force. No further notice was taken, and no further use was made by the Prussians of this otherwise insignificant place. A detachment of the reserve-cavalry of this corps was sent to Chauny, from which it pushed forward a small party along the road towards Soissons, which the latter pursued until on arriving at about a league beyond Coucy, it came upon an enemy's outpost, consisting of a regiment of dragoons and a battalion of infantry.

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The 4th corps d'armée was also required to make a forced march on this day—namely, from Essigny le grand as far as Lassigny, and its advanced guard was to reach Gournay, and thence push forward detachments to Clermont, Creil, and Pont St. Maxence, for the purpose of securing and examining the bridges across the Oise, and of preparing all that was requisite for effecting a passage for the troops. Bülow, in his brigade-orders, drew the attention of his troops to the necessity which had arisen for those forced marches on the part of the Prussian army with a view to obtain a decisive result. The advanced guard started at four o'clock in the morning from Jussy, and proceeded by Lassigny to Gournay, situated upon the road from Peronne to Pont St. Maxence; but the detachments which it sent thence towards Clermont, Creil,

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Pont St. Maxence, and Verberie, did not reach those places until the following day. The reserve-artillery of the 4th corps commenced its march at five o'clock in the morning, following the advanced guard, and reached Ressons late in the evening; where it bivouacked, as did also, subsequently, the main body of the corps, after a march of about twenty-five miles.

Whilst the Prussians were thus, on the 26th, hastening towards Compiègne, the French general, Count d'Erlon, was, on this very day, also marching upon that point from Soissons, with the remains of his corps d'armée—about 4,000 men—having succeeded, through his urgent representations of the expediency of such a movement, in obtaining Grouchy's assent to its execution.

The troops of the 3rd and 4th French corps d'armée moved this day from Rheims towards Soissons, a distance which they could not, however, accomplish in one day's march.

The positions of the respective armies on the evening of the 26th, were as follows:—

Of the Anglo-allied army, the advanced guard (Vivian's hussar brigade) was at Mattignies, near the Somme, having its picquets on that river.*

* Vivian had on this day sent forward Lieutenant Slayter Smith,¹ of the 10th hussars, *en reconnaissance*, as far as Nesle, with directions to proceed, if practicable, to Roye, and gain information concerning the movements of the French army. Lieutenant Smith, having reached the latter place,

¹ Now Captain William Slayter Smith, h.p. 72nd regiment.

The 2nd division, the Nassau troops, and the British cavalry, were encamped near Beauvois and Lanchy.

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The 1st and 3rd divisions, the Dutch-Belgian infantry attached to the 1st corps, and the Dutch-Belgian cavalry, were encamped near Caulaincourt and Martin de Des Près.

The 4th division was encamped at Gouay.

The 1st British brigade of guards was at Peronne.

The reserve, consisting of the 5th and 6th divisions, the Bruns-

ascertained that French troops had left the town the night before, and that a body of *Gensd'armes* had marched out at one end of the town whilst he and his party had entered by the other. On returning from Nesle, he had proceeded but a short distance, when he perceived a carriage moving rapidly, and coming from a cross road. He ordered the driver to halt, and found in the carriage a military-looking man, who, after some evasive answers to his questions, acknowledged himself to be General Lauriston, aide-de-camp to Napoleon; and stated that he was going, in the first instance, to his country-seat at Vœux, near Le Cateau, and then to join the King, Louis XVIII. He added that he had gone to Paris to raise a party for His Majesty, that he had not only failed in the attempt, but had narrowly escaped being arrested. Having given this explanation, he entreated Lieutenant Smith to allow him to continue his route, but the latter, considering it his duty to make him a prisoner, took him that night to Sir Hussey Vivian, who then desired Lieutenant Smith to proceed with the general to the Duke of Wellington. On reaching his Grace's quarters at one o'clock in the morning, and intimating his errand, a curious incident occurred. There was no guard at the house, not even a sentry, and Smith had some difficulty in rousing a sleepy servant from amongst his fellows, to announce him. The Duke was engaged in conversation with a Frenchman. On a table in the room appeared the *débris* of a repast. Having explained to the Duke the name and rank of the individual he had brought with him, his Grace said, "Bring him in." On hearing the name of Lauriston, the Frenchman before mentioned, who had been sent to the Duke by Fouché, to treat for a cessation of hostilities, became greatly alarmed, and begged to know how he might escape without being recognised. His Grace remarked, "There is but one door and one window—take your choice." He preferred the door, and escaped by passing behind the Duke's back as Lauriston entered. An animated conversation ensued between the two generals, and an hour had elapsed in this way, when the Duke gave his orders to Lieutenant Smith for the disposal of the General; whom he subsequently sent to the King, much to his annoyance, since he was thus obliged to appear before His Majesty as a prisoner instead of a volunteer.

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The pontoon-train was at Estrées.

The Duke of Wellington's head-quarters were at Vermand.

The 2nd and 4th brigades of the 1st Prussian corps d'armée were at Chauny, not far from which was also the 1st brigade. The 3rd brigade, forming the advanced guard, was on the march to Compiègne.

The 3rd corps was at Guiscard.

The 4th corps was at Ressons.

Prince Blücher's head-quarters were at Genvry, near Noyon.

The French troops under d'Erlon were not far from Compiègne, on the road from Soissons. Those of the 3rd and 4th corps, under Vandamme, were at some point between Rheims and Soissons.

Grouchy's head-quarters were at Soissons.

It was half-past four o'clock in the morning of the 27th, when the advanced guard of the 1st Prussian corps d'armée, (the 3rd brigade,) after a forced march of about 25 miles, reached Compiègne. General von Jagow immediately posted his troops, in the most advantageous manner, in and about the town, so as to be prepared to meet any attack that the enemy might make, and detached three squadrons of the 1st Silesian hussars upon the Soissons road, and the remaining squadron upon the Paris road, in observation. About five o'clock, by which time he had scarcely completed his arrangements, information reached him from the hussars on the Soissons road that the enemy was advancing. This was, as before remarked, Count d'Erlon, with the remains of his

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corps d'armée, from which circumstance it will be seen that if Zieten's advanced guard had arrived but a single half hour later, the French would have anticipated the Prussians in securing the bridge of Compiègne.

From along the edge of the extensive wood which adjoins this town, a fire was quickly opened by the French skirmishers against the Prussian picquets. Very shortly afterwards a column of infantry appeared advancing from their rear. A half-battery of Prussian horse-artillery, which had been posted on the Soissons road, in front of the gate on that side of the town, having allowed the column to approach within a suitable range, directed a fire upon it with such vigour and precision, that in a few moments more the mass rushed for shelter into the wood. Four French guns were now brought forward, and these replied to the Prussian artillery; during which the enemy moved through the wood to his left. The Prussians concluded from this movement that he contemplated abandoning the attack in this quarter, for the purpose of assailing the lower and weaker side of the town, by the Crespy and Paris roads; but on renewing his advance, he soon showed that he was only masking his retreat; whereupon the 1st Silesian hussars advanced along the road to Soissons in pursuit.

By the result of this affair, which lasted an hour and a half, but was limited to a cannonade and

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mutual tirailade, the French were foiled in their attempt to cover their retreat by securing Compiègne, and checking the advance of the Prussians along the Oise. The 3rd Prussian brigade, however, which had continually formed the advanced guard of the 1st corps d'armée since the battle of Waterloo, was too much exhausted by its efforts during the previous day and night, to attempt seriously to molest the enemy during his retreat; a circumstance of which the latter failed not to take advantage. Zieten decided upon relieving these troops from the duties of an advanced guard by the 2nd brigade, which, however, had not yet come up: and hence the French gained some valuable time.

The main body of Zieten's corps did not reach Compiègne until mid-day. Blücher, who had already arrived there, ordered that the advanced guard (now consisting of the 2nd brigade) and the reserve-cavalry, preceded by 100 riflemen, should march through the wood, towards Villers-Cotterets, followed by the main body of the corps, it having been his intention to throw these troops upon the enemy's line of retreat, in the event of the advanced guard falling in with French troops at or near that point. This order, however, was not strictly followed by Zieten, who marched the main body of his corps, including the reserve-cavalry, and the reserve-artillery, through the wood of Compiègne, to Gillicourt, detaching only his 2nd

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brigade, reinforced by the Brandenburg dragoons and five pieces of horse artillery, towards Villers-Cotterets. The 1st Silesian hussars were pushed forward upon the road from Compiègne to Soissons, to cover the left flank during this movement. The reserve-cavalry, in front of the column of the main body, reached Gillicourt just as the enemy (under Count d'Erlon) had crossed the defile formed by a tributary stream of the Oise, in which that place is situated. The 1st West Prussian dragoons and the Brandenburg uhlans, together with a horse-battery, went on in pursuit; and the 3rd brigade was ordered to follow the latter in support. The 4th brigade was directed to maintain the defile of Gillicourt.

The enemy's rear-guard was overtaken on this side of Crespy by the two regiments of cavalry, which threw it back in disorder upon that town. The French quickly retired from the place, whereupon the 3rd brigade, with a cavalry-brigade, bivouacked there, throwing out parties of dragoons in the direction of the enemy's retreat.

The 4th brigade, the other cavalry-brigade, and the reserve-artillery, bivouacked at Gillicourt. The 2nd brigade, with the additional force attached to it, as before mentioned, reached Longpré, not far from Villers-Cotterets, in the middle of the night. The long march which the troops of the 1st corps d'armée made this day from Noyon, and the probability of their coming into collision with

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the enemy on the following day, rendered a few hours' rest absolutely necessary.

Separated from one another as Zieten's brigades thus were, a strong support was essentially requisite, and this was supplied in good time by the 3rd Prussian corps d'armée, which marched on this day from Guiscard to Compiègne. Prince Blücher directed its commander, Thielemann, to detach strongly towards Soissons, for the purpose of observing the enemy, and of molesting him should he be retiring. The cavalry thus detached presenting the means of covering Zieten's left flank, the 1st Silesian hussars, which had been previously posted on the Soissons road, were directed to rejoin their own corps. The 3rd corps bivouacked on the left bank of the Oise, with the exception of the 12th brigade, which remained on the right bank, at Venette.

On the same day, the 4th Prussian corps d'armée, forming the right column, marched from Ressons and its vicinity, with orders to cross the Oise lower down the stream, at Verberie, Pont St. Maxence, or Creil. Bülow formed his advanced guard with the 3rd Neumark landwehr, a battalion of the 1st Silesian landwehr, the 8th hussars, the 1st Pomeranian landwehr-cavalry, and half the horse-battery No. 12, and desired General von Sydow, who commanded the advanced guard, to move off with a detachment, at the first break of day, and secure the bridge over the Oise at Creil.

This general, aware of the importance of attaining the object in view, proceeded, himself, at the head of a squadron of the 8th hussars, and of 100 infantry, the latter being transported in carts, and reached Creil with this small detachment just as the French were on the point of entering the place. The latter were immediately attacked and repulsed, and the Prussian infantry occupied the bridge, which, on the arrival of the advanced guard, was given over to the 1st Silesian landwehr, whilst the remainder of the troops, after a short halt, commenced their march upon Senlis.

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Another striking instance was thus again afforded of the vast importance of a correct calculation of time in military operations. The Prussians, on this morning, reached the bridge of Compiegne only half an hour before the French approached it, and had they arrived at Creil but a few minutes later, they would have found the French in possession of the bridge at this point.

Major von Blankenburg was detached in advance, with the 1st Pomeranian landwehr-cavalry, from Creil towards Senlis. They had but just reached this town, and had begun to bivouac on the great market-place, when, towards nine o'clock in the evening, Kellermann, with the 1st cuirassier-brigade of French cavalry, approached on the opposite side, and made a dash at the very spot occupied by the Prussians. Major von Blankenburg had barely time to mount: nevertheless, with such of

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his men as were accoutred and prepared, he attacked the French horsemen, and drove them back to the gates of the town. The latter, however, collecting their strength, renewed their attack, overpowered the Prussians, and forced them to retire along the road to Pont St. Maxence. Kellermann's brigade then resumed its march along the prescribed line of retreat. In the mean time, his 2nd cuirassier-brigade, and d'Erlon's French corps d'armée, were retiring along the same road towards Senlis. Upon this point also General von Sydow was moving from Creil, with the advanced guard of the 4th Prussian corps, following, as it was supposed, the detached 1st Pomeranian landwehr-cavalry. On reaching Senlis at ten o'clock in the evening, with the head of the column, consisting of the 8th hussars and the 3rd battalion of the 3rd Neumark landwehr, and finding the place unoccupied, he took possession of it. The French troops had already approached close to the town, from the side of Crespy. The Prussian infantry were immediately posted in the houses nearest to the gate, and as soon as the enemy's cavalry came fully within the effective range of musketry, they suddenly opened upon the latter a sharp fire, which compelled it to go about. The head of d'Erlon's corps now came up, but was forced, along with the cavalry, to take another direction. Sydow, having collected the whole of the advanced guard, followed the French some little distance, and bivou-

acked, about midnight, somewhat in advance of Senlis. The latter, however, reached, next morning, the road leading through Gonesse to Paris.

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During the operation of the advanced guard of the 4th Prussian corps d'armée, another detachment of the latter was sent to occupy Pont St. Maxence and Verberie. The French having partially destroyed the bridge at the former point, the 2nd Pomeranian landwehr-cavalry were ferried to the opposite bank of the river, and detachments were immediately pushed on to Verberie and Senlis. The 14th brigade followed the cavalry, and was passed over the river in a similar manner, after which it occupied the heights on both sides of the great Paris road. These troops bivouacked for the night on their position; whilst the main body of the corps, on reaching Pont St. Maxence, remained on the right bank of the river. The greatest activity was used in repairing the bridge sufficiently for the passage of artillery.

In this manner Blücher had effectually secured the line of the Oise, and by pushing forward his advanced troops as far as Villers-Cotterets, had closed so much upon the flank of the retiring enemy, that he had every reasonable expectation of succeeding in cutting off the line of retreat of the latter upon the capital.

Grouchy, on discovering that the detachments he had thrown out to gain the passages of the Oise, on his left, had been thwarted by the rapi-

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dity of the Prussian movement, and had been compelled to fall back, now employed them in covering his retreat by means of partial combats. Hence arose the engagements at Compiègne, Crespy, and Senlis ; but such was the feebleness of the French resistance, and so frequent were the desertions of the soldiers, who threw away their arms, and fled to their homes, that it was evident the re-organization of the army, and the re-animation of its former spirit, were far from having been thoroughly effected. It has been said, that a cry of alarm spread through its ranks of, "Our retreat is cut off!" as soon as it was known that the Prussians were upon its left flank. At all events it appears tolerably certain that the army was not in that state which would have warranted Grouchy in risking any serious stand against the Prussians. To succeed in reaching the capital, by means of forced marches, and to secure his troops, as far as practicable, from molestation, was all that he could hope to accomplish.

On the 27th, the main body of the Anglo-allied army, crossing the Somme at Willecourt, marched through Nesle upon Roye.

The 4th division marched through Peronne, towards Roye.

Two battalions of the Dutch-Belgian brigade at Peronne were ordered to remain in occupation of that place : the remainder of the brigade, and the brigade of guards at Peronne, marched through

Nesle to the village of Crescy, and joined the 1st corps.

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The 5th division, the Brunswick cavalry, and the reserve-brigade of howitzers, moved upon Ham.

The 6th division, the Brunswick infantry, and the reserve artillery, encamped between the villages of Douilly and Villers.

Notwithstanding the precautions which the Duke of Wellington had taken to ensure the orderly conduct of his troops, and to conciliate in their favour the good disposition of the inhabitants along the line of march, it being his anxious desire that they should be considered as being on a friendly footing, and as acting on behalf of the legitimate sovereign, there was one portion of his army which committed the greatest excesses: these were the Dutch-Belgian troops, who set his orders on this head completely at defiance. They pillaged wherever they went, not even excepting the head-quarters, the house which he himself occupied: they forced the safeguards, and rescued, at the point of the bayonet, the prisoners from the *gensd'armerie* which the Duke had formed for the police of the army. Two of the officers had just rendered themselves conspicuous by participating in, and actually encouraging, these disorders, which had arisen to such a height as to arouse his Grace's just indignation and severe censure. He desired the general officer then in command of that part

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of the army to put in full force his general order of the 26th of June, to cause a roll-call of companies to be made every hour, and to see that every officer and soldier was present. He also directed him to place the two officers before alluded to in arrest, and to send them to the Hague, to be disposed of by the King of the Netherlands, to whom he forwarded a copy of the letter containing these instructions. This letter, which strongly evidenced the feelings of annoyance under which the Duke wrote it, concluded with the following cutting reproof:—"Je ne veux pas commander de tels officiers. Je suis assez longtemps soldat pour savoir que les pillards, et ceux qui les encouragent, ne valent rien devant l'ennemi ; et je n'en veux pas."

The following were the positions of the respective armies on the evening of the 27th :—

The 1st Prussian corps d'armée had its main body at Gilli-court ; its 2nd brigade at Longpré, about half a league from Villers-Cotterets ; and its 3rd brigade at Crespy.

The main body of the 3rd Prussian corps d'armée was at Compiègne : it had strong detachments in the direction of Soissons.

The main body of the 4th Prussian corps was at Pont St. Maxence : it had its advanced guard at Senlis, and detachments at Creil and Verberie.

Prince Blücher's head-quarters were at Compiègne.

Of the Anglo-allied army, the 2nd division, the Nassau troops, and the British and Hanoverian cavalry, were in the vicinity of Roye.

The 3rd division, one brigade of the 1st division, the Dutch-Belgian infantry attached to the 1st corps, and the Dutch-Belgian

cavalry were encamped near the villages of Crescy, Billencourt, and Bereuil. 28th of June.

The 4th division was at the village of Puzeaux, on the road to Roye.

The brigade of guards was at Crescy.

The 5th division and the Brunswick cavalry were at Ham.

The 6th division, the Brunswick infantry, and the reserve-artillery, were between the villages of Douilly and Villers.

The Duke of Wellington's head-quarters were at Nesle.

The remains of the 1st and 2nd French corps d'armée, detachments from which had this day been defeated at Compiègne, Crespy, Creil, and Senlis, were in full retreat, partly upon the Senlis, and partly upon the Soissons, road.

The imperial guards and the 6th corps were at Villers-Cotterets.

The 3rd and 4th corps were at Soissons.

Grouchy's head-quarters were at Villers-Cotterets.

General von Pirch II. having learned, upon his arrival at one o'clock of the morning of the 28th, with the advanced guard of the 1st Prussian corps d'armée, at Longpré, near Villers-Cotterets, that the latter place was not occupied by the enemy in any force, determined to capture the place forthwith by a surprise. The troops detached to the front on this service (the fusilier-battalion of the 6th regiment and the Brandenburg dragoons) favoured by the darkness, which as yet was scarcely relieved by the approaching dawn, as also by the wood through which they advanced, fell upon a detachment that was moving by a by-road through the wood, consisting of a French horse-battery of 14 guns, 20 ammunition-waggon, and an escort of 150 men. The whole vicinity of Villers-Cot-

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terets was, in fact, filled with French troops, thus dispersed, that they might sooner obtain refreshment after the long march, and be prepared to start again at two o'clock in the morning. Thus they were all in motion at the time of this capture. General von Pirch now pushed on to Villers-Cotterets, where the Prussians made many prisoners. Grouchy himself narrowly escaped being taken as he was mounting his horse and hastening out of the opposite side of the town. On reaching the windmill height, upon the road to Nanteuil, he succeeded in collecting together and forming his troops. Pirch, after detaching cavalry in pursuit of the enemy, as also towards Longpré to cover his right, and towards Soissons to protect his left, took up a defensive position. He deployed his infantry, with the foot-battery, upon the height at the garden of the château, posted two battalions at the point of a wood that jutted out on his right, and was still occupied in making his arrangements, when a cavalry-detachment, on the Soissons road, sent in word that a hostile corps was to be seen approaching from Soissons. Another report was received immediately afterwards, that the enemy showed much cavalry on that side, and was already detaching two regiments of the latter arm towards the Prussian left flank, as also another cavalry-force, along with from 20 to 25 pieces of artillery, against the right flank. In the mean time, the French Marshal had collected about 9,000 men on

the height before mentioned, near the road to Nanteuil, one third of whom had already constituted the rear-guard, and the remainder was composed of troops that had halted during the night in the vicinity, as at Vauciennes, Coyolles, and Pisseleux. With these troops, Grouchy showed every disposition to accept an engagement.

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General von Pirch II., finding himself thus critically situated between two separate and overpowering hostile forces, prepared to effect his retreat. This was facilitated in a peculiar manner. The troops of Vandamme's corps, perceiving the Prussians thus posted on the high road to Paris, and imagining their force to be greater than it really was, fell into the greatest disorder, and with loud cries of "Into the woods on the left, towards La Ferté Milon—we are cut off from Paris!" they all rushed in that direction, with the exception of 2,000 men and some guns conducted by Vandamme himself by the way of Pisseleux, leaving Villers-Cotterets on their right, and masking the movement by a vigorous attack upon this place. The 6th Prussian regiment was driven back by the enemy's superior numbers, and Pirch, after having kept up a brisk cannonade, gradually withdrew the regiment from Villers-Cotterets, for the purpose of moving upon Crespy, the direction previously laid down for him, with a view to the concentration of the corps. As Grouchy was moving by the Soissons road towards Nanteuil,

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Pirch was desirous of proceeding in a parallel direction, through Longpré, but he was subsequently induced, on consideration of the defiles in that direction, and which he did not deem it prudent to pass so near to the enemy, to prefer retiring along the Compiègne road, as far as where it is joined by the one leading from Viviers, and where, for the covering of the left flank and rear, a squadron of the Brandenburg dragoons had already been posted. From this point he struck into the road leading by Buts, and reached, towards mid-day, Frenois la Rivière, where he gave his troops a few hours' rest, and then proceeded by Crespy to Nanteuil, which place he reached about nine o'clock in the evening, having marched 21 leagues within the last 38 hours, during 6 of which he had also been engaged with the enemy. He had succeeded in creating confusion in one portion of the retiring French force, and in impeding the retreat of that which was with Grouchy himself sufficiently long to enable Zieten to anticipate the latter in his arrival at Nanteuil.

It has already been explained, when describing the proceedings of the 27th, how much separated the brigades of the 1st Prussian corps d'armée were from one another. The 1st was still on the march from La Fère (it rejoined on the afternoon of this day); the 2nd, with the Brandenburg dragoons, was near Villers-Cotterets; the 3rd, with a cavalry-brigade, was at Crespy; and the 4th, with

the other cavalry brigade was at Gillicourt. Hence Zieten was desirous, on the morning of the 28th, to concentrate his corps at Crespy, leaving only a strong cavalry detachment at Villers-Cotterets. But whilst despatching the order to Pirch II. to move upon Crespy, he received a report from this general, that he had fallen upon the French troops retreating through Villers-Cotterets, and was upon the point of being driven back by superior numbers. Zieten, considering that the Prussian troops at Crespy, the nearest to Villers-Cotterets, were nearly three leagues distant from the latter point, decided upon not attempting to give any direct support to Pirch, but to advance with the 3rd brigade, together with the reserve-cavalry and artillery, towards Levignon, on the great Paris road, between Villers-Cotterets and Nanteuil, and, if possible, occupy that point before the French could reach it. He found the latter in the act of marching through the village, and immediately ordered a howitzer-battery to be drawn up, which commenced throwing shells into the place. He also ordered the 1st West Prussian dragoons, and the 1st Silesian hussars, with a horse-battery, to attack the enemy. The French, however, retired in such haste, that they were not overtaken until about midway between Levignon and Nanteuil, when they halted their rear-guard, which made front against the Prussians. They comprised the 2nd corps d'armée, under Reille,

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who had with him several regiments of cavalry, and continued their march, supporting, however, the rear-guard. On coming up with the latter, two squadrons of the 2nd West Prussian dragoons charged; but they were repulsed, and attacked in flank by a French regiment of lancers. The enemy now advanced, with the hope of completely routing the Prussian cavalry. This attempt failed in consequence of a most successful attack by the 1st Silesian hussars, by which the French were put to flight, and two of their guns captured. The horse-battery drew up, at the same time, on the left of the high road, and, by its effective fire, committed great havoc amidst the flying enemy, who was pursued by the Prussian cavalry even beyond Nanteuil. During the movement upon Levignon, General von Hobe came up with a cavalry-brigade from the 3rd corps d'armée. It advanced by the right, along the road from Crespy to Nanteuil, with the design of intercepting a portion of the enemy's retreating columns; but the French, in the mean time, fled in such haste, that only a few prisoners were made.

Notwithstanding the pressure thus made upon the French line of retreat, Count Reille succeeded in uniting the remains of his corps d'armée with those of Count d'Erlon's corps, which had escaped through Crespy and by the left of Senlis.

The French imperial guards, and the 6th corps d'armée, which were under the more immediate

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orders of Grouchy, and had formed the column that retired through Villers-Cotterets in the morning, reached Levignon after Zieten had passed through it in pursuit of Reille's troops to Nanteuil; and becoming acquainted with the danger of their proceeding further on that road, they turned off to their left, to make their retreat through Assy, Meaux, Claye, and Vincennes.

General Vandamme, who, with the 3rd and 4th French corps d'armée was most in the rear, and had withdrawn from the high road at Villers-Cotterets on perceiving the Prussian brigade in possession of that place, took the direction of La Ferté Milon, Meaux, crossing the Marne to L'Agny, to Paris.

Bülow, who had been directed to move the 4th corps d'armée from Pont St. Maxence to Marly la Ville, on the 28th, deemed it advisable to augment his advanced guard, and therefore added to it the 14th brigade and the reserve-cavalry, and placed the whole under the command of Prince William of Prussia. In the afternoon, Prince William fell upon detachments of d'Erlon's, and also upon Reille's corps d'armée, which latter was retreating from Nanteuil. He immediately attacked the enemy, dispersed a great number of his troops, and took more than 2,000 prisoners. It was evening before the advanced guard reached Gonesse, where it bivouacked. Detachments were pushed on to the front as far as le Bourget and

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Stains, which points were occupied by the enemy.

The main body of the corps arrived at Marly la Ville in the evening, and halted there for the night.

Thielemann, having been directed to proceed with the 3rd corps d'armée from Compiègne to Senlis, should its support not be required by the 1st corps, marched his infantry and artillery upon Crespy, and sent the reserve-cavalry by Verberie; but on hearing that the 1st corps was engaged with the enemy, he drew in his cavalry towards Crespy, from Verberie, as soon as it arrived there. The 1st cavalry-brigade, with six pieces of horse-artillery, was pushed on from Crespy, along the road to Nanteuil, where it joined the reserve-cavalry of the 1st corps d'armée, but not in time to take any active part in the engagement at that place. The 2nd cavalry-brigade was detached towards Villers-Cotterets. The main body of the 3rd corps d'armée bivouacked for the night at Crespy and its vicinity.

Prince Blücher deemed it advisable to send, on this day, a strong detachment of cavalry, consisting of the Queen's dragoons, under Lieut. Colonel von Kamecke, beyond the left of the 1st Prussian corps, towards the Marne, for the purpose of gaining intelligence of the enemy's movements in that direction. Lieut. Colonel von Kamecke was instructed to act discretionally; and to proceed, subsequently, by Meaux, or Chateau Thierry,

and endeavour to open a communication with the advance of the Bavarian army.

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Thus it will be seen that, on the 28th, the Prussian army succeeded in cutting off the line of retreat of the French troops by the Soissons high road, compelling the greater portion of them to seek, along cross-roads, the line of the Marne, by Méaux and L'Agny. It had, since it crossed the Oise, created great disorder and confusion in the French ranks, captured 16 pieces of cannon, and made, altogether, 4,000 prisoners. The Prussians now occupied both the high roads leading from Senlis and Soissons, and had their advanced posts (those of the 4th corps d'armée) within five miles of Paris. The sound of their cannon was already heard in the capital, where the greatest consternation prevailed amongst the citizens, whose fears had been previously excited by the most exaggerated reports brought in by fugitives from the retreating army. The fortified works that had been thrown up on the north side, appeared sufficient to check the progress of the Allied armies, and to secure Paris from a *coup de main*; but time was essential for the organization of the defence, for the recovery of the exhausted remains of the army of the north, expected to arrive on the morrow, and for the collection of every available defensive means. It was only by the assumption of a sufficiently respectable, if not an imposing, attitude, that they could hope to succeed in nego-

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tiating for the preservation of the capital and the establishment of their own prescribed form of government—perhaps, by some extraordinary effort, to disconcert the plans of their enemies, and obtain a triumph under the walls of Paris. Actuated by these considerations, the provisional government was desirous of inducing the victorious commanders of the Allied armies to enter into negotiations. Another commission was appointed, the members of which were Messrs. Andréossy, Valence, Boissy d'Anglas, Flangergues, and la Benardière. They were directed to proceed to the head-quarters of the Allied field marshals, again to solicit a suspension of hostilities, and to negotiate an armistice.

During these proceedings in Paris, a renewed application had been received by Prince Blücher, on the 27th, and by the Duke of Wellington, on the 28th, from the first named commissioners, for a suspension of hostilities, as also a request that a passport and assurances of safety might be accorded to Napoleon and his family, to enable them to pass to the United States of America, the provisional government having previously succeeded, through the medium of representations made to the ex-Emperor by some of his friends, in persuading the latter to consent to this step. Prince Blücher declined taking any notice of the application, conceiving his former verbal reply quite sufficient. The Duke of Wellington referred the

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commissioners to his note of the 26th, on the proposed suspension of hostilities, and stated that, with regard to the passport for Napoleon, he had no authority from his government, or from the Allies, to give any answer to such demand.

The Anglo-allied army advanced this day from Nesle, so as to bring its right in rear of St. Just, and its left in rear of La Taulle, where the high road from Compiègne joins the high road from Roye to Paris.

The 2nd corps, under Lord Hill, as also the British and Hanoverian cavalry, marched by Montdidier to Petit Crevecœur.

The 1st corps, under Sir John Byng, marched upon Couchy.

The reserve, under Sir James Kempt, marched upon Roye.

The following were the positions of the respective armies on the evening of the 28th:—

The 4th Prussian corps d'armée, which was the nearest to Paris, was posted at Marly la Ville; having detachments pushed forward close to le Bourget and Stains.

The 1st Prussian corps d'armée stood in rear of Nanteuil; having its advanced guard at le Plessis, Belleville, and Dammartin.

The 3rd corps d'armée was at Crespy and in its vicinity.

Prince Blücher's head-quarters were at Senlis.

The Anglo-allied army had its right behind St. Just and its left behind La Taulle.

Its reserve was at Roye.

The advanced guard (Vivian's hussar-brigade) was at Antheuil.

The 2nd and 4th divisions, the Nassau troops, and the Hano-

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The British cavalry was encamped near La Taulle and Reissons.

The 1st and 3rd divisions, and the Dutch-Belgian troops, were encamped near Couchy.

The 5th and 6th divisions, the Brunswick troops, and reserve-artillery, were encamped near Roye.

The Duke of Wellington's head-quarters were at Orvillé.

The remains of the 1st and 2nd French corps d'armée, after forming a junction at Gonesse, where the high roads from Nan-teuil and Senlis unite, reached the suburbs of Paris. The imperial guard and the 6th corps, immediately under Grouchy, were in full retreat from Meaux by Claie and Vincennes. The 3rd and 4th corps, under Vandamme, having crossed the Marne at Meaux, were retreating by Lagny and Vincennes.

Blücher having issued orders, during the night of the 28th, for the continuation of the advance upon Paris, the advanced guard of the 4th Prussian corps d'armée moved, on the morning of the 29th, from Gonesse to le Bourget, which place it found abandoned by the enemy, who, however, was strongly posted at St. Denis, towards which point, therefore, some battalions were pushed forward, in observation. The enemy having been driven out of Stains, this post was occupied by two fusilier-battalions and a regiment of cavalry, under Lieut. Colonel von Schill, for the purpose of securing the right flank of the corps. La Cour neuve, between St. Denis and le Bourget, was also occupied. The main body of the corps broke up from Marly la Ville at seven o'clock in

the morning, and on reaching le Bourget, bivouacked in its vicinity.

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The advanced guard of the 1st Prussian corps d'armée pushed on, at day-break, from Dammartin to Blanc-Mesnil, whence, immediately on its arrival, it sent detachments beyond the wood of Bondy, to reconnoitre the enemy's preparations of defence. The main body of this corps took up a position, having its right resting on Blanc-Mesnil, and its left on Aulnay. It sent out infantry detachments towards Livry, and along the Ourcq canal, towards Bondy and Pantin, and cavalry parties towards Grande-Drancey and Baubigny. Zieten also occupied Nonneville with the 7th regiment of infantry ; and the 6th uhlans furnished outposts at the Ourcq canal, communicating with those of the 4th corps.

The 3rd Prussian corps d'armée marched from Crespy as far as Dammartin, in the vicinity of which it was bivouacked. The reserve-cavalry was sent forward as far as Tremblay, in direct support of the 1st corps d'armée.

The 1st and 2nd French corps d'armée had reached the suburbs of Paris on the Gonesse road, during the night, and held possession of le Bourget until the morning of the 29th. The imperial guard and the 6th corps, as also the reinforcements that had arrived from the interior, were, during the forenoon of the 29th, on the high road by Claie and Pantin, under the command of Grouchy,

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and were directed to occupy several defensive points on that side. The 3rd and 4th corps d'armée, under Vandamme, reached Paris at noon on the 29th, by the Lagny road: they passed through the capital, and occupied the heights of Montrouge on the south side.

The Anglo-allied army arrived, on the 29th, at different points on the road between Gournay and Pont St. Maxence.

The advanced guard, consisting of Vivian's light cavalry-brigade, supported by that of Arentschild, crossed the Oise at Pont St. Maxence, and reached Senlis.

The British cavalry moved from La Taulle to Pont St. Maxence.

The 2nd corps, under Lord Hill, moved from Petit Crevecœur to Clermont.

The 1st corps, under Sir John Byng, moved from its camp, near Couchy, by Estrée St. Denis, along the high road to St. Martin Longeau.

The reserve, under Sir James Kempt, moved from its camp, near Roye, to Gournay, on the road to Pont St. Maxence.

The following were the positions of the respective armies on the evening of the 29th :—

The 1st Prussian corps d'armée had its advanced guard and reserve-cavalry at Aulnay and Saveigny; with detachments of the latter at Serran, Livry, Bondy, and Baubigny. The fusilier-battalion of the 7th regiment stood at Nonneville. The 6th uhlans and the 1st Silesian hussars, with two horse-batteries,

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were posted along the Ourcq canal. The corps itself rested its right on Blanc-Mesnil, and its left on Aulnay.

The 3rd corps d'armée was at Dammartin and in its vicinity. Its reserve-cavalry stood at Tremblay, in support of Zieten.

The 4th corps had its advanced guard between le Bourget and St. Denis, which it invested. Lieut. Colonel von Schill, with the 1st Silesian landwehr-cavalry and two battalions of infantry, was posted at Stains. The corps itself was at le Bourget.

Prince Blücher's head-quarters were at Gonesse.

The advanced guard of the Anglo-allied army was at Senlis.

The British cavalry was at Pont St. Maxence.

The 2nd and 4th divisions, the Nassau troops, and Estorff's light cavalry, were at Clermont.

The 1st and 3rd divisions, and the Dutch-Belgian troops, were at St. Martin Longeau.

The 5th and 6th divisions, the Brunswick troops, and the reserve-artillery, were at Gournay.

The pontoon-train and hawser-bridges were at Estrée St. Denis.

The Duke of Wellington's head-quarters were at Le Plessis Longeau.

The French troops comprising the army of the North had entered the capital.

The French force in the capital, after the arrival of the army that had been defeated in Belgium, consisted as follows:—The troops under Grouchy, including the dépôts that had come up from the district of the Loire, and from other parts of the interior, amounted to 60 or 70,000 men. They were reinforced, also, by a very considerable amount of field-artillery. One portion of these troops was posted at Montmartre, at St. Denis, and in rear of the Ourcq canal: the remainder, under Vandamme, occupied the heights of Mont-

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rouge, on the opposite side, with the exception of the cavalry, which lay in the wood of Boulogne. The national guards amounted to about 30,000 men; their disposition, however, was very doubtful, and, in general, they were considered as but little disposed to offer any resistance to the Allied armies. There was another description of force, called the federal tirailleurs, raised in the suburbs, and consisting chiefly of veterans: they amounted to 17,000 men. Hence, setting aside the national guard, there remained, for the defence of Paris, a disposable force of about 80, or 90,000 men, besides a numerous artillery. Marshal Davoust, Prince of Eckmühl, was appointed to the chief command of the French army, and his headquarters were fixed at la Villette.

The measures which had been adopted for taking advantage of the local capabilities of defence which the capital afforded, consisted in the intrenchments that had been raised around the heights of Montmartre, Montfauçon, and Belleville. An advanced line of defence was presented by the Ourcq canal, which, proceeding through the wood of Bondy and contiguously to the high road from Meaux, has an arm that branches off from Pantin towards St. Denis. This canal, which was 30 feet wide but not entirely completed, had been filled with water. Along its inner bank ran a high dam, forming an excellent parapet, in which embrasures were cut to admit heavy ordnance; and St. Denis,

which formed the *point d'appui* of this line of defence on the Seine, was strongly fortified. The ground on the north side of this town, too, had been inundated by means of the little rivers Rouillon and la Vieille Mer. The village of Aubervilliers, which formed an advanced post at musket-shot distance from the line, was occupied : and in rear of it the canal was covered by a sort of *tête de pont*, which secured the communication between both banks. The barriers to the several approaches to Paris were covered by works with strong batteries. Vincennes had been strengthened, and covered by the works which defended la Pissotte. A strong *tête de pont* was also constructed upon the left bank of the Marne, to cover the bridge of Charenton. All ferries and boats upon the Seine and the Marne were transported to the left bank. The bridge of Neuilly had been partially destroyed, and the wooden bridge at Bessons, over the Seine, had been burned. Several villages, parks, and gardens, on the right bank of the Seine and the Marne, were rendered defensible by the walls being crenelated, the approaches barricaded, and the gates blocked up. Upon the left bank of the Seine, on the south side of the capital, preparations for defence were comparatively neglected ; they were limited to the heights of Montrouge.

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For the defence of the principal works, 300 guns of large calibre were supplied, and for the manning of these, 20 companies of marine artillery which

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had been brought into the capital. The line between St. Denis and Vincennes was defended by the 1st, 2nd, and 6th corps d'armée. The imperial guard formed the reserve, and was posted at Menilmontant. The cavalry was stationed in the Bois de Boulogne. The 3rd and 4th corps d'armée, under Vandamme, defended the south side of Paris, and occupied Montrouge.

In the midst of all these preparations, the Provisional Government, the majority of which, under the influence of Fouché, was most desirous of effecting a cessation of hostilities, though acting ostensibly upon the grounds of a necessity of gaining time for the completion of the measures of defence, and of securing the capital from an assault, could not be otherwise than convinced, from the tenor of the replies made by the Allied commanders to all its propositions, that the presence of Napoleon in Paris was the chief obstacle to any satisfactory arrangement. General Becker had been appointed to attend the latter at Malmaison, to watch over his safety, to insure him that respect to which he was so eminently entitled, and to prevent the ill-disposed from making use of his name for purposes of excitement and tumult. Symptoms of a rising among the Buonapartists in Paris had been manifested on the 28th, a circumstance naturally consequent upon the re-union in the capital, of so many regiments of the line, as also of the imperial guard, whose excitement, de-

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votion, and enthusiasm, had Napoleon placed himself once more at their head, might have been such as to have brought them into hostile and fierce collision with the other great parties of the state, and thus have led to scenes of the wildest anarchy and confusion within the walls, whilst the enemy was thundering at the gates from without. Hence every effort was employed to induce the ex-Emperor to quit the capital. The fact of the arrival of the Prussians in front of St. Denis, and the possibility of an attempt being made to carry him off from Malmaison, were explained to him with much earnestness. He immediately referred to the map, and on perceiving the practicability of this coup de main, he adopted precautionary measures of defence. He also offered to the government his services in the capacity of General only, remarking, that he was prepared to march against the enemy, and frustrate his bold and hazardous attempt upon the capital. This proposal was sternly rejected. Fouché declared that to accede to it would be to remove every chance of arrangement with the Allied powers, to create fresh troubles and disorders throughout the country, and, though a temporary success might be gained, to bring down eventually the concentrated force of the immense European armament upon the devoted capital. The commissioners appointed by the government to communicate its wishes to Napoleon, no longer hesitated in arranging his departure. The minister

29th of June. of the marine, and Count Boulay, repaired to his residence, and explained to him that the Duke of Wellington and Prince Blücher had refused to give him any safeguard or passport, and that he had now only to take his immediate departure. Napoleon at length yielded to what he considered to be his destiny, and the preparations for travelling having been completed, he entered his carriage about five o'clock in the afternoon of the 29th, accompanied by Generals Bertrand, Gourgaud, and other devoted friends, and took the road to Rochefort, whither two frigates had been ordered for the embarkation of himself and suite for America.

Napoleon narrowly escaped falling into the hands of the Prussians, whilst at Malmaison. Blücher, hearing that he was living there in retirement, had despatched Major von Colomb, on the 28th, with the 8th hussars and two battalions of infantry to secure the bridge of Chatou, lower down the Seine, leading directly to the house. Fortunately, however, for Napoleon, the Prince of Eckmühl, when he ascertained that the Prussians were nearing the capital, had desired General Becker to cause this bridge to be destroyed. Hence Major von Colomb was much disappointed at finding there was no passage at this point, which in fact was not more than 800 yards distant from the palace, in which Napoleon was yet remaining at the time of the arrival of the Prussians.

On the 29th, the new commissioners appointed

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by the French government waited upon the Duke of Wellington at Etrées, for the purpose of negotiating a suspension of hostilities. In the course of the discussion which took place on this occasion, the Duke declared that he had nothing to add to the communication he had made to the former commissioners, that he could not but consider the abdication as a deception, and would not feel himself justified in suspending his operations on such a pretext, which was by no means calculated to fulfil the object the Allies had in view. He explained that, besides Napoleon, there were his adherents, who were the declared enemies of the Allies, and stated that before he could agree to any suspension he "must see some steps taken to re-establish a government in France which should afford the Allies some chance of peace." Upon this point his Grace was pressed to give some explanation as to what would satisfy the Allies. He replied that he had no authority from his own government, much less from the Allies, to enter upon the subject, and that all he could do was to give them his private opinion, which he should certainly urge upon the Allies with all the influence he might be supposed to possess, unless otherwise instructed by his own government.

This opinion was a remarkable illustration of the sound judgment, straight-forward policy, and unerring foresight, which are so pre-eminently characteristic of the career of this great man. Subsequent events proved its correctness to the letter. It was

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in strict accordance with the design traced out and enforced by the united diplomacy of Europe. It is best expressed in the Duke's own words :—

‘ I then told them that I conceived the best security for Europe was the restoration of the King, and that the establishment of any other government than the King's in France must inevitably lead to new and endless wars; that Buonaparte and the army having overturned the King's government, the natural and simple measure, after Buonaparte was prisoner or out of the way, and the army defeated, was to recall the King to his authority, and that it was a much more dignified proceeding to recall him without conditions, and to trust to the energy of their constitution for any reforms they wished to make either in the government or the constitution, than now to make conditions with their Sovereign ; and that, above all, it was important that they should recall the King without loss of time, as it would not then appear that the measure had been forced upon them by the Allies.

‘ The Commissioners professed, individually and collectively, their earnest desire to see the King restored in the manner I had mentioned, which they said was likewise the desire of the Provisional Government. — — — was, however, of opinion that the two chambers could not be brought to recall the King without conditions ; and he mentioned, as those upon which they would probably insist, and upon which it was desirable the King should give way, the responsibility of the administration and the alteration of the constitution, so far as that the initiative in making the laws should be vested in the assemblies, and not in the King.

‘ I told them, regarding the first point, that I had every reason to believe that the King had determined to form a ministry which should be individually and collectively responsible for all the acts of the government; and that I did not doubt that His Majesty would not oppose himself to the wishes of the French people, if it was desired that the initiative in framing the laws should be vested in the assemblies: that, however, I had no authority to speak on this subject, and recommended to them not to look after little points of difference, and if they really wished to restore the govern-

ment of their King, to do it at once and without any conditions.

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‘In the course of this conversation they stated that the assemblies had proclaimed Napoleon II. as emperor, only to conciliate the officers and soldiers of the army, who had come into Paris in such numbers after the battle, that they had been apprehensive of a civil war in Paris if this measure had not been adopted.

‘While we were discussing the conditions to be proposed to the King, and the evils and inconveniences which the mode of making the laws, and the want of responsibility and power in the ministers had occasioned, I received from Sir Charles Stuart, the King’s declaration of the 28th, countersigned by M. de Talleyrand, which I immediately communicated to the French Commissioners, and pointed out to them the King’s promise, to make the alteration in his administration, which they had proposed to be made in the constitution.

‘They objected to certain paragraphs in the declaration referable to the exclusion of certain persons from the King’s presence, to the intention announced to punish some of those concerned in the plot which had brought back Buonaparte, and to that of calling together the old houses of the legislature, upon which, at their desire, I wrote to M. de Talleyrand, a letter, of which Sir Charles Stuart will probably have sent to England a copy, which I communicated to the Commissioners before I sent it.

‘I then told them that I could not talk more upon the suspension of our operations, which they urged in the most earnest manner, in order to give them time to take their measures to recall the King, until I should see Marshal Blücher, to whose head-quarters I promised to go that evening.

‘Before I set off, the Commissioners asked me whether the appointment of a regency to conduct the affairs of the government in the name of Napoleon II. was likely to satisfy the Allies, and would be such an arrangement as would induce me to stop my operations. I answered, certainly not; that I conceived the Allies, after their declaration, would never treat with Napoleon or any of his family; that the appointment of Napoleon II. was to be attributed to Napoleon I., and the acknowledgment of him

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to the desire to conciliate the army, and that I should not stop my operations in consequence of such an arrangement.

‘They then asked me what would be the case if any other prince of a royal house were called to the throne of France? To which I said it was impossible for me to answer such loose questions; that, as an individual, I had made them acquainted with my opinion of what it was best for them to do, and it rested with them either to follow this opinion or not.

‘One of the Commissioners, before I went away, took occasion to tell me that he wished I had given a more positive answer to this last question, and I determined to take another opportunity of doing so before the Commissioners should report this conversation to Paris.

‘I left them at Etrées, and went to the head-quarters at Le Plessis, to give the orders for the movement of the troops in the morning, and I overtook them again in the night at Louvres. I then told them I had considered their last question since I had seen them, and that I felt no objection to give them my opinion on it as an individual; that, in my opinion, Europe had no hope of peace if any person excepting the King were called to the throne of France; that any person so called must be considered an usurper, whatever his rank and quality; that he must act as an usurper, and must endeavour to turn the attention of the country from the defects of his title towards war and foreign conquests; that the powers of Europe must, in such a case, guard themselves against this evil; and that I could only assure them that, unless otherwise ordered by my government, I would exert any influence I might possess over the Allied Sovereigns to induce them to insist upon securities for the preservation of peace, besides the treaty itself, if such an arrangement as they had stated were adopted.

‘The Commissioners replied that they perfectly understood me, and some of them added—“*Et vous avez raison.*”’*

* Despatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, compiled by Colonel Gurwood, C.B.—vol. xii. p. 534.

CHAPTER XX.

Blücher directs Bülow to make an attack upon Aubervilliers in the night of the 29th—He is joined by Wellington in person, when the two commanders agree not to suspend their operations so long as Napoleon remains in Paris—The Prussians carry the village of Aubervilliers, and drive the French back upon the canal of St. Denis—The Allied commanders decide upon masking the fortified lines of St. Denis and Montmartre with one army, whilst the other should move to the right, and cross to the opposite bank of the Seine—Projected plan of operations—On the 30th, Zieten's and Thielemann's corps, move off to the right, while Bülow's continues in its position—Disposition of the respective armies on the evening of the 30th—Policy of Fouché—Letter from Davoust (Prince of Eckmühl) to Wellington and Blücher, demanding a suspension of hostilities—Wellington's reply—Blücher's reply—Address to the Chamber of Deputies from Davoust and other generals of the army—Proclamation issued by the Chambers—On the morning of the 1st of July, Bülow's corps moves off to the right, towards Argenteuil—The Anglo-allied army reaches le Bourget, and takes up the position vacated by the Prussians—The French attack Aubervilliers, and gain possession of half the village—The British light troops of Colville's division re-take the greater part of Aubervilliers—Lieut. Colonel von Sohr's Prussian light cavalry-brigade reaches Versailles—He is attacked by the French cavalry, under Excelmans—Affairs at Rocquencourt, Versailles, and Lechesnay—Remarks upon the detaching of Sohr's brigade—Positions of the respective armies on the evening of the 1st of July—On the 2nd of July, the Prussian army moves towards the heights of Meudon and Chatillon, on the south side of Paris—Affairs at Sèvres, Moulineaux, and Issy—The Anglo-allied army continues in position in front of St. Denis—Wellington establishes a bridge at Argenteuil, and keeps open the communication with the Prussian army—Critical situation of the French army—The Provisional Government directs the Commissioners to wait again upon the Duke of Wellington—His Grace's reply to their request—Positions of the respective armies during the night of the 2nd of July—Affair at Issy on the morning of the 3rd of July—Cessation of hostilities—Convention of Paris—Conclusion.

PRINCE Blücher had satisfied himself, by means of the reconnaissances made during the 29th, that 29th of June.

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very considerable pains had been taken by the enemy to oppose a serious obstruction to the further advance of troops marching against the north side of Paris. He was now desirous of ascertaining whether the disposition and spirit of the enemy's troops were at all commensurate with the extent of the works which he saw before him ; and, with this view, he directed Bülow to make an attack, in the night of the 29th, with part of his corps d'armée, upon Aubervilliers. He also desired Zieten to support this attack, by raising as much alarm as possible in the villages of Bondy and Pantin.

Before the attack commenced, Blücher was joined by Wellington, in person, who communicated to him the proposals which had been made by the French commissioners. Being already engaged in an important operation, he could not consent to suspend hostilities ; and the two commanders agreed in opinion that, as long as Napoleon remained in Paris they could not arrest their operations without insisting upon his being delivered up to them. Accordingly the Duke wrote a letter immediately to the commissioners to this effect.

Bülow confided the attack upon Aubervilliers to General von Sydow, with the 13th brigade (9 battalions), together with one battalion of the 14th brigade, and two regiments of cavalry. The remainder of the 4th corps d'armée was held under

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arms, in readiness to follow up any acquired advantage. Four battalions advanced in column, under Colonel von Lettow, supported by the remaining five battalions. The arrangements, being made during the night, occupied some little time, so that twilight had set in when the attack commenced. Colonel von Lettow penetrated the extensive village on three sides, forced the barriers, and carried every thing before him with the bayonet. The place had been occupied by 1,000 of the enemy's best troops, of whom 200 were made prisoners, and the remainder pursued as far as the canal of St. Denis.

General von Sydow, accompanied by Major von Lützow, of the staff, immediately made a reconnaissance of the canal, and soon discovered that its opposite bank was lined with infantry in great force, and that the different points of passage were defended by batteries. Nevertheless he made the attempt to advance; but the troops were received with a vigorous fire of both artillery and musketry; and it soon became evident, that the enemy's fortified position could not be taken except at a great sacrifice of both time and men. Von Sydow, therefore, limited his operations to the occupation of the captured village.

A simultaneous advance towards the canal was made, on the left of Aubervilliers, by the 3rd battalion of the 1st Pomeranian landwehr, and the 10th regiment of hussars, which maintained the

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communication with the 1st corps. A sharp tirailade took place, which terminated in the withdrawal of these troops to their former position.

By means of this reconnaissance it was made sufficiently manifest that the line of the canal of St. Denis could not be carried without a serious assault, preluded by a heavy cannonade. It then became a question with the Allied commanders, who had thus, most fortunately, the opportunity of concerting measures in person, whether it would not be advisable to endeavour to turn the enemy's strongly fortified lines of St. Denis and Montmartre, by masking those lines with one army, whilst the other should move off to the right, and cross to the left bank of the Seine, lower down the stream. Although this movement would have the effect of extending and dividing the Allied forces, and consequently of augmenting the chances of success on the part of the enemy, should the latter possess the disposition and the means, not only of acting determinedly on the defensive, but also of assuming the offensive, accordingly as his circumstances might favour the attempt, still any defeat of this kind was fully counterbalanced by the advantages which the plan presented. It cut off the entire communication with Normandy, from which Paris derived its chief supplies; whilst the approach of the Bavarian army towards the opposite side was gradually limiting the resources of the capital in that quarter. It enabled the com-

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manders to present their forces simultaneously at different points, and thus, by continuing that display of vigour which had characterized their advance, they were far more likely to impose upon the *morale* of both the defeated army and the citizens, than by limiting their combined operations to the attack of the stronghold presented by the lines of St. Denis; for to do this, would, in all probability, require time, and it was evident from the repeated proposals made by the French government for a suspension of hostilities, that time was their great object, whether for the purpose of facilitating the collection and organization of their resources, or in the hope of obtaining more favourable terms from the Allies. It had also been tolerably well ascertained that, although fortified works had been thrown up on the right bank of the Seine, the defence of the left bank had been comparatively neglected. A further inducement towards the adoption of this plan arose from a report which was now received from Major von Colomb, stating that although he had found the bridge of Chatou, leading to Malmaison, destroyed, he had hastened to that of St. Germain, on hearing that it had not been injured, and succeeded in gaining possession of it, at the very moment the French were on the point of effecting its destruction. The bridge of Maisons, still lower down the stream, was also taken and occupied.

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No time was lost by the Prussian commander in taking advantage of the captured bridges across the Seine. Lieut. Colonel von Sohr received an order that night to move, with his cavalry-brigade (the Brandenburg and Pomeranian hussars), from the vicinity of Louvres, and to regulate his march so that he might cross the Seine at St. Germain on the following morning. Thence he was to proceed so as to appear, with his brigade, on the 1st of July, upon the Orleans road from Paris, where he was to interrupt this communication, and increase the confusion already produced in that quarter by the fugitives from the capital. Altogether, he was to act independently and discretionally, and, as far as practicable, to impede the supplies of provisions from the western and southern provinces.

It was arranged that the Prussian army should move to its right, for the purpose of crossing the Seine, and, in order to mask the operation as much as possible, the advanced posts of the 1st and 4th corps d'armée were to remain in their present position until the arrival of the Anglo-allied army, which was expected to take place on the evening of the 30th. The 3rd corps was directed to resume, at five o'clock in the morning of the 30th, its march upon Gonesse: and thence to proceed to St. Germain, but in such a manner as to conceal its movements by means of the valley of Montmorency, and not to reach the more open ground about Argenteuil until darkness should

have completely set in. From the latter point it would then complete its march to St. Germain. 30th of June.
The 1st corps was ordered to break up from its bivouac at ten o'clock in the evening, and march southward of Gonesse, by Montmorency, Franconville, Cormeille, and Maisons, at which latter point it was to cross the Seine, and immediately open a communication with the 3rd corps. The 4th corps d'armée was directed to move, at day-break of the 1st of July, by the right of St. Denis, and to bombard this place during its march to Argenteuil, in which direction it was to effect a junction with the 1st and 3rd corps. The advanced posts of the 1st and 4th corps were to remain until relieved by the British troops, and then, in like manner, to follow the rest of the army.

These movements were punctually directed in the manner prescribed. As the 1st and 3rd corps d'armée moved off to the right, Count Bülow considered it necessary to strengthen the outposts of the 4th corps, so as to be prepared to meet the enemy should the latter debouch from St. Denis. He therefore ordered Colonel von Hiller to take post in observation of this point, with six battalions, a regiment of cavalry, half of a 6-pounder battery, and two pieces of horse-artillery.

About three o'clock in the afternoon, the Prussian outposts reported that French columns were advancing from St. Denis, and that the vedettes were already driven in. Colonel von Hiller im-

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mediately pushed forward the sharpshooters of two battalions, as also two squadrons of cavalry, with two pieces of horse-artillery. At the same time, the troops at Stains got under arms, and were prepared to support. A very brisk tirailade ensued, although there was no cover for the skirmishers on the plain, except the trees along the great road, and the high corn, which served to conceal their approach. The enemy had also sent detachments towards Epinay and Pierrefitte, but at these points, as also in advance of Stains, the French were compelled to give way and to retire, without having succeeded in their object of forcing back the Prussian outposts.

The main body of the 4th corps d'armée remained, during the 30th, in its position at le Bourget; its advanced guard, under General von Sydow, was detached to the right, towards Argenteuil, to communicate with the 3rd corps d'armée. As the former was to move off on the following morning, it became necessary to hold the outposts strictly on the defensive. Aubervilliers was the most open to attack. Two companies were posted at the outlets, towards the French side: and in rear of these, two other companies were formed in support. Still further to the rear was the main position, on which these troops, if overpowered, were to fall back. It lay along the villages of Chantourterelle, Courneuve, and Merville, connected together by a watercourse

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lined with bushes, and consisting of separate country-houses and châteaux, mostly within walls, which had been loopholed for tirailleurs. Six battalions, chiefly extended in skirmishing order, were considered sufficient to occupy the whole of this line, as far as the high road from le Bourget. Partial skirmishing, at a distance, was kept up; though, on the side of the Prussians, it was more for the purpose of diverting the attention of the enemy, and concealing from him the general movement to the right. Bivouac-fires were maintained during the night on the ground vacated by the different corps, in order to deceive the enemy by their apparent indication of the continued presence of the Prussian army in front of the lines of St. Denis.

On this day, the advanced guard of the Anglo-allied army (Vivian's hussar-brigade) reached Vauderlan. The British cavalry moved to Louvres.

Estorff's cavalry, attached to the 2nd corps, crossed the Oise at Creil, and proceeded by Chantilly to Luzarches. The infantry of this corps marched from Clermont to Chantilly.

The 1st corps moved from its camp near St. Martin Longeau, crossed the Oise at Pont St. Maxence, and advanced until the head of the column reached La Capelle, and its rear rested upon Senlis.

The reserve moved from its camp, near Gour-

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may, by Pont St. Maxence, the head of the column reaching Fleurines, on the road to Senlis, and the rear resting upon Pont St. Maxence.

The following were the positions of the respective armies on the evening of the 30th :—

The 1st Prussian corps d'armée commenced its march, at half-past ten o'clock in the evening, from Blancmesnil and Aulnay towards St. Germain, passing, during the night, through Gonesse, Montmorency, and le Mesnil, to Carrière au Mont, near St. Germain—leaving its outposts in the position they had hitherto occupied.

The 3rd corps d'armée marched, during the night, from Damartin to St. Germain, by Gonesse and Argenteuil, at which latter place, however, its reserve-cavalry was halted.

The 4th corps d'armée remained in its position at le Bourget, to cover the march of the rest of the army. Its outposts continued at Stains, St. Denis, and Aubervilliers. Lieut. Colonel von Sohr, with the Brandenburg and Pomeranian hussars, crossed the Seine at St. Germain, and was advancing towards Versailles.

Major von Colomb, with the 8th hussars, occupied the bridge of St. Germain.

The head-quarters of Prince Blücher continued at Gonesse.

The advanced guard of the Anglo-allied army was at Vauderlan.

The British cavalry was encamped on the plain about Louvres.

The Hanoverian cavalry was at Luzarches.

The 2nd and 4th divisions, and the Nassau troops, were upon the high road between La Capelle and Senlis.

The 5th and 6th divisions, the Brunswick troops, and the reserve-artillery, were upon the high road between Fleurines and Pont St. Maxence.

The pontoon-train and hawser-bridges were at Senlis.

The Duke of Wellington's head-quarters were at Louvres.

The French army remained within the lines of Paris.

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Since the departure of Napoleon both the army and the citizens looked upon the parliament as the sole directing power ; and, in full reliance upon its integrity, appeared willingly submissive to its dictates. Fouché, who had been in secret communication with the Allies, decided upon exercising, in accordance with their views, the great influence he had succeeded in acquiring over a very considerable portion of the deputies. It was mainly by means of this influence that he contrived to remove the principal obstacle in the way of all negotiation—the presence of Napoleon. His next step was to prepare the chamber for the return to power of the legitimate monarch, a measure which he could only hope to accomplish by holding it forth as the sole alternative to the destruction of Paris by the vast and overwhelming force of the Allied armies marching towards the capital from the north and east frontiers, and by combining with it the adoption of such modifications of the charter as should satisfy the desires of the constitutionalists and the moderately disposed of all parties. Aware that the army was animated with a spirit of determined resistance towards the Allies, he plainly saw that unless conciliated, the turbulent Buonapartists, with whom its ranks were filled, might speedily frustrate the accomplishment of his plans by which the peace of the capital was to be preserved, and ultimately prevent the attainment of that extended constitutional power for which the deputies were

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contending. He, therefore, with his usual adroitness, addressed himself to its chief, Marshal Davoust, Prince of Eckmühl; and by his skilful exposition of the political posture of affairs, he succeeded in gaining over the Marshal to his views. The latter wrote to him on the evening of the 29th that he had overcome his prejudices, and had arrived at the conclusion that the only safe course to be pursued, consisted in entering into an armistice, and proclaiming Louis XVIII. On the 30th, the Prince, as the head of the French army, addressed the following letter to both Wellington and Blücher :—

‘ Head-Quarters, La Villette, June 30, 1815.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Your hostile movements continue, although, according to the declarations of the Allied Sovereigns, the motives of the war which they make upon us no longer exist, since the Emperor Napoleon has abdicated.

‘ At the moment when blood is again on the point of flowing, I receive from Marshal the Duke of Albufera a telegraphic despatch, of which I transmit you a copy. My Lord, I guarantee this armistice on my honour. All the reasons you might have had to continue hostilities are destroyed, because you can have no other instruction from your government, than that which the Austrian generals had from theirs.

‘ I make the formal demand to your Excellency of ceasing all hostilities, and of our proceeding to agree to an armistice, according to the decision of congress. I cannot believe, my Lord, that my request will be ineffectual; you will take upon yourself a great responsibility in the eyes of your fellow-countrymen.

‘ No other motive but that of putting an end to the effusion

of blood, and the interests of my country, has dictated this letter.

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‘If I present myself on the field of battle, with the idea of your talents, I shall carry the conviction of there combating for the most sacred of causes – that of the defence and independence of my country ; and, whatever may be the result, I shall merit your esteem.

‘ Accept, &c.

‘ THE MARSHAL PRINCE OF ECKMUHL,

‘ Minister at War.’

To this the Duke of Wellington replied in the following terms :—

‘ Head-Quarters, July 1, 1815—10 A.M.

‘ MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

‘ I have just received your Excellency’s letter of the 30th June, in which your Excellency communicates to me the intelligence you have received of an armistice having been concluded by General Frimont with Marshal the Duke of Albufera.

‘ I have already made known, in writing, to the French commissioners sent to the Allied powers, and verbally, to the commissioners sent to me, the reasons which have prevented me from suspending my operations; which reasons, I have cause to believe are fully adopted by the Allies of my Sovereign, and of those whose armies I have the honour of commanding.

‘ I have every wish to prevent the further effusion of the blood of the brave troops under my command ; but it must be upon the conditions which shall secure the re-establishment and the stability of the general peace.

‘ I have the honour to be, &c.

‘ WELLINGTON.’

Prince Blücher, who entertained a great con-

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tempt for diplomacy,* attributing as he did the cause of the renewal of the war to the ill-concocted schemes to which that war had given birth, had hitherto refrained from either receiving in person, or noticing in writing, any communications addressed to him by the French authorities. He applied himself solely to the military solution of the great problem, on which depended the peace of Europe. Upon this occasion, however, tempted probably by the opportunity which was offered to him of sharply retorting upon the Marshal, under

* On this point he always expressed himself openly and without reserve. A memorable instance occurred subsequently to the convention of Paris, at a large dinner party given by the Duke of Wellington, when, rising from his seat between the latter and the British minister, Viscount Castlereagh, he gave the following toast:—"May the diplomatists not again spoil with their pens, that which the armies have at so much cost won with their swords!" Not long after this, when the terms of the peace were under discussion, Blücher, conceiving that these would again be made too favourable to France, evinced the greatest mistrust, amounting almost to hatred, of the diplomatists. Happening to meet the Prussian minister, Prince Hardenberg, he thus boldly addressed him—"I only wish I had you, gentlemen of the pen, exposed for once to a pretty smart skirmishing fire, that you might learn what it is when the soldier is obliged to repair with his life's blood the errors which you so thoughtlessly commit on paper." The following fact shows that no personal considerations restrained him from indulging in his splenetic humour against the great diplomatists of the day. It is well known that immediately after the convention of Paris, he was extremely desirous of destroying the bridge of Jena, and that he would undoubtedly have carried his intentions into effect had it not been for the urgent representations of the Duke of Wellington. On that occasion, Count von der Goltz, formerly his aide-de-camp, and then Prussian ambassador in Paris, made a written application to him, in behalf, and in the name, of Prince Talleyrand; beseeching the preservation of the bridge. Blücher replied in his own hand-writing—"I have resolved upon blowing up the bridge; and I cannot conceal from your excellency how much pleasure it would afford me if M. Talleyrand would previously station himself upon it; and I beg you will make my wish known to him."

whose government of Hamburg the greatest excesses had been committed upon his countrymen, he was induced to pen the following reply, couched in his rough native German, as if to evince both his disdain of the usual diplomatic mode of communication, and his dislike of even the very language of the country he so thoroughly detested:—

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*‘ To the French General Davoust.**

‘ Head-Quarters, July 1, 1815.

‘ MARSHAL,

‘ It is not conformable to truth that, because Napoleon has abdicated the throne, there exists no further motive for war between the Allied powers and France. His abdication is conditional; that is, in favour of his son: but a decree of the Allied powers excludes not only Napoleon, but every member of his family, from the throne.

‘ If General Frimont has considered himself authorised to conclude an armistice with your general opposed to him, that is no motive for us to do the same. We shall pursue our victory. God has given us strength and resolution to do so. Beware, Marshal, of what you do; and forbear devoting another city to

** Au den Französischen General Davoust.*

Mein Herr Marschall!

Es ist irrig dass zwischen den verbündeten Mächten und Frankreich alle Ursachen zum Kriege aufgehört haben, weil Napoleon dem Throne entsagt habe; dieser hat nur bedingungsweise entsagt, nämlich zu Gunsten seines Sohnes, und der Beschluss der vereinigten Mächte schliesst nicht allein Napoleon, sondern alle Mitglieder seiner Familie vom Throne aus.

Wenn der General Frimont sich berechtigt geglaubt hat, einen Waffenstillstand mit dem ihm gegenüberstehenden feindlichen General zu schliessen, so ist dies kein Motiv für uns, ein Gleiches zu thun. Wir verfolgen unsern Sieg, und Gott hat uns Mittel und Willen dazu verliehen.

Sehen Sie zu, Herr Marschall, was Sie thun, und stürzen Sie nicht aber-

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destruction ; for you know what liberties the exasperated soldiers would take, should your capital be carried by storm. Do you solicit the maledictions of Paris, in addition to those of Hamburg ?

‘ We shall enter Paris to protect the respectable inhabitants against the mob, by whom they are threatened with pillage. An armistice can be made with security nowhere but in Paris. This, our relative position towards your nation, be pleased, Marshal, not to mistake !

‘ Let me finally observe to you, Marshal, if you mean to negotiate with us, it is matter of surprise that, in defiance of the law of nations, you detain our officers despatched with letters and orders.

‘ In the usual form of conventional civility, I have the honour to be,

‘ Marshal,

‘ Your obedient servant,

‘ BLÜCHER.’

Whilst thus endeavouring to draw the Allied generals into negotiation, Fouché and Davoust felt

mals eine Stadt ins Verderben ; denn Sie wissen, was der erbitterte Soldat sich erlauben würde, wenn Ihre Hauptstadt mit Sturm genommen würde.

Wollen Sie die Verwünschungen von Paris eben so wie die von Hamburg auf sich laden ?

Wir wollen in Paris einrücken, um die rechtlichen Leute in Schutz zu nehmen gegen die Plünderung, die ihnen von Seiten des Pöbels droht. Nur in Paris kann ein zuverlässiger Waffenstillstand Statt haben. Sie wollen, Herr Marschall, dieses unser Verhältniss zu Ihrer Nation nicht verkennen.

Ich mache Ihnen, Herr Marschall, übrigens bemerlich, dass, wenn Sie mit uns unterhandeln wollen, es sonderbar ist, dass Sie unsere mit Briefen und Aufträgen gesendeten Offiziere gegen das Völkerrecht zurückhalten.

In den gewöhnlichen Formen conventioneller Höflichkeit habe ich die Ehre mich zu nennen,

Herr Marschall,

Ihren

dienstwilligen,

Blücher.

the necessity of carrying out their plans with the greatest caution, and in such a manner as to prevent any unfavourable construction being put upon their motives by the army. On the evening of the 30th of June there was an assemblage of general officers at the head-quarters in Villette, at which it was proposed to send up an address to the chamber of representatives, expressive of the determined spirit of resistance which animated the troops, and of their hostility to the Bourbons. It was adopted by the majority, and Davoust, though secretly working with Fouché for the restoration of Louis XVIII., did not hesitate to attach to it his signature. It was couched in the following terms:—

30th of
June.

‘Camp at Villette, 30th June.

‘REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE !

‘We are in présence of our enemies. We swear before you and the world, to defend, to our last breath, the cause of our independence and the national honour.’

‘It is wished to impose the Bourbons upon us, but these princes are rejected by the immense majority of Frenchmen. If their return could be agreed to, recollect, representatives, that you would sign the annihilation of the army, which for twenty yea has been the palladium of French honour. There are in war, especially when it has been long conducted, successes and reverses. In our successes, we have appeared great and generous. If it is wished to humble us in our reverses; we shall know how to die.

‘The Bourbons present no guarantee to the nation. We received them with sentiments of the most generous confidence: we forgot all the calamities they had caused us in their rage to

30th of June. deprive us of our most sacred rights. Well! what return did they make for this confidence? They treated us as rebels and as vanquished. Representatives! these reflections are terrible, because they are true. History will one day relate what the Bourbons have done to replace themselves on the throne of France; it will also narrate the conduct of the army; of that army essentially national; and posterity will judge which best deserved the esteem of the world.

‘ The Marshal Prince of ECKMUHL,
‘ Minister at War,

‘ Count PAJOL, commanding the first
‘ corps of cavalry,

‘ Count D’ERLON, commanding the
‘ right wing,

‘ Count VANDAMME, General in chief.’

(And fifteen other generals.)

The chambers being thus appealed to, felt it incumbent on them to issue a proclamation explanatory of the political situation of France, and of their own intentions under all the critical circumstances in which it presented itself to their view. This document, cautiously drawn up by the constitutionalists, who formed the preponderating party in the state, and strongly marked by the policy which was pursued throughout by Fouché, was framed with great tact. Although it acknowledged the nomination of Napoleon’s son to the empire, it manifested no hostility to the Bourbons; it expressed a desire to secure a monarchical and representative government, but, at the same time, declared that the head of the government, whoever

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he might be, must enter into a solemn compact and abide by the constitutional charter. In short, its general tone was sufficiently independent to secure for it, if not the approbation, at least the acquiescence, of both the liberals and the Buonapartists; whilst, on the other hand, it significantly indicated the terms upon which a Bourbon might re-ascend the throne, and rally round him the friends of constitutional order and civil rights. With but few exceptions it admitted of being reconciled with the proclamation published on the 28th of June by Louis XVIII.* It ran thus:—

‘FRENCHMEN!

‘The foreign powers proclaimed, in the face of Europe, that they were only armed against Napoleon, and that they wished to respect our independence, and the right which belongs to every nation to choose a government suitable to its habits and its interests.

‘Napoleon is no longer the chief of the state. He has renounced the throne, and his abdication has been accepted by your representatives. He is removed from us. His son is called to the empire by the constitution of the state. The coalesced sovereigns are informed of this; and the war ought to be terminated, if the promises of kings have any foundation in truth.

‘While plenipotentiaries have been sent to the Allied powers to treat for peace in the name of France, the generals of two of those powers have refused any suspension of arms. Their troops have accelerated their marches under favour of a moment of hesitation and trouble. They are now at the very gates of the capital, and no communication has stated for what object the war

* Appendix XVII.

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is continued. Our plenipotentiaries will soon declare whether we must renounce peace. In the mean time, resistance is not only legitimate, but necessary ; and humanity, in requiring an account of the blood uselessly shed, will not accuse those brave men who only combat to repel from their houses the scourges of war, murder, and pillage, and to defend with their lives the cause of liberty, and of that independence the imprescriptible right of which has been guaranteed to them even by the manifestoes of their enemies.

‘ Amidst these circumstances, your representatives cannot forget that they were not chosen to stipulate for the interests of any individual party, but for the whole nation. Every act of weakness will dishonour them, and will only tend to endanger the future tranquillity of France. While the government is employing all the means in its power to obtain a solid peace, or, should that not be obtained without compromising our honour, to repel the battalions of foreigners, what more advantages to the nation can be done than to collect and establish the fundamental rules of a monarchical and representative government, destined to secure to all citizens the free enjoyment of those sacred rights, which sacrifices so numerous and so great have purchased ; and to rally for ever, under the national colours, that great body of Frenchmen who have no other interest, and no other wish, than an honourable repose and a just independence.

‘ Meanwhile the chambers conceive that their duty and their dignity require them to declare that they will never acknowledge, as legitimate chief of the state, him who on ascending the throne, shall refuse to acknowledge the rights of the nation, and to consecrate them by a solemn compact. The constitutional charter is drawn up ; and if the force of arms should succeed in temporarily imposing upon us a master—if the destinies of a great nation are again to be delivered up to the caprice and arbitrary will of a small number of privileged persons—then, in yielding to force, the national representation will protest in the face of the whole world against the oppression of the French people.

‘ Your representatives will appeal to the energy of the present

and future generations to renew their claim both to national independence, and the rights of civil and religious liberty. For these rights they now appeal to the reason and the justice of all civilized nations.'

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Notwithstanding the continued endeavours on the part of the French commissioners appointed by the chambers, to induce the Allied generals to enter upon an armistice, the military operations were not for a moment interrupted.

On the morning of the 1st of July, Bülow's corps d'armée (the 4th) moved off to its right, towards Argenteuil. During the movement, however, the enemy, as if at length aware, or desirous of ascertaining the nature, of Blücher's operations, attacked the village of Aubervilliers in front, from the canal of St. Denis, and penetrated as far as the church situated in the centre of the place. The French were here met by the Prussian support, and two battalions from the main position arriving immediately afterwards, they were prevented from making any further progress. Nevertheless, a prolonged tirailade, as well as a howitzer-fire, on the part of the French, were maintained, during which the march of Bülow's corps continued in operation, the 14th brigade being left in support to the advanced posts until the arrival of the Anglo-allied troops.

In the afternoon, the Duke of Wellington's army reached le Bourget, and took up the position vacated by Prince Blücher, whose advanced posts

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it immediately relieved. Three companies of light infantry from Colville's division were thrown into Aubervilliers. The Prussians who had hitherto been stationed for the purpose of masking as much as possible the general movement of their army to the right, had kept up a distant and desultory fire from that portion of the village which was in their possession, abstaining from making any direct attack, since this might have led to the advance of the French in great force at the moment the former were no longer supported by the main army, and before the Anglo-allied troops had arrived.

The British light companies, mentioned as having been thrown into Aubervilliers, were under no restraint of this kind, and Lieut. Colonel Sir Neil Campbell, who commanded them, determined to push forward, and possess himself, if possible, of the entire village. Having first gained two or three of the highest houses, he broke from the top of these into some that were lower, and thence forcing his way through the partition walls of others, without much firing, since the French did not appear disposed to make an obstinate resistance, (being by that time probably aware of the Prussian movement to the right, and of the arrival of the Anglo-allied army,) he succeeded in obtaining possession of one side of a whole street, and of the greater portion of the village. The French officer in command then proposed a truce, which was accepted, since the post he occupied lay

between the British and a battery upon the canal. The remaining outposts were taken up from the Prussians without any molestation on the part of the enemy, and the main Anglo-allied army occupied a position, having its right upon the height of Richebourg, and its left upon the wood of Bondy.

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It will be recollected that Lieut. Colonel von Sohr, of the Prussian light cavalry, was directed to pass the bridge of St. Germain, on the morning of the 30th of June, and to show himself on the Orleans road upon the 1st of July. Starting at daybreak of the 30th, the brigade passed through Montmorency and Argenteuil, towards St. Germain, where it fell in with Major von Colomb's detachment, consisting of the 8th hussars and two battalions of infantry. It then moved on about a league further, to Marly, upon the Versailles road, which it reached at nightfall, and where it bivouacked. On the morning of the 1st of July, Lieut. Colonel von Sohr resumed his march, and took the direction of Versailles, which place, however, he did not reach until noon, much delay having occurred whilst passing through the intersected ground in that quarter, and in awaiting the reports from the detachments sent out in different directions to gain intelligence of the enemy.

This bold and hazardous movement of Lieut. Colonel von Sohr's brigade, which was acting independently as a free corps for the time, did not escape the enemy's observation. General Excel-

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mans, who commanded the French cavalry on the south side of Paris, on receiving information that two regiments of Prussian hussars were advancing by Marly upon Versailles, resolved to attack them. For this purpose he proceeded himself with the 5th, 15th, and 20th dragoons, and the 6th hussars, comprising a force of 3,000 men, along the road from Montrouge towards Plessis-Piquet, against the front of the Prussian brigade. At the same time, the light cavalry-division of General Piré, together with the 33rd regiment of infantry, consisting of three battalions, were detached against the flank and rear of the Prussian brigade. The 5th and 6th lancers marched by the Sèvres road upon Viroflay; the 6th chasseurs proceeded to occupy the cross-roads connecting Sèvres with the northern portion of Versailles; the 1st chasseurs moved by Sèvres towards Rocquencourt, about three miles from Versailles, on the road to St. Germain; in which direction the 33rd infantry followed. Both the latter regiments were destined to cut off the retreat of the Prussian cavalry, should it be driven back by Excelmans. An exceedingly well planned ambush was now laid in and about Rocquencourt, and every precaution taken by the detaching of small parties on the look-out.

It was late in the afternoon when Lieut. Colonel von Sohr received intelligence that the enemy's cavalry was approaching, and that his advanced

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guard was attacked. He immediately advanced, with both his hussar-regiments, and drove back the enemy upon Villa-Coublai, in the defile of which village a sharp engagement ensued. In this attack the ranks of the Prussian hussars had become disordered, and, as the latter retired, they were fallen upon by the 5th and 6th French lancers, of Piré's light cavalry-brigade, before alluded to as having been posted in ambush. They then fell back upon Versailles, pursued by the French, who vainly endeavoured to force an entrance into the town, at the gate of which a gallant resistance was made by the Prussians. The short time that was gained by this resistance sufficed for collecting the main body of the brigade on the open space at the outlet leading to St. Germain, towards which point it might have retreated through the park, but, having received information of the advance of Thielemann's corps, and expecting every moment to derive from it a support, Lieut. Colonel von Sohr retired by the more direct road through Rocquencourt. About seven o'clock in the evening, at which time the hussars had collected their scattered force together, and were on the point of commencing their further retreat upon St. Germain, Sohr received intelligence, upon which he could rely, that he had been turned by both cavalry and infantry, and that his line of retreat had been intercepted. His decision was instantly formed. He knew his men,

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their devotion, and their courage, and resolved upon cutting his way through the enemy with the sword.

On quitting Versailles the Prussian hussars were fired upon by the national guard from the barrier. They had not proceeded far when word was brought in, that Prussian and English cavalry were approaching from the side of St. Germain, but they were speedily undeceived. It was the 1st regiment of French chasseurs. In the next moment they were formed for attack, and advanced at a gallop. The chasseurs came on in the same style, but they were completely overthrown, and their commanding officer lay stretched upon the ground by a pistol-shot. As they were pursued by the hussars, a fire was unexpectedly opened upon the latter by two companies of the 3rd battalion of the 33rd French regiment, posted behind some hedges, near Lechesnay; whereupon Sohr, with the greater part of his hussars, struck into a field-road to the right, in order to turn this village, which was occupied by the enemy. This, however, led them to a bridge, with adjacent houses, occupied by two more companies of the above battalion, from which they also received a sharp fire. Meeting with this new obstacle, and aware of the proximity of the great mass of cavalry under Excelmans, in their rear, the diminished and disordered remnant of the two Prussian regiments, about 150 hussars, rallying upon their

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chief, dashed across a meadow, with a determination to force a passage through the village of Lechesnay. Here the chasseurs again opposed them, but were once more overthrown, and the Prussians now followed a road which conducted them through the village, but which unfortunately led into a large court whence there was no other outlet. Not only was their further progress thus checked, but their whole body was suddenly assailed by a fire from infantry, already posted in this quarter, whilst the pursuing cavalry prevented every chance of escape. Their situation had become truly desperate, but their bravery, instead of succumbing, appeared incited to the highest pitch by the heroic example of Lieut. Colonel von Sohr, who rejected the offer of quarter, and fell, severely wounded by a pistol-shot. Victory favoured the strongest; but it was a victory gained by immeasurably superior numbers over the dead and dying of a gallant band of warriors, who fought to the last, and did all that the most inflexible bravery could accomplish.

The losses incurred by this brigade during the short campaign had already reduced it, previously to this affair, to between 600 and 700 men; and on the present occasion it suffered a still further loss of 10 officers and from 400 to 500 men.

The detaching of these two regiments so much in advance of the Prussian general movement to the right, and the orders given to Lieut. Colonel

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von Sohr, to cross the Seine on the morning of the 30th of June, appear a questionable measure. It is true that this officer was desired to consider himself as acting independently, and without reference to the troops that were to follow in the same direction; but then it must be recollected that he had to proceed along a very considerable portion of the circumference of a circle, from the centre of which the enemy could detach superior force along radii far shorter than the distance between the Prussian brigade and the main army: so that, with a vigilant look-out, the French possessed every facility of cutting off his retreat. His orders were, to interrupt the communication with Paris by the Orleans road, and to spread alarm and confusion on that side of the capital, but in issuing them the effect likely to be produced upon the *morale* of the citizens could have alone been contemplated; and, in all probability, it was at the same time conceived that, as no fortified works had been thrown up on the south side, the French troops intended to direct their attention mainly, if not wholly, towards the armies in front of the northern portion of the capital. The effect thus sought to be produced might have been obtained in the case of a weak garrison, but that of Paris, comprising as it did about 50,000 troops of the line, besides the national guards, was not to be so lightly treated. In carrying into execution the order to create alarm and confusion on the south

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side of Paris, these two regiments of hussars would naturally draw in that direction the attention of the French commanders, and thus lead, as the result proved, not only to the cutting off of so comparatively weak a force, but also to the posting of a respectable body of troops at the threatened point, in anticipation of the enemy's following up the attack in greater force. Even previously to obtaining the insight thus afforded into a part of the plan of the invaders, the movements of the latter had been more narrowly watched than was supposed, as may be readily inferred from the fact of Excelmans having been detached, on the 1st, towards Versailles, with a body of cavalry, and of the position at Montrouge having been occupied in considerable force. All circumstances considered, the preferable course would have been, to have employed Sohr's brigade as an advanced guard only, having immediate support from the main columns in its rear.

It so happened that the advanced guard of Thielemann's corps, consisting of the 9th infantry-brigade, under General von Borceke, was on the march from St. Germain (which it had left about seven o'clock in the evening) to take post at Marly, when it received intelligence of the two cavalry-regiments, under Lieut. Colonel von Sohr, having been completely defeated. Borceke hastened forward, and it was not long before his advance became engaged with the French tirailleurs

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proceeding from Versailles. The enemy was immediately attacked, and driven back upon Rocquencourt. As darkness was setting in, Borcke drew up his force with caution. He pushed forward the fusilier-battalion of the 8th regiment, supported by the 1st battalion of the 30th regiment, and held the remainder in battalion-columns on the right and left of the road. The vigour of the attack made by the first named battalion was such, that the enemy retired in all haste upon the nearest suburb of Paris, whilst Borcke bivouacked at Rocquencourt.

Besides the cavalry under Excelmans, the remains of the 3rd and 4th French corps d'armée were detached to the south of Paris, on which side Vandamme, who commanded, took up a position, having his right upon the Seine, his left by Montrouge, and his centre in rear of Issy. He placed a portion of his troops in the villages of Vanves and Issy, the houses and walls of which appeared to offer great advantages for defence. His advanced guard occupied Chatillon, Clamord, Meudon, Sèvres, and St. Cloud. In the evening he was joined by the imperial guard, which he posted in support.

The following were the positions of the respective armies on the evening of the 1st of July:—

The 2nd corps of the Anglo-allied army, under Lord Hill, comprising the 2nd and 4th divisions, the Nassau troops, and Estorff's Hanoverian cavalry-brigade, was in the position pre-

viously occupied by the 4th Prussian corps ; having its right upon the great road about Pierrefitte, its left upon the great road of Senlis, and its advanced posts at Aubervilliers and in front of St. Denis.

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The 1st corps, under Sir John Byng, comprising the 1st and 3rd divisions, and the Dutch-Belgian troops, were in the position previously occupied by the 1st Prussian corps ; having its right upon the great road behind le Bourget, its left upon the forest of Bondy, and its advanced posts along the Ourcq canal.

The reserve, under Sir James Kempt, was encamped between Louvres and Vauderlan.

The cavalry was encamped and cantoned about the villages of Groussainville, Vauderlan, and Roissy.

The pontoon-train and the hawser-bridges were at Sarcelles, on the Chantilly road to Paris.

The head-quarters of the Duke of Wellington were at Gonesse.

The 1st Prussian corps d'armée was encamped between the villages of le Mesnil and Carrière au Mont, on the left bank of the Seine, not far from St. Germain.

The 3rd corps was also on the left bank of the Seine, in the valley, and near St. Germain. Its advanced guard (the 9th brigade) was at Rocquencourt.

The 4th corps was upon the march to St. Germain.

Prince Blücher's head-quarters were at St. Germain.

The 3rd and 4th French corps d'armée and the imperial guard were on the south side of Paris, their right upon the Seine, their left by Montrouge ; with the advanced guard at Chatillon, Clamord, Meudon, Sèvres, and St. Cloud.

The remainder of the French army continued within the capital.

The Prince of Eckmühl's head-quarters were at Villette.

At daybreak of the 2nd of July, Blücher put the whole Prussian army in motion towards the south side of Paris, where he purposed taking pos-

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session of the advantageous position comprising the heights of Meudon and Chatillon, and their immediate vicinity. Thielemann's advanced guard (the 9th brigade) immediately proceeded to occupy Versailles. The corps itself halted two hours at Rocquencourt to wait for the arrival of Zieten's corps. As the latter corps advanced, it threw out a detachment to its left, consisting of the 1st battalion of the 1st West Prussian regiment, two pieces of horse-artillery, and a squadron of cavalry, under Captain von Krensky, who was directed to proceed by Malmaison towards St. Cloud, communicating with Major von Colomb, who had already been detached, with the force before mentioned as being under his command, towards the bridge of Neuilly, and to keep a look-out to the left of the direct road to Paris. On Zieten's advanced guard reaching Villedavray, whence it drove off a French picquet, information was obtained that the enemy was restoring the bridge of St. Cloud, which he had previously destroyed, and that he occupied the Bois de Boulogne in considerable force. The 3rd brigade was therefore ordered to proceed by its left towards St. Cloud, and to oppose any movement which might be attempted against that flank.

It was three o'clock in the afternoon when Zieten's 1st brigade, under Steinmetz, reached Sèvres. Here the French were strongly posted, occupying the place itself, the heights of Bellevue,

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and having their light troops well disposed amongst the adjacent gardens and vineyards. The 1st Prussian brigade was followed in support by the 2nd and 4th brigades; and, notwithstanding the very gallant defence that was made, these troops succeeded in forcing the French to abandon their stronghold, and fall back upon Moulineau. Here the French made another stand, but were again defeated by Steinmetz, who had closely pursued them. Whilst the 1st brigade was thus gaining ground, the 2nd, together with the reserve-artillery, advanced towards the heights of Meudon. The reserve-cavalry of the corps followed the 1st brigade, in support. The 4th brigade occupied Sèvres. Major General von Jagow, who had been detached to the left, with the 3rd brigade, having ascertained that the enemy was not likely to undertake any movement from the Bois de Boulogne, and that Captain von Krensky's detachment was on the look-out in that direction, proceeded to rejoin the corps, and on reaching Sèvres, towards evening, he was directed by Zieten to take up a position, with his brigade, to the right, on the heights of Meudon.

In the evening, the French, after having reformed, and collected their defeated force at Issy, made an attempt to regain possession of Moulineau, but the attack failed, and they were driven back upon Issy. Here they were reinforced: 15 battalions were posted in and about Issy, supported

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by numerous guns and cavalry; their light infantry occupying the vineyards in front of the village. About half-past ten o'clock in the night, however, the Prussians, who kept a sharp look-out, heard these troops marching off, and perceived that their departure was conducted in rather a disorderly manner. Instant advantage was taken of this circumstance, and a part of the 1st and 2nd Prussian brigades attacked the French, who fled back upon the suburb of Vaugirard in such confusion, that Paris might have been entered at this moment, if more force had been at hand.

During the night, Zieten posted his corps in the following manner:—his right upon the height of Clamord, his centre upon that of Meudon, and his left in Moulineau; Sèvres still occupied; the advanced-guard in Issy, in rear of which village was the reserve-cavalry, in support.

Whilst Zieten's corps had been thus successfully effecting its movement against the south side of the capital, Thielemann's, which formed the right column, proceeded towards Plessis-Piquet, and pushed forward its advanced guard to the heights of Chatillon, which it reached late in the evening. Bülow's corps, acting as a reserve, occupied Versailles and its vicinity during the night.

During the whole of this day, the troops of the Anglo-allied army continued in position in front of the fortified lines on the north side of Paris. The Duke having established a bridge at Argen-

teuil, detachments were sent across the Seine ; and these, having secured the villages of Anières, Courbevoie, and Suresnes, on the left bank of the Seine, opened a communication with the Prussians.

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The Allied commanders had thus succeeded in shutting up the French forces within their lines. Wellington was perfectly prepared to attack the north side of Paris, if circumstances should render such a step necessary, or if a favourable opportunity should present itself ; whilst Blücher, having secured a strong position in front of the south side, which was mostly open and defenceless, was equally ready to storm the capital with his collected force. The effect of this well-conceived and successfully-executed plan of operation was to divide the enemy's attention between two opposite points of the town. Should he attempt to assail the one army with his principal force, he would immediately find himself attacked by the other army, without possessing the means wherewith to carry on the contest with both simultaneously. On the other hand, should a general and formidable assault be made by those armies, on the opposite points, at the same time, the necessary division of his forces, in arranging his plan of defence, would render his situation still more desperate.

The provisional government, fully alive to this state of things, and duly aware of the approach of the Bavarian, Russian, and Austrian, armies,

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clearly saw the inutility of further resistance to the Allies, and instructed the commissioners to wait upon the Duke of Wellington, and report to his Grace the fact of Napoleon having quitted Paris on the 29th, to embark for the United States, and to press the point of a suspension of hostilities. To this representation the Duke replied that the great obstacle to the armistice having thus been removed, there remained only the question as to the terms, which he thought should be, the halting of the Anglo-allied and Prussian armies in their present positions, the withdrawal of the French army from Paris across the Loire, and the placing of the capital in the keeping of the national guards until the King should order otherwise. He offered, if they agreed to these terms, to endeavour to prevail on Prince Blücher to halt his troops and send an officer to settle the details; but, at the same time, he told them distinctly that he would not consent to suspend hostilities so long as a French soldier remained in Paris. Having received this explicit declaration on the part of his Grace the commissioners withdrew.

The following were the positions of the respective armies during the night of the 2nd of July :—

The troops of the Anglo-allied army continued in position in front of the lines of St. Denis. Detachments were at Anières, Courbevoie, and Suresnes, on the left bank of the Seine.

The 1st Prussian corps d'armée had its right on the height of Clamard, its centre on that of Meudon, its left at Moulineau,

and its advanced guard at Issy : in rear of which point was the reserve-cavalry of the corps. 3rd of July.

Of the 3rd corps, the 9th brigade was at Chatillon, the 10th and 11th brigades were in front of Velisy, the 12th brigade was at Chatenay and Sceaux. The reserve-cavalry of the corps bivouacked about Plessis-Picquet.

Of the 4th corps, the 16th brigade was at Montreuil, in advance of Versailles ; the 13th brigade bivouacked near Viroflay ; the 14th brigade bivouacked at Lechesnay bel Air, not far from Rocquencourt. The reserve-cavalry of the corps was partly in front of Versailles, and partly on the left of Montreuil.

The troops composing the right wing of the French army occupied the lines on the right bank of the Seine, whence they were watching the British. Some troops were posted in the Bois de Boulogne, and several posts were established along both banks of the river.

The left wing extended from the Seine as far as the Orleans road. It held Vaugirard strongly occupied, the main body was posted between the barrières de l'Ecole militaire and de l'Enfer.

At three o'clock on the morning of the 3rd of July, Vandamme advanced in two columns from Vaugirard to the attack of Issy. Between Vaugirard and the Seine, he had a considerable force of cavalry, the front of which was flanked by a battery, advantageously posted near Auteuil, on the right bank of the river. The action commenced with a brisk cannonade : the French having brought twenty pieces of cannon against the front of the village, which was then vigorously assailed by his infantry. The Prussians had constructed some barricades, and other defences, during the night, but these did not protect them

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from the sharp fire of case-shot which was poured upon them by the French batteries, the guns of which enfiladed the streets. The 12th and 24th Prussian regiments, and the 2nd Westphalian landwehr, supported by a half battery of 12-pounders, fought with great bravery. There was much loss on both sides. At length the French withdrew; but only to advance again, considerably reinforced.

The 2nd Prussian brigade was immediately ordered to join the 1st, and the whole of the troops of the 1st corps stood to their arms. Zieten sent a request to Prince Blücher for the support of two brigades of Bülow's corps; and, at the same time, begged Thielemann to advance (in conformity with instructions conveyed to him from head-quarters) from Chatillon, and threaten the enemy's left flank.

In the mean time, the French renewed their attack upon Issy, which, however, again proved unsuccessful. This was followed by a heavy cannonade and by further assaults, without any decided advantage having been gained over the defenders. The French did not appear disposed to venture upon a more general attack, which would have offered them a much greater chance of forcing back the Prussian advanced guard, probably considering that, if unsuccessful, it might end in the suburbs of Paris being easily carried by storm; and hence, after four hours' continued, but fruitless, attempts upon Zieten's advanced po-

sition, they fell back upon Paris, the Prussian tirailleurs following them until they came within a very short distance of the barriers.

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At a council of war, which had been held during the previous night in Paris, it was decided that the defence of the capital was not practicable against the Allied armies. Nevertheless, Davoust was desirous that another attempt should be made on the Prussian army ; but now that this had failed in the manner described, that the two Allied armies were in full communication with each other, and that a British corps was likewise moving upon the left of the Seine, towards Neuilly, a capitulation was determined upon. Accordingly, at seven o'clock in the morning, the fire on the part of the French suddenly ceased ; and General Revest was deputed to pass over to Zieten's corps, which of all the Allied troops was the nearest to the capital, for the purpose of offering a capitulation, and requesting an immediate armistice. Blücher, however, required from Marshal Davoust, the commander-in-chief of the French army, a negotiator possessing greater powers, before he would finally agree to a suspension of hostilities, and indicated the palace of St. Cloud, as the place where the negotiations should be carried on, to which point he then removed his head-quarters.

During the contest at Issy, the detachments on the left of the 1st Prussian corps, under Captain

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von Krensky, were engaged rather sharply with the enemy between St. Cloud and Neuilly, which ended in the French being driven back upon the bridge at the latter place, towards which point also a body of British troops was advancing. Thus Zieten's corps, the same that had opened the campaign with the actions along the Sambre, had the honour of closing it with those at Issy and Neuilly on the Seine.

Officers furnished with full powers by their respective chiefs, soon met at St. Cloud, whither the Duke of Wellington had already repaired in person to join Prince Blücher; and the result of their deliberations was the following

Military Convention.

This day, the 3rd of July, 1815, the Commissioners named by the Commanders-in-chief of the respective armies; that is to say, the Baron Bignon, holding the portfolio of foreign affairs; the Count Guilleminot, chief of the general staff of the French army; the Count de Bondy, prefect of the department of the Seine; being furnished with the full powers of his Excellency the Marshal Prince of Eckmühl, commander-in-chief of the French army, on one side: and Major General Baron Müffling, furnished with the full powers of his Highness the Field Marshal Prince Blücher, commander-in-chief of the Prussian army; and Colonel Hervey, furnished with the full powers of his Excellency the Duke of Wellington, commander-in-chief of the English army, on the other side, have agreed to the following articles:—

ARTICLE I. There shall be a suspension of arms between the

Allied armies commanded by his Highness the Prince Blücher and his Grace the Duke of Wellington, and the French army under the walls of Paris.

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July.

ART. II. The French army shall put itself in march to-morrow, to take up a position behind the Loire. Paris shall be completely evacuated in three days ; and the movement behind the Loire shall be effected within eight days.

ART. III. The French army shall take with it all its matériel, field-artillery, military-chest, horses, and property of regiments, without exception. All persons belonging to the dépôts shall also be removed, as well as those belonging to the different branches of administration which appertain to the army.

ART. IV. The sick and wounded, and the medical officers whom it may be necessary to leave with them, are placed under the special protection of the Commanders-in-chief of the English and Prussian armies.

ART. V. The military, and those holding employments to whom the foregoing article relates, shall be at liberty, immediately after their recovery, to rejoin the corps to which they belong.

ART. VI. The wives and children of all individuals belonging to the French army shall be at liberty to remain in Paris. The wives shall be allowed to quit Paris for the purpose of rejoining the army, and to carry with them their property and that of their husbands.

ART. VII. The officers of the line employed with the *Fédérés*, or with the tirailleurs of the national guard, may either join the army, or return to their homes, or the places of their birth.

ART. VIII. To-morrow, the 4th of July, at mid-day, St. Denis, St. Ouen, Clichy, and Neuilly shall be given up. The day after to-morrow, the 5th, at the same hour, Montmartre shall be given up. The third day, the 6th, all the barriers shall be given up.

ART. IX. The duty of the city of Paris shall continue to

3rd of
July.

be done by the national guard, and by the corps of the municipal gensd'armerie.

ART. X. The Commanders-in-chief of the English and Prussian armies engage to respect, and to make those under their command respect, the actual authorities, so long as they shall exist.

ART. XI. Public property, with the exception of that which relates to war, whether it belongs to the government, or depends upon the municipal authority, shall be respected, and the Allied powers will not interfere in any manner with its administration and management.

ART. XII. Private persons and property shall be equally respected. The inhabitants, and in general all individuals who shall be in the capital, shall continue to enjoy their rights and liberties, without being disturbed or called to account, either as to the situations which they hold, or may have held, or as to their conduct or political opinions.

ART. XIII. The foreign troops shall not interpose any obstacles to the provisioning of the capital, and will protect, on the contrary, the arrival and the free circulation of the articles which are destined for it.

ART. XIV. The present convention shall be observed, and shall serve to regulate the mutual relations until the conclusion of peace. In case of rupture it must be denounced in the usual forms at least ten days beforehand.

ART. XV. If any difficulties arise in the execution of any one of the articles of the present Convention, the interpretation of it shall be made in favour of the French army and of the city of Paris.

ART. XVI. The present convention is declared common to all the Allied armies, provided it be ratified by the powers on which these armies are dependant.

ART. XVII. The ratifications shall be exchanged to-morrow, the 4th of July, at six o'clock in the morning, at the bridge of Neuilly.

ART. XVIII. Commissioners shall be named by the respective parties, in order to watch over the execution of the present Convention.

7th of
July.

Done and signed at St Cloud, in triplicate, by the Commissioners above named, the day and year before mentioned.

THE BARON BIGNON.

THE COUNT GUILLEMINOT.

THE COUNT DE BONDY.

THE BARON DE MUFFLING.

F. B. HERVEY, Colonel.

Approved and ratified the present suspension of arms, at Paris, the 3rd of July, 1815.

THE MARSHAL PRINCE OF ECKMUHL.

Afterwards approved by PRINCE BLÜCHER and the DUKE OF WELLINGTON; and the ratifications exchanged on the 4th of July.

The terms of the Convention were literally fulfilled. On the 4th, the French army, commanded by Marshal Davoust, quitted Paris, and proceeded on its march to the Loire; and the Anglo-allied troops occupied St. Denis, St. Ouen, Clichy, and Neuilly. On the 5th, the latter took possession of Montmartre. On the 6th, they occupied the barriers of Paris, upon the right of the Seine, and the Prussians those upon the left bank. On the 7th, the two Allied armies entered Paris: the chamber of peers, having received from the provisional government a notification of the course of events, terminated its sittings; the chamber of de-

24th of
July.

puties protested, but in vain. Their president (Lanjuinais) quitted his chair, and on the following day, the doors were closed, and the approaches guarded by foreign troops.

On the 8th, the French King, Louis XVIII. made his public entry into his capital, amidst the acclamations of the people, and again occupied the palace of his ancestors.

It was also on the 8th that Napoleon Buonaparte embarked, at Rochefort, on board the French frigate *La Saale*, and proceeded, accompanied by *La Méduse*, in which was his suite, to the roads of the Isle of Aix, with the intention of setting sail for America. On the 10th the wind became favourable, but a British fleet made its appearance, and Napoleon, seeing the difficulty of eluding the vigilance of its cruisers, resolved, after having previously communicated with Captain Maitland, upon placing himself under his protection on board the *Bellerophon*, which vessel he accordingly reached on the 15th. On the following day, Captain Maitland sailed for England, and arrived at Torbay, with his illustrious charge, on the 24th. The Ex-Emperor was not permitted to land, and the British government having decided upon sending him to the island of St. Helena, he was removed to the Northumberland man-of-war, under Rear Admiral Sir George Cockburne, in which ship he sailed for that distant rock, the final abode on earth of the man whose extraordinary career

marks the most stirring and eventful period in the history of Europe. July.

The Convention of Paris constituted a basis for the resumption of negotiations for the general peace which, a few months before, had been so unexpectedly interrupted. The celebrated statesmen of that remarkable period—Castlereagh, Nesselrode, Metternich, Hardenberg, and Talleyrand—aided by distinguished representatives of the minor European states, now perceived the importance of establishing a more closely cemented alliance; reconciling the clashing interests of emulative governments, securing the rights of the legitimate sovereign of France, and consolidating the re-established order of things in that country. The mere engagement of the French government to a treaty of peace and grateful amity, was not considered a sufficient guarantee for the long-desired repose of Europe. France, which dictated laws according to her own desires and interests, to the entire continent, was now, in her turn, to be subjected to the most severe conditions. In order to guarantee her compliance with the demands required of her by the wants and necessities of the nations panting for that peace which was to relieve their exhausted means, and to avert the dangers of internal dissensions, she was destined to witness the occupation of her frontier fortresses by a vast army, comprising contingent forces from the Allied powers, and requiring to be maintained

July. upon a full war establishment, at her expense; whilst, at the same time, heavy contributions were laid upon her for the purpose of indemnifying the sovereigns who had been compelled again to take up arms against her.

But, notwithstanding these reverses and indemnities, France herself is, perhaps, the country that has most benefited by that general peace which was established on the ruins of her empire. The rational form of government which was secured to her by an enlarged constitutional charter, has gradually introduced among her people the most salutary reforms, and the most liberal institutions: the stimulus given to her industry by the cessation of harassing wars, of persecuting conscriptions, and of vexatious imposts, rapidly obtained for her a commercial prosperity to which she had long been a stranger; whilst an unusual period of tranquillity has so completely renovated and invigorated her resources, both moral and physical, as to place her again in the rank of the highest powers.

Now that the nation has completely recovered from the effects of the convulsive throes which attended its dissolution as an empire, and has assumed the calm and dignified attitude of repose, in its resuscitated strength it contemplates the past in a more rational and philosophic spirit, balancing the evil with the good. If the public mind of France dwell for a time upon the tyrannical exer-

July.

cise of Napoleon's power upon the people, the sadness of the reflection is palliated by his flattering, though personally ambitious, desire to render France the arbitress of Europe: if it perceive the rights of the citizens subverted for the furtherance of his designs, the impression thus produced vanishes at the contemplation of the *Code Napoléon*: if it appear shocked by the general perversion of labour from its natural sphere to purely military purposes, it is again soothed by the grandeur in design, and utility in effect, of mighty enterprises, conferring employment on myriads of artists and artisans: if it be disposed to disapprove of the spoliation authorized in foreign states, it is speedily flattered by the grand idea of rendering Paris the centre of civilization and of the arts: and finally, if it feel pained and subdued by a contemplation of the disasters of Moscow, Vittoria, Leipzig, and Waterloo, it revives and rejoices in recounting the glorious triumphs of Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, and Wagram.

If one country more than any other required a lasting peace to enable her to recover from the effects of the immense sacrifices she had made, in life and treasure—sacrifices which proved, beyond doubt, the salvation of Europe—that country was Great Britain. Through the intelligence of her statesmen, the freedom of her constitution, the enterprise of her merchants, the industry of her artisans, and the bravery of her naval and military

July. — defenders, she continues to maintain her lofty position in the scale of nations ; and even to extend her empire and her sway to the furthestmost points of the earth. But to whom is she mainly indebted for this proud pre-eminence, this unparalleled grandeur ? To such a question every Briton, no matter what may be the direction of his political feelings or party prejudices, will unhesitatingly reply—to the rare talent, the untiring zeal, and practised skill, of her Chief who led, as also to the inflexible courage, extraordinary endurance, and the perfect discipline, of her sons who fought, her last and ever-memorable struggle on the continent of Europe—the BATTLE OF WATERLOO. It was upon the solid foundation thus obtained that was raised that well-cemented superstructure, the solemn compact of sovereigns and states, constituting the General Peace of 1815 ; and although, as time rolls on, symptoms of decay may be traced in some portions of the edifice, still it stands, a monument of the downfall of an insatiable ambition, aiming at universal dominion, and continues to this day the surest guarantee of the preservation of that equitable balance of power which can alone secure the permanence of the tranquillity and prosperity of Europe.

SUPPLEMENT.

SUPPLEMENT.

THE Battle of Waterloo, followed as it was by the advance of the Anglo-allied and Prussian armies upon Paris, was so decisive in its effects, and so comprehensive in its results, that the great object of the war—the destruction of the power of Napoleon and the restoration of the legitimate sovereign—was attained while the armies of the Upper Rhine and of Italy were but commencing their invasion of the French territory. Had the successes attendant upon the exertions of Wellington and Blücher assumed a less decisive character, and, more especially, had reverses taken the place of those successes, the operations of the armies advancing from the Rhine and across the Alps would have acquired an immense importance in the history of the war; but the brilliant course of events in the north of France materially diminished the interest excited by the military transactions in other parts of the kingdom. Upon this ground it has been considered, that to enter into any very detailed account of the movements and dispositions of the Allies, on the eastern frontier, is unnecessary, and that the completion of the present work will be sufficiently accomplished by the addition of a simple outline of the daily progress and attendant circumstances of the advance of each army into the interior of the country.

Operations of the German Corps d'Armée.

This corps, which was composed of contingent forces supplied by the petty Princes of North Germany, was assembled, in the

middle of April, in the vicinity of Coblenz. It amounted to 26,200 men, divided into 30 battalions, 12 squadrons, and 2½ batteries ; and was placed under the command of General Count Kleist von Nollendorf. At a somewhat later period it crossed the Rhine at Coblenz and Neuwied, and took up a position on the Moselle and the Sarre, its right communicating with the 3rd Prussian corps d'armée, and its left with the Bavarian troops at Zweibrücken. Its advanced posts extended along the French frontier from Arlon to Mertzig. Its head-quarters were at Trier, on the Moselle.

In this position it remained until the 16th of June, when its commander, General von Engelhard (in the absence of Count Kleist, who was ill), advanced from Trier to Arlon, which it reached on the 19th. Here it continued until the 21st, when it received an order from Prince Blücher to move into France by Bastogne and Neufchâteau, and to gain possession of the fortresses of Sedan and Bouillon. On the 22nd, the corps commenced its march, in two columns ; the one by Neufchâteau, upon Sedan, the other by Recogne, upon Bouillon. Sedan, after a few days' bombardment, capitulated on the 26th of June. An attempt was made to take Bouillon by a *coup de main*, but its garrison was strong enough to frustrate this project. The place was not considered of sufficient importance to render a regular siege expedient, and it was therefore simply invested, from the 25th of June until the 21st of August, when it was blockaded at all points by troops of the Netherlands, under Prince Frederick of Orange.

On the 28th of June, Lieut. General von Hacke, who had been appointed to the command of the German corps, directed the advanced guard to move upon Charleville, which lies under the guns of the fortress of Mézières, and to carry the place by storm. The capture was successfully made by some Hessian battalions, and tended greatly to facilitate the siege of Mézières. Moveable columns were detached to observe the fortresses of Montmédy, Laon, and Rheims. The last named place was taken

by capitulation on the 8th of July; and the garrison, amounting to 4,000 men, retired behind the Loire.

Lieut. General von Hacke, finding that notwithstanding his vigorous bombardment of Mezières, which he commenced on the 27th of June, his summons to surrender was unheeded by the commandant, General Lemoine, undertook a regular siege of the place, and opened trenches on the 2nd of August. On the 13th the French garrison gave up the town, and retired into the citadel, which surrendered on the 1st of September.

The efforts of the corps were now directed upon Montmédy, around which fortress it had succeeded in placing 12 batteries in position by the 13th of September. After an obstinate resistance, the garrison concluded a convention on the 20th of September, by which it was to retire, with arms and baggage, behind the Loire.

After the capture of Montmédy, the German corps d'armée went into cantonments in the department of the Ardennes, whence it returned home in the month of November.

Operations of the Army of the Upper Rhine, under the command of Field Marshal His Highness Prince Schwartzemberg.

This army consisted of four corps d'armée, and reserves, composed of troops of Austria, Bavaria, Wirtemberg, Saxony, of Hesse-Darmstadt, and of the petty Princes.

Its strength was as follows:—

			Battalions.		Squadrons.		Batteries.
1st corps d'armée	. .	24,400	men, in	26	. 16	. 8	
2nd ...	. .	34,350	...	36	. 26	. 11	
3rd ...	. .	43,814	...	44	. 32	. 9	
4th ...	. .	57,040	...	46	. 66	. 15	
Austrian Reserve Corps	. .	44,800	...	38	. 86	. 10	
Blockade Corps	. .	33,314	...	38	. 8	. 6	
Saxon corps d'armée	. .	16,774	...	18	. 10	. 6	
Total	. .	254,492	...	246	. 244	. 65	

According to the general plan of operations projected by Prince Schwartzberg, this army was to cross the Rhine in two columns. The right column, consisting of the 3rd corps, under Field Marshal the Crown-Prince of Wirtemberg, and of the 4th corps, or the Bavarian army, under Field Marshal Prince Wrède, was to cross the Rhine between Germersheim and Mannheim. The left column, consisting of the 1st corps, under the Master General of the Ordnance, Count Colloredo, and of the 2nd corps, under General Prince Hohenzollern Hechingen, together with the Austrian reserve corps, the whole being commanded by General the Archduke Ferdinand, was to cross the Rhine between Basle and Rheinfelden. The column formed by the right wing was to be supported by the Russian army, under Field Marshal Count Barclay de Tolly, which was expected to be collected at Kaiserslautern by the 1st of July. The object of the operations, in the first instance, was the concentration of the Army of the Upper Rhine and the Russian army, at Nancy.

As soon as Prince Schwartzberg was made acquainted with the commencement of hostilities in Belgium, he gave his orders for the advance of his army. The 4th, or Bavarian, corps d'armée was directed immediately to cross the Sarre, and, by turning the Vosgian Mountains, to cut off the French corps under General Rapp, collected in the environs of Strasburg, from its base of operations, and to intercept its communications with the interior of France.

A Russian corps, under General Count Lambert, forming the advance of the army of Count Barclay de Tolly, was united to the corps d'armée of Prince Wrède, who was to employ it principally in keeping up the communication with the North German corps d'armée, under Lieut. General von Hacke.

4th corps
d'armée,
Prince
Wrède.

On the 19th of June the Bavarian army crossed the Rhine at Mannheim and Oppenheim, and advanced towards the Sarre. On the 20th, some trifling affairs of advanced posts occurred near Landau and Dahn. On the 23rd, the army having approached the Sarre, proceeded, in two columns, to take possession of the passages across the river at Saarbrück and Saargemünd.

The right column, under Lieut. General Count Beckers, attacked Saarbrück, where it was opposed by the French General Meriag. The Bavarians carried the suburb and the bridge, and penetrated into the town along with the retiring French, of whom they made 4 officers and 70 men prisoners, and killed and wounded 100 men; suffering a loss, on their own part, of 3 officers and from 50 to 60 men killed and wounded. Count Beckers occupied the town, posted his division on the heights towards Forbach, and detached patrols along the road to Metz, as far as St. Avold, and to the right, along the Sarre, as far as Saarlouis.

The left column, consisting of the 1st infantry division, under Lieut. General Baron von Raglovich, and of the 1st cavalry-division, under his Royal Highness Prince Charles of Bavaria, advanced against Saargemünd, at which point the French had constructed a *tête de pont* on the right bank of the river. After some resistance, this was taken possession of by the Bavarians, whereupon Baron von Raglovich marched through the town, and took up a position on the opposite heights, commanding the roads leading to Bouquenom and Lüneville.

The 4th infantry-division, under Lieut. General Baron Zollern, advanced towards the fortress of Bitsch, which, however, the French commandant, General Kreutzer, refused to surrender.

The Russian corps, under Count Lambert, attached to the right wing of Prince Wrède's army, advanced as far as Ottweiler and Ramstein.

On the 24th, Prince Wrède occupied Bouquenom, and detached the cavalry-division under Prince Charles towards Pfalzburg, to observe this place. His 2nd, 3rd, and 4th divisions, and the reserve, were collected at Saargemünd. The Russian troops under Count Lambert occupied Saarbrück, having previously detached the cavalry, under Lieut. General Czernitscheff, as far as St. Avold.

On the 26th, Prince Wrède's head-quarters were at Morhange, and, on the 27th, his advanced posts penetrated as far as Nancy, where he established his head-quarters on the 28th. From St.

Dieuze the Prince detached to the left, in order to discover the march of General Rapp ; who, however, was still on the Rhine, and whose retreat had thus become cut off by the occupation of Nancy.

Prince Wrède halted at Nancy, to await the arrival of the Austrian and Russian corps d'armée. Upon his right, Lieut. General Czernitscheff crossed the Moselle, on the 29th, within sight of Metz, and carried by storm, on the 3rd of July, the town of Châlons sur Marne. The garrison of this place had promised to make no resistance, and yet fired upon the Russian advanced guard ; whereupon the cavalry immediately dismounted, scaled the ramparts, broke open the gates, sabred a part of the garrison, made the remainder prisoners, including the French General Rigault, and pillaged the town.

After remaining four days in the vicinity of Nancy and Lunéville, Prince Wrède received an order from Prince Schwartzemberg to move at once upon Paris, with the 4th, or Bavarian corps, which was destined to become the advanced guard of the Army of the Upper Rhine. This order was given in consequence of the desire expressed by the Duke of Wellington and Prince Blücher, that the Army of the Upper Rhine should afford immediate support to their operations in front of Paris. On the 5th of July, the main body of the Bavarian army reached Châlons, in the vicinity of which it remained during the 6th. On this day its advanced posts communicated, by Epernay, with the Prussian army. On the 7th, Prince Wrède received intelligence of the Convention of Paris, and, at the same time, directions to move towards the Loire. On the 8th, Lieut. General Czernitscheff fell in with the enemy between St. Prix and Montmirail, and drove him back across the Morin, towards the Seine. Previously to the arrival of the corps at Château-Thierry, the French garrison had abandoned the place, leaving behind it several pieces of cannon, with ammunition. On the 10th of July the Bavarian army took up a position between the Seine and the Marne, and Prince Wrède's head-quarters were at la Fertè sous Jouarre.

On the 22nd of June, a portion of the 3rd corps d'armée

under the Crown Prince of Wirtemberg, took possession of the intrenchments of Germersheim, on the left bank of the Rhine. Lieut. Field Marshal Count Wallmoden was posted, with 10 battalions and 4 squadrons, in observation of the fortress of Landau, and the line of the Queich. The main body of the corps stood between Bruchsal and Philippsburg. On the 23rd, the corps crossed the Rhine at Germersheim, and passed the line of the Queich without opposition.

3rd corps
d'armée,
Crown
Prince of
Wirtem-
berg.

The Crown Prince was directed to proceed by Weissenburg and Hagenau, with a view to complete, in conjunction with the 4th corps d'armée, the plan of intercepting the retreat of General Rapp.

On the 24th, the corps advanced to Bergzabern and Nieder-Ottersbach, at both of which points it fell in with the enemy, and drove him back. Count Wallmoden left a small detachment to observe Landau, and advanced, with the remainder of his force, as far as Rhein-zabern. On the 25th, the Crown Prince ordered the advance towards the lines of Weissenburg, in two columns. The first column assembled at Bergzabern, and the second moved forward by Nieder-Ottersbach. Count Wallmoden was directed to advance upon Lauterburg. The Crown Prince advanced his corps still further along the Hagenau road. His advanced guard pushed on to Inglesheim, and the main body of the corps reached the lines of Weissenburg, which the French abandoned in the night, and fell back upon the forest of Hagenau, occupying the large village of Surburg. On the 26th, the Crown Prince attacked and defeated the enemy at the last mentioned place, with his right column, whilst the left column, under Count Wallmoden, was equally successful in an attack which it made upon the French General Rothenburg, posted, with 6,000 infantry, and a regiment of cavalry, at Selz. On the following day General Rapp fell back upon the defile of Brümth, but this he quitted in the night, and took up a favourable position in rear of the Suffel, near Strasburg. His force comprised 24 battalions of infantry, 4 regiments of cavalry, and a numerous artillery, and amounted to nearly 24,000 men.

The Crown Prince of Wirtemberg, whose force amounted altogether to more than 40,000 men, succeeded, on the 28th, after a smart action, in forcing General Rapp to retire within the fortress of Strasburg. The loss of the 3rd corps on this occasion amounted to 75 officers, and 2,050 men, killed and wounded. That of the French was about 3,000 men.

Austrian
Reserve-
corps—
Archduke
Ferdinand.

The 3rd corps remained in front of Strasburg until the 4th of July, when it was relieved by the arrival of the 2nd Austrian corps, under Prince Hohenzollern, from the vicinity of Colmar. At this last point the advanced guard of the Austrian reserve-corps, under Lieut. Field Marshal Stutterheim, moved upon Remiremont, and the main body, upon Ste Marie aux mines. The Austrian reserve-corps itself reached Raon l'Etape, whence it subsequently moved (on the 10th) to Neufchâteau. The 3rd corps, under the Crown Prince of Wirtemberg, marched into the vicinity of Molsheim.

On the 7th of July the Crown Prince reached Lüneville, but instead of proceeding to Nancy, according to its original destination, the corps, on the 9th, took the road to Neufchâteau. The advance was in two columns; the one upon Bayon, and the other upon Rembervillers. These two columns moved respectively, the one, by Vaucouleurs, Joinville, Brienne le Château, Troyes, and Auxonne; and the other, by Neufchâteau, Chaumont, Bar sur Aube, Vendoeuvres, Bar sur Seine, and Chatillon; at which points (Auxonne and Chatillon) they halted on the 18th. On the 21st the corps entered into cantonments between Montbard and Tonnerre.

1st and 2nd
corps—
Count Col-
lorado and
Prince von
Hohenzol-
lern.
Reserve-
corps—
Archduke
Ferdinand.

The 1st and 2nd Austrian corps d'armée and the reserve-corps, forming the left wing of the army of the Upper Rhine, crossed this river at Rheinfelden and Basle in the night of the 25th of June. On the 26th, the 1st, under Count Colloredo, was directed upon Belfort and Montbelliard; and, on the same day, the Austrians invested the fortress of Huningen. The advanced guard of the 1st corps had an affair with a French detachment of 3000 men, belonging to the corps of General Lecourbe, and repulsed it as far as Donnemarie. On the 28th,

the 1st corps fell in with the enemy near Chabannes, between Donnemarie and Bfort, when the French force, amounting to 8000 infantry and 500 cavalry, was driven back upon Bfort. Major General von Scheither of the 1st corps was detached against Montbelliard, a town fortified and defended by a citadel. After having maintained a most destructive fire against the place, the Austrian troops carried it by storm ; with a loss, however, of 25 officers and 1000 men killed and wounded.

With the exception of a few sorties of little consequence, General Rapp remained very quiet in the fortress of Strasburg. The news of the capture of Paris by the British and Prussian troops led to a suspension of hostilities, which was concluded on the 24th of July, and extended to the fortresses of Strasburg, Landau, Lutzelstein, Huningen, Schlettstadt, Lichtenberg, Pfalz-burg, Neuf-Brisac, and Bfort.

The Russian Army.

The main body of the Russian army, commanded by Field Marshal Count Barclay de Tolly, and amounting to 167,950 men, crossed the Rhine at Mannheim, on the 25th of June, and followed the army of the Upper Rhine. The greater portion of it reached Paris and its vicinity by the middle of July.

Operations of the Army of Italy.

The army of Italy, composed of Austrian and Sardinian troops, and amounting to 60,000 men, was under the command of General Baron Frimont. It was destined to act against the army of the Alps, under Marshal Suchet, posted in the vicinity of Chambery and Grenoble. It is uncertain what was the amount of force under Suchet, it having been estimated from 13,000 to 20,000 men ; but the corps of observation on the Var, in the vicinity of Antibes and Toulon, under Marshal Brune, amounted to 10,000, and was not occupied with any enemy in its front.

Baron Frimont's army was divided into two corps ; the one under Lieut. Field Marshal Radivojevich, was to advance by the Valais towards Lyons; and the other, which was in Piedmont, under Lieut. Field Marshal Count Bubna, was to penetrate into the south of France, through Savoy.

Marshal Suchet had received orders from Napoleon to commence operations on the 14th of June, and by rapid marches to secure the mountain passes in the Valais and in Savoy, and close them against the Austrians. On the 15th, his troops advanced at all points for the purpose of gaining the frontier from Montmeilian as far as Geneva, which he invested. Thence he purposed to obtain possession of the important passes of Meillerie and St. Maurice, and in this way to check the advance of the Austrian columns from the Valais. At Meillerie the French were met and driven back by the advanced guard of the Austrian right column, on the 21st of June. By means of forced marches the whole of this column, which Baron Frimont himself accompanied, reached the Arve on the 27th of June.

The left column, under Count Bubna, crossed Mount Cenis on the 24th and 25th of June. On the 28th it was sharply opposed by the French at Conflans, of which place, however, the Austrians succeeded in gaining possession.

In order to secure the passage of the Arve the advanced guard of the right column detached, on the 27th, to Bonneville, on its left ; but the French, who had already fortified this place, maintained a stout resistance. In the mean time, however, the Austrians gained possession of the passage at Carrouge, by which means the French were placed under the necessity of evacuating Bonneville, and abandoning the valley of the Arve. The column now passed Geneva, and drove the enemy from the heights of Grand Saconex and from St. Genix. On the 29th this part of the army moved towards the Jura ; and, on the 1st July, it made its dispositions for attacking the redoubts and intrenchments which the French had thrown up to defend the passes. The most vigorous assault was made upon the pass of Les Rousses ; but the Austrians were driven back. Reserves

were then brought up, and the French having quitted their intrenchments to meet the latter, and a good opportunity having offered for a flank attack upon them with cavalry and artillery, the pass was captured by the Austrians; and the French were compelled to abandon both it and the other passes of the Jura. The Austrian advanced guard pursued the enemy and reached, in the evening, St. Claude, on the road leading to the left from Gex, and St. Laurent, in the original direction of the attack, beyond Les Rousses.

In the mean time, the Austrian reserve-corps, under Lieut. Field Marshal Meerville, was directed to advance, and to throw back the French upon the Rhone. The latter, in retreating, destroyed the bridge of Seyselle; and, by holding the fort of l'Ecluse, closed the road from Geneva to Lyons. A redoubt had been constructed in front of the fort, and completely commanded the approach. It was gallantly stormed and carried by the regiment of Esterhazy. The fort itself was now turned by the reserve-corps along the left bank of the Rhone, with the design of forcing the passage at the Perte du Rhone. Here the French had constructed a *tête de pont*, which, however, they were forced to abandon in consequence of a movement made by the 1st corps under Lieut. Field Marshal Radivojevich. On retiring, they destroyed the very beautiful stone bridge then existing, and thus rendered it necessary for the Austrians to construct temporary bridges over the extremely narrow space between the rocks which confine the stream at this remarkable spot. The advanced guard of the reserve-corps, under General Count Hardegg, first crossed the Rhone, and found the enemy posted at Charix, in rear of Chatillon, on the road to Nantua. Count Hardegg immediately attacked him, and, after encountering an obstinate resistance, forced him to retire.

The troops of the 1st Austrian corps, which, in the mean time, were left in front of the fort l'Ecluse, had commenced a bombardment; and this, after twenty-six hours' duration, considerably damaged the fort. A powder-magazine exploded, which caused a general conflagration; to escape which the

garrison rushed out, and surrendered at discretion to the Austrians; and thus, in three days, the high road from Geneva to Lyons was opened to the army of Italy.

On the 3rd July, General Bogdan, with the advanced guard of the 1st Austrian corps, having been reinforced by Lieut. Field Marshal Radivojevich, attacked the enemy with much impetuosity at Ojanax, beyond St. Claude, where the French General Maransin had taken up a favourable position, with 2,000 men. The Austrians turned his left flank, and forced him to retire. The corps reached Bourg en Bresse on the 9th July.

On the 10th July, a detachment, under Major General von Pflüger, was pushed on to Maçon on the Saone, and gained possession of the *tête de pont* constructed there, and of the place itself.

On the 7th July, the 2nd corps, under Count Bubna, reached Echelles. A detachment, consisting principally of Sardinian troops, under Lieut. General Count Latour, had been directed to observe Grenoble, in front of which its advanced guard arrived on the 4th July. On the 6th, the suburbs were attacked, and the communication between this place and Lyons was cut off. The garrison, consisting of eight battalions of the national guard, offered to capitulate on the 9th, upon the condition of being permitted to return to their homes. That a vigorous defence might have been maintained, was evident from the fact of the Austrians having found in the place 54 guns, and 8 mortars, and large quantities of provisions.

Count Bubna's corps and the reserve corps, by simultaneous movements, assembled together in front of Lyons on the 9th. An armistice was solicited by the garrison on the 11th July, and granted upon condition that Lyons and the intrenched camp should be evacuated, and that Marshal Suchet should retire with his corps behind the Loire, keeping his advanced posts within a stipulated line of demarcation.

Having secured possession of the line of the Rhone as far down as its junction with the Isère, as also of that part of the Saône between Maçon and Lyons, the army of Italy now pro-

ceeded towards the upper line of the latter river, leaving the 2nd corps, under Count Bubna, at Lyons, in front of Marshal Suchet. The 1st corps marched upon Chalons sur Saône, in order to gain the *tête de pont* at that point. At this time the 4th division of the army, under the French General Lecourbe, was at Salins, between Dôle and Pontarlier, and as Besançon had not yet been invested, Baron Frimont detached a part of the reserve-corps, under General Hecht, to Salins, whilst General Fölseis, detached from the 1st corps towards Dôle. The advanced guard of the 1st corps had arrived in front of the *tête de pont* at Chalons, and had completed its dispositions for attack, when the place surrendered. By the advance, at the same time, of Hecht upon Salins, and of Fölseis from Dôle upon Besançon, the retreat of the French General Laplane was completely cut off. This led to a convention, which stipulated the dissolution of the national guards, the surrender of all the officers, and the abandonment of one of the forts of Salins to the Austrians.

On the 20th, the 1st corps d'armée advanced from Chalons sur Saône as far as Autun, and Besançon having in the mean time been occupied by the Austrian troops of the army of the Upper Rhine, a junction was effected with the latter by the army of Italy by Dijon.

The Sardinian General d'Osasca, who had been detached to Nice, concluded on the 9th July an armistice with Marshal Brune, who commanded the army of the Var, in front of the Maritime Alps, and thus terminated all hostilities on that side of France.

The foregoing outline will suffice to show the nature, extent, and interconnection of the operations of the Allied armies which invaded France along her eastern and south-eastern frontier; and at the same time afford a clear proof that amongst the more immediate consequences of the decisive battle of Waterloo and speedy capture of Paris must be ranked that of their having been the means of averting the more general and protracted warfare

which would probably have taken place, had a different result in Belgium emboldened the French to act with vigour and effect in other parts of the country.

The reduction of the fortresses left in rear of the British and Prussian armies, adjoining their main line of operations, and which was confided to Prince Augustus of Prussia, with the 2nd Prussian corps d'armée, assisted by the British battering-train, was effected in the following manner:—

Maubeuge—siege	commenced	8th July,	capitulated	12th July.
Landrecies	...	19th do.	...	21st do.
Marienburg	...	27th do.	...	28th do.
Philippeville	...	7th August,	...	8th August.
Rocroy	...	15th do.	...	16th do.

Prince Augustus had made every preparation for commencing the siege of Charlemont and its connecting forts, the two Givets and the Mont d'Hours, on the 8th September, when the commandant, General Count Burcke, foreseeing that the occupation of the detached forts would divide his force too much, entered into negotiations, and surrendered those works on the 10th, withdrawing his troops into Charlemont; the bombardment of which was to have opened on the 23rd September, but, on the 20th, Prince Augustus received information from Paris that hostilities were to cease throughout the whole of France.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

I.

List of Officers of the King's German Legion, who were present at the Defence of La Haye Sainte.

2nd Light Battalion. MAJORS—G. Baring; A. Bösewiel, *killed*. CAPTAINS—E. Holtzermann, *taken prisoner*; W. Schaumann, *killed*. LIEUTENANTS—F. Kessler, *wounded*; C. Meyer; O. Lindam, *wounded*; B. Riefkugel, *wounded*; A. Tobin, *taken prisoner*; T. Carey, *wounded*; E. Biedermann; D. Græme, *wounded*; S. Earl. ENSIGNS—F. von Robertson, *killed*; G. Frank, *wounded*; W. Smith; L. Baring. LIEUT. AND ADJUTANT—W. Timmann, *wounded*. SURGEON—G. Heise.

1st Light Battalion. CAPTAINS—von Gilsa, *wounded*; von Marschalck, *killed*: LIEUTENANT—Kuntze. ENSIGN—Banmgarten.

Skirmishers of 5th Line Battalion. CAPTAIN—von Wurmb, *killed*. LIEUTENANTS—Witte, *wounded*; Schläger. ENSIGN—Walther, *wounded*.

II.

Effective Strength of the Prussian Troops on the Field of Waterloo.

				Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Guns.
At half-past 4 o'clock	{	Part of 4th corps	15th Brigade	5,881	..	1,143	64
			16th Brigade	6,162	..		
			Reserve Cavalry	..	2,720		
At 6 o'clock ..	{	Remainder of 4th corps	13th Brigade	6,385			
		..	14th Brigade	6,953			
At 7 o'clock ..	{	Part of 1st corps	Part of 1st Brig.	2,582	1,070	274	16
		Part of 2nd corps	5th Brigade	6,851			
			6th Brigade	6,469	4,468	386	24
Total				41,283	8,858	1,803	104
Grand Total				51,944 Men, and 104 Guns.			

III.

Lines descriptive of the part taken in the Battle of Waterloo by the 6th brigade of British cavalry, upon the repulse of the last attack by the French ; with the death of Major the Hon. Frederick Howard.

BY AN OFFICER OF THE 10TH HUSSARS, WHO WAS PRESENT.

Back rolls the tide of war ; its refluent wave
 E'en Ney arrests not, *bravest of the brave*.*
 For ever turn'd, in wild confusion throng
 Horse, cannon, infantry, the slope along ;
 And while with parting glare the sun illumines
 Helm, cuirass, sabre, lances, pennons, plumes,
 Such splendid pageantry of glorious war
 Alone must swell the soul ; but higher far
 The feelings rose, to see the pride of France
 Thus routed, mingled, while our bands advance,
 Each serried column form'd in order due,
 Each eye elate this glorious end to view.
 Hark ! on the right exulting shouts arise,
 And the huzza of Britons rends the skies ;
 From the left flank, in column, winding far,
 Speeds with a whirlwind's force the swift hussar,
 Tho' to their thund'ring hoofs the plain resounds,
 Still cautious discipline their ardour bounds.
 Who, with a hero's port and lofty form,
 With waving sabre onward guides the storm ?
 While through the tangled corn and yielding clay
 His spurs incessant urge his panting grey—
 'Tis Vivian, pride of old Cornubia's hills,
 His veins th' untainted blood of Britons fills.

* "*Brave des braves*."

Him follows close a Manners,* glorious name,
 In him a Granby's soul aspires to fame,
 Or such as erst, when Rodney gain'd the day,
 Ebb'd from his kinsman's wound with life away.
 "Front form the line!" cries Vivian, still its course
 The head maintain'd, the rear with headlong force
 Speeds at the word, till troops to troops combine,
 And each firm squadron forms the serried line.
 Now to their head as eager Uxbridge rush'd,
 Fate check'd his wish to lead, as sudden gush'd
 A purple torrent from his ebbing wound,
 And from his charger hurl'd, he press'd the ground;
 No groan he utter'd, breath'd no fainting sigh,
 But on our squadrons bent his anxious eye.
 Th' heroic eye spoke firm contempt of pain,
 But disappointment not to lead again.
 Then pierc'd the fatal ball young Gunning's heart,
 Headlong he fell, nor felt one instant's smart :
 Calm, pale as marble forms on tombs, he lay
 As days had sped since pass'd his soul away.
 His charger onward on the squadron's flank
 To battle rush'd, and kept its master's rank.

Vain ! (tho' still worthy of their former fame,
 And from a gen'rous foe respect to claim,)
 Vain the attempt ! some gallant bands appear
 Arrang'd to check the fierce hussars' career,
 Awhile protection for their rear to form
 And shield it from the desolating storm—
 The helm'd dragoon upon our right bears down,
 Couch'd are the lances of a band that crown
 The hill's low brow, and down at speed they burst,
 Sabre meets lance, and blow encounters thrust.
 They turn, they fly—Vain hope to rally ! vain !
 To stem our onward course ; o'er all the plain

* *Lieut. Colonel Lord Robert Manners, 10th Hussars.*

Amid their bands confusion reigns supreme,
While o'er their heads our threat'ning sabres gleam.
At length a pause—A band of vet'rans true,
Whom no dire terrors of pursuit subdue,
Form the close square, and on a swelling brow
Unmov'd they stand, undaunted ; onwards flow
The streaming fugitives, yet still they stand
Resolv'd to perish for their *beauteous land*.*
Resolv'd, indignant, ere the field they leave,
The stains on Gallic honour to retrieve.
Here, should they rest, by their example warm'd
Others may join, and conflict fierce be form'd—
Charge, Howard, charge ! and sweep them from the field,
To British swords their bayonets must yield—
To high emprise upon the battle's plain
When was the name of Howard call'd in vain ?
Worthy his great progenitors he heard
The call, exulting, and with ready word,
“ Charge, brave hussars ! ” he cried, and wav'd on high
His gleaming sword—forward at once they fly—
No tighten'd rein, no high curvetting airs,
(As their cuirassiers hover'd round our squares,
In hopes, perchance, some trembling files to spy,
Vain hopes, in hands where all were prompt to die.)
Now to each panting steed the spurs were press'd,
His mane wav'd o'er the rider's forward breast—
Thus rush'd the gallant squadron on the foe,
Yet firm they stood, their arms in levell'd row
Their volleying thunders pour'd our ranks among,
Where foremost blade on foremost musket rung.
Three gallant youths the van exulting led,
Three by the deadly volley instant bled—
Arnold and Bacon fall, again to rise,
From three fell wounds brave Howard's spirit flies :

* “ *La belle France*.”

Full many a warrior on that dreadful day,
 Brave, generous, gentle, breath'd his soul away,
 But one more gentle, generous, or brave,
 Never in battle found a soldier's grave—
 Alas! what tears shall dim the lovely eyes
 Of her who now for absence only sighs—
 Her whom to leave gives death its keenest smart,
 Its deepest anguish to his bursting heart.

Short were your pangs, but ere the spirit fled,
 Heaven grant you saw that not in vain you bled;
 That your brave followers on the broken foe
 With vengeance wing'd dealt many a deadly blow,
 Till mercy check'd each hand, and bade them spare
 The suppliant remnants of the vanquish'd square.

IV.

List of British Officers who were present at the defence of Hougomont.

2nd Battalion of Coldstream, or 2nd Regiment of Foot Guards. MAJOR—A. G. Woodford, Colonel. CAPTAINS and LIEUT. COLONELS—J. Macdonell, *wounded*; D. Mackinnon, *wounded*; Hon. J. Walpole; H. Dawkins; Hon. E. Acheson; H. Wyndham, *wounded*. LIEUTENANTS and CAPTAINS—G. Bowles; T. Sowerby; W. L. Walton; W. G. Baynes; C. A. F. Bentinck, Adj.; J. S. Cowell; E. Sumner, *wounded*; J. L. Blackman, *killed*; B. Lord Hotham; Hon. R. Moore, *wounded*; T. Chaplin. ENSIGNS—Hon. J. Forbes; H. Gooch; A. Cuyler; M. Beaufoy; H. F. Griffiths, *wounded*; J. Montagu, *wounded*; G. R. Buckley; J. Hervey; H. Vane; F. J. Douglass; R. Bowen; A. Gordon; Hon. W. Forbes; C. Short. ADJUTANT—C. A. F. Bentinck. QUARTER MASTER—B. Selway. SURGEON—W. Whympier. ASST. SURGEONS—G. Smith; W. Hunter.

2nd Battalion of the 3rd Regiment of Foot Guards. MAJOR—F. Hepburn, Lieut. Col. CAPTAINS and LIEUT. COLONELS—H. W. Rooke; W. C. Master; D. Mercer; C. Dashwood, *wounded*; F. Home; E. Bowater, *wounded*; C. West, *wounded*. LIEUTENANTS and CAPTAINS—W. Stothert, Adj. W. Drummond; R. B. Hesketh, *wounded*; H. Hawkins; R. H. Wigston; Hon. J. B. Rodney; C. J. Barnett; J. W. Moorhouse; E. B. Fairfield; G. Evelyn, *wounded*; Hon. H. Forbes, *killed*; J. Elrington; H. B. Montgomerie, *wounded*; T. Crawford, *killed*; J. Ashton, *killed*. ENSIGNS—C. Lake, *wounded*; Hon. E. Stopford; B. Drummond; G. D. Standen; D. Baird, *wounded*; W. James; W. F. Hamilton; Hon. G. Anson; T. Wedgewood; W. Butler; A. C. Cochrane; J. Prendergast; C. Simpson, *wounded*; H. S. Blane; H. Montague. ADJUTANT—W. Stothert, Capt., *wounded*. QUARTER MASTER—J. Skuce. SURGEON—S. Good. ASST. SURGEONS—J. R. Warde; F. G. Hanrott.

1st Regiment of Foot Guards. CAPTAINS and LIEUT. COLONELS—Lord Saltoun; C. P. Ellis, *wounded*.*

* I know not the names of the remaining officers of the light companies of the 1st Brigade of Guards detached to Hougomont.—W. S.

V.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the British Troops at the Battle of Waterloo.

		Killed.					Wounded.					Missing.					Total Rank and File Killed, Wounded, and Missing.		
Brigades.	Regiments.	Officers.	Troop Quarter-Masters, and Sergeants.	Trumpeters or Drummers.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Officers.	Troop Quarter-Masters, and Sergeants.	Trumpeters or Drummers.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Officers.	Troop Quarter-Masters, and Sergeants.	Trumpeters or Drummers.	Rank and File.	Horses.			
Cavalry.	1st	Royal Artillery . . .	5	2	..	51	337	24	13	..	198	123	..	..	..	10	35	25	
		Royal Engineers . . .	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		Royal Staff Corps . . .	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		1st Life Guards . . .	2	4	..	12	39	3	4	..	36	21	..	..	..	..	4	25	..
		2nd do. . .	1	2	..	14	106	1	5	1	34	20	..	3	..	94	53	52	
		Bl. H. Guards (Blues) . .	1	2	..	14	54	4	5	..	51	15	1	..	..	20	34	..	
		1st Dragoon Guards . .	3	3	..	37	55	4	4	2	94	13	4	9	..	115	243	..	
		1st Dragoons . . .	4	6	..	79	161	9	6	1	81	35	1	..	..	9	..	..	
		2nd do. (Scots Greys) . .	6	3	1	92	179	8	9	..	80	47	..	..	..	..	2	53	..
		6th do. (Tuniskillings) .	1	5	1	66	105	5	10	2	99	49	1	..	..	..	27	53	..
		1st Light Drag. K.G.L. . .	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
		2nd do. . .	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
		23rd Light Dragoons . .	1	3	..	10	20	5	..	..	23	26	1	..	..	..	31	33	..
		11th do. . .	1	1	..	10	17	4	4	..	20	38	..	1	2	20	18	..	10
		12th do. . .	2	6	..	39	28	3	4	1	56	22	..	..	..	..	60	..	..
		16th do. . .	2	2	..	6	35	4	2	..	16	20	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Infantry.	1st	2nd Hussars, K. G. L. . .	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		7th Hussars . . .	..	1	..	55	84	6	9	1	83	116	..	..	..	..	..	20	
		15th do. . .	2	2	..	19	31	3	3	..	45	52	..	..	..	5	22	..	
		1st Hussars, K. G. L. . .	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		10th Hussars . . .	2	..	..	20	40	6	1	1	38	35	..	..	1	25	41	17	
		18th do. . .	..	..	..	12	19	2	9	..	62	41	..	..	..	17	37	..	
		3rd Hussars, K. G. L. . .	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		13th Light Dragoons . .	1	..	..	11	15	9	10	2	57	46	..	..	..	18	52	8	
		1st Guards, 2nd Battn. . .	1	..	..	50	..	5	7	..	89	..	..	..	..	..	..	45	
		1st Guards, 3rd Battn. . .	3	2	..	79	..	6	7	..	238	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		2nd Guards, 2nd Battn. . .	1	1	..	53	..	7	13	..	229	..	..	..	1	3	..	50	
		3rd Guards, 2nd Battn. . .	3	2	..	37	..	9	10	..	178	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		52nd Regiment, 1st do. .	1	..	..	16	..	8	8	..	166	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
		71st do. do. . .	1	1	..	23	..	14	7	3	150	..	..	..	..	..	3	..	62
		95th do. 2nd do. . .	..	2	1	31	..	14	6	2	171	..	..	..	..	..	20	..	..
		95th do. 3rd do. . .	..	..	..	3	..	4	1	1	34	..	..	..	..	..	7	..	..
		14th do. 3rd do. . .	..	..	..	7	..	1	5	..	16	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
		23rd do. 1st do. . .	4	2	..	9	..	6	7	..	71	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	13
		51st do. do. . .	..	..	1	8	..	2	..	..	20	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
		39th do. 2nd do. . .	6	3	1	41	..	14	6	..	145	..	..	..	..	2	12	..	..
		33rd do. do. . .	2	1	1	31	..	10	8	..	84	..	..	..	..	3	45	..	67
		69th do. 2nd do. . .	4	..	..	14	..	3	..	..	50	..	..	..	..	2	13	..	..
		73rd do. 2nd do. . .	5	3	1	43	..	12	13	2	169	..	..	..	..	..	41	..	..
		28th do. 1st do. . .	1	1	..	17	..	15	6	1	136	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
		32nd do. 1st do. . .	..	..	..	28	..	9	11	..	126	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	58
		79th do. 1st do. . .	2	2	..	27	..	11	7	4	121	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..
		95th do. 1st do. . .	1	4	..	16	..	11	7	1	116	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
		1st do. 3rd do. . .	2	1	..	12	..	14	4	..	111	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
		42nd do. 1st do. . .	..	..	..	5	..	6	6	..	33	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
		41th do. 2nd do. . .	..	..	..	4	..	3	3	..	54	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	32
		92nd do. 1st do. . .	..	1	..	13	..	6	3	..	93	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
		4th do. do. . .	..	2	..	10	..	9	6	..	107	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
		27th do. do. . .	2	7	..	96	..	13	10	2	348	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	74
		40th do. do. . .	2	5	..	25	..	10	16	1	142	..	..	..	..	..	18	..	..
		General Staff . . .	10	..	..	..	..	40	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..
Total		85	82	7	1245	1319	365	271	28	1261	719	10	13	11	558	708	606		

VI.

*Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the King's German Legion
at the Battle of Waterloo.*

	Brigades.	Regiments.	Killed.					Wounded.					Missing.					Total Rank and File Killed, Wounded, and Missing.
			Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers.	Trumpeters or Drummers.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers.	Trumpeters or Drummers.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers.	Trumpeters or Drummers.	Rank and File.	Horses.	
Cavalry.	3rd	Artillery	1	3	..	16	51	6	1	..	50	..	..	..	..	4	..	70
		1st Light Dragoons	3	3	1	26	42	11	7	1	91	93	..	..	..	10	14	127
		2nd do.	2	..	1	17	29	4	5	..	47	14	..	..	..	2	25	66
		23rd British do.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	6th	1st Hussars	..	..	..	1	9	1	..	..	5	13	..	..	..	..	..	6
		10th British do.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	7th	18th do. do.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
		3rd Hussars	4	2	1	37	63	8	7	..	71	24	..	..	..	..	15	108
	1st	13th British Light Dragoons	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
		1st Line Battalion	1	2	1	19	..	6	6	..	63	..	..	1	16	..	..	98
		2nd do.	1	1	1	16	..	2	4	..	75	..	1	..	6	..	..	97
		3rd do.	1	1	..	18	..	5	2	1	90	..	..	..	31	..	..	137
		4th do.	1	1	..	12	..	7	3	..	74	..	..	1	13	..	..	99
		1st Light Battalion	4	1	..	36	..	9	6	3	73	..	..	..	13	..	..	122
	2nd	2nd do.	3	6	..	34	..	9	8	1	111	..	1	2	..	27	..	172
		5th Line Battalion	2	1	..	35	..	3	6	1	40	..	..	..	74	..	..	149
		8th do.	3	2	1	41	..	4	4	..	76	..	1	2	13	..	..	130
		General Staff	1	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Total			27	23	6	306	194	77	59	7	366	144	1	4	4	209	54	1381

VII.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Hanoverian Troops on the 16th, 17th, and 18th of June, 1815.

	Cavalry.	Brigades.	Regiments.	Killed.					Wounded.					Missing.					Total Privates Killed, Wounded, and Missing.
				Officers.	Non-com- missioned Officers.	Buglers and Drummers.	Privates.	Horses.	Officers.	Non-com- missioned Officers.	Buglers and Drummers.	Privates.	Horses.	Officers.	Non-com- missioned Officers.	Buglers and Drummers.	Privates.	Horses.	
Infantry.	1st	1st	1st Battery of Foot Artillery }	..	1	..	7	..	..	1	..	26	..	..	..	..	..	33	
			2nd Battery of Foot Artillery }	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
			Prince Regent's Hussars ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
			Bremen and Verden Hussars	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
			Duke of Cumberland's do.	1	2	..	15	..	..	3	..	30	..	..	..	2	..	47	
			Rifle Corps ..	..	..	..	12	..	3	..	1	37	..	..	..	19	..	68	
	1st	1st	Field Batt. Bremen ..	1	1	..	10	..	8	8	1	104	..	..	1	34	..	148	
			Field Batt. Verden ..	..	3	..	60	..	7	6	1	87	..	..	2	51	..	198	
			Field Batt. Duke of York's	2	..	1	21	..	4	2	..	66	..	..	1	44	..	131	
			Field Batt. Lüneburg ..	3	1	1	27	..	5	4	1	132	..	1	1	46	..	205	
			Field Batt. Grubenhagen ..	1	1	..	14	..	6	4	1	67	..	..	1	47	..	128	
			Landwehr Batt. Bremervörde	2	..	..	16	..	4	1	1	15	2	2	..	5	..	36	
	3rd	3rd	Do. Osnabrück ..	3	1	..	16	..	6	..	1	61	..	..	..	6	..	83	
			Do. Quackenbrück ..	1	..	..	1	..	1	..	..	9	..	..	..	2	..	12	
			Do. Salzgritter ..	..	1	..	19	..	2	3	..	57	..	..	..	1	..	77	
			Do. Verden ..	2	..	..	10	..	4	1	..	96	3	1	..	42	..	148	
			Do. Lüneburg ..	..	..	..	10	..	5	1	..	36	..	..	..	..	..	46	
			Do. Osterode ..	2	..	..	12	..	5	2	..	91	..	..	..	14	..	117	
	4th	4th	Do. Münden ..	..	1	..	11	..	6	4	1	92	..	..	1	16	..	119	
			Do. Hameln ..	..	..	..	9	..	4	3	..	57	..	..	..	7	..	73	
Do. Gifhorn ..			2	..	..	13	..	3	4	..	65	..	..	..	..	..	78		
Do. Hildesheim ..			..	..	..	3	..	1	1	2	17	..	..	..	..	..	20		
Do. Peine ..			..	..	..	8	..	2	1	1	38	..	..	1	5	..	51		
General Staff ..			..	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		
Total				20	12	2	294	..	77	50	11	1183	..	6	3	8	341	..	1818

VIII.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Brunswick Troops at the Battle of Waterloo.

Regiments.	Killed.		Wounded.		Horses.	Missing.	Total Rank and File Killed, Wounded, and Missing.
	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers, and Privates.	Officers.	Non-commissioned Officers, and Privates.	Killed, and Wounded.	Rank and File.	
Regiment of Hussars ..	1	27	5	45	40	} 50*	72
Squadron of Uhlans ..	..	..	2	13	15		13
Horse Battery ..	1	2	..	6	16		8
Foot Battery ..	..	..	..	18	6		18
Advanced-Guard Battalion ..	..	7	1	20	..		27
Guard Battalion ..	..	14	1	36	..		50
1st Light Battalion ..	..	4	3	41	..		45
2nd do. ..	2	37	2	73	..		110
3rd do. ..	1	35	5	75	..		110
1st Line Battalion ..	..	9	..	46	..		55
2nd do. ..	1	2	1	6	..		8
3rd do. ..	..	10	2	51	..		61
General Staff ..	1	..	4	..	..		..
Total ..	7	147	26	430	77	50	627

IX.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Troops of the Nassau Contingent (1st Regiment) at the Battle of Waterloo.

Killed	-	-	5 Officers, 249 Under-officers and Privates.
Wounded	-	-	19 .. 370
Total Killed and Wounded	24	..	619

X.

*List of Officers of the British Army who were present in the Actions on the 16th, 17th, and 18th of June, 1815, including those posted near Hal on the 18th, and distinguishing such as were Killed, Wounded, or Missing.**

STAFF.

Commander-in-Chief—FIELD MARSHAL HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G., G.C.B., &c. *Military Secretary*—Lieut. Colonel Lord FitzRoy Somerset, 1st F. Gds. *re*. *Aides-de-Camp*—Lieut. Colonels, J. Fremantle, 2nd F. Gds., C. F. Canning, 3rd F. Gds. *k.*, Hon. Sir Alex. Gordon, 3rd F. Gds. *k.*, Lieut. Lord George Lennox, 9th Lt. Drns., Hered. Prince of Nassau Usingen. *Extra A.D.C.'s*—Lieut. Colonel Hon. Henry Percy, 14th Lt. Drns., Captain Lord Arthur Hill, h.p., Lieutenant Hon. George Cathcart, 6th Drn. Gds.

GENERAL H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF ORANGE, *re*. *Aides-de-Camp*—Lieut. Colonel Tripp, 60th Foot, Captains, Lord John Somerset, h.p., Hon. Francis Russell, h.p., *Extra A.D.C.'s*—Captain Earl of March, 52nd Foot, Lieutenant H. Webster, 9th Lt. Drns.

LIEUT. GENERAL THE EARL OF UXBRIDGE, G.C.B. *re*. *Aides-de-Camp*—Major W. Thornhill, 7th Huss., *re*, Captain H. Seymour, 60th Foot, *re*. *Extra A.D.C.'s*—Captains, T. Wildman, 7th Huss. *re*, J. Fraser, 7th Huss. *re*.

LIEUT. GENERAL LORD HILL, G.C.B. *Aides-de-Camp*—Lieut. Colonel C. Hill, R. H. Gds. *re*, Majors, R. Egerton, 34th Foot, C. H. Churchill, 1st F. Gds., Captain D. Mackworth, 7th Foot. *Extra A.D.C.*—Captain Hon. O. Bridgeman, 1st F. Gds. *re*.

LIEUT. GENERAL SIR THOMAS PICTON, G.C.B. *k.* *Aides-de-Camp*—Captains, J. Tyler, 93rd Foot, *re*, N. Chambers, 1st F. Gds. *k.* *Extra A.D.C.*—Captain B. Price, h.p.

LIEUT. GENERAL SIR HENRY CLINTON, G.C.B. *Aide-de-Camp*—Captain F. Dawkins, 1st F. Gds.

LIEUT. GENERAL C. COUNT ALTEN, K.C.B. *Aide-de-Camp*—Lieutenant W. Havelock, 43rd Foot, *re*, Major Ch. Heise, 2nd Lt. Batt. K.G.L.

LIEUT. GENERAL SIR CHARLES COLVILLE, G.C.B. *Aides-de-Camp*—Captain J. Jackson, 37th Foot, Lieutenant F. W. Frankland, 2nd Foot. *Extra A.D.C.*—Captain Lord James Hay, 1st F. Gds.

M. GENERAL V. COUNT ALTEN. *Aide-de-Camp*—Lieutenant Baron Estorff, 2nd Drns. K.G.L.

M. GENERAL SIR JOHN VANDELEUR, K.C.B. *Aide-de-Camp*—Captain W. Armstrong, 19th Lt. Drns. *Major of Brigade*—Major M. Childers, 11th Lt. Drns.

M. GENERAL COOKE, *re*. *Aide-de-Camp*—Captain G. Desbrowe, 1st F. Gds. *Extra A.D.C.*—Ensign A. Cuyler, 2nd F. Gds.

M. GENERAL SIR JAMES KEMPT, K.C.B. *re*. *Aide-de-Camp*—Captain Hon. Charles Gore, h.p. *Major of Brigade*—Captain C. Eeles, 95th Foot.

M. GENERAL HON. SIR W. PONSONBY, K.C.B. *k.* *Aide-de-Camp*—Lieutenant B. Christie, 5th Drn. Gds. *Extra A.D.C.*—Major D. Evans, 5th W. I. Regt. *Major of Brigade*—Major Reignolds, 2nd Drns. *k.*

M. GENERAL SIR JOHN BYNG, K.C.B. *Aide-de-Camp*—Captain H. Dumaresq, 9th Foot, *re*. *Major of Brigade*—Captain W. Stothert, 3rd F. Gds. *k.*

M. GENERAL SIR DENIS PACK, K.C.B. *re*. *Aide-de-Camp*—Major E. L'Estrange, 71st Foot, *k.* *Major of Brigade*—Captain C. Smith, 93rd Foot, *k.*

M. GENERAL LORD E. SOMERSET, K.C.B. *Aide-de-Camp*—Lieutenant H. Somerset, 18th Huss. *Major of Brigade*—Captain G. Villiers, R. H. Guards.

M. GENERAL SIR JOHN LAMBERT, K.C.B. *Aide-de-Camp*—Lieutenant T. Baynes, 39th Foot. *Major of Brigade*—Major H. G. Smith, 95th Foot, *k.*

* The names of those killed, wounded, or missing, are marked *k*, *re*, and *m*, respectively.

M. GENERAL SIR COLQUHOUN GRANT, K.C.B. *re. Aide-de-Camp*—Lieutenant R. Mansfield, 15th Huss. *re. Extra A.D.C.*—Captain W. Moray, 17th Lt. Drns. *re. Major of Brigade*—Captain Jones, h.p.

M. GENERAL SIR JAMES LYON, K.C.B. *Aide-de-Camp*—Lieutenant J. M'Glashan, 2nd Lt. Bn. K.G.L. *Major of Brigade*—Captain Richter, 1st Ceylon Regt.

M. GENERAL P. MAITLAND. *Aide-de-Camp*—Ensign Lord Hay, 1st. F. Gds. *re. Extra A.D.C.*—Cornet Lord William P. Lennox, R.H. Gds. *Major of Brigade*—Captain J. Gunthorpe, 1st. F. Gds.

M. GENERAL G. JOHNSTONE. *Aide-de-Camp*—Capt. C. G. Gray, 25th Foot. *Major of Brigade*—Captain S. Holmes, 78th Foot.

M. GENERAL F. ADAM, *re. Aide-de-Camp*—Lieutenant R. P. Campbell, 7th Foot. *Extra A.D.C.*—Captain C. Yorke, 52nd Foot. *Major of Brigade*—Major Hunter Blair, 91st Foot, *re.*

M. GENERAL SIR COLIN HALKETT, K.C.B. *re. Aides-de-Camp*—Captains, H. Marschall, 1st Lt. Bn. K.G.L. *re. A. Holme*, 2nd Lt. Bn. K.G.L. *Major of Brigade*—Captain W. Crofton, 54th Foot, *re.*

M. GENERAL SIR HUSSEY VIVIAN, K.C.B. *Aide-de-Camp*—Captain E. Keane, 7th Huss. *Extra A.D.C.*—Lieutenant C. A. Fitzroy, R. H. Gds. *Major of Brigade*—Captain T. N. Harris, h.p. *re.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL—M. General Sir Edward Barnes, K.C.B. *re. Aide-de-Camp*—Major A. Hamilton, 4th W.I. Regt. *re. Dep. Adj. General*—Colonel Sir John Elley, K.C.B. R. H. Gds. *re. Assist. Adj. Gen.*—Lieut. Colonels, S. Waters, Unatt. *re.*, Sir George H. Berkeley, K.C.B. 35th Foot, *re.*, Sir Guy Campbell, Bt. 6th Foot, Sir Noel Hill, K.C.B. 1st F. Gds., D. Barclay, 1st F. Gds., H. Rooke, 3rd F. Gds., E. Currie, 90th Foot, *re.*; Majors, A. Wylly, 7th Foot, G. Evatt, 55th Foot, W. Darling, h.p., F. Breymann, 2nd Lt. Bn. K.G.L. *Dep. Assist. Adj. Gen.*—Captains, Hon. E. S. Erskine, 60th Foot, *re.*, Lord Charles Fitzroy, 1st F. Gds., C. Bentinck, 2nd F. Gds., L. Grant, 78th Foot, H. Blanckley, 23rd Foot, Hon. W. Curzon, 69th Foot, *re.*; Lieutenants, J. Hamilton, 46th Foot, *re.*, J. Harford, 7th R. V. Bn., E. Gerstlacher, 3rd Huss. K.G.L., J. Rooke, h.p. *Dep. Judge Advocate*—Lieut. Colonel S. Goodman, h.p.

DEP. QUARTER MASTER GENERAL—Col. Sir William Delancey, K.C.B. *re. Assist. Quar. Mas. Gen.*—Colonels, Hon. A. Abercromby, 2nd F. Gds. *re.*, F. B. Hervey, 14th Lt. Drns., Lieut. Colonels, R. Torrens, 1st W.I. Regt., Sir Charles Broke, K.C.B. Perm., Sir Jeremiah Dickson, K.C.B. Perm., Lord Greenock, Perm., J. Woodford, 1st F. Gds., C. Grant, 11th Foot, Sir William Gomm, K.C.B. 2nd F. Gds., Sir Henry Bradford, K.C.B. 1st F. Gds. *re.*, Sir George Scovell, K.C.B., h.p., D. Kelly, 73rd Foot; Majors, W. Campbell, 23rd Foot, Hon. George L. Dawson, 1st Drn. Gds. *re.*, E. Beckwith, 95th Foot, *re.*, J. Shaw, 43rd Foot, J. Jessop, 44th Foot, *re. Dep. Assist. Quar. Mas. Gen.*—Captains, E. Fitzgerald, 25th Foot, *re.*, T. Wright, R. Staff Corps, *re.*, H. McLeod, 35th Foot, *re.*, J. Mitchell, 25th Foot, *re.*, W. Moore, 1st F. Gds., G. Hillier, 74th Foot, J. Fraser, 90th Foot, W. Cameron, 1st F. Gds., F. Read, R. Staff Corps; Lieutenants, P. Barrailleur, 33rd Foot, B. Jackson, R. Staff Corps, A. Brauns, R. Staff Corps.

Commandant at Head-Quarters—Colonel Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B. 2nd F. Gds.

CAVALRY.

1st Life Guards. MAJOR—S. Ferrier, Lieut. Col. *re.* CAPTAINS—J. Whale, *re.*; M. Lind, *re.*; E. Kelly, *re.*; J. Berger, Maj. LIEUTENANTS—G. Randall; W. Mayne; H. Wyatt. SUB-LIEUTENANTS—W. S. Richardson, *re.*; S. Cox, *re.*; W. Wombwell; G. Storey. SURGEON—R. Gough. ASST. SURGEON—J. H. James. VET. SURGEON—F. Dalton.

2nd Life Guards. MAJOR—Hon. E. P. Lygon, Lieut. Col. CAPTAINS—W. Boyce, Maj.; R. Fitzgerald, Lt. Col. *re.*; Hon. H. E. Irby; J. P. M. Kenyon. LIEUTENANTS—R. Meares; W. Elliott; S. Waymouth, *re.* and *m.*; C. Barton. SUB-LIEUTENANTS—A. Kenyon; T. Martin; A. M'Innes; J. Clues, Adj. SURGEON—S. Broughton. ASST. SURGEON—T. Drinkwater. VET. SURGEON—J. Field.

Royal Horse Guards, Blue. LIEUT. COLONELS—Sir John Elley, Col. *re.*; Sir R. C. Hill, *re.* MAJOR—R. C. Packe, *re.* CAPTAINS—J. Thoyts; W. R. Clayton; C. Hill,

Lt. Col. *w.*; W. T. Drake. LIEUTENANTS—J. B. Riddlesden; W. C. Shawe, *w.*; E. W. Bouverie, *w.*; H. E. Boates; T. B. Tathwell; G. Smith; Hon. G. J. Watson. CORNETS—J. K. Picard; J. Arnold. SURGEON—D. Slow. VET. SURGEON—J. Seddall.

1st (or King's) Dragoon Guards. LIEUT. COLONEL—W. Fuller, Col. *k.* CAPTAINS—H. Graham, Maj. *k.*; M. Turner, *w.*; J. F. Naylor, *w.*; W. Elton; J. D. Brughurst, Maj. *k.*; J. P. Sweeny, *w.*; R. Wallace; T. N. Quicke; G. E. Battersby, *k.* LIEUTENANTS—J. Leatham, *w.*; Sterling; R. Babington; F. Brooke, *k.*; R. T. Hamley; T. C. Brander; T. Shelper, Adj. *k.*; E. Hamill; W. D. A. Irvine, *w.*; J. E. Greaves; J. N. Hibbert. CORNETS—G. Quicke; J. F. Middleton; Hon. H. B. Bernard, *k.*; W. W. Huntley. PAYMASTER—J. Webster. SURGEON—J. Going. ASST. SURGEONS—W. M'Auley; Robert Pearson.

1st Royal Dragoons. LIEUT. COLONEL—A. B. Clifton. MAJOR—P. Dorville, Lieut. Col. CAPTAINS—C. E. Radclyffe, Maj. *w.*; A. K. Clark, *w.*; P. Phipps; R. Heathcote; E. C. Windsor, *k.*; C. L. Methuin; C. Foster, *k.* LIEUTENANTS—H. R. Carden; G. Gunning, *w.*; T. R. Kelly, *w.*; S. Trafford, *w.*; S. Windawe, *w.*; C. Bridges; C. Ommamney, *w.*; C. Blois, *w.*; S. Goodenough, *w.*; R. Magniac, *k.* CORNETS—W. Sturges; J. C. Sykes, *k.* ADJUTANT-CORNET—T. Shipley, *k.* QUARTER MASTER—W. Waddel. SURGEON—G. Steed. ASST. SURGEON—T. Prosser.

2nd, or Royal North British, Dragoons, (Scots Greys). LIEUT. COLONEL—J. J. Hamilton, Col. *k.* MAJOR—J. B. Clarke, Lieut. Col. *w.*; T. P. Hankin, Lieut. Col. *w.* CAPTAINS—E. Cheney, Maj.; J. Poole, *w.*; R. Vernon, Maj. *w.*; T. Reignolds, *k.*; C. L. Barnard, *k.*; E. Payne. LIEUTENANTS—John Mills, *w.*; F. Stupart, *w.*; G. H. Falconer; J. Wemyss; J. Carruthers, *w.*; A. Hamilton; T. Truthier, *k.*; J. Gape; C. Wyndham, *w.*; J. R. T. Graham; H. M'Millan. CORNETS—E. Westby, *k.*; F. C. Kinchant, *k.*; L. Shuldham, *k.*; W. Crawford. PAYMASTER—W. Dawson. QUARTER MASTER—J. Lennox. SURGEON—R. Dunn. ASST. SURGEON—J. Alexander. VET. SURGEON—J. Trigg.

6th, or Inniskilling, Dragoons. LIEUT. COLONEL—J. Muter, Col. *w.* MAJORS—F. S. Miller, Lieut. Col. *w.*; H. Madox; W. F. Browne, *w.*; W. F. Hadden. CAPTAINS—Hon. S. Douglass, *w.*; E. Holbech; T. Mackay. LIEUTENANTS—T. Biddulph; A. S. Willett; J. Linton; H. W. Petre; A. Hassard, *w.*; F. Johnston; R. Down; B. Barry; P. Ruffo, *m.*; M. Dames. CORNET—J. D. Allingham. ADJUTANT—M. M'Cluskey, *k.* REGIMENTAL QUARTER MASTER—J. Kerr. SURGEON—J. Bolton. ASST. SURGEONS—W. H. Rickatts; W. Campbell. VET. SURGEON—R. Vincent. PAYMASTER—W. Armstrong.

7th Light Dragoons. COLONEL—Earl of Uxbridge, Lt. Gen. *w.* LIEUT. COLONEL—Sir Edward Kerrison, Col. MAJORS—Edward Hodge, *k.*; W. Thornhill, *w.* CAPTAINS—W. Verner, *w.*; T. W. Robbins, *w.*; E. Keane; P. A. Heyliger, *w.*; T. Wildman; J. J. Frazer, *w.*; J. D. Elphinstone, *w.*; E. Wildman, *w.* LIEUTENANTS—S. O'Grady; W. Shirley; W. Grenfell; R. Douglass, *w.*; R. Uniacke; J. R. Gordon, *w.*; Henry Lord Paget; J. Daniel; E. J. Peters, *w.*; J. Wildman; F. Beatty, *w.*; S. Rice; F. Towers. PAYMASTER—T. Feltom. LIEUT. ADJ.—A. Meyers, *w.* QUARTER MASTER—J. Greenwood. SURGEON—D. Irwin. ASST. SURGEONS—R. A. Chermiside; J. Moffit. VET. SURGEON—R. Dorville.

10th Hussars. LIEUT. COLONEL—George Quentin, Col. *w.*; Lord Robert Manners. MAJOR—Hon. F. Howard, *k.* CAPTAINS—T. W. Taylor, Maj.; H. C. Stapleton; J. Grey, *w.*; J. Gurwood, *w.*; C. Wood, *w.*; H. Floyd; A. Shakespeare. LIEUTENANTS—J. W. Parsons; C. Gunning, *k.*; W. S. Smith; H. J. Burn; R. Arnold, *w.*; W. Cartwright; J. C. Wallington; E. Hodgson; W. C. Hamilton; A. Bacon, *w.*; W. H. B. Lindsey. PAYMASTER—J. Tallon. LIEUTENANT AND ADJUTANT—J. Hardman. ASST. SURGEON—G. S. Jenks. VET. SURGEON—H. C. Sannerman.

11th Light Dragoons. LIEUT. COLONEL—J. W. Sleigh. MAJOR—A. Money, Lt. Col. CAPTAINS—J. Bouchier; B. Lutyens, Maj.; M. Childers, Maj.; J. A. Schreiber; J. Jenkins; T. Binney; J. Duberley. LIEUTENANTS—G. Sicker; F. Wood, *w.*; W. Smith; R. Coles, *w.*; B. Lye; E. Phillips, *k.*; J. R. Rotton; J. S. Moore, *w.*; R. Milligan, *w.* CORNETS—B. P. Browne; H. Orme; G. Schreiber, *w.*; H. R. Bullock; P. H. James. PAYMASTER—D. Lutyens. ADJUTANT—G. Sicker. QUARTER MASTER—J. Hall. SURGEON—J. O'Meally. ASST. SURGEON—H. Steel.

12th, or Prince of Wales's, Light Dragoons. LIEUT. COLONEL—Hon. F. C. Ponsonby, Col. *w.* MAJOR—J. P. Bridger. CAPTAINS—S. Stawell; G. F. Erskine; E. W. T. Sandys, *w.*; H. Wallace; A. Barton; H. Andrews. LIEUTENANTS—W. Heydon; J. Chatterton; J. Van

deleur; W. Hay; W. H. Dowbiggen, *w.*; A. Goldsmid; J. D. Calderwood; L. J. Bertie, *k.*; T. Reed. CORNETS—J. E. Lockhart, *k.*; J. H. Slade. ADJUTANT—J. Griffiths.

13th Light Dragoons—LIEUT. COLONEL—P. Doherty, Col. MAJOR—S. Boyse, Lt. Col. *w.* CAPTAINS—B. Lawrence, Maj.; J. Doherty, *w.*; J. Macalister, Maj.; M. Bowers; J. Gubbins, *k.*; C. Gregorie; F. Goulbourn; J. Moss; G. Doherty, *w.*; J. H. Drought; C. R. Bowers, *w.*; A. T. Maclean; J. Geale, *w.*; R. Nesbitt; G. Pym, *w.*; W. Turner; J. Mill, *w.*; G. H. Pack, *w.*; H. Acton; J. Wallace; J. E. Irving, *w.*; J. Wakefield. PAYMASTER—A. Strange. QUARTER MASTER—W. Minchin. SURGEON—T. G. Logan. ASST. SURGEON—A. Armstrong. VET. SURGEON—J. Coustant.

15th Hussars. LIEUT. COLONEL—L. C. Dalrymple, *w.* MAJOR—E. Griffith, *k.*; CAPTAINS—J. Thackwell, *w.*; S. Hancox; J. Whiteford, *w.*; P. Wodehouse; F. C. Phillips; W. Booth; J. Buckley, *w.*; J. Carr. LIEUTENANTS—E. Barrett; J. Sherwood, *k.*; W. Bellairs; H. Lane; W. Byam, *w.*; E. Byam, *w.*; G. A. F. Dawkins, *w.*; H. Dixon; J. J. Douglass; W. Stewart. PAYMASTER—J. C. Cocksedge. LIEUTENANT and ADJUTANT—J. Griffith. SURGEON—T. Cartan. ASST. SURGEON—S. Jeyes. VET. SURGEON—C. Dalwig.

16th Light Dragoons. LIEUT. COLONEL—James Hay, *w.* MAJORS—Hon. H. B. Lygon; G. H. Murray. CAPTAINS—J. H. Belli, Maj.; C. Swetenham; R. Weyland, *w.*; W. Perse; J. P. Buchanan, *k.*; W. Tomkinson; C. King. LIEUTENANTS—J. Barra; W. Osten, *w.*; T. Wheeler; G. Baker; R. Beauchamp; N. D. Crichton, *w.*; E. B. Lloyd; W. Nepean; J. A. Richardson; J. Luard; W. Harris; Hon. C. T. Monckton. CORNETS—W. Beckwith; W. Polhill; G. Nugent. PAYMASTER—G. Neyland. LIEUTENANT and ADJUTANT—J. Barra. QUARTER MASTER—J. Harrison. SURGEON—J. Robinson. ASST. SURGEON—J. M. Mallock. VET. SURGEON—J. Jones.

18th Light Dragoons. LIEUT. COLONEL—Hon. H. Murray. CAPTAINS—A. Kennedy; R. Croker; R. Ellis; J. Grant, Maj.; G. Luard; J. R. L. Lloyd. LIEUTENANTS—C. Heste, *w.*; T. Dunkin; J. Waldie; G. Woodberry; Hon. L. C. Dawson; M. French; T. Prior; R. Coote; J. T. Machell; D. M'Duffie; H. Somerset, W. H. Rowlls; J. R. Gordon; C. C. Moller; W. Monins. PAYMASTER—W. Deane. LIEUTENANT and ADJUTANT—H. Duprier, *w.* SURGEON—W. Chambers. ASST. SURGEONS—L. Pulsford; J. Quincey. VET. SURGEON—D. Pilcher.

23rd Light Dragoons. LIEUT. COLONEL—Earl of Portarlington, Col. MAJORS—J. M. Cutcliffe, *w.*; P. A. Lautour. CAPTAINS—C. W. Dance, *w.*; P. Z. Cox; J. Martin; T. Gerrard, Maj. *w.*; R. McNeil; H. Grove, Maj.; J. M. Wallace. LIEUTENANTS—G. Dodwell; A. Bolton; S. Coxen, *k.*; C. Tudor; J. Banner; J. Lewis; C. Bacon; B. Disney, *w.*; R. Johnson; T. B. Wall, *w.*; G. W. Blathwayte. CORNET—W. Hemmings. PAYMASTER—T. Dillow. LIEUTENANT and ADJUTANT—H. Hill. QUARTER MASTER—J. Grouchley. SURGEON—S. Steele. ASST. SURGEON—H. Cowen. VET. SURGEON—J. Ship.

INFANTRY.

1st Regt. Foot Guards (2nd and 3rd Batts.) MAJORS—H. Askew, Col. *w.*; Hon. W. Stuart, *w.* CAPTAINS and LIEUT. COLONELS—Hon. H. Townsend, *w.*; R. H. Cooke, *w.*; E. Stables, *k.*; Sir F. D'Oyly, K.C.B. *k.*; L. G. Jones; H. D'Oyly, *w.*; G. Fead, *w.*; C. Thomas, *k.*; Lord Saltoun; J. Reeve; W. Miller, *w.*; Hon. J. Stanhope; J. G. Woodford; C. Colquett; W. H. Milnes, *w.*; Sir H. W. Bradford, K.C.B. *w.*; Sir T. N. Hill, K.C.B.; D. Barclay, K.C.B.; Sir U. Burgh, K.C.B.; Lord F. Somerset, K.C.B. LIEUTENANTS and CAPTAINS—R. Adair, *w.*; T. Streatfield, *w.*; J. H. Davis; Lord James Hay, *k.*; E. Grose, *k.*; J. Gunthorpe, Adj.; Hon. R. Clements, *w.*; Lord C. Fitzroy; J. H. Hutchinson; R. Ellison; H. W. Powell; George Desbrowe; W. G. Cameron; Lonsdale Boldero; R. W. Phillimore; C. P. Ellis, *w.*; J. Simpson, *w.*; A. F. Viscount Bury; E. Clive; W. F. Johnstone; E. F. Luttrell, *w.*; T. Brown, *k.*; E. P. Buckley; F. Dawkins; J. Nixon; C. F. R. Lascelles, *w.*; W. G. Moore; S. W. Burgess, *w.* ENSIGNS—R. Batty, *w.*; R. Master; W. Barton, *w.*; Hon. H. S. V. Vernon; E. Pardoe, *k.*; J. Butler; T. R. Swinburne; C. J. Vyner; F. D. Swan; J. P. Dirom, Lt.; J. F. M. Erskine; R. Bruce, *w.*; Hon. T. S. Bathurst; Hon. E. A. Edgcumbe; G. Fludyer, *w.*; W. F. Tinling; A. Greville; G. T. Jacob;

D. Cameron; L. Hurd; F. Norton; H. Lascelles; G. Mure; G. Allen; T. E. Croft, *rc.*; Hon. S. S. P. Barrington, *k.*; J. St. John; D. Tighe; J. Talbot. ADJUTANT—C. Allix, Capt. QUARTER MASTER—R. Colquhoun. SURGEONS—W. Curtis; W. Watson. ASST. SURGEONS—J. Harrison; A. Armstrong; J. Gardner; F. Gilder.

Coldstream, or 2nd Regt. Foot Guards (2nd Batt.) MAJOR—A. G. Woodford, Col. CAPTAINS and LIEUT. COLONELS—J. Macdonell, Lt. Col. *rc.*; D. MacKinnon, Lt. Col. *rc.*; Hon. J. Walpole; H. Dawkins; H. A. Abercromby, *k.*; Sir C. Campbell, K.C.B.; Hon. E. Acheson; Sir W. Gomm, K.C.B.; H. Wyndham, *rc.* LIEUTENANTS and CAPTAINS—G. Bowles; T. Sowerby; J. Fremantle, Lt. Col.; W. L. Walton; W. G. Baynes; C. A. F. Bentinck, Adj.; J. S. Cowell; E. Sumner, *rc.*; J. L. Blackman, *k.*; Lord Hotham; Hon. R. Moore, *rc.*; T. Chaplin. ENSIGNS—Hon. J. Forbes; H. Gooch; A. Cuyler; M. Beaufoy; H. F. Griffiths, *rc.*; John Montagu, *rc.*; G. R. Buckley; J. Hervey; H. Vane; F. J. Douglas; R. Bowen; A. Gordon; Hon. W. Forbes; C. Short. ADJUTANT—C. A. F. Bentinck, Capt. QUARTER MASTER—B. Selway. SURGEON—W. Whympere. ASST. SURGEONS—G. Smith; W. Hunter.

3rd Foot Guards, (2nd Batt.) MAJOR—F. Hepburn, Col. CAPTAINS and LIEUT. COLONELS—H. W. Rooke; D. Mercer; Hon. Sir A. Gordon, *k.*; C. Dashwood, *rc.*; F. Home; C. F. Canning, *k.*; E. Bowater, *rc.*; C. West, *rc.* LIEUTENANTS and CAPTAINS—W. Stothert, Adj.; W. Drummond; R. B. Hesketh, *rc.*; H. Hawkins; R. H. Wigston; C. J. Barnet; J. W. Moorhouse; E. B. Fairfield; G. Evelyn, *rc.*; Hon. H. Forbes, *k.*; J. Elrington; H. B. Montgomerie, *rc.*; T. Crawford, *k.*; J. Ashton, *k.* ENSIGNS—C. Lake, *rc.*; Hon. E. Stopford; B. Drummond; G. D. Standen; D. Baird, *rc.*; W. F. Hamilton; W. James; Hon. G. Anson; T. Wedgewood; W. Butler; A. C. Cochrane; J. Prendergast; C. Simpson, *rc.*; H. S. Blane; H. Montague. ADJUTANT—W. Stothert, Capt. *rc.* QUARTER MASTER—J. Skuce. SURGEON—S. Good. ASST. SURGEONS—J. R. Warde; F. G. Hanrott.

1st Regt. Foot, or Royal Scots, (3rd Batt.) MAJOR—Colin Campbell, Lt. Col. *rc.* CAPTAINS—L. Arquimbaum, Maj. *rc.*; R. Macdonald, Maj. *rc.*; H. Massy, Maj. *rc.*; W. Buckley, *k.*; W. Gordon; R. Dudgeon, *rc.* LIEUTENANTS—A. Morrison, *rc.*; J. Armstrong, *k.*; J. E. O'Neil, *k.*; W. J. Rea, *rc.*; J. Ingram, *rc.*; W. Clarke, *rc.*; G. C. Johnstone; T. Gordon; A. Cameron, Adj. *rc.*; J. Stoyte, *rc.*; R. H. Scott, *rc.*; G. Lane, *rc.*; J. Symes, *rc.*; J. Alstone, *rc.*; W. G. Young, *k.*; J. Mann, *rc.*; W. Dobbs, *rc.*; J. F. W. Millar, *rc.*; G. Stewart, *rc.*; J. L. Black, *rc.* ENSIGNS—A. Glen; C. Mudie; J. G. Kennedy, *k.*; C. Lewis; C. Graham, *rc.*; T. Stephens, *rc.*; J. MacKay, *rc.*; A. Robertson, *k.*; W. Anderson, *k.*; L. M. Cooper, *rc.*; W. Thomas. PAYMASTER—J. C. Thompson. ADJUTANT—A. Cameron, *rc.* QUARTER MASTER—T. Griffith, *rc.* SURGEON—W. Galliers. ASST. SURGEONS—W. Finnie; T. Bolton.

4th Regt. Foot (King's Own). LIEUT. COLONEL—F. Brooke. CAPTAINS—G. D. Wilson, Maj. *rc.*; C. J. Edgell, *rc.*; W. L. Wood; J. W. Fletcher; H. T. Shaw; R. Erskine; D. S. Craig; E. S. Kirwan; J. Browne, *rc.* LIEUTENANTS—G. Vincent; B. Martin; G. Richardson, *rc.*; P. Boulby; H. Boyd, *rc.*; G. H. Hearne; B. Collins, *rc.*; W. Squire, *rc.*; J. Bushel; R. Mulholland; W. Lonsdale; E. Boulby; W. Clarke; W. Richardson, Adj.; F. Field; W. Reddock; A. Gerard, *rc.*; J. L. Fernandez; W. Blaggrave; C. Levinge. ENSIGNS—W. Taylor; E. Newton; W. M. Mathews, *rc.*; J. E. H. Holland; I. Beer. PAYMASTER—J. Lansdale. QUARTER MASTER—T. Richards. SURGEON—F. Burton. ASST. SURGEONS—W. Morrah; J. French.

14th Regt. Foot (3rd Batt.) MAJORS—F. S. Tidy, Lt. Col.; J. Keightley. CAPTAINS—G. Marley, Maj.; T. Ramsay; W. Turnor; W. Ross; R. Adams; C. Wilson; J. L. White; W. Hewett. LIEUTENANTS—W. Akenside; C. M. Brannan; L. Beachcroft; W. Buckle, Adj.; G. Baldwin; J. Nickson; L. Westwood; D. Slocock; J. C. Hartley; H. Boldero. ENSIGNS—W. Reed; J. Mackenzie; F. R. Fane; R. B. Newenham; C. Frazer; A. T. E. Adamson; W. Keowen; J. M. Wood; A. Ormsby, *rc.* (24th); J. R. Smith; A. Cooper, *rc.*; J. Bowlby; J. P. Matthews; R. J. Stackpoole; R. B. Holmes; Hon. G. T. Keppel. PAYMASTER—R. Mitton. QUARTER MASTER—A. Ross. ASST. SURGEONS—A. Shannon, Henry Terry.

23rd Regt. Foot (Royal Welsh Fusiliers) LIEUT. COLONEL—Sir H. W. Ellis, K.C.B., Col. *rc.* MAJORS—T. Dalmer, Lt. Col.; J. H. E. Hill, Lt. Col. *rc.* CAPTAINS—J. Hawtyn, Maj. *k.*; P. Brown, Maj.; F. Dalmer, Maj.; H. Wynne; T. Strangeway; W. Campbell, Maj.; C. Jolliffe, *k.*; T. Farmer, *k.*; H. Johnson, *rc.*; H. S. Blanckley. 1st LIEUTENANTS—F. O'Flaherty; J. Milne; W. Walley; E. M. Brown; F. L. G. Cowel; G. Hensham, *k.*; R. Smith; H. Palmer; J. W. Harris; J. Enoch, Adj.; G. Phillips; J. Macdonald; G. Fielding; R. P. Holmes; C. Fryer; W. A. Griffiths, *rc.*; J. Clyde, *rc.*; A. A. Brice; A. D. Sidley, *rc.*;

A. Clayhills; E. Methold. 2nd LIEUTENANTS—T. Lilly; G. Dunn; G. Stainforth; G. FitzGibbon; W. Leebody, *k.* (24th); T. Towers; T. Allan. PAYMASTER—R. Julian. LIEUT. and ADJUTANT—J. Enoch. QUARTER MASTER—G. Sidley. SURGEON—J. Dunn. ASST. SURGEONS—T. Smith; J. Williams.

27th (*Inniskilling*) *Regt. Foot.* CAPTAINS—J. Hare, Maj. *w.*; J. Tucker, *w.*; G. Holmes, *k.* LIEUTENANTS—G. Macdonald, *w.*; W. Henderson, *w.*; R. Handcock, *w.*; E. W. Drewe, *w.*; J. Betty; W. F. Fortescue, *w.*; W. Talbot; J. Millar, *w.*; C. Manley, *w.*; T. Craddock, *w.* ENSIGNS—W. Kater; T. Handcock, *w.*; T. Smith, *w.*; S. Ireland, *k.*; J. Dittmas, *w.* QUARTER MASTER—T. Taylor. ASST. SURGEONS—T. Mostyn; G. FitzGerald.

28th *Regt. Foot.* LIEUT. COLONELS—Sir Charles Philip Belson, K.C.B., Col.; R. Nixon, *w.* MAJORS—W. P. Meacham, *k.*; W. Irving, *w.*; R. Llewellyn, *w.* CAPTAINS—C. Cadell; R. Kelly, *w.*; J. Bowles, *w.*; T. English, *w.*; C. Teulon, *w.* LIEUTENANTS—J. H. Crumner; J. F. Wilkinson, *w.*; M. Semple; R. P. Gilbert, *w.*; R. P. Eason, *w.*; W. Irwin, *w.*; H. Hilliard, *w.*; S. Moore; J. Coen, *w.*; C. B. Carruthers, *w.*; J. T. Clarke, *w.*; J. W. Shelton, *w.*; J. Deares, *w.*; E. E. Hill; G. Ingram, *w.*; T. W. Colleton; J. Parry. ENSIGNS—R. T. Stewart; W. Serjeantson; R. Martin; J. Simpkin; W. Mountstevens, *w.*; W. Lynam. LIEUTENANT and ADJUTANT—T. Bridgeland, *w.* PAYMASTER—J. Dewes. QUARTER MASTER—R. Reynolds. ASST. SURGEON—P. H. Lavens.

30th *Regt. Foot* (2nd Batt.) LIEUT. COLONEL—A. Hamilton, *w.* MAJORS—N. W. Bailey, *w.*; C. A. Vigoureux, *w.*; T. W. Chambers, *k.* CAPTAINS—R. Machell; A. M'Nab, *k.*; R. Howard; A. Gore, *w.*; D. Sinclair. LIEUTENANTS—B. W. Nicholson; M. Andrews; R. Heaviside; W. Penefather; R. C. Elliot, *w.*; J. Rumley, *w.*; A. Baillie; R. Daniells, *w.*; J. Roe, *w.*; T. O. Halloran; R. Hughes, *w.*; P. Lockwood, *w.*; J. Pratt, *w.*; H. Beere, *k.*; E. Prendergast, *k.*; W. O. Warren, *w.*; T. Money Penny, *w.*; R. Harrison; M. Ross; J. Roe; F. Tincombe. ENSIGNS—R. N. Rogers; J. James, *k.*; W. B. Frizell; J. Bullen, *k.*; G. L. Backhouse. PAYMASTER—H. B. Wray. LIEUTENANT and ADJUTANT—M. Andrews, *w.* QUARTER MASTER—Williamson. SURGEONS—R. Pearce; J. G. Elrlington. ASST. SURGEONS—J. Evans; P. Clarke.

32nd *Regt. Foot.* MAJORS—J. Hicks, Lt. Col.; F. Calvert. CAPTAINS—C. Hames, Maj.; H. R. Lewen; W. H. Toole, Maj. *w.*; J. Crowe, *w.*; J. Boyce, *k.*; T. Cassan, *k.*; E. Whitty, *k.*; H. Harrison, *w.*; C. Walleth, *w.*; S. Cane. LIEUTENANTS—H. W. Brookes, *w.*; G. Barr, *w.*; M. W. Meighan, *w.*; S. H. Lawrence, *w.*; T. Butler; J. Boase, *w.*; T. Ross Lewin, *w.*; H. Butterworth, *w.*; J. S. M'Culloch; J. R. Colthurst, *w.*; B. Hill; J. Harvey; J. Robinson, *w.*; G. Brock; R. T. Belcher; J. Fitzgerald, *w.*; T. J. Horan, *w.*; E. Stephens, *w.*; H. Quill, *w.*; J. Jagoe, *w.*; G. Small; B. R. O'Connor; H. Newton; J. Peyton. ENSIGNS—J. Lucas; J. M'Conchy; H. Metcalf, *w.*; J. Birtwhistle, *w.*; A. Stuart, *w.*; G. Brown; W. Bennett, *w.*; C. Dallas, *w.* LIEUTENANT and ADJUTANT—D. Davis, *w.* PAYMASTER—T. Hart. QUARTER MASTER—W. Stevens. SURGEON—W. Buchanan. ASST. SURGEONS—R. Lawder; H. M'Clintock.

33rd *Regt. Foot* (2nd Batt.) LIEUT. COLONEL—W. K. Elphinstone. MAJORS—G. Colclough; E. Parkinson, *w.* CAPTAINS—W. M'Intyre, *w.*; C. Knight, *w.*; J. Haigh, *k.*; J. M. Harty, *w.*; R. Gore; J. Longden. LIEUTENANTS—T. Reid, *w.*; G. Barrs; H. R. Buck, *k.*; A. H. Trevor; J. Boyce, *k.*; A. Gore, *k.*; J. Hart; J. Markland, *w.*; T. H. Patterson; R. Westmore, *w.*; T. D. Haigh, *w.*; G. Whannell; J. G. Ogle, *w.*; S. A. Pagan, *w.*; E. Clabon; J. Lynam; J. Archbald; J. Forlong, *w.*; J. Cameron, *w.* ENSIGNS—H. Bain, *w.*; J. Alderson, *w.*; J. A. Howard, *w.*; A. Watson; C. Smith; W. Hodson; G. Blackall; G. Drury, *w.*; W. H. Grote. PAYMASTER—E. Stoddart. ADJUTANT—W. Thain, *w.* QUARTER MASTER—J. Fazakerly. SURGEON—R. Learer. ASST. SURGEONS—W. Fry; D. Finlayson.

35th *Regt. Foot* (2nd Batt.) MAJORS—C. Macalister; J. Slessor, Lt. Col. CAPTAINS—C. W. Wall; W. Rawson; H. Rutherford; T. M'Niell; R. Cameron; N. Dromgoole. LIEUTENANTS—S. S. Scarfe; J. W. Amos; J. Osbourne; T. M'Donough; R. Thobourne; W. Farrant; A. Barnwell; J. Hildebrandt; P. Murdock; J. Wilder; N. R. Tompkins; E. Shewell; W. Rainsford; G. Wilkins; J. Middleton. ENSIGNS—J. M. Bliss; W. L. Hedding; J. Hewetson; W. Macalister; J. B. Wyatt; Lord S. Ker; N. M'Donnell; R. Pottenger; A. D. Hamilton; J. Thomas. PAYMASTER—W. Bury. ADJUTANT—C. S. Brearey. QUARTER MASTER—R. Foot. SURGEON—C. S. Doyle. ASST. SURGEONS—W. Keoghoe; J. Purcell.

40th *Regt. Foot.* MAJOR—A. R. Heyland, *k.*; F. Browne. CAPTAINS—S. Stretton, Maj.;

R. Turton; C. Ellis, *w.*; J. H. Barnet, *w.*; R. Phillips; W. Fisher, *k.*; E. C. Bowen; P. Bishop; J. D. Franklyn; W. Kelly. LIEUTENANTS—J. Thoreau; M. Chadwick; R. Moore, *w.*; W. O. Sandwith; J. Butler; H. Millar; J. Richardson; J. Anthony, *w.*; C. Gorman; J. Mill, *w.*; — Glynn; W. Neilly; R. Iludson; H. Wilkinson; J. Foulkes; T. Campbell, *w.*; H. B. Wray; R. Jones; Hon. M. Browne, *w.*; D. M'Donald; F. Fort; G. Hibbert; R. Rudd. ENSIGNS—H. Hensley; J. L. Wall; W. Clerke; G. Atkinson; R. Thornhill; J. Murphy; W. J. McCarthy. PAYMASTER—F. H. Durand. ADJUTANT—W. Manning, Lieut. SURGEON—W. James. ASST. SURGEONS—W. Barry; G. Scott.

42nd Regt. Foot (R. Highlanders.) LIEUT. COLONELS—Sir Robert Macara, *k.*; R. H. Dick, *w.*; MAJOR—A. Menzies, *w.* CAPTAINS—J. Campbell, Lt. Col.; G. Davidson, Maj. *w.*; M. Macpherson, *w.*; D. M'Donald, *w.*; D. M'Intosh, *w.*; R. Boyle, *w.* LIEUTENANTS—D. Chisholm, *w.*; D. Stewart, *w.*; D. M'Kenzie, *w.*; H. A. Frazer, *w.*; J. Malcolm, *w.*; A. Dunbar, *w.*; J. Brander, *w.*; R. Gordon, *k.*; R. Stewart; J. Robertson; K. M'Dougall; D. M'Kay; A. Innes; J. Grant; J. Orr, *w.*; G. G. Munro, *w.* ENSIGNS—G. Gerard, *k.*; W. Fraser, *w.*; A. L. Fraser, *w.*; A. Brown; A. Cumming. ADJUTANT—J. Young, *w.* QUARTER MASTER—D. M'Intosh, *w.* SURGEON—S. M'Leod. ASST. SURGEONS—D. M'Pherson; J. Stewart.

44th Regt. Foot (2nd Batt.) LIEUT. COLONEL—J. M. Hamerton, *w.* MAJOR—G. O'Malley, Lt. Col. CAPTAINS—A. Brugh, *w.*; D. Power, *w.*; W. Burney, *w.*; M. Fane, *w.* LIEUTENANTS—R. Russell, *w.*; R. J. Twinberrow; R. Grier, *w.*; W. Tomkins, *k.*; W. B. Strong, *w.*; J. Campbell, *w.*; N. T. Kingsley; J. Burke, *w.*; H. Martin; W. M. Hern, *w.*; A. Reddock. ENSIGNS—Christie, *w.*; B. Whitney, *w.*; G. Dunlevie; P. Cooke, *k.*; T. M'Cann, *w.*; J. C. Webster, *w.*; A. Wilson, *w.* PAYMASTER—J. Williams. ENSIGN and ADJUTANT—T. M'Cann, *w.* QUARTER MASTER—H. Jones. SURGEON—O. Halpin. ASST. SURGEONS—J. Collins; W. Newton.

51st Foot. LIEUT. COLONEL—H. H. Mitchell, Col. MAJOR—S. Rice, Lt. Col. CAPTAINS—J. T. Keyt, Maj.; J. Campbell; W. Thwaites, Maj.; R. Storer; J. H. Phelps; James Ross; J. Ross; S. Beardsley, *w.*; E. Frederick. LIEUTENANTS—T. Brook; B. B. Hawley; F. Minebin; W. Mahon; W. H. Hare; O. Ainsworth; H. Read; F. Kennedy; J. Dyas; J. J. Flaman, *k.*; W. H. Elliott; W. D. Simpson; F. Mainwaring; C. W. Tyndall, *w.*; H. Martin; H. H. Roberts; E. Isaacson; E. J. Taylor; T. Troward; J. Lintott. ENSIGNS—G. F. B. St. John; F. Percy; W. H. Krause; R. B. Walton; W. Johnstone; A. Fraser; J. Blair; H. Lock. PAYMASTER—J. Gibbs. LIEUT. and ADJUTANT—W. Jones. QUARTER MASTER—T. Askey. SURGEON—R. Webster. ASST. SURGEONS—J. F. Clarke; P. Fitzpatrick.

52nd Foot. LIEUT. COLONEL—Sir John Colborne, K.C.B., Col. MAJOR—C. Rowan, Lt. Col., *w.* CAPTAINS—P. Campbell, Maj.; W. Chalmers, Maj.; W. Rowan, Maj. *w.*; J. F. Love, Maj. *w.*; C. Earl of March, Maj.; C. Diggle, Maj. *w.*; J. Shedden; G. Young; J. M'Nair; E. Langton; J. Cross; C. Yorke. LIEUTENANTS—C. Dawson, *w.*; M. Anderson, *w.*; C. Kenny; G. H. Love; W. Ripley; J. C. Barrett; W. H. Clerke; G. Hall; W. R. Nixon; G. Gawler; G. Whicheote; W. Ogilvy; E. R. Northey; Hon. W. Browne; E. Seoones; G. Campbell, *w.*; W. Austin; J. Snodgrass; J. S. Cargill; W. Hunter; W. C. Yonge; T. Cottingham, *w.*; C. Holman; G. Moore; E. Mitchell; C. Shawe; J. Hart; G. E. Scott; H. T. Oakes; J. R. Griffith; J. Burnett; R. Steward; G. Robson; F. W. Love. ENSIGNS—J. Jackson; T. Massie; W. Nettles, *k.*; J. Macnab; J. Montagu; J. F. May; E. Monins; W. Leeke. PAYMASTER—J. Clarke. LIEUT. and ADJUTANT—J. Winterbottom, *w.* QUARTER MASTER—B. Sweeten. SURGEON—J. B. Gibson. ASST. SURGEONS—P. Jones; W. Macartney.

54th Regt. Foot. LIEUT. COLONEL—J. Earl Waldegrave. MAJORS—Sir Neil Campbell, Col.; A. Kelly. CAPTAINS—T. C. Kirby; R. Blakeman; W. Crofton, Brig. Maj. *k.*; J. Leslie; G. J. Tappenden; G. Black, Brig. Maj.; T. Chartres. LIEUTENANTS—G. Fraser; G. Bromhead; E. A. Evanson; J. Pillon; R. Woodgate; W. Claus; R. Kelly; J. Grey; P. Mandilhon; J. H. Potts; R. Seacroft; F. Taylor; E. Mareon; J. Reid; R. Staepoole; F. Burgess; W. Pilkington; W. Persse; D. Denham; F. Hutchinson; M. S. H. Lloyd. ENSIGNS—E. Nugent; T. Fraser; C. Hill; J. Clark; C. W. Thomas; A. Mathewson; P. Clarke. PAYMASTER—H. Irwin. ADJUTANT—J. Dowdell. QUARTER MASTER—W. Coates. SURGEON—G. Redmond. ASST. SURGEONS—M. F. Finan; G. Leech.

59th Regt. Foot (2nd Batt.) LIEUT. COLONEL—H. Austen. MAJORS—F. W. Hoysted, Lt. Col.; C. Douglas. CAPTAINS—F. Fuller; J. Cockburn; A. Pilkington; J. A. Crawford; J. McGregor; J. Fawson. LIEUTENANTS—R. Preedy; W. F. Mayne; A. Dent; J. Cowper; H. Brown; A. Macpherson; E. Duncan; N. Chadwick; L. Carmichael; H. Hartford; P. O'Hara; W. Veall; W. Pittman; W. H. Hill; G. Robinson; R. Scott. ENSIGNS—A. C. Ross; H. K. Bloomfield; R. F. Hill; C. Makepeace. PAYMASTER—C. Marr. ADJUTANT—A. Campbell, Lt. QUARTER MASTER—W. Baird. SURGEON—J. Hagan. ASST. SURGEONS—P. K. Lambe; A. Calvin.

69th Regt. Foot (2nd Batt.) COLONEL—C. Morice, *k.* MAJOR—G. Muttelbury, Lt. Col. CAPTAINS—J. L. Watson, Maj. *w.*; H. Lindsay, Maj. *w.*; G. S. Cotter; C. Cuyler; B. Hobhouse, *k.*; H. W. Curzon, *k.*; R. Blackwood, *k.*; G. W. Barlow. LIEUTENANTS—W. Harrison; R. Franklyn; S. Parke; B. Pigot, *w.*; C. Busteed, *w.*; N. Ray; C. W. Ingle; J. Hill; H. Oldershaw, Adj.; C. L. Dickson; E. M. Wrightwick, *k.*; H. Anderson, *w.*; J. Stewart, *w.* ENSIGNS—E. Hodder, *w.*; W. Bartlett; C. Seward; H. D. Keith; G. S. H. Ainslie; Volunteer Clarke, *w.* PAYMASTER—P. Vyvyan. QUARTER MASTER—M. Stevens. SURGEON—C. Banks, M.D. ASST. SURGEON—J. Bartlet.

71st Light Infantry (Glasgow Highlanders.) LIEUT. COLONEL—T. Reynell, Col. *w.* MAJORS—A. Jones, Lt. Col. *w.*; L. Walker. CAPTAINS—S. Reed; J. T. Pidgeon; A. Armstrong; D. Campbell, *w.*; E. L'Estrange, Maj. *k.*; W. A. Grant, *w.*; J. Henderson, *w.*; A. J. McIntyre; C. Johnstone, Maj. *w.*; A. Grant. LIEUTENANTS—J. Baraillier, *w.*; L. Richards; J. R. Elwes, *k.*; C. Stewart; R. Baldwin; W. C. Hanson, *w.*; R. Lind, *w.*; J. Roberts, *w.*; J. Coates; J. Fraser; E. Gilborne; J. Whitney; W. Long; R. Lawe, *w.*; C. T. Cox; C. Lewin, *w.*; W. Woolcombe; W. Torriano; G. W. Horton; J. Coote, *w.*; C. Moorhead; D. Soutar; H. Mamro; N. Campbell. ENSIGNS—A. Moffit; W. Smith; H. W. Thompson; J. Todd, *k.*; J. Barnett; A. M. Henderson; J. Spalding; J. Impett; A. L'Estrange. PAYMASTER—H. Mackenzie. ADJUTANT—W. Anderson, Lieut. *w.* QUARTER MASTER—W. Gavin. SURGEON—A. Stewart. ASST. SURGEONS—J. Winter-scale; L. Hill.

73rd Regt. Foot (2nd Batt.) COLONEL—G. Harris, *w.* MAJOR—A. J. Maclean, *w.* CAPTAINS—H. Coane, *w.*; A. Robertson, *k.*; W. Wharton, *w.*; J. M. Kennedy, *k.*; J. Garland, *w.* LIEUTENANTS—R. Leyne; J. W. H. Strachan, *k.*; J. R. McConnell, *w.*; M. Hollis, *k.*; J. Acres, *w.*; J. Dowling; T. Reynolds, *w.*; D. Browne, *w.*; J. Y. Lloyd, *w.*; R. Stewart. ENSIGNS—R. G. Hesilrige, *w.*; W. MacBean, *w.*; T. Deacon, *w.*; C. B. Eastwood, *w.*; G. D. Bridge, *w.*; G. Hughes; W. S. Lowe, *k.*; A. Blennerhasset; C. Page, *k.* ADJUTANT—J. Hay, *w.* PAYMASTER—J. Williams. SURGEON—D. M'Dearmid. ASST. SURGEONS—J. Riach; F. B. White.

79th Regt. Foot (Cameron Highlanders.) LIEUT. COLONEL—Neil Douglas, *w.* MAJORS—A. Brown, Lt. Col. *w.*; D. Cameron, Lt. Col. *w.* CAPTAINS—T. Mylne, Maj. *w.*; P. Innes; R. Mackay, *k.*; J. Campbell, *w.*; N. Campbell, *w.*; W. Marshall, *w.*; M. Fraser, *w.*; — M'Kay, *k.*; W. Bruce, *w.*; J. Sinclair, *w.* LIEUTENANTS—A. Cameron, *w.*; D. Cameron, *w.*; T. Brown, *w.*; W. Maddocks, *w.*; W. Leaper, *w.*; J. Fraser, *w.*; D. M'Pherson, *k.*; D. M'Phee, *w.*; F. Robertson; E. Cameron, *w.*; A. Forbes, *w.*; C. M'Arthur, *w.*; K. J. Leslie; J. Powling, *w.*; J. Cameron; E. Kennedy, *k.*; W. A. Riach, *w.*; J. Thompson; G. Harrison. ENSIGNS—J. Mackenzie; J. Nash, *w.*; J. Robertson, *w.*; A. Cameron; A. S. Crawford, *w.*; J. Campbell; Volunteer Cameron, *w.* ADJUTANT—J. Kynock, Lt. *k.* PAYMASTER—J. M'Arthur. QUARTER MASTER—A. Cameron. SURGEON—G. Ridesdale. ASST. SURGEONS—W. G. Burrell; D. Perston.

91st Regt. Foot. LIEUT. COLONEL—Sir W. Douglas, K.C.B., Col. CAPTAINS—J. Walsh, Maj.; T. H. Blair, Maj.; W. Stewart; A. Campbell; D. Campbell; J. C. Murdoch; A. J. Collender, Maj.; A. Campbell; R. Anderson. LIEUTENANTS—J. Campbell; J. Russell; A. Campbell; R. Stewart; A. M'Lochlan; C. Egan; A. Cathcart, *w.* (24th); J. M'Dougall; J. Hood; A. Smith; T. L. Hemmick; T. Murray; R. S. Knox; C. Stuart; J. M'Donald; E. Brown; A. Campbell; G. Scott, Adj.; W. Smith; J. Black, *w.* (24th); A. Sword. ENSIGNS—N. Lamont; W. Trimmer; J. Paton; D. Ducat; A. Smith; L. Lind. PAYMASTER—D. Campbell. ADJUTANT—G. Scott, Lt. QUARTER MASTER—J. Stewart. SURGEON—R. Douglass. ASST. SURGEONS—G. M'Lachlan; W. H. Young.

92nd Regt. Foot (Highlanders.) LIEUT. COLONEL—J. Cameron, *k.* MAJORS—J. Mitchell, Lt. Col. *w.*; D. Macdonald. CAPTAINS—G. W. Holmes, *w.*; D. Campbell, *w.*; P.

Wilkie, *w.*; W. C. Grant, *k.*; W. Little, *k.*; A. Ferrier, *w.* **LIEUTENANTS**—C. Alexander, Adj.; J. J. Chisholm, *k.*; R. Winchester, *w.*; T. Hobbs, *w.*; T. Macintosh, *w.*; D. Macdonald, *w.*; A. Will; J. K. Ross, *w.*; R. Macdonald, *w.*; T. Gordon; H. Innes, *w.*; G. Logan, *w.*; E. Campbell; R. M'Donald; J. Mackinlay, *w.*; R. Peat; G. Mackie, *k.*; A. M'Pherson, *w.*; E. Ross, *w.*; J. Hope, *w.* **ENSIGNS**—J. Branwell, *w.*; R. Logan, *w.*; J. Clarke; A. M'Donald, *w.*; A. Becher, *k.*; R. Hewitt; R. M'Pherson, *k.*; J. M. M'Pherson. **PAYMASTER**—J. Gordon. **ADJUTANT**—C. Alexander, Lt. **SURGEON**—G. Hicks. **ASST. SURGEON**—J. Stewart, *w.*

95th Regt. (Rifle Corps,—1st and 2nd Batt. and 2 Companies 3rd Batt.) **LIEUT. COLONEL**—Sir A. F. Barnard, K.C.B. **Col. w.** **MAJORS**—A. G. Norcott, Lt. Col. *w.*; G. Wilkins, Lt. Col. *w.*; J. Ross, Lt. Col. *w.*; A. Cameron, Lt. Col. *w.* **CAPTAINS**—J. Leach, Maj.; P. Glasse; G. Miller, Maj. *w.*; C. Beckwith, Maj.; J. Logan; C. G. Gray; J. Fullerton, Maj.; H. Lee; H. G. Smith, Maj.; E. Chawner, *w.*; W. Johnston, *w.*; T. M'Namara; J. G. McCulloch, *w.*; W. Eeles, Maj.; C. Eaton; C. Eeles, *k.*; F. Le Blanc; J. R. Budgen. **1ST LIEUTENANTS**—W. Humbley, *w.*; J. C. Hope; T. Cochran; J. Layton; J. Molloy, *w.*; T. Smith, Adj.; J. Cox; F. Bennett; A. Stewart; F. Dixon; W. Chapman; C. Coxon, *w.*; R. B. Freer; J. Gardiner, *w.*; D. Cameron, *w.*; J. Kincaid, Adj.; G. Simmons, *w.*; J. Stilwell, *w.*; R. Cochran, *w.*; J. A. Ridgeway, *w.*; J. Fry, *w.*; J. P. Gardner, *w.*; W. Haggup; G. Vickers; T. T. Worsley, Adj.; J. G. Fitzmaurice, *w.*; G. Drummond; E. Madden; V. Webb, *w.*; G. H. Shenley; C. C. Urquhart; J. Lynam, *w.*; O. Felix, *w.*; G. Drummond. **2ND LIEUTENANTS**—D. Macfarlane; A. Stewart; C. Rochfort; W. Wright; J. Church; R. Fowler; A. Milligan; T. B. Sheean; C. Probart; W. Shenley; R. C. Eyre, *w.*; J. P. Walsh, *w.* **PAYMASTERS**—J. Mackenzie; A. M'Donald. **ADJUTANTS**—T. Smith; J. Kincaid. **QUARTER MASTERS**—D. Ross; J. Bagshaw. **SURGEONS**—J. Burke; F. Scott. **ASST. SURGEONS**—J. Robson; R. H. Hett; J. Armstrong; T. P. M'Cabe; R. Scott.

ARTILLERY.

Staff. **COLONEL** Sir George A. Wood, Kt., Com. **LIEUT. COLONEL** Sir Augustus Frazer, K.C.B., com. British Horse Artillery. **LIEUT. COLONEL** A. Macdonald, com. under Sir Augustus Frazer. **LIEUT. COLONEL** Sir John May, K.C.B., Asst. Adj. Gen. **CAPTAIN** H. Baynes, *w.*, Brigade Major. **LIEUTENANTS**, J. Bloomfield, G. Coles, F. Wells, Staff Adjuts. to Sir George Wood. **LIEUTENANT** W. Bell, Staff Adjut. to Sir Augustus Frazer. **FIELD OFFICERS** com. two batteries of Foot Artillery attached to each division of the Army—**LIEUT. COLONELS** S. G. Adye, C. Gold, J. S. Williamson, J. Hawker. **FIELD OFFICER** com. Reserve-Artillery—**MAJOR** P. Drummond. Com. Battering Train—**LIEUT. COLONEL** Sir Alexander Dickson, K.C.B.

Troops of British Horse Artillery. 1. **MAJOR** R. Bull, *w.*; **CAPTAINS**, R. M. Cairnes, Maj. *k.*, M. Louis; **LIEUTENANTS**, W. Smith, *w.*, J. Townsend. (Heavy 5½ in. Howitzers.) 2. **LIEUT. COLONEL** Webber Smith; **CAPTAINS**, E. Y. Walcott, D. Crawford, *w.*; **LIEUTENANTS**, D. J. Edwards, H. Foster, *w.* (Light 6-pounders.) 3. **LIEUT. COLONEL** Sir Robert Gardiner, K.C.B.; **CAPTAINS**, T. Dyneley, Maj., R. Harding; **LIEUTENANTS**, W. Swabey, W. B. Ingleby. (Light 6-pounders.) 4. **CAPTAIN** E. C. Whinyates, Maj. *w.*; **CAPTAINS**, C. C. Dansey, *w.*, A. Wright; **LIEUTENANTS**, T. Strangways, *w.*, A. Ward, R. H. Ord. (Light 6-pounders and Rockets.) 5. **CAPTAIN** A. C. Mercer; **CAPTAIN** R. Newland; **LIEUTENANTS**, H. M. Leathers, J. Hincks, J. Breton. (9-pounders.) 6. **CAPTAIN** W. N. Ramsay, Maj., *k.*; **CAPTAINS**, A. Macdonald, Maj., W. Brereton, *w.*; **LIEUTENANTS**, P. Sandilands, W. Robe, *k.* (9-pounders.)

Troops in Reserve. **LIEUT. COLONEL** Sir Hew D. Ross, K.C.B.; **CAPTAINS**, J. B. Parker, Maj. *w.*, R. Hardinge; **LIEUTENANTS**, J. Day, *w.*, F. Warde, P. V. Onslow. (9-pounders.) **CAPTAIN** G. Beane, Maj. *k.*; **CAPTAINS**, W. Webber, *w.*, J. E. Maunsell; **LIEUTENANTS**, J. R. Bruce, M. T. Cromie, *k.* (Light 6-pounders.)

Batteries of British Foot Artillery. **CAPTAIN** C. F. Sandham; **CAPTAIN** W. H. Stopford; **LIEUTENANTS**, G. Foot, G. M. Baynes, D. Jago. (9-pounders.) **CAPTAIN** S. Bolton, *k.*; **CAPTAIN** C. Napier, *w.*; **LIEUTENANTS**, G. Pringle, W. Anderson, C. Spearman, *k.*, W. Sharpin, B. Cuppige. (9-pounders.) **CAPTAIN** W. I. Lloyd, Maj. *k.*; **CAPTAIN** S. Rudyerd;

LIEUTENANTS, S. Phelps, W. Harvey, *w.* (9-pounders.) CAPTAIN J. Brome, Maj.; CAPTAIN J. J. G. Parker; LIEUTENANTS, R. J. Saunders, T. O. Cater, A. O. Molesworth. (9-pounders.) CAPTAIN G. W. Unett; CAPTAIN G. Browne; LIEUTENANTS, D. Lawson, W. Montagu, C. G. Kett.

Battery in Reserve. CAPTAIN J. Sinclair; CAPTAIN F. Macbean; LIEUTENANTS, J. A. Wilson, W. H. Poole, *w.*, R. B. Burnaby.

Subaltern Officers present but unattached. LIEUTENANTS, W. Lemoine, E. Trevor, E. W. Wood, G. S. Maule, T. Watkis, G. T. Hume.

ROYAL ENGINEERS.

LIEUT. COLONEL—J. Carmichael Smyth, com. CAPTAINS—Sir George Hoste, Bart., Maj., J. Oldfield, B. Harris, F. Stanway, A. Thomson, *w.* (26th). LIEUTENANTS—J. W. Pringle, *w.*, M. A. Waters, F. B. Head, F. Y. Gilbert, J. Sperling, A. D. White.

ROYAL STAFF CORPS.

LIEUT. COLONEL W. Nicolay, Col. CAPTAINS, T. Wright, *w.*, W. Staveley, F. Read. LIEUTENANTS, G. D. Hall, *w.*, B. Jackson, A. C. G. Brauns. ENSIGNS, T. W. Colleton, J. S. Sedley, J. Milliken.

ROYAL WAGGON TRAIN.

LIEUT. COLONEL T. Aird. CAPTAINS, T. Pardoe, B. Jackson. LIEUTENANTS, W. Aitkin, W. Smith, J. McDowall, H. O'Neill, W. Dean, R. Parkinson, C. Bott, R. Kerr. CORNETS, T. Glendening, J. Fenn. SURGEON, T. Wynne. VET. SURGEON, F. Cherry.

MEDICAL STAFF.

INSPECTOR, J. R. Grant, M.D. DEPUTY INSPECTORS, W. Taylor, J. Gunning, S. Woolriche, J. R. Hume, M.D. PHYSICIAN, G. Denecke, M.D. SURGEONS, H. G. Emery, M.D., M. A. Burmeister, R. Grant, J. Maling, J. G. Van Millingen. ASST. SURGEONS, J. Dease, W. Twining. APOTHECARY, W. Lyons.

XI.

*List of the Officers of the King's German Legion, Killed, Wounded, and Missing, in the Actions on the 16th, 17th, and 18th of June, 1815.**

KILLED.

Staff. Captain C. von Bobers, Brigade Major. (Attached to 7th brigade of cavalry.) *Artillery.* 1st Lieutenant C. von Schultzen. (Attached to 1st battery of Hanoverian Artillery.)

1st Dragoons. Captain F. Peters. Lieutenants, F. C. von Levetzow, O. Kuhlmann.

* From a Return compiled by Major L. Benne, K.H., of the Hanoverian Staff.

2nd Dragoons. Captain F. von Bülow. Cornet H. Drangmelster.
3rd Hussars. Lieut. Colonel F. L. Meyer. Captains, A. von Kerssenbruch, G. Janssen. Lieutenant H. Brüggemann. Cornet W. Deichmann.
1st Light Battalion. Captains, P. Holtzermann, H. von Marschalk, A. A. von Goeben. Lieutenant A. Albert.
2nd Light Battalion. Major A. Büsewiel. Captains, F. M. W. Schaumann, H. Wiegmann, (acting Brigade Major to 1st Infantry-Brigade, K.G.L.) Ensign F. von Robertson.
1st Line Battalion. Captains, C. von Holle, A. von Saffe. Ensign H. von Lücken.
2nd Line Battalion. Lieut. Colonel J. C. von Schröder. Captain G. Tilee.
3rd Line Battalion. Captain F. Didd. Lieutenants, F. von Jeinsen, F. Leschen.
4th Line Battalion. Colonel G. C. A. du Plat, (commanding 1st infantry-brigade, K.G.L.) Majors, G. C. Chüden, G. Lewis Leue. Captain G. Heise. Ensign E. T. von Cronhelm.
5th Line Battalion. Colonel C. von Ompteda, (commanding 2nd infantry-brigade, K.G.L.) Captain E. C. C. von Wurmb. Lieutenant J. L. Schuck.
8th Line Battalion. Captains, A. W. von Voigt, T. von Westernhagen. Lieutenant W. von Marenholtz.

WOUNDED.

Staff. Brigade Majors, Captain G. von Einem, (attached to 2nd infantry-brigade, K.G.L.) Captain M. von Cloudt, (attached to 3rd cavalry-brigade.)
Artillery. Major A. Sympher. 2nd Captains, W. Braun, F. Erythropel. 1st Lieutenants, W. von Goeben, H. Hartmann. 2nd Lieutenant L. Heise.
1st Dragoons. M. General Sir William von Dörnberg. Lieut. Colonel J. von Bülow. Major A. von Reizenstein. Captains, P. von Sichert, G. von Hattorf, B. von Bothmer. Lieutenants, W. Mackenzie, W. Fricke, O. von Hammerstein, H. Bosse. Cornets, S. H. Nanne, E. Trittau.
2nd Dragoons. Lieut. Colonels, C. de Jonquières, C. von Maydell. Captains, C. T. von Harling, L. Lüderitz. Lieutenant H. H. Rittor. Cornet F. Lorentz.
1st Hussars. Lieutenant G. Baring.
3rd Hussars. Captains, Q. von Goeben, W. von Schnehen. Lieutenants, H. True, C. Oehlkers. Cornets, F. Hoyer, C. von Dassel, H. von Hodenberg.
1st Light Battalion. Major Hans von dem Bussche. Captains, F. von Gilsa, C. Wynecken. Lieutenants, A. Warendorff, C. Heise, H. Wollrabe, E. F. Koester, H. Leonhart, N. de Miniussir, E. Gibson. Ensigns, G. Best, A. A. von Gentzkow, C. Behne, A. Heise.
2nd Light Battalion. Captain E. A. Holtzermann. Lieutenants, G. Meyer, F. G. T. Kessler, O. Lindam, B. Riefkugel, M. T. H. Tobin, G. D. Græme, W. Timmann, T. Carey. Ensigns, G. Frank, A. Knop.
1st Line Battalion. Major W. von Robertson. Captain G. von Schlütter. Lieutenants, F. Schnath, A. Müller, D. von Einem, H. Wilding, jun. Ensign C. A. von der Hellen.
2nd Line Battalion. Captain F. Purgold. Lieutenants, C. von der Decken, C. Fischer, F. la Roche, A. F. Ziel.
3rd Line Battalion. Major A. Boden. Lieutenants, A. Kuckuck, H. E. Kuckuck.
4th Line Battalion. Captain W. Heydenreich. Lieutenants, C. von Both, A. von Hartwig, W. L. de la Farque, A. von Langwerth. Ensign A. Appuhn.
5th Line Battalion. Captain F. Sander. Lieutenants, C. Berger, G. Klingsöhr.
7th Line Battalion. Lieutenant G. Klingsöhr.
8th Line Battalion. Captain C. E. W. Rougemont. Lieutenants, F. Brinckmann, C. Sattler. Ensign W. von Moreau.

MISSING.

2nd Light Battalion. Captain E. A. Holtzermann. Lieutenant M. T. H. Tobin.

XII.

*List of the Officers of the Hanoverian Troops, Killed, Wounded, and Missing, in the Actions on the 16th, 17th, and 18th of June, 1815.**

KILLED.

- Cumberland Hussars.* Captain F. S. von Winterstedt.
Field Battalion Bremen. Lieut. Colonel W. L. von Langwehr.
Field Batt. Duke of York. Captain R. von Pawel; Ensign A. C. Müller.
Field Batt. Lüneburg. Captains, F. Bobart, C. T. Korfes; Ensign C. B. von Plato.
Field Batt. Grubenhagen. Lieut. Colonel F. L. A. von Wurmb.
Landwehr Batt. Bremervörde. Lieutenant C. C. Löper; Ensign T. von Holt.
Landwehr Batt. Osnabrück. Captain C. H. Quentin; Lieutenant G. F. Uffel; Ensign H. Bergtroff.
Landwehr Batt. Quackenbrück. Major C. W. von dem Bussche-Hünefeldt.
Landwehr Batt. Verden. Lieutenants, C. E. Wegener, C. E. von Hinüber.
Landwehr Batt. Osterode. Lieutenant T. Fenisch; Ensign C. A. Schanz.
Landwehr Batt. Gifhorn. Major G. von Hammerstein; Lieutenant H. C. Schmidt.

WOUNDED.

- Staff.* Colonel von Berger. Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp Hanbury.
Rifle Corps. Captain von Reden; Lieutenants, Grote, Schutze.
Field Battalion Bremen. Major Müller; Captains, Bazoldo, von Lepel; Lieutenants, von Quistorp I., von Quistorp II., Welmer; Ensigns, Briël, Meyer.
Field Batt. Verden. Major von Schkopp; Captain Jacoby; Lieutenants, Gehrhard, Brandis I., Brandis II., Selig, Suffenplan.
Field Batt. Duke of York. Major von Bülow; Lieutenants, Moll, von Mahrenholz; Ensign Rabiuss.
Field Batt. Lüneburg. Lieut. Colonel von Klencke; Lieutenants, Völger, von Plato; Ensigns, Sachse, von Weyhe.
Field Batt. Grubenhagen. Captain Bauer; Lieutenants, Westphal, Marwodel; Ensigns, von Bülow, Ernst, Stieppel.
Landwehr Batt. Bremervörde. Lieutenants, Warnecke, Meyer; Ensigns, Hotthusen, Wilken.
Landwehr Batt. Osnabrück. Major Count Münster; Captain Gotthard; Lieutenants, Winkler, Richers; Ensigns, Nickenke, Meyer.
Landwehr Batt. Salzgitter. Captain von Hammerstein; Lieutenant von Spangenberg.
Landwehr Batt. Verden. Captain von Witzendorf; Lieutenants, H. Wynecken, Hurtzig; Ensign Siegner.
Landwehr Batt. Lüneburg. Captains, von Reiche, von Kemps; Lieutenant von Dassel; Ensigns, Dormauer, Meyer.
Landwehr Batt. Osterode. Major von Reden; Captains, von Ingersleben, Papet; Lieutenants, Greve, Laubrecht.

* From a Return compiled by Major L. Benne, K.H., of the Hanoverian Staff.

Landwehr Batt. Minden. Captain von Hanstein; Lieutenants, Wrisberg, Brenning, Schwenke II.; Ensigns, Murray, Oppermann.

Landwehr Batt. Hameln. Major von Strube; Captain Blankhard; Lieutenants, Krahle, Kistner.

Landwehr Batt. Gifhorn. Captain Wiedenfeld; Lieutenant and Adj. Schwake; Ensign Brüggemann.

Landwehr Batt. Hildesheim. Major von Rheden.

Landwehr Batt. Peine. Captain von Bertrap; Ensign Köhler.

MISSING.

Field Batt. Lüneburg. Major von Dachenhausen.

Landwehr Batt. Bremerförde. Lieutenant Ehlers; Ensign Röss.

Landwehr Batt. Verden. Lieutenant von der Horst; Ensigns, Plati, Kotzebue.

XIII.

*List of Officers of the Brunswick Troops, Killed in the Action of the 16th, and 18th, of June, 1815.**

16th of June. His Serene Highness the Reigning Duke FREDERICK WILLIAM: Major von Cramm, commanding the regiment of hussars; Captain von Pawel, of the hussars: Ensign Hercher, of the first line-battalion: Major von Strombeck, commanding 2nd line-battalion: Captain von Billow, of the 2nd line battalion.

18th of June. Lieut. Colonel von Heinemann, of the Staff: Lieutenant Lambrecht, of the hussars: Lieutenant Diedrich, of the horse-artillery: Ensigns, Bruns and Sensemann, of the 2nd light battalion: Captain von Praun, of the 3rd light battalion: Ensign von Vechelde, of the 2nd line-battalion.

* From a Return furnished by Lieut. General Aug. von Herzberg, of the Brunswick service, but which does not comprise the names of the *wounded* officers.

XIV.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Dutch-Belgian Troops, on the 16th, 17th, and 18th, of June, 1815.

Divisions.	Brigades.	Regiments.	Killed.			Wounded.			Missing.			Total Under-Officers and Privates, Killed, Wounded, & Missing.
			Officers.	Under-Officers, and Privates.	Horses.	Officers.	Under-Officers, and Privates.	Horses.	Officers.	Under-Officers, and Privates.	Horses.	
2nd	1st	27th Chasseurs	1	14	..	6	172	..	2	156	..	342
		7th Regt. of the Line ..	2	18	..	4	134	..	1	82	..	234
		5th Militia	3	70	..	7	132	..	7	102	..	304
		7th do.	..	20	..	7	57	..	..	201	..	278
		8th do.	..	17	..	4	103	..	..	70	..	100
	2nd	1st Battn.	1	26	..	5	92	..	..	50	..	177
		2nd do.	1	20	..	9	86	..	..	38	..	144
		3rd do.	..	18	..	8	105	..	..	3	..	126
		1st Battn.	1	4	..	3	33	..	..	20	..	57
		2nd do.	..	6	..	4	42	..	..	52	..	100
	1st	Orange Nassau	1	14	114	6	83	..	..	14	..	111
		Artillery Train	..	8	..	3	60	..	..	..	..	68
		35th Chasseurs	..	6	..	4	24	..	..	57	..	87
		2nd Regt. of the Line ..	..	6	..	..	26	..	..	38	..	70
		4th Militia	1	4	..	..	15	..	..	22	..	41
	2nd	6th do.	..	1	..	3	24	..	..	30	..	55
		17th do.	..	1	..	3	25	..	..	50	..	76
		19th do.	..	1	..	..	10	..	..	41	..	54
		36th Chasseurs	..	3	..	..	23	..	..	56	..	80
		3rd Regt. of the Line ..	..	1	..	1	23	..	..	34	..	23
3rd	1st	12th do.	..	2	..	..	13	..	1	8	..	23
		13th do.	..	6	..	..	20	..	..	34	..	60
		3rd Militia	..	5	..	..	20	..	..	2	..	33
		10th do.	..	7	..	1	14	..	..	3	..	24
		Horse-Artillery	..	2	13	..	16	6	..	..	..	18
	2nd	Foot do.	..	..	..	..	5	..	..	10	..	13
		Train	..	3	17	..	2	..	..	12	11	17
		1st Regt. Carabiniers ..	..	12	101	9	66	..	2	13	49	91
		2nd do.	1	57	86	4	64	..	..	30	76	151
		3rd do.	..	6	39	2	29	..	..	26	43	61
	Heavy	4th Light Dragoons	4	50	71	8	135	..	1	51	233	236
		5th do.	..	10	24	2	74	..	..	71	90	155
		6th Hussars	2	10	122	6	64	..	1	131	180	205
		8th do.	1	10	79	6	145	..	..	122	189	277
		Horse-Artillery	..	8	31	..	9	..	..	4	4	21
Cavalry.	Light	Train	..	1	27	..	10	..	..	4	12	15
		General Staff	1	..	4	3	..	..	..	..	..	..
		Total	20	446	728	118	1936	6	15	1612	896	3994
	Heavy	1st Regt. Carabiniers ..	..	12	101	9	66	..	2	13	49	91
		2nd do.	1	57	86	4	64	..	..	30	76	151
		3rd do.	..	6	39	2	29	..	..	26	43	61
		4th Light Dragoons	4	50	71	8	135	..	1	51	233	236
		5th do.	..	10	24	2	74	..	..	71	90	155

XV.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Prussian Troops, at the Battle of Waterloo.

Corps.	Brigades.	Regiments.	Killed.				Wounded.				Missing.				Total Privates Killed, Wounded, and Missing.
			Officers.	Under-Officers, Drummers or Trumpeters.	Privates.	Horses.	Officers.	Under-Officers, Drummers or Trumpeters.	Privates.	Horses.	Officers.	Under-Officers, Drummers or Trumpeters.	Privates.	Horses.	
1st	1st Brigade.		1	2	28	5	7	10	1	139	2	2	109	2	276
	Reserve Cavalry				2	9	1			10	17				12
	Reserve Artillery				1	4		1		3	2				4
	1st Pomeranian Regiment		1	2	2		1	4	1	40			1	17	59
5th Brigade	25th Regiment									8					8
	5th Westphalian Landwehr				2					8					10
7th Brigade	Volunteer Light Company												7		7
	2nd Elbe Landwehr				1					4					5
2nd	21st Regiment							1		14				4	18
	23rd do.				7			5		31			1	6	46
8th Brigade	3rd Elbe Landwehr		1		20		2	1		65		4	1	45	130
	Brandenburg Hussars					3			1		3	1		7	7
Reserve Cavalry	Pomeranian do.				1	6				2	1			1	2
	6-pr. Foot Battery No. 10							1		2	1				2
Reserve Artillery	Horse Battery No. 6					4				2	2				2
	1st Silesian Regiment		3		41		10	16		195		1	2	6	242
13th Brig.	2nd Neumark Landwehr		1	2	7		2	6		97		8	1	100	204
	3rd do.		1	3	23	1	7	7	3	116		3		131	270
14th Brig.	2nd Silesian Regiment		2	4	35		13	18	4	285		2	1	86	406
	1st Pomeranian Landwehr		2	10	103	3	11	17	4	226					329
15th Brig.	2nd do.		10	1	276		15	17	3	143		2		104	523
	18th Regiment		2	6	124	2	19	43	5	528				88	740
16th Brig.	3rd Silesian Landwehr		3	5	135	3	13	43		369		3		54	558
	4th do.			5	33		5	10	2	200		1		100	333
16th Brig.	15th Regiment		2	6	1	59	4	18	49	2	509	5		25	593
	1st Silesian Landwehr		5	9	141	2	10	17	9	381		4	1	50	572
4th	2nd do.		1	4	32	1	7	11	4	170	3	27	3	278	480
	2nd Silesian Hussars			1	6	18	1	6	1	66	72	1	4	40	112
Cavalry..	West Prussian Uhlans				1	2	1	4		15	16				16
	10th Hussars				1	7		1		4	10		2	13	15
Cavalry..	8th do.			1	7	19	8	6	1	43	25			2	52
	1st Neumark Landwehr Cav.				1	5					13				1
Cavalry..	2nd do.			1	6	30	5	7		93	102		1	9	108
	1st Pomeranian do.				4					3	9				3
Cavalry..	1st Silesian do.				1	26				1	1			3	5
	2nd do.				1	26	1			14	6	1	1	2	3
Cavalry..	3rd do.			1	1	10	35	2	6	34	22			6	14
	12-pr. Batteries Nos. 3, 5, & 13				5	17		6		22	14			3	30
Artillery	6-pr. do. Nos. 2, 11, 13, 14, & 21				5	20		3		14	12			7	26
	Horse-Batteries, Nos. 1, 11, & 12				5	21	2	6		13	18				18
Artillery	General Staff		2				1								
	Total		22	75	6	1122	286	162	315	41	3869	356	39	36	3296

XVI.

*List of the Officers of the Prussian Army, Killed, Wounded, and Missing,
at the Battle of Waterloo.*

KILLED.

II. CORPS. *2nd Regt. of Infantry*—1st Lieutenant von Mirbach.

IV. CORPS. 13TH BRIGADE—*2nd Neumark Landwehr*—1st Lieutenant von Stoberts.—*3rd Neumark Landwehr*—2nd Lieutenant von Norrmann.

14TH BRIGADE. *11th Regt. of Infantry*—Major von Aulok. 2nd Lieutenant von Dewette. *1st Pomeranian Landwehr*—2nd Lieutenants, von Lindner, von Kuhfass.

15TH BRIGADE. *18th Regt. of Infantry*—2nd Lieutenants, von Schlemmer, von Wehlermann. *3rd Silesian Landwehr*—1st Lieutenants, von Treutter, von Teiminger, von Becker.

16TH BRIGADE. *15th Regt. of Infantry*—Captain von Seidlitz. 2nd Lieutenant von Quanstedt. *1st Silesian Landwehr*—Major von Seidlitz. Captains, von Wittich, von Geisler. 2nd Lieutenants, von Hildebrandt, von Briesen, von Gregor. *2nd Silesian Landwehr*—2nd Lieutenant von Zimmermann.

RESERVE-CAVALRY—Colonel and Brigadier Count von Schwerin. Lieut. Colonel and Brigadier von Watzdorf.

WOUNDED.

I. CORPS. *Brandenburg Dragoons*—Captain von Puttkammer. *Silesian Rifle Battalion*—Lieutenant von Hotten. *12th Regt. of Infantry*—Captain von Wenkster. *24th Regt. of Infantry*—Major von Lowenklau. Captain von Blankenstein. Lieutenants von Maller, von der Goltz, Lampresch.

II. CORPS. *2nd Regt. of Infantry*—2nd Lieutenant von Stempel. *3rd Elbe Landwehr*—Captain von Büllingslöwen. 2nd Lieutenant von Scholmer.

IV. CORPS—13TH BRIGADE. Colonel and Brigadier von Lettow. *10th Regt. of Infantry*—Major von Marsigli. 1st Lieutenants, von Doringkowski, von Turzilowsky, von Nordhausen. 2nd Lieutenants, von Barth, von Kretschmer, von Marguardt, von Witzleben, von Bartke. *2nd Neumark Landwehr*—Captain von Solta. 2nd Lieutenant von Liebich. *3rd Neumark Landwehr*—Major von Osten. Captain von Zamori. 2nd Lieutenants, von Münchow, von Szandahelly, von Moritz, von Alter, von Achterberg.

14TH BRIGADE. *11th Regt. of Infantry*—Captains, von Niesemauschel, von Kuensberg, von Morgenstern. 1st Lieutenant von Aulock. 2nd Lieutenants, von Biederstein, von Cirlacy, von Rahden, von Podewil, von Bentivigni, von Egloffstein, von Koepke, von Bender, von Walter. *1st Pomeranian Landwehr*—Lieut. Colonel von Brandenstein. Majors, von Nettelhorst, von Toll. Captains, von Andrees, von Spalding, von Loeper, von Wolter. 2nd Lieutenants, von Zirkel, von Nehring, von Hoepfner, von Doebeke. *2nd Pomeranian Landwehr*—Majors, von Katt, von Stojenthin. Captains, von Steinwehr, von Pauly, von Wedell. 2nd Lieutenants, von Stricker, von Preussendorf, von Barth, von Ewald, von Dolist, von Hagemann, von Schmidt, von Ludwig, von Heinze.

15TH BRIGADE. *18th Regt. of Infantry*—Captains, von Pogursch, von Gluschinsky. 1st Lieutenants, von Wedelstädt, von Bursche, von Elsner, von Kursteln, von Wallenroth, von Taubenheim. 2nd Lieutenants, von Arnim, von Bath, von Lutermann, von Alberti, von Koeppen, von Bindemann, von Wiedermouth, von Broene, le Blanc, von Schömfeldt, von Kerzieg. *3rd Silesian Landwehr*—Major von Zischwitz. Captains, von Osten, von Loepell. 1st Lieutenant von Krause. 2nd Lieutenants, von Pari, von Lützow, von Büttcher,

von Pietsch, von Schreiber, von Wende, von Platin. *4th Silesian Landwehr*—Captain von Schirche. 1st Lieutenant, von Stemler. 2nd Lieutenants, von Wagner, von Liebich, von Schedelbach.

16TH BRIGADE. *15th Regt. of Infantry*—Major von Boek, com. Captains, von Jutrzenka, von Bionstierne, von Cawizinsky. 1st Lieutenant von Redeker. 2nd Lieutenants, von Preuss (and Adjutant), von Nadler, von Mousers, von Hering, von Frohreich, von Hassenstein, von Luck, von Hülsen, von Sinel, von Lindenhöfer, von Wittke, von Pittscherini, von Helm. *1st Silesian Landwehr*—Captains, von Maistre, von Salisen, von Schrötter. 1st Lieutenants, von Herzberg, von Vogt, von Laubak. 2nd Lieutenants, von Louve, von Bemda, von Stürmer. *2nd Silesian Landwehr*—Major von Schwemmler. 2nd Lieutenants, von Richter, von Brandt, von Krickmuth, von Arnim, von Beyer, von Sack.

RESERVE-CAVALRY. *Staff*—Major von Drigalsky. *2nd Silesian Hussars*—Captain von Wander. *West Prussian Uhlans*—Lieutenant von Knobelsdorf. *8th Regt. of Hussars*—Captain von Erichson. 2nd Lieutenants, von Bauhöfen, von Möllendorf, von Plieth, von Dieringsfeldt, von Winterfeldt, von Genny. *2nd Neumark Landwehr Cavalry*—Lieut. Colonel von Hiller. Captains, von Goerz, von Preussendorf. Lieutenants, von Braun, von Oestreich. *2nd Silesian Landwehr Cavalry*—Lieutenant von Schweinitz. *3rd Silesian Landwehr Cavalry*—Captain von Altenstein. *Horse Artillery*—Captains, von Zinken, von Pfeil.

MISSING.

IV. CORPS. *1st Silesian Landwehr*—2nd Lieutenant von Sieberg. *11th Regt. of Infantry*—Captain von Riesemeuschel. 2nd Lieutenant von Bieberstein. *2nd Silesian Landwehr*—2nd Lieutenant von Koeszegy. *2nd Silesia Hussars*—N— R—.

XVII.

Proclamation of Louis XVIII. to the French People.

‘THE gates of my kingdom at last open before me. I hasten to bring back my misguided subjects to their duty, to mitigate the calamities which I had wished to prevent, and to place myself a second time between the Allies and the French armies, in the hope that the feelings of consideration of which I may be the object, may tend to their preservation.

‘This is the only way in which I have wished to take part in the war. I have not suffered any prince of my family to appear in foreign ranks, and have restrained the courage of those of my servants who had been able to range themselves around me.

‘Returned to my native country, I feel a peculiar pleasure in speaking confidence to my people. When I first re-appeared among you, I found men’s minds heated and agitated by con-

slicting passions. My views encountered difficulties and obstacles on every side. My government was liable to commit errors : perhaps it did commit them. There are times when the purest intentions are insufficient to direct, and sometimes they even mislead. Experience alone can teach ; it shall not be lost. All that can save France is my wish.

‘ My subjects have learned by cruel experience, that the principle of the legitimacy of sovereigns is one of the fundamental bases of social order ;—the only one upon which, amidst a great nation, a wise and rational liberty can be established. This doctrine has just been proclaimed as that of all Europe. I had previously consecrated it by my charter, and I will add to that charter all the guarantees which can secure the benefits of it.

‘ The unity of the ministry is the strongest that I can offer. I design that it should exist, and that the frank and firm march of my council should guarantee all interests and calm all troubles.

‘ Some persons have spoken of the restoration of tithes and feudal rights. This fable, invented by the common enemy, does not require refutation. It will not be expected that the King should stoop to refute calumnies and lies. The success of the treason has too clearly indicated their source. If the purchasers of national property have felt alarm, the charter should suffice to re-assure them. Did I not myself propose to the chambers, and cause to be executed sales of such property ? This proof of my sincerity is incontrovertible.

‘ In these latter times, my subjects of all classes have given me unequivocal proofs of their love and fidelity. I wish them to know how sensibly I feel them, and that it is from among all Frenchmen I shall delight to choose those who are to approach my person and my family. I wish to exclude from my presence none but those whose celebrity is matter of grief to France, and of horror to Europe.

‘ In the plot which they contrived, I perceive many of my subjects to have been misled, and some guilty. I promise—I who never promised in vain (as all Europe can witness)—to

pardon to misled Frenchmen all that has transpired since the day when I quitted Lille, amidst so many tears, up to the day when I re-entered Cambray, amidst so many acclamations.

‘ But the blood of my people has flowed in consequence of a treason unprecedented in the annals of the world. That treason has summoned foreigners into the heart of France. Every day reveals to me a new disaster. I owe it, therefore, to the dignity of my crown, to the interest of my people, and to the repose of Europe, to except from pardon the instigators and authors of this horrible plot. They shall be delivered over to the vindication of the laws by the two chambers, which I propose forthwith to assemble.

‘ Frenchmen ! such are the sentiments which he brings among you, whom time has not been able to change, nor calamities, fatigues, nor injustice, made to stoop. The King, whose fathers reigned for eight centuries over yours, returns to consecrate the remainder of his days in defending and consoling you.

‘ Given at Cambray, the 28th of June, 1815, and of our reign the twenty-first.

‘ LOUIS.’

THE END.

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